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Normative power Europe (NPE) reflects one of the most influential, yet controversial 
contributions to European Studies. Existing literature tends to adopt an abstract focus on 
whether the EU is or is not a normative power, based on macro-level analyses that focus 
on the outcomes of the EU’s policies with third countries. This thesis instead seeks to 
ascertain the extent to which the EU’s values are practically featuring in its external 
relations, focusing on the micro-level implementation of its normative power. This 
reflects an arena where the actual role of values in the EU’s external action can be 
ascertained and meaningful change can take place.  
To address this gap, this thesis concentrates on how individual EU officials are promoting 
or mainstreaming the EU’s values in the diverse bilateral dialogues making up the EU-
China Strategic Partnership. EU-China relations represent arguably the hardest test-case 
for the EU’s normative power, as they display the greatest tension between the EU’s 
economic interests and its values in its international relationships. While scholars 
commonly conclude that the EU’s material interests are being prioritised at the expense 
of its values, discourse analysis of transcripts from 49 interviews, principally with officials 
from the European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS), reveals 
that the weakness of the EU’s normative power is far more complex in practice.  
It is impacted by contrasting perceptions of inter-institutional responsibilities, fears of 
antagonising the Chinese side, didactic approaches to value mainstreaming by EU officials 
and a lack of understanding of China amongst them. Nevertheless, this thesis also reveals 
that the EU’s values do underpin EU-China dialogues in practice. Dialogues are framed by 
these values and officials sporadically raise them in exchanges as a result. This highlights 
the existence of the EU’s normative power with China. However, these partial 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction  
 
For decades scholars have debated the nature of the EU as an international actor due to 
its non-traditional qualities (Damro, 2012:682; Duchene, 1972:38). In contrast to historical 
conceptualisations which privileged the EU’s economic or military attributes, Ian Manners 
(2002i:235) maintained that the EU’s international identity was altogether more 
progressive and unique. For Manners (ibid.), the EU reflected a normative power, 
primarily defined by its values, which represented its most potent asset in its external 
relations.  
The concept of normative power Europe (NPE) has been very popular in academic and 
policymaking circles, with an ever-expanding body of literature and dedicated panels a 
regular fixture at European studies conferences. This attention has been catalysed by the 
EU appearing to formally present itself as a normative power: in the Lisbon Treaty (2009), 
the EU for the first time described how its values reflected the basis of its external action 
(EU, 2010i:28). 
Nevertheless, Manner’s (2002i) concept also remains highly controversial. Scholars often 
reject it based on arguments that the EU’s material interests are being prioritised in its 
international relations, following macro-level appraisals of policy outcomes (Forsberg, 
2011:1193; Sjursen, 2005:236-237). However, this archetypal manner of framing debates 
on NPE according to whether the EU is or is not a normative power arguably neglects not 
only the complex relationship between values and interests, but the nuanced dynamics 
taking place in practice. 
Instead, greater attention should be paid to the micro-level dynamics informing the 
extent to which the EU’s values are featuring in its external action, in line with the Lisbon 
Treaty. This includes the role of individual EU officials, the mechanisms framing their 
activities and the impact of their counterparts from third countries. This micro-level 
reflects an arena where the actual role of values in the EU’s external action can be 
ascertained and meaningful change can take place, beyond superficial declarations or 
grandstanding. Nevertheless, it is highly under-researched. 
This thesis addresses this gap, by focusing on how EU values feature in EU officials’ 
engagement with China. EU-China relations reflect one of the EU’s forefront bilateral 
partnerships. China represents the EU’s second biggest economic partner and the EU, 
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China’s largest (EEAS, 2016i; Panebianco, 2009:143). Trade flows exceed €1 billion per day 
and make China a crucial contributor to European economic growth and investment 
(European Commission, 2014i; Farnell and Crookes, 2016:4). 
Moreover, the EU and China represent major global political powers, bilaterally and 
multilaterally addressing major challenges like trade, terrorism and climate change (EEAS, 
2017i). With an isolationist United States under Donald Trump, they play not only an 
integral, but increasingly agenda-setting roles in multilateral forums like the World Trade 
Organisation and the United Nations, particularly its Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) (EU Council, 2018). Reflecting these attributes, the partnership is 
immense, with multilateral and bilateral cooperation at the EU-level as well as distinct 
relationships in these arenas with individual EU member states. 
Nevertheless, this extensive cooperation is largely one of necessity and mutual economic 
interest. It is highly transactional. While notable tensions impact EU-China trade relations, 
particularly surrounding China’s anti-competitive policies, the political relationship is 
beset by a fundamental disagreement over values (Farnell and Crookes, 2016:4; Maher, 
2016:962-963). This creates a significant tension between EU values and economic 
interests which is arguably unmatched in the EU’s relations with other international 
actors. Additionally, this bilateral normative conflict arguably has far-reaching, global 
implications. China’s increasing power, reflected in the scale of its Belt and Road Initiative 
(Huang, 2016:318-320), has the potential to de-facto normalise its own values, at the 
expense of the EU’s. Consequently, EU-China relations can be seen to reflect the hardest 
test-case for the EU’s normative power. 
The sheer scale of EU-China relations necessitates this thesis focusing on the area which is 
of greatest pertinence to assessing the practical implementation of the EU’s normative 
power. Arguably, the over 50 diplomatic dialogues making up the bilateral EU-China 
strategic partnership, reflect the most appropriate level of analysis (EEAS, 2017ii). These 
closed-door exchanges represent the frontlines of EU-level diplomacy with China. They 
consist of regular (typically annual) meetings between officials from each side to deepen 
cooperation and resolve challenges in each of the diverse sectors of bilateral cooperation 
(e.g. trade, energy, communications technologies) (ibid.).  
A concentration on these dialogues is justified on the following basis. Firstly, NPE 
considers the EU as an international actor distinct from its member states and these 
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dialogues reflect the principal forums of the EU-level bilateral relationship. Secondly, 
these dialogues, operationalised by the European Commission and the European External 
Action Service (EEAS), also represent the will of all EU actors involved in EU-China 
relations. Their mandates are pre-agreed by other EU institutions and the member states. 
Synchronising with NPE literature, EU-China scholars typically conclude that the EU’s 
material interests are taking precedence over its values with China based on macro-level 
appraisals of policy outcomes that neglect the micro-level dynamics (See: Balducci, 
2008:27; Fox and Godement, 2009:2; Mattlin, 2012:189). This again overlooks the 
complex relationship between values and interests, while insight into how individual EU 
officials coordinate and implement – or in official jargon mainstream - the EU’s values in 
dialogues, is absent. There is thus a parallel gap in NPE and EU-China literature, impeding 
deeper understanding of the EU’s normative power in practice. In order to address this 
gap, this thesis tackles the following research question: 
How is the EU operationalising its normative power in EU-China relations in 
practice? 
To formulate an answer, this thesis looks at the discursive practices in EU-China 
dialogues. It applies discourse analysis to EU and Chinese policy documents along with 
transcripts from 49 interviews, principally with EU officials from the European 
Commission and the EEAS operationalising EU-China dialogues. These were acquired 
using the elite interview method during 2017 in Brussels and Beijing. As minutes of EU-
China dialogues are seldom publicly available, a vast amount of novel data was gained 
through these methods. The practical implementation of the EU’s normative power was 
assessed both broadly and specifically in the context of human rights and the 
environmental dimension of sustainable development, arguably the most and least 
controversial values in EU-China relations. Through this process, the shared social 
backgrounds or discourses informing EU value mainstreaming with China were revealed. 
 
Summary of findings 
This thesis found that the EU’s normative power remains weak in EU-China dialogues. The 
systematic value mainstreaming in all dialogues, prescribed by the EU’s official discourse 
found in documents and the ideal-type of NPE, is not taking place in practice either more 
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broadly or specifically in the cases of human rights and sustainable development. This 
superficially appears to support the conclusions found in NPE and EU-China literature that 
the EU is prioritising its material interests with China, at the expense of its values. 
However, using discourse analysis, this thesis captured more nuanced factors 
underpinning these dynamics at the micro-level of EU-China dialogues, neglected by 
existing scholarship.  
First and foremost, five key discourses were identified to be shared by EU officials, which 
were invoked to justify an avoidance of systematic value mainstreaming. These discourses 
fell into two categories and were identifiable in the accounts Commission and EEAS 
officials based in Brussels and Beijing. Firstly, what this thesis refers to as organisational 
discourses highlighted that institutional dynamics and understanding of roles and 
responsibilities were invoked as rationales for individual behaviour related to value 
mainstreaming. In this fashion, discourse 1 characterised value mainstreaming as implicit 
to EU-China dialogues and therefore requiring no further action to realise, while discourse 
2 cast such activities as not applicable to individual officials’ policy sectors and instead 
representing the exclusive responsibility of designated individuals and dialogues tasked 
with values.  
The remaining three discourses surrounded China’s role as a principal impediment to EU 
value mainstreaming. Discourse 3 surrounded a concern amongst EU officials that raising 
the most controversial values in dialogues – i.e. human rights/rule of law, but not 
sustainable development – would engender obstructive responses by China and 
undermine exchanges. Discourse 4 captured how EU officials considered value 
mainstreaming to be a pointless exercise (as well as risky), due to a perception that their 
Chinese counterparts were unable to impact Chinese policy connected to controversial 
EU values.  
Lastly discourse 5 related to a perception amongst EU officials that China is not listening 
to the EU and it should be. The discourse informed a lack of reflexivity amongst EU 
officials and didactic approaches to value mainstreaming in the rare instances when it 
was taking place (particularly through the human rights dialogue). It was also revealed to 
have a deterrence effect on value mainstreaming in all other dialogues, due to a shared 




Beyond these discourses, it emerged that a significant lack of Chinese cultural and 
linguistic knowledge among EU officials may be contributing to an avoidance of 
systematic value mainstreaming in EU-China dialogues. Significantly, this thesis also 
identified and assessed existing value mainstreaming practices by EU officials. These 
activities highlighted that EU-China dialogues are underpinned by EU values and thus the 
existence of the EU’s normative power with China. This reflects a key nuance neglected by 
scholars and integral to this thesis’s original contribution. 
In this context, it emerged that values were sporadically entering dialogues, despite the 
absence of systematic mainstreaming efforts by officials, as they were pre-built into each 
policy sector. This sporadic inclusion of values appeared to often take place without the 
awareness of officials, due to a lack of purposeful actions to realise them. This 
phenomenon was captured by the concept of partial mainstreaming. The thesis also 
revealed that the EEAS was conducting ad-hoc efforts to promote value mainstreaming in 
Commission-led dialogues. However, in both cases, the analysis suggested that these 
existing mainstreaming activities were limited in scope versus the systematic actions 
prescribed by the EU’s official discourse and NPE. They were thus unable to fully realise 
the ideal-type of NPE with China and compensate for a lack of systematic value 
mainstreaming practices by officials in EU-China dialogues.  
 
Thesis structure 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 first establishes the theoretical foundation 
of this thesis, outlining the concept of NPE and unpacking the elements which theorise 
the practical implementation of the EU’s normative power. Within this context, the 
chapter establishes the project’s principal focus on the EU values of human rights and 
sustainable development, specifically the latter’s environmental dimension. This is 
justified on the basis that they reflect the most and least controversial values in the 
relationship.  
In the case of human rights, the chapter also illuminates how this thesis will extend 
analysis to rule of law. The EU considers rule of law an enabler of human rights, making it 
an important component of the value. Additionally, Chapter 2 describes this project’s 
original contribution. It displays how existing literature often approaches NPE in a fashion 
which lacks critical reflexivity, from a Eurocentric standpoint, as well as typically adopting 
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macro-level appraisals of the EU’s external action. These approaches fail to capture the 
extent to which the EU’s values are being prioritised in EU-China dialogues at the micro-
level, including the role/impact of EU officials and their Chinese counterparts. 
Building on this, Chapter 3, provides an overview of EU-China relations and the role of EU 
values therein. In this context, the imbalance between a highly developed economic 
relationship and a comparably nascent political relationship is highlighted to be largely 
derivative of a fundamental disagreement over values, especially human rights. Opposing 
interpretations of the value appear to impede the EU’s efforts to promote it in EU-China 
dialogues. Conversely, sustainable development’s comparably uncontroversial status is 
reflected in it underpinning successful environment and climate change cooperation.  
Reinforcing this project’s original contribution, Chapter 3 then describes how, while 
existing literature tends be highly critical of the EU’s value promotion with China, it 
focuses narrowly on human rights and the human rights dialogue (neglecting other 
values/dialogues). Moreover, it is highlighted that this literature overwhelmingly mirrors 
NPE scholarship in failing to capture the micro-level dynamics impacting the practical 
implementation - or mainstreaming - of the EU’s normative power in EU-China dialogues. 
Within this context, the chapter also notably emphasises the importance of incorporating 
analysis of the EU-China Legal Affairs dialogue, which has been designed to indirectly 
promote human rights (and rule of law) via judicial cooperation. This under-researched 
dialogue not only embodies the EU’s conceptual linkage between human rights and rule 
of law but presents a fascinating interinstitutional connection between EU human rights 
promotion and bilateral judicial cooperation.  
Chapter 4 describes this thesis’s research design, outlining a rigorous set of interrelated 
qualitative methods to answer the research question. These include the case study 
method as a means of justifying China as a single crucial case for assessing the practical 
implementation of the EU’s normative power; the elite interview method as the principal 
tool for data collection that facilitates interviews with EU officials and discourse analysis 
as a means of maximising the richness of these accounts. 
Chapter 5 provides an essential explanation of the practical machinations of EU-China 
dialogues and how value mainstreaming features in the interinstitutional relationship 
between the European Commission and the EEAS. It also addresses the potential impact 
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of China’s opaque institutional systems on dialogues and EU value mainstreaming 
specifically. 
Chapter 6 then begins to present this thesis’s findings. The chapter importantly first 
establishes the EU’s official discourse on value mainstreaming found in policy documents. 
This notably aligns with the ideal-type standards of NPE and existing definitions in 
academia/policymaking, providing a crucial reference point for assessing the practical 
implementation of the EU’s normative power.  
The analysis then reveals the main finding of this thesis: that systematic value 
mainstreaming in all EU-China dialogues, prescribed by the official discourse and NPE, is 
rarely taking place in practice. It then describes the five discourses justifying this, falling 
into two categories. These discourses are argued to fulfil Chinese, as opposed to EU 
interests in ensuring EU values are not being tabled in EU-China dialogues.  
The remainder of Chapter 6 focuses on the first category, the organisational discourses. 
Discourse 1 encompasses officials justifying an eschewing of value mainstreaming on the 
basis that it is implicit to their dialogues and discourse 2 reflects a perception that such 
activities are inapplicable to officials’ dialogues and the responsibility of other designated 
individuals and dialogues. The chapter also highlights how value mainstreaming is not 
being coordinated via the EU’s internal interinstitutional meeting mechanisms in Brussels 
and Beijing, an absence which seemingly connects to the discourses challenging value 
mainstreaming. 
Chapter 7 addresses the second category of discourses identified amongst EU officials, 
those surrounding China’s role as the principal impediment to EU value mainstreaming. 
The chapter first focuses on discourse 3, which legitimises the avoidance of value 
mainstreaming on the basis that raising the most controversial values in dialogues (like 
human rights) will antagonise China and compromise exchanges. This discourse even 
extends to the human rights dialogue, where, instead of deterring mainstreaming, China’s 
behaviour is considered to be the principal barrier to the EU’s efforts to promote human 
rights.  
The chapter then approaches discourse 4, which captures how EU officials eschew 
mainstreaming due to a perception that their Chinese counterparts will be unable to 
impact Chinese policy linking to controversial EU values. It emerges that the discourse 
appears to be partly based on the opacity of China’s decision-making systems and claims 
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by the Chinese side that they cannot address these areas. In this sense, discourses 3 and 4 
similarly deter value mainstreaming and can be linked to genuinely obstructive behaviour 
by the Chinese side. The chapter also argues that, as such conduct by the Chinese side is 
informed by an official party-state discourse, EU officials avoiding value mainstreaming 
out of concern over how their counterparts will respond, could be seen to reflect a de-
facto compliance with the party line and an indirect endorsement of the official Chinese 
interpretation of human rights.  
Lastly, Chapter 7 identifies and describes discourse 5, which relates to a view amongst 
officials that China is not listening to the EU and it should be. The discourse is revealed to 
be particularly nuanced and rooted in the EU’s actions. It appears to inform didactic 
mainstreaming strategies in the isolated dialogues where such activities are taking place 
and a deterrence towards value mainstreaming in all other dialogues (e.g. trade, 
environmental and judicial cooperation dialogues).  
The remaining two chapters of this thesis capture its additional findings. Chapter 8 
highlights how a lack of understanding of China amongst EU officials reflects another 
factor contributing to weak value mainstreaming and the discourses informing it, 
particularly those surrounding China’s role. This element, identifiable in interviewees’ 
accounts, is due to limited cultural and linguistic capacity on the EU side which compares 
poorly with other Western diplomatic actors of comparable calibre. However, the chapter 
also highlights significant caveats to improvements in this area, citing the role of the 
Chinese side and the personalities on each side, both of which contribute to mutual 
understanding and are out with the EU’s control. 
Chapter 9 represents the last findings chapter of this thesis, importantly identifying and 
assessing the value mainstreaming practices which are taking place in EU-China dialogues, 
irrespective of the discourses and lack of understanding described in Chapter 6-8. The 
identification of these practices significantly highlights that values do underpin EU-China 
dialogues in practice and the existence of the EU’s normative power with China.  
Firstly, the chapter introduces the concept of partial mainstreaming, which captures how 
EU values are sporadically entering dialogues, often without the awareness of officials, 
due to EU values being pre-built into policy sectors. These activities are argued to be a 
poor substitute for the absence of systematic value mainstreaming and unable to fully 
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realise the ideal-type of NPE, due to their limited scope. They fail to ensure that the value 
dimensions of dialogues are comprehensively identified and raised in every exchange. 
Thereafter the chapter describes the ad-hoc efforts by the EEAS to coordinate value 
mainstreaming across Commission-led dialogues. Again, however, these activities are 
argued to be a weak substitute for systematic value mainstreaming and unable to fully 
realise the ideal-type of NPE, considering their irregular role in interinstitutional contacts 
and low impact. The chapter closes with discussion of how logistical limitations and 
interinstitutional tensions may be contributing to a perpetuation of these sub-par 
mainstreaming practices. A final concluding chapter summarises this thesis’s key findings 




Chapter 2 - Theorising the practical implementation of the EU’s 




This chapter presents the theoretical concept of normative power Europe (NPE), which 
underpins this thesis. Firstly, the chapter introduces and unpacks NPE, justifying the 
concept’s appropriateness for theorising the research question (Sections 2.2-2.3). NPE’s 
specification of the EU’s values also makes it possible to focus on human rights and the 
environmental dimension of sustainable development, arguably the values of greatest 
pertinence to EU-China relations (See Section 2.3.2). Most significantly however, NPE 
outlines the mechanisms used by the EU to operationalise its normative power in 
practice, making it possible to theoretically capture the mainstreaming of EU values 
through EU-China dialogues (Section 2.3.3).  
Subsequently, the chapter establishes how this thesis interacts with existing literature 
and makes an original contribution, analysing key criticisms and debates of NPE relevant 
to the research question (Section 2.4). The literature review highlights that existing works 
tend to lack reflexivity about how norms are being diffused and their flow between the 
EU and third countries. Most pertinently, existing works have tended to neglect the 
nuances involved in the practical implementation of the EU’s normative power. Instead, 
scholars have tended to parsimoniously judge the EU’s status as a normative power, 
based upon the extent to which EU values are being prioritised in the EU’s external 
action, according to a macro-level analysis of EU foreign policy and its impact.  
This thesis departs from these limited approaches. It aims to capture the complexities of 
the practical implementation of the EU’s normative power, through a focus on the role of 
individual EU officials responsible for value mainstreaming in EU-China dialogues. 
Through establishing the elements of NPE necessary to theorise the research question 
and a critical analysis of existing literature, a crucial foundation is established for this 
thesis. This makes it possible to effectively design and operationalise empirical data 





2.2 Situating NPE in historical debates: a response and reappraisal of past 
literature  
 
It is important first to examine how Manners’ (2002i:235) conceptualisation of the EU as a 
normative power interacts with and builds upon historical debates surrounding Europe’s 
role and identity in world politics. In this context, NPE can be seen to reflect both a 
response to and reappraisal of past literature on the subject. Manners (2002i:235) argued 
that the changes embodied by the post-Cold War international system necessitated a 
“rethink” of historical conceptualisations theorising the ideal-type international role that 
Europe should aspire to, particularly those by Francois Duchene (1972) and Hedley Bull 
(1982). Their opposing seminal works were premised upon the Cold War international 
environment and thus argued to be outdated in their perspectives and prescriptions (Diez 
and Manners, 2007:173; Whitman, 2011:1). 
Duchene (1972:38-43) argued that Europe, reflecting systemic restraints to its 
militarisation and its “amilitary” (Diez, 2005:617) values, could become a non-military1 
civilian power (a.k.a. civilian power Europe or CPE) that shared its pacific practices to 
civilise world politics. Conversely, Bull (1982:149-151), from a rationalist IR theory 
perspective, maintained that such assertions were idealistic and based upon a 
momentary détente between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (See also: 
Niemann and Bretheron, 2013:263 Orbie, 2006:124-126; Whitman, 2011:4). For Bull 
(1982:151-156), Europe, as a collection of states rather than a unitary actor, needed to 
instead accumulate traditional military power if it was not to remain ill-equipped and 
vulnerable in world politics, as the external environment gradually returned to anarchic 
normality (See also: Manners, 2002i:236-237).2  
Manners’ (2002i:235) NPE can be seen to acknowledge elements from both key rival 
conceptualisations in its re-conceptualisation of the EU’s ideal-type contemporary 
international role as a normative power. As opposed to wholly eschewing Bull (1982) and 
Duchene’s (1972) conceptualisations, Manners (2006i:168) views the EU’s normative 
                                                          
1 Duchene (1972:38, 45) particularly emphasised Europe’s economic capacity, maintaining that it had to the 
potential to become an “imposing” economic force and “a massive market no one can ignore”. 
2 A central premise of the traditional rationalist neorealist and neoliberal paradigms is that of systemic 
anarchy. In the absence of a world government, the neo-neo paradigms assert that the international system 
is anarchic, and that states’ survival is thus dependent on vigilantly accruing power to balance against 
potentially malign state rivals (Elman and Jensen, 2013:18; Mearsheimer, 2001:18).  
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power as a superseding addition to the “pre-existing European ideal types of civilian vs 
military power” (Manners, 2006i:168; See also; Manners and Whitman, 2003:390).  
In this regard, Manners (2002i:235-239) acknowledges the EU’s uniquely “pacific” 
(Manners and Whitman, 2003:398) contemporary military role with its humanitarian 
focus and civilian/military activities. He also recognises the EU’s civilian power role, 
reflected in its unparalleled development aid, wide-ranging trade relations and penchant 
for institutionalism (Manners, 2002i:235-239; 2008ii26; Manners and Whitman, 
2003:388). However, it is crucial to highlight that Manners (2002i) does not consider this 
inter-relationship between the EU’s international roles to be entirely static, instead, being 
subject to an “ongoing process of evolution and interplay” as international events and the 
EU’s responses can “ultimately weaken or undermine the strength of one particular role” 
(Manners and Whitman, 2003:390). For example, whether the EU resorts to sanctions or 
engagement with countries like China or Iran that express different interpretations of EU 
values (ibid.).  
Relating back to the research question, NPE therefore importantly recognises that the EU 
has strong material interests which co-exist with its normative objectives. This is an 
important tension impacting the practical implementation of the EU’s normative power. 
As detailed in Section 2.4, many scholars neglect NPE’s nuanced appraisal of the interplay 
between EU interests and values, unduly and parsimoniously dismissing Manners (2002i) 
conceptualisation on the grounds that the EU’s material (typically economic) interests 
seemingly prevail in any given case.  
NPE also crucially departs from some key aspects of Duchene (1972) and Bull’s (1982) 
conceptualisations. Firstly, Manners importantly identifies and seeks to distance NPE 
from the neo-colonial dimensions of Duchene’s concept. As Manners (2006ii:184) 
articulates: 
Civilizing is far too encumbered a term to be used in any self-reflexive discussion 
of European relations with the rest of the world. 
For Manners, the terminology connects to negative “Eurocentric strategies of 
narrativizing history” (ibid.). Nonetheless, this integral departure from CPE appears to be 
frequently neglected by NPE literature (See Section 2.4). 
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Beyond this, Manners (2002i:238) also highlights that both Duchene (1972) and Bull’s 
(1982) conceptualisations embody traditional (rationalist) IR assumptions about a 
Westphalian international system which NPE aims to distance itself. In this sense, NPE 
focuses on the increased significance of norms in post-Cold War international politics as 
opposed to “direct physical power” (Manners 2002:238). It also rejects the “fixed nature 
of the nation state” (ibid.) in its characterisation of the EU as a supranational actor, 
distinct from its member states (Manners, 2006ii:184; Whitman, 2011:4). Relatedly, NPE 
seeks to deviate from the primacy of material self-interest envisioned by Duchene (1972) 
and Bull’s (1982) conceptualisations (Manners 2002i:238; Diez and Manners, 2007:179). 
The EU’s normative power displays a prioritisation of values in the EU’s external action to 
pursue a common good in line with universally agreed principles (ibid.). 
 
2.3 Theorising the practical implementation of the EU’s normative power in EU-
China dialogues 
 
Having situated NPE, the next step is to define and unpack NPE, displaying how it reflects 
the most appropriate framework for theorising the practical implementation of the EU’s 
normative power in EU-China dialogues. This includes demonstrating how it captures this 
thesis’s focus on human rights and the environmental dimension of sustainable 
development, along with the role of EU-China diplomatic dialogues as a channel for 
practically promoting EU values. 
 
2.3.1 Defining normative power Europe  
 
Manners (2002ii:32) broadly defines the EU’s normative power as the capacity to “shape 
or change what passes for normal in international relations”. Manners (2008i:46), 
attributes this substantial potency to a synchronisation between the EU’s values and the 
“universally applicable” values of the “United Nations system” (See also: Diez and 
Manners, 2007:182). Through this alignment, Manners (2008i:46; 2011:233) claims that 
the EU’s normative power crucially derives legitimacy as well as influence, while 
countering potential criticism that the EU’s dissemination of its values amounts to 
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incipient “cultural imperialism which continues the mission civilisatrice of the European 
colonial states” (Forsberg, 2011:1187).  
Additionally, Manners (2002i:253) maintains that the EU holds this unique normative 
power as a product of its normative difference from other international actors. He argues 
that the EU’s values, historically informed by a desire to avoid repeating the horrors of 
two world wars and the totalitarian governance that enabled them, are constitutionally 
bound into its hybrid intergovernmental/supranational polity, creating an actor with a 
“different [normative] basis” (ibid.) for its external action (See also: Diez, 2005:619; 
Manners and Whitman, 2003:398; Whitman, 2013:175).  
Notably, Manners (2002i:239) maintains that the EU’s normative power also displays both 
symbolic and substantive dimensions. The former relates to the EU’s capacity to 
disseminate its values passively, with other international actors observing and being 
influenced by the EU’s actions or even its mere existence (ibid.). The EU represents an 
economic and social model that others aspire to and may be willing to emulate (ibid.). 
Conversely, the substantive dimension of the EU’s normative power captures the active 
promotion of EU values, such as that through development aid, or crucially for this thesis, 
diplomatic dialogues with third countries like China (Manners, 2011:230-232; Whitman, 
2011:6).  
According to Manners (2008i:46; 2011:230; 2013:310), the EU’s activities through these 
active and passive channels should be principally justified according to its values, as 
opposed to its material interests. Moreover, they should be employed coherently and 
consistently (ibid.). Manners (2008i:58-59) also emphasises the importance of the EU 
being reflexive about how it promotes its values and its impact on external partners, 
“encouraging local ownership” of initiatives and following a utilitarian philosophy of “do 
least harm”. This consolidates NPE’s rejection of the neo-colonial trappings of Duchene’s 
(1972) conceptualisation. As Whitman (2011:8) notes: 
Universally accepted values cannot be pushed forward on third parties but must 
be acceptable to Europeans and non-Europeans alike in terms of principles, 
actions and impact. 
Reflecting these aspects, assessing the practical implementation of the EU’s normative 
power through EU-China dialogues, requires judging the extent to which the EU’s values 
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are not only featuring in exchanges in a coherent and consistent fashion, but acting as a 
superseding logic for exchanges and their themes. Similarly, the analysis needs to 
scrutinise the extent to which the EU is promoting its values in a reflexive and egalitarian 
fashion.  
Beyond this, it is significant to highlight that Manners’ (2011:227) conceptualisation has a 
normative theory component, insofar as he argues that the EU “should act to extend its 
norms into the international system [emphasis added]”; i.e. that the spread of the EU’s 
values is intrinsically a good thing (See also: Diez, 2013:205). This superficially appears to 
suggest that the EU is already meeting its ideal-type as a normative power, promoting 
scholarship which fails to problematise the EU’s normative power in practice. However, 
Diez (2013:205) argues that on closer reading, NPE can be seen to recognise that the EU’s 
“foreign policy is not consistent” and that the EU instead, should aspire to be a normative 
power.   
The conceptualisation therefore seeks to illuminate the EU’s values and aspirations to aid 
it in meeting the ideal-type envisioned by Manners (Diez, 2013:205). This importantly 
reaffirms NPE’s recognition of a nuanced relationship between the EU’s material interests 
and its values with third countries. It highlights that empirical analysis should be framed 
in terms of assessing the extent to which the EU is meeting this ideal-type in EU-China 
dialogues in practice, as opposed to making assertions about whether the EU is or is not a 
normative power. Ultimately, the above analysis displays how NPE reflects an appropriate 
conceptual framework for critically assessing the practical implementation of the EU’s 
normative power in EU-China dialogues. It specifically theorises the role of values in the 
EU’s external action. 
 
2.3.2 Establishing the fabric of the EU’s normative power: Defining the EU’s values and a 
focus on human rights and sustainable development  
 
Reinforcing the concept’s appropriateness for the research question, NPE also crucially 
articulates the EU’s values. This makes it possible to isolate and assess the practical 
promotion of individual values in EU-China dialogues. Manners (2002i:242; 2008ii:55) 
asserts that the EU has nine constitutive norms (or values) which can be explicitly 
identified in the EU’s treaties and align with those at the international level. They are 
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categorised into five core values (peace, liberty, democracy, human rights and rule of law) 
and four minor values (social progress, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and 
good governance) which are argued to be comparably more contested and recent in their 
origin (Manners, 2002i:242).  
It is important to acknowledge that the EU also adheres to and promotes other norms in 
its external relations, particularly those encompassed by the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), which contribute to its trade policy. However, NPE and by extension this thesis, 
considers the EU’s normative power to be principally reflected in the values described 
above. These are explicitly articulated as the basis of the EU’s external action in the 2009 
Lisbon Treaty (See Chapter 6.2). 
In the context of EU-China dialogues, while this thesis will address the practical 
promotion or mainstreaming of EU values holistically, it will particularly focus on the 
promotion of human rights and sustainable development, on the basis that they reflect 
arguably the most and least controversial values in the bilateral relationship (See Chapter 
3). This section will summarise these values. 
 
Human rights  
Firstly, human rights are considered integral to the EU’s normative identity. The EU 
promotes a comprehensive definition of the value, which perceives an “interdependence” 
(Manners, 2008ii:51) between individual civil and political rights and collective socio-
economic rights (See Table 2.1 below for key examples of each). Significantly, for the EU, 
human rights are perceived to be all-encompassing, being considered universal and 
indivisible from its other values, particularly rule of law and liberal democracy. These 
values are argued by Burnay et al. (2016:97) to foster an interdependent triangle with 
human rights (See also: Manners, 2008ii:51). In effect, rule of law and liberal democracy 
facilitate and protect human rights.  
While, as described in Chapter 3, liberal democracy is effectively side-lined in EU-China 
relations, this thesis’s focus on human rights will extend to the promotion (or 
mainstreaming) of rule of law, which features prominently. For the EU’s external action, 
rule of law consists of promoting legal systems where there is a separation of power 
between the government and the judiciary, the supremacy of the law over all individuals 
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and institutions (including the government), the independence of the judiciary, and the 
“transparent, efficient, and fair” (European Commission, 2018i) preparation and 
enforcement of legislation (Burnay et al., 2016:96).  
Importantly, as described in Chapter 3.6, the EU has institutionally made the linkage 
between human rights and rule of law in EU-China relations. A dialogue on judicial 
cooperation – the Legal Affairs Dialogue – displays overlapping personnel with the EU’s 
human rights infrastructure.3 Moreover, the dialogue appears to have been designed as 
an indirect channel for promoting human rights with China, under the auspices of 
technical cooperation on Chinese judicial reform (Burnay et al., 2016:101-103).4 
As “human rights are at the very heart of EU’s relations with other countries” (EU, 2015) 
and the value reflects the most controversial normative conflict in EU-China relations, this 
thesis’s focus on it is arguably justified (See also: Panebianco, 2006:130). Ultimately, 
human rights in EU-China relations represents a fertile ground for testing the EU’s 
commitment to its values in practice. If the EU is found to be prioritising this particularly 
controversial value in EU-China dialogues, it would suggest that the EU’s normative power 










                                                          
3 Interviews with an official from DG JUST on 09.02.2017 at 10.30am and diplomats from the EEAS on 





Table 2.1 Key collective socio-economic and individual civil and political rights (EHRC 2018i; 
2018ii) 
Collective socio-economic rights Individual civil and political rights 
 
• The right to work • Freedom from torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment 
• The right to fair and just conditions 
of work 
• Freedom from slavery and forced 
labour 
• The right to social security • Freedom from arbitrary arrest, 
detention and imprisonment 
• The right an adequate standard of 
living, including adequate food, 
clothing and housing 
• Freedom of movement into, within and 
out of a state 
• The right to health • The right to fair treatment by the 
judicial process 
• The right to education • The right to privacy, home and family 
life 
 • Freedom of thought, religion and 
expression 
• The right to peaceful assembly 
• Freedom of association, including 
through trade unions 
• The right to (consensual, equalitarian) 
marriage and the rights of children 
• The right to political participation 










Sustainable development principally surrounds the EU’s persistent efforts to attain a 
balance between “uninhibited economic growth and biocentric ecological crisis” 
(Manners, 2008ii:54), in the face of its pervasive difficulties in reconciling “economic and 
environmental interests” (Manners, 2006iii:37). As European Commission outlines, 
paraphrasing the Brundtland Report’s early (and oft-quoted) definition of the value (See: 
WCED, 1987:16), EU sustainable development focuses on “meeting the needs of present 
generations without jeopardizing the ability of futures generations to meet their own 
needs” (EU Commission, 2015i).  
The value has dramatically increased in significance for the EU in recent years, even since 
Manners’ later writings on NPE (See: Manners, 2008ii), evidenced by its formal 
articulation in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty; characterisation by the European Council (the 
same year) as a “fundamental objective of the European Union” (DG Environment, 2015i) 
in 2009; and the key role it occupies in the 2010 EU 2020 Strategy (See also: EU, 2010i:17; 
2010ii:8-9). 
However, it is crucial to highlight that the EU value of sustainable development has 
evolved with the UN’s 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which superseded 
the 2000 Millennium Development Goals (United Nations, 2018). The value, its scope and 
application has become multidimensional, now including social and economic 
dimensions, as well as the forefront environmental facet (EU Commission, 2016i; 2018ii). 
This nebulous use of sustainable development presents a challenge for assessing how it is 
being practically mainstreamed in EU-China dialogues, as the contemporary definition 
overlaps with the EU’s pursuit of human rights and its economic interests. 
This thesis will therefore focus on the dominant environmental dimension of sustainable 
development. This facet of the value has become prominent in the EU’s external action, 
notably underpinning high-profile international environment and climate cooperation at 
the multilateral and bilateral levels, wherein the EU is a leading proponent (EU 
Commission, 2018iii). More pertinently, as described in Chapter 3, environment and 
climate change cooperation has emerged as a forefront area of EU-China political 
relations. This arguably makes the environmental dimension of sustainable development 
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the least controversial value in the bilateral relationship. In theory, this uncontroversial 
status in EU-China relations should mean that, unlike human rights, the value is most 
likely to be mainstreamed into EU-China dialogues. It is effectively the easiest test for the 
EU’s normative power with China. 
Reflecting the above clarifications, when sustainable development is mentioned in this 
thesis, it will be with reference to the environmental dimension, unless stated otherwise. 
However, it is worth highlighting that the multidimensional nature of sustainable 
development means that the value can mean different things in different contexts. This 
thesis will remain vigilant for this during data collection and analysis.  
 
2.3.3 Defining the mechanisms used by the EU to practically implement its normative power 
through EU-China dialogues 
 
Consolidating the appropriateness of NPE as a framework for this thesis, the concept can 
also importantly theorise how the EU’s values are practically promoted through EU-China 
dialogues, the specific setting of interest for this project. Manners’ (2002i) NPE describes 
mechanisms of norm diffusion (i.e. channels) used by the EU to project both the symbolic 
(passive) and substantive (active) dimensions of its normative power towards third 
countries (Manners, 2002i:244-245; 2013i:314-319).  
Regarding the symbolic mechanisms, informational diffusion surrounds how values are 
shared through third countries observing the EU’s strategic declarations/communications 
and replicating their prescriptions, while Contagion captures how the EU unintentionally 
shares its values through third countries merely observing the EU’s behaviour and 
following its example (Manners, 2002i:244; 2013:316). With their focus on passive actions 
by the EU, these mechanisms do not capture how the EU mainstreams its values through 
EU-China dialogues, as mainstreaming implies active and purposeful action.5 
Straddling the substantive and symbolic mechanisms, Manners (2002ii:36; 2013:318) also 
describes the cultural filter, which pertains to the inter-relationship between the EU’s 
capacity to disseminate values with third countries and the capacity/receptiveness of 
their civil societies to internalise them. Again, this mechanism is not appropriate, focusing 
                                                          
5 Mainstreaming is defined in Chapter 6.2.3. 
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on the role of civil society as opposed to the official-official contacts reflected in EU-China 
dialogues.  
Concerning the substantive mechanisms, transference captures how the EU physically 
shares its values through trade or development aid which are often based on 
conditionality agreements, or through funding non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in 
third countries (Manners, 2002:245; 2013:317). This aspect is once more unable to 
capture the EU’s promotion of values through EU-China dialogues. Instead, it captures the 
role of values in EU-funded activities informed by dialogues, such as bilateral cooperation 
programmes and projects. These programmes and projects are funded through 
instruments beyond the dialogue framework, such as the Partnership Instrument and the 
EU’s Official Development Assistance (ODA), the latter of which China is no longer eligible 
for (EU Commission, 2018iv).6  
It is important to highlight that these funding activities are not predicated on value-based 
conditionality. China’s economic significance to the EU provides it with little scope to 
apply such measures with China, which are dependent on the EU having asymmetrical 
power in relationships (Mattlin, 2012:185; Panebianco, 2009:133). Lastly, Transference 
also captures the EU’s funding of civil society groups through funding such as the 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), which reflects another 
framework distinct from EU-China dialogues and thus again not applicable to this thesis 
(EU Commission, 2018v).7  
However, the remaining two substantive mechanisms effectively support the research 
question. Firstly, procedural diffusion directly captures value mainstreaming through EU-
China dialogues. The mechanism theorises how the EU actively disseminates its values 
through institutionalising its relationships with third countries and explicitly incorporating 
its values into associated bilateral dialogues and agreements (Manners, 2002i:244). It 
therefore alludes to purposeful and systematic actions to promote EU values through 
these frameworks. Examples include pre-accession association agreements, the European 
Neighbourhood Programme (ENP)8 and most pertinently, strategic partnerships with 
                                                          
6 From 2017, China was no longer eligible for EU ODA (Interview with a diplomat from the EEAS on 
05.10.2017 at 11.00am, in Brussels). 
7 Interview with a diplomat from the EEAS on 05.10.2017 at 11.00am, in Brussels. 
8 The ENP is an EU initiative seeking to offer countries that are not future members, neighbouring the EU, 




major (or strategically significant) powers like China, along with the dialogues 
underpinning them (Forsberg, 2011:1185; Manners and Whitman, 2013:191).9  
However, as Manners (2013:317) importantly notes, in several cases the EU’s insistence 
on a normative facet has proved “extremely controversial” in its bilateral relationships. As 
described in Chapter 3, China reflects a key example, wherein there is little agreement on 
EU values (See: Mattlin, 2012:186; Panebianco, 2009:142, 143). Ostensibly, this thesis is 
seeking to assess the EU’s normative power through procedural diffusion in practice, 
according to a) the standards of NPE and b) the EU’s official discourse on value 
mainstreaming found in policy documents, which aligns with these standards (See 
Chapter 6.2).   
In addition to procedural diffusion, NPE’s mechanism of overt diffusion also underpins an 
important element of this thesis: the distinction between value mainstreaming in practice 
by Brussels-based EU officials and those based on the ground at the EU delegation to 
China in Beijing. The mechanism theorises how the physical presence of the EU in third 
countries10 can act as a highly localised and direct means of value promotion, which can 
be distinguished from less frequent/impersonal contacts between Brussels-based officials 
and their counterparts from third countries (Forsberg, 2011:1185; Manners, 2013:318).  
This thesis’s analytical disaggregation between Brussels-based and Beijing-based officials 
is arguably significant to EU-China relations where mutual understanding is less robust 
than in other relationships, reflecting a symptom of bilateral disagreement over values 
(See Chapter 3.5). EU officials based in China may have developed more effective 
strategies for value mainstreaming, based on greater Chinese cultural and linguistic 
knowledge, than their colleagues in Brussels. Table 2.2 summarises NPE’s mechanisms of 
norm diffusion below.  
Overall, Manners’ (2002i) mechanism of procedural diffusion can be seen to theoretically 
capture the practical implementation of the EU’s normative power by EU officials 
operationalising EU-China dialogues. Building on this, the mechanism of overt diffusion 
                                                          
9 To date, the EU has Strategic Partnerships with: Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South 
Africa, South Korea and the United States (ESP, 2016i). 
10 This includes but irregular visits by senior EU officials and even EU ‘peacekeeping/peacebuilding’ missions 
on the ground (Manners, 2013:318; See also: Manners, 2002i:244; Manners and Whitman, 2013:192). 
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theorises this project’s analytical distinction between the role EU officials based in 
Brussels and Beijing operationalising EU-China dialogues. 
 
Table 2.2 Theorising the practical implementation of the EU’s normative power in EU-China 
dialogues  
 
Mechanism of norm 
diffusion in NPE 
Theorises value 
mainstreaming in 






 Captures how the EU shares its values 






Captures how the EU shares its values 
through its actions and very existence.  
The cultural filter 
(both symbolic and 
substantive) 
 
 Captures the interplay between the EU 
and third countries’ respective 
capacities to share and receive values 
at the (non-official) societal level.  
Transference 
(substantive) 
 Theorises how the EU shares values 
through transferring resources to third 
countries, i.e. conditionality for 




                X Theorises how the EU shares its values 
through institutionalised bilateral 
engagement. Principally captures how 
the EU implements (or mainstreams) 




                 X 
 
Theorises how the EU shares its values 
through its physical presence. 
Importantly distinguishes between EU 
officials based in Brussels and those in 
third countries for assessing the 












2.4 Key debates and criticisms of normative power Europe  
 
Introduction 
For this thesis to make an original research contribution and assess the practical 
implementation of the EU’s normative power with China in an effective and balanced 
manner, it is essential to not only comprehensively understand NPE, but the central 
debates surrounding it. As Manners (2006i:180) states: 
Anyone arguing that the EU does ‘good’ in the world should cause us to engage in 
socially contextual consideration and contestation of this argument. 
To this end, the following section will address the criticisms of NPE which are of greatest 
relevance to this thesis, namely; 1) the lack of critical reflexivity amongst many 
proponents; 2) the failure to problematise one-way norm diffusion; 3) the neglect of EU 
member states in analysis; and 4) arguments that the EU’s material interests take 
precedence in its external action.   
 
The importance of critically approaching the EU’s normative power  
Firstly, NPE literature is often criticised for its lack of critical reflexivity, which is argued to 
have negative practical implications for value mainstreaming by EU officials. In this 
context, scholars maintain that there is an identifiable “Eurocentric” (Niemann and 
Bretherton, 2013:264) inclination amongst proponents, making them “unable to 
distinguish between their own sympathies for the European project and their critical role 
as academics” (Sjursen, 2006:170; See also: Forsberg, 2011:1187; Youngs, 2004:417).  
While this bias arguably equates to poor scholarship, it also has potentially significant 
wider implications, as the ideal-type enshrined by NPE is “very similar” (Sjursen 2006:170) 
to the idealistic self-perceptions held by many EU officials, who view “Europe as a force 
for peace and well-being” (Diez, 2005:620) in world politics. Consequently, the idealised 
perspectives expressed by both NPE academics and EU practitioners can be seen to 
effectively overlap (Diez, 2005:614-615; Diez and Manners, 2007:174).  
Following this, scholars express concern that uncritical NPE scholarship may be 
encouraging, rather than challenging the self-perceptions of EU officials, risking 
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promotion of the EU’s normative power which lacks reflexivity (Aggestam, 2008:6; 
Scheipers and Sicurelli, 2007:436, 453; Sjursen, 2006:178; Whitman, 2011:8). Whitman 
(2011:8), emphasises the importance of academics viewing the EU’s claims to be 
normative critically and not being blinded by its “honourable motives”, which do not 
represent sufficient criteria for judging its “normative quality” as an actor (See also: 
Balducci, 2008:9; Niemann and Bretherton, 2013:264). In practice, Whitman (2011:8) 
elaborates, policies based on “good intentions” may be neglecting other actors “interests 
or values”.  
Responding to these arguments, Manners and Diez (2007:174) emphasise the importance 
of “reflection and reflexivity” among scholars, maintaining that such attributes are key to 
the EU aspiring to NPE’s ideal-type as opposed to “pure self-interested hegemony”. In this 
sense, adopting a critical approach to enquiry appears to be essential to not only 
conducting a balanced assessment of the practical implementation of the EU’s normative 
power with China, but ensuring that the findings aid self-reflection amongst EU officials 
and make the greatest positive impact on existing practices. 
The importance of adopting a critical approach to the EU’s normative power is further 
reinforced by scholars suggesting that existing literature may be neglecting to identify and 
challenge behaviour by EU officials operationalising the EU’s values, which could be 
interpreted as neo-colonial in nature, an aspect at odds with Manners’ (2002i) vision for 
NPE scholarship. As Bicchi (2006:287) notes, the EU displays a “deeply engrained belief 
that Europe’s history is a lesson for everybody”, which, may be manifesting in behavioural 
tendencies which are not reflexive.  
In this vein, Aggestam (2008:7) warns scholars about uncritically accepting the 
universality of the EU’s values, noting that the EU’s “impulse to draw on a distinct 
European experience to shape the world in its own image” stands at odds with its claims 
to universal (normative) legitimacy. Reflecting this, Bicchi (2006:289) urges scholars to 
carefully consider whether the EU is empowering external actors and giving them “a 
voice” in its foreign policy and the values which inform it, as opposed to asserting its 
positions while remaining inattentive to partners’ perspectives.  
To this end, this thesis will remain vigilant throughout data collection and analysis for 
evidence of approaches by EU officials to mainstreaming values in EU-China dialogues 
that lack reflexivity. Reflecting the above analysis, such conduct can be characterised by 
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instances where EU officials assert the superiority of the EU’s values and the need for 
China to comply, while dismissing any alternative Chinese perspectives. This aspect is 
arguably highly salient to EU-China relations, where the EU is promoting interpretations 
of (mutually agreed) universal values which China contests, particularly in the case of 
human rights. Moreover, China importantly has historical experience of European 
colonialism, making it very sensitive to any perceived attempts by the EU to impose its 
ideas/practices (See Chapter 3.5).   
 
Problematising norm diffusion as a one-way process 
Building on this, scholars have also criticised NPE and broader international relations 
literature for neglecting the agency of non-Western states and perpetuating the “biased 
and incomplete” (Pu, 2012:347) notion that Western powers are diffusing norms in a one-
way fashion, as opposed to a dynamic two-way process (See also, Achayra, 2004:241). Pu 
(2012:342) highlights that far from being passive receivers of the values underpinning the 
Western world order, emerging powers such as Brazil, Russia and most pertinently China, 
display not only distinct alternative interpretations of international norms, but the desire 
and capacity to diffuse them internationally and impact major global issues (See also: 
Kavalski, 2013:249).  
China reflects a particularly strong example of these attributes. At the multilateral level it 
actively challenges (with other emerging powers) Western interventionism in favour of 
unconditional state sovereignty, while it has been the standard bearer for “common but 
differentiated responsibilities” (Pu, 2012:341) for developing countries in multilateral 
climate negotiations (See Chapter 3.4). More pertinently, China’s development model 
including the values which underpin it, has emerged as a distinct and attractive 
alternative to Western models for developing countries keen to emulate China’s 
economic growth (Lanteigne, 2015:42; Pu, 2012:342-343). China has fuelled the 
international spread of its model through the exhaustive building of bilateral relations 
and vast global investments, including those encompassed by the globe-spanning Belt and 
Road Initiative (Kavalski, 2013:252; Lanteigne, 2015:46; See Chapter 3.2). Reflecting this 
capacity to diffuse norms and the ambition to do so, Kavalski (2013:255) suggests that 
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China itself reflects a normative power which offers “a viable alternative to the models 
proffered by western actors”.11  
Considering this distinct normative identity amongst emerging powers like China, Pu 
(2012:344) argues that a one-way conceptualisation of norm diffusion is outdated and 
“blinds us from understanding the complex interactions between emerging powers and 
international norms”, which are two-way in nature. In this fashion, the flow of norms 
between Western and non-Western actors is dynamic, with the latter not wholly 
accepting nor rejecting the norms of Western interlocutors, instead subjecting them to 
both resistance and “reframing” (Pu, 2012:344), the latter encompassing active efforts to 
project an alternative interpretation (ibid., p. 347; See also: Achayra, 2004:241-242). 
Consequently, in EU-China dialogues, China can be seen to reflect not only a norm-taker, 
but a norm-shaper, (Pu, 2012:357-359).12 This norm shaping notably represents a global 
discourse, shared by China, which seeks to challenge the alleged superiority of “Western 
ideas and culture” (ibid., p.357) and define what constitutes legitimate international 
norms.  
A recognition of the dynamic flow of norms in EU-China dialogues represents an 
important nuance for this thesis, which is largely neglected by NPE literature. Departing 
from NPE’s assumption that norm diffusion between the EU and China reflects a 
somewhat binary acceptance or rejection of the EU’s values in their entirety, it offers the 
analytical capacity to identify evidence of areas where the EU and China have partially 
accepted or reframed each other’s values and how this is impacting EU value 
mainstreaming. This nuance is particularly pertinent for EU-China relations wherein each 
side offers such conflicting interpretations of universal values and wholesale adoption of 
values is unlikely (See Chapter 3.5). In effect, China’s agency may represent a counterforce 
to and limitation of the EU’s normative power, engendering a stalemate where each 
side’s values can only be partially shared or enmeshed. While this thesis is focused on the 
processes rather than the outcomes of the EU’s normative power (see below), it will 
                                                          
11 Kavalski (2013:248) describes how this model departs from the EU’s application of abstract values to 
every international relationship, instead being driven by “practices of interaction”, including mutual respect 
and reciprocity, tailored to each relational context (See also, ibid. p.255). 
12 Pu (2012:359) describes how emerging powers take norms as a necessity in the early stages of their 
development, while in the later stages of their development, aligning only with those which they consider 
beneficial and/or legitimate. In turn, he argues that emerging powers are actively “shaping the further 




remain vigilant for any evidence of these nuanced dynamics, that may have significant 
implications for EU value mainstreaming in practice. 
 
The neglect of the role of member states in the EU’s external action  
Another key criticism of NPE is that scholars tend to theoretically neglect the role of EU 
member states, which are argued to “exert considerable influence in the EU foreign policy 
system” (Diez, 2013:198; See also: Aggestam, 2008:4; Balducci, 2008:9). Through this 
neglect, proponents are considered to fail to capture the EU’s “internal 
complexity”(Balducci, 2010:36), uncritically considering it “a single actor” (Balducci, 
2008:9) and assuming a harmonisation of interests between its supranational and 
intergovernmental/national facets, the latter of which may have an asymmetric impact 
on foreign policy outcomes towards third countries (Aggestam 2008:4; Diez, 2013:198; 
Tocci, 2008).  
This thesis acknowledges the role of EU member states, recognising that they have their 
own bilateral relationships with China which act independently and contribute holistically 
to EU-China relations. However, it focuses specifically on the EU-level dialogues with 
China, based on the assumption that the mandates of these dialogues and the officials 
implementing them are pre-agreed by not only member states, but the European 
Parliament too via co-decision.13 Having made this assumption, EU-China dialogues are 
arguably the most appropriate setting for assessing the practical implementation of the 
EU’s normative power. This is similarly justified by NPE conceptualising the EU as 
supranational actor, distinct from its member states, and these exchanges reflecting the 
primary official-official contact point of EU-China relations. 
 
Core criticisms surrounding prioritisation of EU material interests in the EU’s external action 
Departing from the above debates, it is crucial to address the most vocal criticisms of 
NPE. These surround assertions that the EU’s material interests take precedence over its 
values in practice; an area branded by Diez (2013:201) as the “main empirical evidence 
                                                          
13 The principle of co-decision is central to the EU’s decision-making. As the EU Commission (2012i) notes, 
“it is based on the principle of parity and means that neither institution (European Parliament or Council) 
may adopt legislation without the other's assent”. 
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against the EU as a normative power”. It is upon this basis that existing literature often 
parsimoniously concludes that the EU is not a normative power, based on macro-level 
analysis focusing on the outcomes of the EU’s external action.  
Scholars highlight an inconsistency between how the EU promotes its values with third 
countries, despite a “comprehensive approach”14 (Panebianco, 2009:133) which has been 
designed to intensify the role of EU values in all aspects of the EU’s external action. In this 
vein, normative conditionality is observed to be strictly enforced in the case of 
prospective member states (as a prerequisite for membership) and less powerful third 
countries dependent on development aid, wherein formal measures (i.e. joint 
actions/common positions) are often instigated if these actors contravene EU values, 
particularly human rights and democracy (Mattlin, 2012:184).  
Conversely, scholars observe that in the case of major powers like China, where the EU 
has strong economic interests yet profound disagreements over values, the enforcement 
of EU values is far weaker in practice (Panebianco, 2009:131). Formal measures are 
observed to be eschewed in favour of softer “discursive” (ibid.) approaches in the form of 
non-binding statements or merely raising grievances in bilateral dialogues. However, 
existing literature does concede that this inconsistency derives not only from selective 
enforcement on the basis of material interests, but the EU lacking effective leverage (i.e. 
membership or aid) to employ conditionality in these more egalitarian power relations 
(Crookes, 2014:647; Panebianco, 2009:131; Schimmelfennig, 2009:19-21).   
Criticisms along these lines arguably also notably underpin what can be described as 
counter-conceptualisations to NPE. These assert that the EU should be defined according 
its material power, typically based upon observations of how the EU applies its significant 
economic power. In this context, Zimmerman (2007:813-818), argues from a rationalist 
perspective that the EU prioritises its self-interest, as opposed to its normative aspirations 
and thus reflects a realist power. Similarly, Damro’s (2012i:683-689) market power Europe 
conceptualisation builds upon Manners’ work in arguing that the EU’s economic power, 
as opposed to its normative power, reflects its prevailing international identity, due to the 
EU’s historical economic focus and significant institutional expertise in this area. For 
                                                          
14 This comprehensive approach is based upon the premise that between partners’ economic 
growth/security is linked to their adherence to the (universal) norms propagated by the EU (Mattlin, 
2012:181; Panebianco, 2009:133). 
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Damro (2012i:683, 697) the EU’s economic power reflects the principal vehicle for 
meeting EU interests, including those connected to EU values.  
 
Analytical challenges in distinguishing between EU values and interests 
However, it is crucial to highlight that scholars propagating these criticisms of the EU’s 
normative power, often neglect the complex relationship between the implementation of 
the EU’s values and its interests. In this fashion, they may be prematurely writing off the 
EU’s normative power.  
As Aggestam (2008:8) highlights, it is important for scholars to recognise that values and 
interests are often “intertwined” in practice and that the EU, “like any other international 
actor, has mixed motives” (See also: Diez, 2005:625; 2013:201). For Youngs (2004:421), 
this practical overlap has been exacerbated by the EU’s aforementioned comprehensive 
approach to its bilateral relations. Notably, the EU itself explicitly acknowledges this 
overlap in its 2016 Global Strategy describing how: 
Our interests and values go hand in hand. We have an interest in promoting our 
values in the world. At the same time, our fundamental values are embedded in 
our interests. Peace and security, prosperity, democracy and a rules-based global 
order are the vital interests underpinning our external action. (EU, 2016i:13) 
Reflecting this complex interrelationship, scholars emphasise the analytical and 
methodological challenges inherent in disaggregating EU values and interests. As Diez 
(2013:197) notes, it is “very difficult” in practice to “differentiate between foreign policy 
that is motivated by norms and foreign policy that is motivated by interests”. 
This observation is not new, being reminiscent of Goldstein and Keohane’s (1993:3-30) 
seminal work where they rigorously problematize the distinction between ideational 
forces (i.e. values) and interests in practice. They emphasise how the lack of 
phenomenological separation between values and interests facilitates profound 
methodological challenges for scholars studying foreign policy outcomes (ibid.). The 
scholars highlight the complications associated with isolating individual ideational stimuli 
when actors are exposed to many international sources, as well as the difficulties in 
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distinguishing between individual policymaker’s subjective beliefs and truly 
institutionalised normative influences (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993:26-30) 
Building on this, Diez (2013:201) highlights the broader difficulties present in 
distinguishing between policy outcomes informed by values and those based on interests. 
Citing the example of Western engagement with authoritarian regimes (like China), which 
are “less easy to judge” than commonly professed, he highlights how Western actors i) 
pursuing engagement or ii) severing ties/implementing sanctions, could both be 
legitimately considered strategies of promoting Western values. Reflecting this, Diez 
(2013:201) argues that criticisms that the EU prioritises its material interests over its 
values with third countries should be downplayed, casting such assertions as 
“problematic” and “impossible to prove”. For Diez (2013:201), often “the normative 
argument can explain behaviour as much as an interest-based argument” (See also: Diez, 
2005:625). 
This thesis acknowledges the profound difficulties in assessing the outcomes of the EU’s 
external action with third countries like China, based on whether they reflect a 
prioritisation of EU values or interests. To mitigate these analytical challenges and pursue 
an original contribution, this project instead focuses on the extent to which EU values are 
being practically operationalised by individual EU officials in EU-China dialogues and what 
challenges/facilitates these activities. In this sense, the emphasis is on the processes and 
dynamics at the micro-level as opposed to the outcomes of the EU’s external action at the 
macro-level, which are much harder to assess in terms of motives/objectives.  
Through this focus, it is possible to directly approach EU officials via the elite interview 
method (See Chapter 4) and ascertain the degree to which they are consciously and 
purposefully integrating values into their dialogues, in line with active practices inferred 
by NPE’s mechanism of procedural diffusion. Similarly, this micro-level approach makes it 
possible to establish how institutional mechanisms are informing officials’ value 
mainstreaming activities and the impact of the Chinese side upon them.  
Crucially, as well as mitigating the ambiguity in distinguishing between values and 
interests in the EU’s external action, which has been neglected by NPE studies to date, 
this thesis’s micro-level focus also underpins its original contribution. It offers fresh 




2.5 Chapter conclusion  
 
Through defining NPE and unpacking the elements which are most relevant to the 
research question, it has been possible to construct a theoretical framework to address 
the research question. In this respect, NPE crucially defines the EU’s values and makes it 
possible to isolate and assess the promotion of arguably the most pertinent values to EU-
China relations: human rights and the environmental dimension of sustainable 
development.  
Most significantly, NPE theorises the mechanisms used by the EU to practically 
operationalise its normative power, with procedural diffusion capturing the active and 
purposeful mainstreaming of EU values through EU-China dialogues. In addition, overt 
diffusion was revealed to theorise the important analytical distinction between EU 
officials based in Brussels and those based in Beijing. The latter individuals may have 
alternate knowledge-based approaches to value mainstreaming, due to their physical 
proximity to their counterparts. 
Building on this, the chapter addressed the key debates in the literature connected to the 
research question, situating this thesis and highlighting its original contribution. To this 
end, the literature review revealed how existing literature often fails to critically assess 
how the EU’s values are being diffused with third countries and the potential for values to 
flow in a two-way manner. This reflects a lack of reflexivity amongst scholars, with real-
world implications for EU-China relations, which this thesis seeks to rectify.  
Furthermore, the literature review highlighted how the strongest criticisms of NPE 
surrounded accusations that the EU’s material interests take precedence over its values, 
leading to scholars rejecting the EU as a normative power. However, it was revealed that 
such assertions lacked analytical nuance, being based upon macro-level analysis of the 
outcomes of the EU’s external action, which neglect the complex relationship between EU 
values and interests.  
As result, it was highlighted that this thesis was pursuing an original micro-level approach, 
emphasising processes as opposed to outcomes. This approach captures the nuances of 
the EU’s normative power through focusing on the extent to which individual EU officials 
are actively mainstreaming values into EU-China dialogues in practice, and the 
role/impact of institutional mechanisms and the Chinese side on these activities.  
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This chapter provides an overview of EU-China relations and contextualises the role of EU 
values therein. Section 3.2 summarises the contemporary bilateral relationship and its 
historical development, before Section 3.3 describes the forefront economic relationship. 
Thereafter, the chapter addresses the comparatively underdeveloped political 
relationship and its roots in a fundamental disagreement over values. Reflecting this 
thesis’s focus on the values of sustainable development and human rights, Section 3.4 
details successful EU-China environmental and climate change cooperation, and Section 
3.5 describes bilateral tensions on human rights. The final section of the chapter (3.6) 
focuses on how the EU promotes its values with China in practice. 
 
3.2 The development of EU-China relations 
 
Building relations: 1975-2003 
Contemporary EU-China relations can be traced back to 1975. Formal diplomatic ties 
were established on the cusp of Deng Xiaoping’s far-reaching economic reform 
programme, which opened China to international markets and fostered decades of high 
economic growth (Dai, 2006:5). This catalysed China’s rise to become the world’s second 
biggest economic and military power (Lanteigne, 2013:39).15  
From this point, EU-China relations rapidly developed. The core economic basis of the 
partnership was established with a trade agreement in 1985, along with early 
academic/cultural exchanges and the first of many bilateral cooperation programmes and 
projects in the policy sectors of science and agriculture (Dai, 2006:5; EEAS, 2014:1; Men, 
                                                          
15 Deng’s economic reforms sought to revive China’s undeveloped and isolated economy through the 
opening up of domestic trade and the encouragement of international investment in designated special 
economic zones (Lanteigne, 2013:40). This had a colossal impact on China’s economic growth, with Chinese 
real GDP averaging 9.3% 1980-2015 and total GDP quadrupling between 1978-2004, all of which aided 
China in facilitating immense foreign investment capacity, unrivalled foreign exchange reserves, and 




2011:544-545). 16 A European Commission delegation opened in Beijing, in 1988 (EEAS, 
2014:1). 
However, this intensification of relations was brought to a standstill by China’s crackdown 
on student protests in Tiananmen square. The (then) European Communities17 froze the 
relationship and enacted a series of sanctions, mostly notably an arms embargo, which 
remains in place (Dai, 2006:5). While this signalled the beginning of significant political 
tensions in EU-China relations, the impasse was short-lived due to China’s increasing 
economic importance, with bilateral exchanges largely returning to normal within three 
years (ibid.). The 1990s saw the political relationship expand significantly, with the 
establishment of dialogues in areas such as human rights and environmental protection, 
as well as the launch of annual bilateral summits in 1998 (Dai, 2006:5; EEAS, 2014:1; Yuan 
and Orbie, 2015:343). 
 
Deepening relations: 2003 – Present 
These attempts to “move beyond a commercial and economic relationship” (Maher, 
2016:961) towards an equally meaningful political/security facet, reached a new level 
with the creation of a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2003 (Farnell and Crookes, 
2016:3; Sachdeva, 2014:427). The Strategic Partnership is built around three pillars: 
Political Dialogue, Economic & Sectoral Dialogue and People-to-People Dialogue (from 
2012) (EEAS, 2017i). These pillars include over 50 dialogues, covering a multiplicity of 
diverse policy sectors (Crookes, 2013:648; EEAS, 2017ii; ESPO, 2013; Maher, 2016:960). 
Each pillar is topped with a high-level strategic dialogue and collectively, an annual 
summit (ibid.). The Strategic Partnership’s diverse dialogues also often inform a range of 
cooperation programmes and projects in mainland China (EEAS, 2017i). These co-funded 
and time-limited activities seek to further cooperation in specific areas and are often 
operationalised by civil society experts (EEAS, 2017i; EGP, 2014i).18 The format and typical 
outcomes of dialogues is further detailed in Chapter 5.6. 
                                                          
16 A flagship Science and technology cooperation programme was established in 1983, before the first 
bilateral cooperation project on management training rural development began the following year (EEAS, 
2014:1). The first EC-China academic/cultural exchanges also took place in the 1980s (Dai, 2006:5). 
17 The European Communities became the European Union with the 1993 Maastricht Treaty (EU, 2017iii). 
18 Phone Interview with an official from the European Commission based in Beijing on 23.06.2015 at 4.00pm 
(CST), from Bath. 
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Scholars describe how shared strategic interests principally underpinned the evolution in 
EU-China relations embodied by the 2003 Strategic Partnership (Casarini, 2006:7). In this 
fashion, there was a common desire to manage complex international issues at the 
bilateral and multilateral levels, such as climate change, terrorism and the world economy 
(Geeraerts, 2013:4-5; Maher, 2016:959; Sachdeva, 2014:427-428). They mutually 
perceived such activities as a duty for major powers (ibid.).  
Similarly, both actors promoted multipolarity and sought to counter the Bush 
Administration’s (2000-08) assertive unipolarity (Sachdeva, 2014:428). In this regard, 
China considered the EU an alternative pole to hedge against a perceived US containment 
strategy in East Asia (Casarini, 2006:13). These broad objectives are reflected in the 
foreword to the joint 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, which notes that: 
The world of today is experiencing profound and complex changes. As important 
actors in a multipolar world, the EU and China share responsibility for promoting 
peace, prosperity and sustainable development for the benefit of all. (EEAS, 
2013:2) 
Notably, the EU also hoped that facilitating closer relations with China would hasten its 
political reform, moulding it into a more dependable international partner, which 
adhered to dominant international norms and standards (Maher, 2016:961).  
However, despite these shared ambitions, scholars observe how interests between the 
two actors have diverged over time. Strategic priorities have evolved since 2003. The EU 
has been preoccupied with internal regional concerns surrounding migration and a 
resurgent Russia, in the face of an “erosion” (Farnell and Crookes, 2016:3) of its economic 
and political status (Maher, 2016:966; Yuan and Orbie, 2015:337-338). Conversely, China 
has sought to project its growing power globally to assert itself, particularly through 
countering US regional and international dominance (ibid.).  
Reflecting this, beyond successful bilateral cooperation on the Iran nuclear deal, the EU 
and China have expressed conflicting positions on high-profile international issues such as 
development aid and the crises in Ukraine and Syria, both of which have had significant 
EU security implications (EU, 2016:11; Fox and Godement, 2009:9; Maher, 2016:966, 
970). More broadly, China’s increasing power and influence has also been problematic for 
the international promotion of the EU’s values and economic standards, rhetorically cast 
as the rules-based world order on the EU side (EEAS, 2017i). These tensions are reflected 
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in the EU’s China Strategy (Elements for a new strategy on China [2016]), which describes 
how:  
The rise of China has happened with unprecedented scale and speed. Not only is 
China different internally than it was before the current leadership took over in 
2013, but China's increased weight and a renewed emphasis on "going global" 
mean that it is seeking a bigger role and exerting greater influence on an evolving 
system of global governance …The EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for 
Cooperation fulfils an important role …But the EU needs its own strategy, one 
which puts its own interests at the forefront in the new relationship; which 
promotes universal values; which …helps to define an increased role for China in 
the international system; and is based on a positive agenda of partnership coupled 
with the constructive management of differences. (EU, 2016ii) 
Two key examples particularly display how China’s interests have conflicted with the EU’s. 
Firstly, in 2011 China orchestrated the 16+1 formation (institutionalised in 2013) which 
brings together eleven EU member states (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia) and five candidate states 
(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYROM, Montenegro, and Serbia) from Central/Eastern 
Europe, plus China (CEEC, 2018; Fallon 2015:145). Although these 11 EU member states 
have been keen to take advantage of Chinese trade and investment (particularly 
concerning infrastructure) and educational/cultural exchanges, there has been concern at 
the EU-level that the formation is designed to undermine EU unity. It is often cast as a 
“divide and conquer” (Turcsányi, 2014:2) strategy by China. 
Similarly, the global scale and ambition of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has 
significant implications for the EU’s international interests, particularly in terms of 
maintaining its interpretation of economic norms and universal values. Through the BRI, 
China is recreating the ancient silk road between China and Europe (Wang, 2016:1). It is 
investing hundreds of billions of USD in infrastructure to build one sea route and three 
multi-regional land routes, which collectively encompass over 60 countries, 30% of the 
world’s GDP and 64% of its population (Du and Zhang, 2018:191; Huang, 2016:318-320; 
Wang, 2016:22-25). The EU’s most pressing concerns include the recognition of 
international labour and environment standards, the opacity of individual projects, 
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discrimination against Western companies for project procurement and the dangers of 
overburdening target states with debts (EU, 2017).  
Reflecting the above developments, scholars consider the Strategic Partnership to have 
been largely unsuccessful in its ambitions. As Farnell and Crookes (2016:4) note, it is 
“widely acknowledged (if not officially) that the results of the strategic partnership have 
been disappointing”. Fox and Godement (2009:9) pertinently highlight how the EU has 
failed in shaping China’s international actorness and its increasing assertiveness is now 
posing a challenge to the EU’s normative power (See also: Geeraerts, 2013:4, 7; Yuan and 
Orbie, 2015:337-338).  
 
3.3 EU-China economic relations 
 
Despite the conflicting strategic interests described above, the foundational economic 
component of EU-China relations and the numerous dialogues underpinning it, has 
continued to expand under the strategic partnership (See also: Geeraerts, 2013:11; 
Sachdeva, 2014:427). As Men (2011:544) notes, it reflects the “indispensable link” 
between the partners. Since China opened its economy to global markets, EU-China total 
annual trade in goods and services has grown exponentially, from €6 billion in 1980 to 
€582.7 billion in 2016 (EU Commission, 2018vi; Sachdeva, 2014:429;). This encompasses, 
€514.8 trade in goods and €69.7 in services.19 The European Commission’s latest data 
suggests that annual trade in goods alone has risen to €604.6 billion in 2018, surpassing 
the total for goods and services combined in 2016 and highlighting the substantial growth 
rates in EU-China trade flows (EU Commission, 2019i:2). These contemporary figures 
equate to over €1.5 billion in bilateral trade per day and make China the EU’s second 
biggest economic partner and the EU, China’s largest (EU Commission, 2018vi).20 
This dramatic growth of the EU-China economic relationship and its role as the nexus of 
material power between the partners, derives from mutual interests. China has 
historically perceived the EU as a vehicle for capital, technology and expertise to fuel its 
                                                          
19 The EU’s primary imports from China are “industrial and consumer goods, machinery and equipment, and 
footwear and clothing” and its key exports are “machinery and equipment, motor vehicles, aircraft, and 
chemicals” (EU Commission, 2018vi). 
20 Providing greater insight into this, China accounted for 15.4% of the EU’s total global trade in goods in 




domestic development and systemic rise, while the EU has been keen to exploit the 
colossal opportunities offered by China’s market for European businesses and more 
recently, its surplus capital for investment (Casarini, 2006:11-12; Farnell and Crookes, 
2016:4).  
In the contemporary relationship, these mutual economic interests remain constant if not 
more pressing, as both actors face common challenges (Farnell and Crookes, 2016:4). 
These include natural resource management, job creation, an “ageing labour force” (ibid.) 
and more recently, trade conflict with an increasingly protectionist United States (US) 
(CNBC, 2018).  
 
Tensions in EU-China economic relations  
However, despite its continued growth, the economic relationship is subject to notable 
tensions which significantly impact EU-China relations. These surround the EU’s 
allegations that China is pursuing anti-competitive economic policies which are resulting 
in the relationship being of greater benefit to China than the EU. Firstly, the EU actively 
imposes anti-dumping measures against Chinese goods being exported to Europe at 
below-market rates, with prominent examples including solar panels and steel (See: ECFR, 
2016i:133). These activities, which are enabled by China providing state aid to subsidise 
its businesses - particularly state owned enterprises or SOEs - have informed the EU 
refusing to recognise China as having Market Economic Status (MES) under World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) rules (Casarini, 2006:16; Farnell and Crookes, 2016:88).21 While this 
denial of status allows the EU to impose, from its perspective, necessary trade defence 
measures, China considers the issue a question of mutual respect and equality (Casarini, 
2006:16). 
Most explicitly, the imbalance in the economic relationship can be observed through a 
substantial trade deficit in goods (176.6 billion) and services (8.8 billion) and not only very 
low, but declining EU foreign direct investment (FDI), while China’s investments in Europe 
                                                          
21 This conflict came to a head in 2016/2017, with China arguing that the WTO accession clause allowing 
other members to treat it as a non-market economy when assessing dumping duties had now expired 
according to WTO rules (Euractiv, 2016i). China maintained that the EU (like the US and Japan) had to treat 
it as a market economy (ibid.). The EU responded with a change in its international trading legislation which 
allows its anti-dumping policies to continue with China, without punitively singling it out. 
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continue to rise (EU Commission, 2014i:1; 2018vi).22 This trade deficit derives from the 
significant barriers to market access faced by European businesses in China (along with 
foreign businesses more broadly). This situation contrasts dramatically with the open 
access to European markets accorded to China. Barriers include a lack of transparency 
and unpredictability in legislation, opaque property rights, weak rule of law (particularly 
surrounding intellectual property protection) and preferential treatment for Chinese 
companies (particularly SOEs) (EC, 2014i:2; ECCC, 2016:4; Farnell and Crookes, 2016:4; 
Geeraerts, 2013:12).23  
The impact of this hostile environment for European businesses is reflected in the 
European Chamber of Commerce in China’s (EUCCC) 2018 Businesses Confidence Survey. 
46% of respondents maintained that they were missing opportunities based on barriers to 
market access - 48% identified ambiguous legislation as the greatest obstacle - and half 
believed that doing business was becoming “more difficult” and “the regulatory 
environment [would] …worsen over the next five years” (EUCCC, 2018).  
China and the EU are seeking to redress these issues and effectively rebalance the 
economic relationship from China-wins to truly win-win, through the negotiation of a 
Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) (EU Commission, 2014ii). This would 
remove barriers to European investment in China, through elements such as investment 
protection,24 improved market access and rules regulating the role of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) (De Jonquieres, 2015:3; ECFR, 2015i; 2015ii:84; EU Commission, 2014ii; 
Farnell and Crookes, 2016:110-111). However, progress is proving very slow since the 
negotiations began in 2014 (EEAS, 2016iii). It has taken two years to agree on the scope of 
the agreement and as of summer 2018, the details have yet to be agreed, much to the 
frustration of the EU side (ibid.).  
                                                          
22 The European Commission notes that “Investment flows… show vast untapped potential” (EU 
Commission, 2016:1). Investments in China by European businesses are continuing to decline from already 
low levels (See: EEAS, 2016ii; ECCC:2016:4). Conversely, investment by Chinese businesses in the EU is 
increasing by as much as 44% per annum (ECCC, 2016:25). As the ECCC (2016:5) notes, this merely “serves 
to highlight the many areas where European business is prohibited, or at best restricted, from making 
similar investments in China”. 
23 The Chinese government discriminates against European businesses through industrial policies promoting 
“domestic (Chinese) champion companies…[and] protecting or nurturing strategic industries’” (Covington 
and Burling, 2014:6) as well as ‘government-backed’ research and development public procurement 
favouring tenders with indigenous intellectual property (ibid. pp. 6, 11).   
24 This surrounds the “the rules governing the ownership of foreign investments, the right to compensation 
in the event of expropriation, and the procedures for applying these rules” (Farnell and Crookes, 2016:110).    
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Scholars attribute this pace to China’s fears about the requisite economic liberalisation 
upsetting powerful vested interests associated with SOEs and unleashing destabilising 
social forces (Farnell and Crookes, 2016:112-113). At the time of writing, it remains to be 
seen whether the Trump Administration’s (2016-) protectionist tariffs against China 
(based on similar grievances to the EU) and those threatened against the EU, will catalyse 
a breakthrough in the negotiations (CNBC, 2018, EEAS, 2018i). 
 
3.4 EU-China environmental and climate change cooperation  
 
Introduction 
Contrasting with the scale and relative success of the economic relationship, EU-China 
political relations, despite spanning many policy sectors and the ambitions of the 
Strategic Partnership, remain comparatively underdeveloped (Farnell and Crookes, 
2016:4). Dialogues in key areas such as Science (where Horizon 2020 funds cutting-edge 
collaboration between EU and Chinese researchers in many areas25), communications 
technologies and connectivity (i.e. infrastructure/transport connected to BRI) take place 
at senior levels and have yielded tangible results (See: EEAS, 2017i; EU Commission, 
2018vii).  
However, it is environmental and climate change cooperation, underpinned by the EU 
value of sustainable development, that reflects a standout area of EU-China political 
relations. For clarification, environment and climate change reflect two overlapping policy 
sectors seeking to mitigate the negative effects of economic growth on the environment, 
with the former largely focusing on micro-solutions at the national level and the latter 
more concerned with macro-solutions at the multilateral level (See: EEAS, 2016i). 
Much like the economic relationship, the interconnected sectors have gained prominence 
in the political relationship due to mutual interest (Carrapatoso, 2015:18). While the EU 
has aspired to become an international leader in tackling global climate change, China, as 
one of the largest greenhouse gas emitters, has sought to mitigate the negative effects of 
its rapid economic development (De Cock, 2011:89; EEAS, 2016i; Scott, 2009:213). China 
                                                          
25 These include food; agriculture; biotechnologies; sustainable urbanisation; aviation and aeronautics 
environment and climate action; energy (non-nuclear); peaceful uses of nuclear energy; information and 
communication technologies; and space. 
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has viewed the EU as a uniquely credible partner which can offer valuable expertise, 
technologies and investment (ibid.).   
Importantly, this synthesis of interests is matched by a level of mutual political 
understanding and respect which appears absent from the remainder of the political 
relationship (Scott, 2009:212). China recognises the EU’s normative agenda and expertise, 
while the EU displays an awareness of the challenges posed by China’s ongoing 
development/reforms for the implementation of environmental policies, namely the need 
for continued economic growth (Carrapatoso, 2015:179-180). For these reasons, as noted 
in Chapter 2.3.2, the environmental dimension of sustainable development can be seen 
to reflect the least controversial value in EU-China relations.  
 
Key developments in EU-China environmental and climate change relations 
Reflecting this successful convergence between values and material interests, significant 
developments have taken place at the bilateral and multilateral levels. The establishment 
of the EU-China Partnership on Climate Change in (2005), which includes commitments to 
tackle global climate change and reduce mutual energy consumption as well as a 
sustainable development chapter in the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation 
(2013), have set the scene for productive dialogues and many bilateral cooperation 
programmes and projects in mainland China (EU Commission, 2005:1; EEAS, 2013; 2017iii; 
Farnell and Crookes, 2016:179-180).  
Additionally, cooperation on carbon emissions trading has dramatically evolved in recent 
years, under the auspices of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (EU Commission, 
2005i:4).26 EU businesses have become majority investors in the Chinese emissions 
market, while the EU facilitated China’s first nationwide emissions trading system (i.e. 
between Chinese provinces) in 2017 (De Cock, 2011:100-102; EEAS, 2016iv; EU 
Commission, 2017i). At the multilateral level, both actors have also adopted a leading role 
in international climate mitigation. They have co-represented developed and developing 
countries through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
                                                          
26 Linked to the 1992 Kyoto Protocol, the CDM ostensibly allows developed countries (in this case EU 
member states) to contribute to their own carbon emission targets by aiding developing countries (such as 
China) to reduce their emissions (De Cock, 2011:102; Scott, 2009:215, 216). 
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(UNFCCC) and have been instrumental in the historic signing of the Paris Agreement in 
2016 (ECFR, 2016:138).27  
Conversely, it is important to highlight that environment and climate cooperation is not 
tension-free. China’s reluctance to incorporate non-state actors into cooperation 
programmes and projects has frustrated the EU, while there have been concerns that free 
technology transfers to China risk undermining the EU’s leadership in environmental 
technologies, giving away valuable intellectual property to partner who can pay for it 
(Farnell and Crookes, 2016:179-181; Scott, 2009:218). This reflects an interesting conflict 
between the EU’s normative objective of climate change mitigation and its economic 
interests. 
Additionally, it is also important to highlight that, although there is normative alignment 
on the environmental dimension of sustainable development, China does not fully 
approximate it, having its own interpretation called ecological civilisation. This may allude 
to the existence of the nuanced dynamics posited in Chapter 2.4, with China potentially 
reframing and developing a distinct Chinese variation of the EU value of sustainable 
development. It also supports the notion that values are flowing two ways in EU-China 
dialogues, with ecological civilisation being, in turn, diffused with the EU. However, the 
analysis in Chapter 7.4 suggests that the EU tends to be dismissive of ecological 
civilisation and its distinctiveness from sustainable development. While the concept’s 
isolated environmental focus re-affirms the importance of disentangling the non-
controversial environmental dimension of sustainable development from its economic 
and social facets (described in Section 2.3.2), it is worth also briefly detailing how 
ecological civilisation differs in substance.  
Firstly, the concept is distinct in being framed according to specific Chinese cultural 
features. Ecological civilisation presents environmental protection as civilised behaviour, 
connecting such activities with the prevailing values in society, to which individuals are 
judged according to the socio-cultural Confucian hierarchy (described in Section 3.5).28 
Secondly, the concept differs in its tailoring to China’s domestic circumstances. To 
maintain economic growth, ecological civilisation permits the perpetuation of coal power 
                                                          
27 The historic agreement encompasses a comment from all nations to “undertake ambitious efforts to 
combat climate change and adapt to its effects” as well as keeping “global temperature rise this century 
well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels” (UNFCC, 2018). 
28 Interview with an individual working for an environmental NGO, 25.05.2017 at 4.00pm, in Beijing. 
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and increased car ownership on the basis that technology is being pursued which 
mitigates emissions (i.e. carbon capture for coal power plants) (See: UNEP, 2016). This is 
at odds with the environmental dimension of sustainable development, which seeks to 
reduce all sources of pollution.  
Overall, as Scott (2009:220) observes, both sides have dedicated significant efforts to 
make a success of environmental cooperation, viewing it as a springboard for 
strengthening other areas of the political relationship (See: Yuan and Orbie, 2015:350). 
While progress in these overlapping sectors has been partly reflective of mutual self-
interest, in the context of assessing the practical implementation of the EU’s normative 
power, this thesis is seeking to explore the normative basis of this cooperation. It aims to 
gain insights into how EU officials practically mainstream sustainable development in 
dialogues and the extent to which lessons can be learned for effectively promoting more 
controversial EU values.  
 
3.5 The EU-China value gap  
 
The comparatively underdeveloped nature of EU-China political relations versus the 
economic relationship, is largely attributable to a fundamental disagreement over values 
(Crookes, 2013:643; Maher, 2016:962). As Crookes (2013:643) notes, this has “limited and 
will continue to limit the scope and depth of any EU-China strategic relationship”. While 
the EU maintains that China should reform in line with its universal values, China rejects 
these values and their claimed universality (Maher, 2016:962-963). For China, the EU’s 
values reflect exclusively Western constructs (ibid.).  
Within this context, although the EU value of liberal democracy conflicts with China’s 
authoritarian political system, it is effectively so sensitive for China - considered an 
existential threat29 - that it is kept off the table by the EU (Maher, 2016:964; Mattlin, 
2012:187). Rule of law on the other hand, does feature prominently in EU-China relations, 
with alternative interpretations impacting many areas of political and economic 
cooperation (Maher, 2016:964). However, it is human rights, which encompasses and is 
enabled by rule of law, that reflects the highest profile normative conflict in the bilateral 
                                                          
29 Maher (2016:963-964) notes that leaked Chinese government memo known as ‘Document No. 9’ cited 
western constitutional democracy as one of “seven perils threating its authority”. 
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relationship and the focus of academic literature (Maher, 2016:964; Mattlin, 2012:190; 
Panebianco, 2009:140; Shen, 2013:170).  
Disagreement over human rights has increased since Xi Jinping became President in 2013, 
with China’s human rights environment widely perceived to have significantly 
deteriorated amidst a broad crackdown on political dissent (AFET, 2015:13; ECFR, 
2015ii:88; 2016i:128; Maher, 2016:964). The EU has been particularly vocal about the 
arrest/detainment/conviction of over “300 lawyers and human rights defenders” (EEAS, 
2016v; 2016vi) from mid-2015 and more recently, extra-judicial internment of Uighurs in 
Xinjiang (See: EEAS, 2018ii). EU officials and academics also express concern that China’s 
integration of big data, artificial intelligence and facial recognition, embodied by China’s 
evolving social credit system, is likely to engender worsening human rights conditions and 
thus increased bilateral conflict (See: ABC, 2018; BBC, 2018i; Business Insider, 2018; HRW 
2017i; 2017ii).30 
 
3.5.1 The EU and China’s differing interpretations of human rights 
 
The controversy over human rights derives from different interpretations of the value on 
each side (Men, 2011:549; Panebianco, 2009:143). While the EU interpretation attaches 
equal importance to collective socio-economic rights and individual civil and political 
rights, China promotes a conceptualisation of the value which privileges collective socio-
economic rights (Panebianco, 2009:143; See also: Men, 2011:536; The Epoch Times, 2015; 
Zhao, 2015:48). This understanding is underpinned by a perception that “the right to 
subsistence is the most fundamental” (Men, 2011:543) component of human rights, 
meaning that its attainment through economic development is considered a prerequisite 
to the of realisation of individual civil and political rights (Panebianco, 2009:143; See also: 
The Epoch Times, 2015; Zhao, 2015:48).31 As Li Junhua32 stated at the press conference 
following the 2015 33rd EU-China human rights dialogue: 
                                                          
30 Interviews with diplomat from the EEAS on 23.03.2017 at 11.00am, in Brussels and 23.03.2018 at 2.15pm 
in Bath.  
31 Scholars highlight how this Chinese understanding of human rights is displayed in its 1982 constitution 
and its chapter on the “fundamental rights and duties of citizens” (Men, 2011:543; See also: Zhao, 2015:40). 
32 Li Jinhua is Director-general of the Department of International Organizations and Conferences. He has 
been the Chinese co-chair for most EU-China human rights dialogues in recent years.  
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When we look at the issue of human rights, I think the European perspective and 
the Chinese perspective differ…From the EU perspective, I think the human rights 
are very much focused on the civil liberties, the right of government, but in China, 
we’re talking about the right to development and the right to survival. (The Epoch 
Times, 2015) 
This alternative interpretation of human rights has a strong historical and cultural basis, 
which challenges the argued universality of the EU position. Firstly, as Men (2011:540-
541) highlights, China has experienced over 2,000 years of authoritarian governance, 
based on value systems which differ markedly from those in European history. Imperial 
China’s main “governing ideology” (Guo, 2013:47) was Confucianism, which continues to 
strongly impact contemporary Chinese political culture.33 The school of thought casts 
social harmony as a product of maintaining a strict hierarchy where those who display the 
highest virtue, through superior education and morality, should be entrusted with 
authority (Guo, 2013:48-50).  
To realise this social harmony and collective societal good, every individual in society was 
expected to conform to their role in the hierarchy, fulfilling duties as a subject to their 
ruler, as opposed to any question of individual rights which would threaten and 
undermine the system (ibid.). As Guo (2013:53) summarises, “Confucianism is a 
collectivistic-based value system” which is “essentially hostile to individualism”. 
The other key philosophical school which influences the Chinese interpretation of human 
rights is Legalism. The pre-Confucian school of thought34 promotes highly centralised 
governance wherein an extensive bureaucracy reports to a central ruler, as well as a strict 
judicial system where any transgression leads to severe punishment. These prescriptions 
are considered an essential prerequisite for social order and state stability by Legalism 
(Guo, 2013:51-52). Like Confucianism, legalist principles emphasise the greater collective 
good of the state and de-emphasise individual rights. Moreover, they continue to impact 
contemporary Chinese governance (Guo, 2013:52), underpinning a lasting perception that 
                                                          
33 The school of thought is based on the writing/teachings of philosopher Kǒng Fūzǐ (551–479 BC), Latinised 
as Confucius (Guo, 2013:48). 
34 Legalism was the governing ideology China’s first imperial dynasty, the Qin Dynasty (221-206BC). The 
ideology emerged during the Warring states period (475–221 BC) in Chinese history, wherein its 
prescriptions helped empower the Qin state to defeat its rivals and unify China, under the leadership of Qin 
Shi Huangdi (Guo, 2013:47). 
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ultra-centralisation and strict law and order is crucial to governing a country of 1.3 billion 
people across 23 provinces.  
This precedent for an alternative interpretation of human rights is further compounded 
by China’s modern history. After the collapse of Imperial China, catalysed by the actions 
of European colonial powers,35 Chinese intellectuals perceived the independence, 
sovereignty and material prosperity of the state (i.e. the collective good) as a necessary 
precursor to the plight of individual citizens, in rejuvenating the nation (Men, 2011:540; 
Zhao, 2015:48). This sentiment was consolidated by the 1949 Chinese revolution, with the 
Marxist-Leninist ideology of the emergent People’s Republic of China prioritising 
collective socio-economic rights. 
Ultimately, China’s historical and cultural basis for human rights differs dramatically from 
the European experience of the Enlightenment, where the promotion of individualism 
evolved to foster contemporary European human rights principles (Panebianco, 
2009:143). However, it is important to highlight that this disagreement over human rights 
(and other EU values) goes beyond cultural differences. The interpretation of human 
rights expressed by the Chinese government reflects an official position established and 
enforced by party-state structures (i.e. as a party line) (See Section 5.5.2). This party-state 
discourse is heavily informed by the practical maintenance of the Communist Party’s 
totalitarian rule, with the parallel realisation of socio-economic rights and individual civil 
and political rights considered a threat to systemic stability (Panebianco, 2009:142; Men, 
2011:549).36 As Men (2011:544) notes, learning from the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
Communist Party considers political reform to be “complementary and even secondary to 
economic reform” and that “rapid political change can lead to chaos and collapse of the 
country”. 
In turn, it is important to highlight that unlike the EU’s values, which are enabled by and 
largely representative of the views held by European civil society, the official Chinese 
interpretation of human rights is not necessarily reflective of that held by Chinese civil 
                                                          
35 The ruling Qing dynasty was progressively weakened by the actions of European Colonial powers. This 
included the control of Chinese customs administration, seizure of territory and reparations levied by the 
British Empire after China’s loss of two Opium wars (1840-42 and 1857-60) (Guo, 2013:59-60). Moreover, 
Britain and other European powers extracted exclusive trading rights to parts of China following its defeat 
in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) (ibid.). 
36 There are pervasive fears that “autonomous social forces such as organised interest groups” (Panebianco, 
2009:142) could de-rail China’s national development/reforms under the stewardship of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) (Men, 2011:549). 
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society (e.g. academics, activists, NGO practitioners). In this sense, there is a distinction to 
be made between official and non-official China. As described above, challenges to the 
party-state discourse on sensitive values like human rights by civil society, are actively 
supressed - and in an increasingly assertive manner - in Xi Jinping’s China, with those 
responsible risking arrest and imprisonment.  
Reflecting the scale and depth of the conflict over human rights between the EU and 
China, the value can be considered the most controversial value in the bilateral 
relationship and thus the most challenging dimension of the EU’s normative power to 
realise in practice. For this reason, it reflects a key focus of this thesis and a counterpoint 
to the environmental dimension of sustainable development. 
 
3.6 The practical implementation of the EU’s normative power in EU-China 
relations  
 
The EU’s strategy to tackle this disagreement over values has evolved over time. While 
the EU initially adopted an assertive approach to operationalising its normative power 
with China following the Tiananmen crackdown, a constructive engagement strategy 
emerged in the mid-late 1990s (Kinzelbach and Thelle, 2011:61; Men, 2011:546; 
Panebianco, 2009:139). This sought to engender reform in China through a more 
pragmatic approach, seeking to promote the EU’s values through increasing engagement 
with China, a rationale embodied by the plethora of dialogues created by the strategic 
partnership (ibid.).  
While the constructive engagement strategy partly envisions indirect promotion of EU 
values through exposing China to the EU’s standards and ideas (Casarini, 2006:21; 
Panebianco, 2009:139), official documents emphasise that the EU values are also 
intended to explicitly feature in EU-China dialogues and be actively mainstreamed by EU 
officials (See Chapter 6.2).37 Nevertheless, existing literature focuses almost exclusively on 
the promotion of human rights through the EU-China human rights dialogue, the advent 
of which was catalysed by the introduction of the constructive engagement strategy 
(Kinzelbach, 2015:44). 
                                                          
37 See Chapter 6, which establishes the EU’s official discourse on value mainstreaming and the standards it 
prescribes for EU officials operationalising EU-China dialogues. 
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The EU-China human rights dialogue 
The contemporary EU-China human rights dialogue consists of an annual exchange 
involving the reciprocal discussion of each side’s human rights record (Kinzelbach and 
Thelle, 2011:63; Panebianco, 2009:140-141; Shen, 2013:173). The dialogue emerged in 
1995, suggested by the Chinese side in exchange for the EU ceasing annual condemnation 
of its human rights record through the United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
(UNCHR),38 at the multilateral level (Kinzelbach, 2015:26, 31 Kinzelbach and Thelle, 
2011:61; Shen, 2013:169). China’s Tiananmen crackdown had triggered a coordinated 
public approach by the EU and the US in the form of a co-sponsored UNCHR annual draft 
resolution (ibid., p.25). This action was fuelling unprecedented international outrage and 
scrutiny of China’s human rights record in the context of a “general optimism among 
Western powers” about democratic transitions, following the collapse of the Soviet Union 
(ibid.). In response to this negative pressure, which effectively constituted an existential 
threat, China was eager to stymie these multilateral resolutions, while satisfying the EU 
side’s need to promote human rights (ibid. p.25-26).  
Notably, China’s resulting suggestion for a structured dialogue on human rights 
capitalised on a growing desire amongst EU member states - led by France and Germany - 
to improve EU-China relations, particularly in order to realise national material interests 
(Kinzelbach, 2015:26; Kinzelbach and Thelle, 2011:61). The dialogue framework reflected 
a compromise option for the EU side, which unfroze EU-China relations while providing a 
platform for the EU to address human rights concerns with China (Kinzelbach, 2015:27).  
Although the EU initially refused to give into China’s demands to trade the dialogue for an 
end to the annual UN resolutions, with dialogues in 1995 and 1996 taking place 
nonetheless, China used these early dialogues to lobby their demand and a split vote on 
the annual resolution by member states in 1997 compromised the necessary unity on the 
EU side (Kinzelbach 2015:32). This effectively closed the “political deal” (Kinzelbach and 
Thelle, 2011:61) between the EU and China, with regular dialogues taking the place of 
annual resolutions thereafter. 
While the EU unlocked economic relations with China through this development, in the 
context of human rights promotion with China, the key beneficiary appeared to be the 
                                                          
38 The United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) is the predecessor of the United Nations 
Human Rights Council (UNHRC). 
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Chinese side. A closed-door, opaque dialogue which compartmentalised discussion of 
human rights into a single EU-China exchange, reflected a far more attractive prospect for 
China than an annual public spotlight by the international community (Shen, 2013:170). 
This reading is reaffirmed by scholars and NGOs which consider the establishment of the 
human rights dialogue framework a symbolic victory for the Chinese side in the 
neutralisation of “Western European criticism” (Wan, 2001:83) and a capitulation by the 
EU (See also: Kinzelbach, 2015:30). As Wan (2001:83) suggests, the litmus test for the 
human rights dialogue is its capacity to serve as a “source of real pressure for change”. 
The dialogue initially took place on a biannual basis and was accompanied by human 
rights seminars from 1998, that brought together civil society groups from each side 
(Panebianco, 2009:141; Kinzelbach and Thelle, 2011:64). However, the introduction of the 
rotating presidency with the Lisbon Treaty informed a transition to a single annual 
exchange from 2010,39 while the seminars were dropped altogether due their controversy 
and low productivity.40 Accounts from participants describe how the Chinese side tightly 
controlled the contribution of Chinese participants to these seminars and limited their 
contact with the EU side (HRIC, 2010). On several occasions, the substance or inclusion of 
particular NGOs, led the Chinese delegation to interrupt or walk out of sessions (HRIC, 
2010; Kinzelbach and Thelle, 2011:65). These dynamics informed the EU participants 
often focusing solely on a European context to avoid upsetting their Chinese counterparts 
(HRIC, 2010). 
Concerning the contemporary annual dialogue, the EU commonly raises concerns about 
China’s large-scale use of the death penalty, allegations of torture, freedom of 
expression/belief and minority rights (particularly in the context of Xinjiang and Tibet) (EU 
Commission, 2016:194; Panebianco, 2009:140). Promoting China’s compliance and 
                                                          
39 Interviews with diplomats from the EEAS on 09.04.2015 at 10.00am and 23.03.2017 at 11.00am, in 
Brussels. 
 
40 The seminars were devised by the British Presidency of the EU in 1998. They were fully funded by the EU 
side and involved academics, NGOs and officials from each side discussing human rights issues as means of 
exposing the “Chinese government to international human rights standards and EU best practice” 
(Panebianco, 2009:141), as well as feeding discussions in the bilateral dialogue and proposing new ideas for 
cooperation projects (See also: Casarini, 2006:19; HRIC, 2010).  
 
The topics of the seminars were informed by bilateral negotiations which tended to lead to two topics for 
each seminar (one picked by each side). According to Kinzelbach and Thelle (2011:69) the EU tended to 
prioritise issues such as “the death penalty, torture, freedom of expression and right to fair trial”, while 
China opted for “low-sensitivity” topics such as “right to health, the rights of persons with disabilities, 
women’s and children’s rights, and corporate social responsibility”.   
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ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which it 
signed in 1998, is also considered a key objective. This reflects part of broader efforts by 
the EU to lobby China on the basis that it should adhere to multilateral human rights 
frameworks that it has acceded to, in line with EU interpretations (EU Council, 2015:305; 
2016:194). This extends to the human rights provisions in China’s own constitutional and 
criminal law (ibid.).  
The EU also demands information about individual cases in China (e.g. pertaining to 
specific people/incidents of concern) during each instalment of the dialogue. Such 
practices are strongly opposed by China, which views them as contrary to the “principles 
of mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs” (MoFA, 2014). During 
dialogues, the Chinese side has tended to raise concerns about the rights of migrants and 
ethnic minorities in the EU (EEAS, 2018ii; Shen, 2013:173).  
 
Assessing the human rights dialogue 
Academic and internal EU assessments are critical about the effectiveness of the EU-
China human rights dialogue. Panebianco (2009:141) states that there is “no sight yet of a 
considerable improvement” in China’s human rights standards and Fox and Godement 
(2009:8) describe the dialogues as “inconclusive talking shops” (See also: Baker, 2002:60, 
62; Balducci, 2010:51; Men, 2011:546; Mattlin, 2012:189-190; Shen, 2013:172-173). 
Kinzelbach and Thelle (2011:79) highlight a more fundamental deficiency of the EU-China 
human rights dialogue, noting that it is:  
Based on the (false) premise that a negotiation and exchange between equal 
partners is taking place, while in reality part A aims at changing part B and part B 
knows it and does not accept it. 
Echoing this academic criticism, internal assessments carried out by various EU 
institutions are consistently critical about the dialogue and its incapacity achieve progress 
(See: EU Council, 2015:305-307; 2016i:194-197; EU Commission, 2006:4-5). These internal 
and external criticisms suggest that China has indeed emerged as the chief beneficiary 
from the establishment of the human rights dialogue, as opposed to the EU. The EU 
appears to have traded hard-hitting public criticism at the multilateral level for a 
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compartmentalisation of human rights discussion with China to an unproductive and 
opaque bilateral dialogue.  
However, existing literature often fails to provide insight into the micro-level dynamics 
between EU and Chinese officials. The dialogue is criticised purely based on its outcomes, 
while little attention has been paid to the actual processes underpinning it and the 
approaches of each side. The conflictual dynamics hinted at by press releases following 
each dialogue and the collapse of the human rights seminar system, suggest that both 
sides are playing a role in the dialogues apparent inefficacy.  
 
Assessing the EU’s normative power beyond the human rights dialogue 
Existing literature also importantly neglects to provide insights into extent to which EU 
values are being practically mainstreamed in all other 50+ EU-China dialogues along with 
the micro-dynamics informing this. Instead, scholars tend to focus on a broad, macro-
level appraisal, of the constructive engagement strategy.  
Aligning with the dominant criticisms of NPE,41 they argue that the EU’s material interests 
take precedence over its values with China in practice (See: Balducci, 2008:27; Forsberg, 
2011:119; Panebianco, 2009:144; Sachdeva, 2014:427). For example, Fox and Godement 
(2009:2) cast the constructive engagement strategy as “unconditional engagement”, 
describing how China is given unrestricted access to the (mutually beneficial) EU-China 
economic relationship, without any value-related prerequisites. Similarly, Mattlin 
(2012:189) argues that “concrete material interests still dominate” and alludes to limited 
value mainstreaming in practice, noting that: 
The human rights dialogue …has become practically the only venue where the EU 
is still trying to maintain at least a façade of a commitment to human rights. 
Additionally, scholars neglect to make any distinction between the EU officials based in 
Brussels and those working from the delegation in Beijing. Due to their physical location, 
the latter may display alternate knowledge-based approaches to promoting EU values. 
Relatedly, the role of Chinese cultural and linguistic skills amongst EU officials is generally 
given little attention by scholars. The role of these skills in the practical implementation of 
                                                          
41 Please note that NPE literature and EU-China literature is not strictly divided and there are many NPE 
articles focusing on EU-China relations.  
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the EU’s normative power appears to be particularly neglected. Works which do 
incorporate the role of cultural-linguistic knowledge, suggest that it reflects a potentially 
high-impact factor in EU-China cooperation. In this fashion, Burnay et al. (2014:50) 
describe how: 
A lack of mutual understanding …[deriving from] an obvious language problem, a 
weak awareness of regional history and economic political and cultural realities … 
[which] is particularly significant on the European side. 
Similarly, Fulda (2015:274) describes a “low level of intercultural knowledge and trust in 
relations between Europe and China” and how linguistic and cultural knowledge 
represent some of the “main constraints and barriers” (ibid. p. 281) to bilateral 
cooperation. For Fulda (2015:274), the considerable differences in language and culture 
mean that the risk and cost of misunderstandings are “high”. It can be inferred that in the 
context of mainstreaming controversial values like human rights, these risks and costs are 
increased. 
Fulda’s (2018) work on European citizen diplomats – civil society individuals involved in 
assuaging difficult bilateral relationships42 - reinforces the apparent value of these skills in 
EU-China relations. Fulda (2018:9-11) observed that these individuals had successfully 
navigated China’s “treacherous political-administrative landscape” largely as a product of 
their profound “intercultural knowledge” and capacity to collaborate with their Chinese 
counterparts (See also: Fulda, 2015:11-13). This included their ability to navigate within 
the “red lines” (Fulda, 2018:9) of Chinese cultural and social norms, as well as a reflexivity 
about their own cultural assumptions and an openness to new perspectives (ibid., p. 11-
17).  
While these civil society individuals are distinct from EU officials in their non-official 
capacity, they arguably face similar challenges, having to build relationships with Chinese 
officials, who must approve and monitor their activities, particularly following China’s 
2015 NGO law (Fulda, 2018:9, 15). As a result, it is possible that these skills have 
                                                          
42 Fulda (2018:2) describes citizen diplomacy as reflecting “an alternative problem-solving strategy 
underpinning the role that non-state actors may play in mitigating difficult interstate relations and help 




comparable worth in EU-China dialogues, aiding the discussion of controversial EU values 
like human rights. 
 
The EU-China Legal Affairs dialogue  
Another potentially significant dimension of the EU’s normative power with China 
overlooked by scholars, is the role of the EU-China Legal Affairs Dialogue (LAD). 
Inaugurated in 2016, the high-level exchange appears to reflect a channel designed by the 
EU to indirectly promote human rights, along with rule of law (EEAS, 2016vii).   
The dialogue emerged from long-running bilateral discussions to establish an EU-China 
dialogue connected to rule of law (See: Burnay et al., 2016). Irrespective of mutual 
interest in enhancing judicial cooperation, with the EU keen to increase legal certainty in 
all areas of bilateral cooperation and China interested in bolstering its judicial system, 
conflicting definitions of rule of law made the negotiations controversial (Burnay et al., 
2016:98-99).  
China rejects the EU’s interpretation of the value which promotes an independent 
judiciary and conceptually links to liberal democracy and human rights. Socialist rule of 
law with Chinese Characteristics (See: State Council, 2011), instead displays markedly 
different standards which support China’s one-party system (Burnay et al., 2016:97-101). 
These include no separation of power between the government and the judiciary, no 
supremacy of the law, as well as a lack of legal certainty and judicial independence 
(Burnay et al., 2016:100).43 
Reflecting this impasse, the EU proposed a “practical and technical rather than a 
conceptual approach” (Burnay et al., 2016:102) to the dialogue, which proved palatable 
to the Chinese side. Dialogues would instead focus on sharing experience and supporting 
China’s transformation of its legal system, as opposed to being predicated upon 
reforming China’s legal system in line with Western standards, as in the case of the 
human rights dialogue. This was reflected in the nomenclature of the dialogue: legal 
affairs as opposed to rule of law (Burnay et al., 2016:103).44  
                                                          
43 Within this context, Burnay et al. (2016:100) note how there is “no truly independent mechanism to 
interpret, enforce or review the Constitution and no possibility to invoke constitutional rights or have them 
protected”. 
44 Interview with an official from DG JUST on 09.02.2017 at 10.30am, in Brussels 
54 
 
Crucially, despite this aesthetic concession, institutionally as well as conceptually, the EU 
still maintains a concrete connection between the LAD and bilateral human rights 
promotion. As in the case of the pre-dialogue negotiations, the EEAS’s principal human 
rights desk in Brussels remains intimately involved with the dialogue.45 The EEAS funds 
and coordinates the dialogue, with the support of DG Justice and Consumers (JUST).46  
Further empowering the channel as a means to promote human rights, the Chinese 
interlocutor is the State Council, one of the few China state institutions that can impact 
Chinese policy connected to the value.47 Reflecting these attributes, the dialogue is 
(unofficially) framed by the EU side as an indirect, technical channel for promoting human 
rights with China.48 As a result, this thesis will assess the extent to which the LAD is 
practically realising such a role, in the context of its case study focus on human rights. 
 
People-to-People dialogue  
It is also important to draw attention to the third pillar of the EU-China Strategic 
Partnership, People-to-People Dialogue (PPD), which has also largely been neglected by 
existing literature. Inaugurated in 2012, PPD primarily seeks to “contribute to the 
knowledge and common understanding between the EU and China through the 
enhancement of contacts between people of both sides” (EU Commission, 2012ii). As 
Burnay et al. (2014:50) note, PPD effectively reflects a response to the lack of 
understanding in EU-China relations described in this chapter - rooted in a disagreement 
over values - and its impact in limiting EU-China political relations.  
To operationalise this objective, PPD seeks to facilitate exchanges between EU and 
Chinese civil society through (official-level) bilateral dialogues in the sectors of education, 
culture, youth and multilingualism, to increase mutual understanding (Burnay, et al, 
2014:51; EU Commission, 2012ii; 2017ii; Reiterer, 2014:143-44). The focus of PPD in these 
sectors implies that the bilateral lack of understanding which informs it is also strongly 
rooted in weak intercultural knowledge and communication. This suggests that each side 
                                                          
45 Interviews with an official from DG JUST on 09.02.2017 at 10.30am and diplomats from the EEAS on 
23.03.2017 at 11.00am and 07.10.2017 at 10.00am, in Brussels. 
46(ibid.) 
47 Interview with a diplomat from the EEAS on 23.03.2017 at 11.00am, in Brussels. 




may be engaging from a default position of ethnocentrism in EU-China dialogues which is 
negative for building common ground in controversial areas like values. Moreover, PPD’s 
enabling of a non-official dimension of EU-China relations notably reflects an example of 
horizontal power in the partnership aimed at co-production to resolve differences, which 
can be distinguished from the exclusively official-official and top-down vertical power 
characterising the majority of EU-China dialogues and in turn, the bilateral relationship.49  
However, the sparse existing literature focusing on these sectors suggests that PPD is not 
yet functioning as envisioned due to a combination of limited bilateral funding and the 
Chinese side’s top-down approach to the dialogues, wherein a reluctance to facilitate 
genuine bottom-up exchanges is worsening the challenges posed by a highly 
underdeveloped Chinese civil society (Burnay, et al, 2014:53; Fulda, 2013:4; 2015:278-
279; Reiterer, 2014:152). In this sense, the role of horizontal power and its capacity to 
enhance EU-China relations, appears to be being constrained by vertical power on each 
side, leading to EU-China relations remaining overwhelmingly official-official in nature. 
This has meaningful implications for the practical implementation of the EU’s normative 
power, as it means that the EU is almost solely engaging with Chinese officials strictly 
expressing the official party-state discourse on values, while limiting any input from 
individuals from Chinese civil society which may express more diverse positions, that 
could aid the establishment of normative common ground (See also, Chapter 5.5.2).  
As a product of its holistic appraisal of the practical implementation of the EU’s normative 
power in EU-China dialogues, this thesis will intrinsically incorporate and assess the 
dialogues encompassed by this interesting and under-researched (relatively new) pillar of 
EU-China relations. 
 
3.7 The role of EU member states  
 
Lastly, while this thesis focuses on the EU-level dialogues, much existing literature looks 
at the role of member states in EU-China relations. This offers important context to the 
mandates of EU-China dialogues and the background machinations informing them, 
                                                          
49 Horizontal power can be captured by “political authority being transferred between the state and non-
state actors” (Buchs, 2008:1), while vertical power relates to solely official-official transfers of power 
“upward or downward between differing levels of government”.  
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particularly in terms of the extent to which the political centre of gravity pulls towards EU 
values or material interests.  
Scholars describe how the EU’s normative power with China has been weakened by 
disunity amongst member states, many of which have been hesitant about condemning 
China’s contravention of EU values (particularly human rights) for fear of economic 
reprisal or missed Chinese trade and investment opportunities (Casarini, 2006:19; ECFR, 
2015ii:86; 2016i) Mattlin, 2012:190). This tendency is argued to have been catalysed by 
domestic pressures for member states to regain economic stability and growth following 
the Eurozone crisis (Casarini, 2006:21; De Jonquieres, 2015:2).  
As Casarini (2008:19-21) highlights, China has actively fuelled this disunity, skilfully linking 
political concessions to bilateral trade and attempting to “divide-and-rule” (Maher, 
2016:976), including through high-profile vehicles such as 16+1 or the BRI (Fox and 
Godement, 2009:3; ECFR, 2016; Wood, 2011:253). Such dynamics have contributed to 
member states breaking ranks to join China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 
their lobbying to end the EU’s arms embargo and the EU’s unconditional support of 
China’s accession to the WTO (De Jonquieres, 2015:2; Balducci, 2008:18-19; ECFR, 
2016:126; Mattlin, 2012:189, 194). A more recent example saw Greece vetoing the EU’s 
UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) statement condemning China’s human rights record 
after receiving significant Chinese investment (Reuters, 2017). This was the first time in 
history that the statement had not been delivered (ibid.). 
Reflecting these themes in the literature, scholars can be seen to address the role of the 
Chinese side in impacting the EU’s normative power through bilateral relations, in a 
fashion sorely lacking from research on EU-China dialogues. However, this is partly 
symptomatic of these dynamics being publicly observable (e.g. through the media and EU 
documents) through a macro-level approach, unlike the closed-door dialogues this thesis 
focuses upon.  
 
3.8 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has provided an overview of EU-China relations and associated literature. It 
was revealed that the EU-China partnership represents a highly transactional relationship, 
where the most successful areas of cooperation are based on mutual self-interest. 
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Reflecting this, economic cooperation dominates the relationship, while environmental 
and climate change cooperation has emerged as a standout area of political cooperation. 
This supports the argued status of the environmental dimension of sustainable 
development as the least controversial value in EU-China relations.  
The comparatively underdeveloped nature of EU-China political relations, versus the 
economic relationship, was revealed to be rooted in a fundamental disagreement over 
values. Human rights was highlighted to reflect the most controversial and high profile 
example, supporting this thesis’s focus on the value along with sustainable development. 
Importantly, the chapter also addressed how the EU practically promotes its values in EU-
China relations. It emerged that existing literature was highly critical of the EU’s approach 
and impact, aligning with NPE literature in arguing that the EU’s material interests are 
being prioritised in the bilateral relationship. However, like NPE literature, scholars 
appeared to narrowly focus on macro-level analysis of the EU constructive engagement 
strategy or the human rights dialogue specifically, while neglecting to provide insights 
into value mainstreaming in other EU-China dialogues. However, even in the context of 
the human rights dialogue, scholars still seemingly failed to provide insights into the 
micro-level dynamics of EU value promotion in practice. These include the role of 
individual EU officials and the impact of their Chinese counterparts and institutional 
mechanisms.  
Additionally, literature to date appears have neglected to explore the possible distinction 
between value-promotion by Brussels-based and Beijing based officials, as well as the 
impact of cultural-linguistic skills amongst EU officials on value mainstreaming. 




Chapter 4 - Research Design  
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter defines this thesis’s research strategy. It first details the project’s underlying 
philosophical and theoretical positions, along with their relationship to the concept of 
normative power Europe (NPE) and the knowledge-gaps identified in Chapters 2 and 3 
(Section 4.2). Thereafter, it presents this project’s methodological choices and how they 
interact with the research question (Sections 4.3 and 4.4). These include the following 
qualitative methods: (1) the thesis’s overarching approach, the case study method; (2) its 
principal tool of data collection, the elite interview method and (3) the thesis’s approach 
to data analysis, discourse analysis. 
 
4.2 Methodology  
 
This thesis views epistemology and ontology as fixed perspectives held by researchers, 
impacting the topics they choose and the theory/methods used to engage with them 
(Braun and Clarke, 2013:31 Punch, 2014:14). On this level, the project reflects a middle-
ground philosophy associated with constructivist approaches in International Relations 
(IR) (See: Jupille et al., 2003:14; Checkel, 1998:327; Manners, 2011:241; Parsons, 2010:90; 
Shen, 2011:24-26). 
The research is ontologically constructivist in its privileging of the role of values in the 
EU’s external relations more broadly and EU-China dialogues specifically. However, the 
project also displays objectivism through its acknowledgement of observable independent 
state/supranational structures (i.e. China and the EU) and the international system they 
occupy.  
Epistemologically, the project’s focus on the role of individual EU and Chinese officials 
and gaining their first-hand accounts is interpretivist, yet the research is positivistic in its 
desire to explain how values are practically promoted in EU-China relations. Crucially, as a 
product of this research’s constructivist-interpretivist facet, there are numerous 
opportunities for bias. These surround the subjectivity of officials’ accounts and the 
author’s interpretation of them. This will be vigilantly mitigated during this thesis’s data 
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collection and analysis through reflexivity and rigorous triangulation between 
interviewees’ accounts and official documents (See sections 4.3.2 and 4.4).   
Contrasting with other International Relations (IR) theories, arguably IR constructivism 
represents the most appropriate framework for this thesis. This is supported through a 
brief assessment of other key paradigms, which also serves to situate this thesis in the 
discipline of IR. Firstly, the dominant rationalist paradigms of neorealism and 
neoliberalism appear to lack applicability. Neorealism maintains that the international 
system is anarchic (i.e. no world government) and that the principle objective of state 
actors is survival, through the acquisition of power to balance against rivals (Copeland, 
2012:54; Mearsheimer, 1994:10). According to neorealists, the best outcome in this 
environment is order. In contrast, neoliberalism maintains that peace is feasible in an 
anarchic system between dynamic states, through cooperative mechanisms, particularly 
those of economic independence, political institutionalism and democratic governance 
(Paul, 2012:13). For neoliberals, such mechanisms have been catalysed by globalisation 
and its blurring of borders, information and capital (Baldwin, 1993:5-6). 
At a basic level, the state-centrism of these paradigms makes them unable to capture the 
role of the EU as an independent international actor. While neorealism struggles to 
explain the existence of the EU as a product of interstate cooperation, let alone its 
independent actorness in world politics, neoliberalism’s capacity to theorise European 
integration remains limited to a focus on its member states (Rosamond, 2000:132-133, 
135). Additionally, these theories view states as abstract actors at the macro-level, while 
neglecting the role of individual policymakers/officials at the micro-level addressed by 
this thesis.50 More fundamentally however, even when these paradigms are developed to 
theorise the EU as an international actor, akin to the counter-conceptualisations of NPE 
described in Chapter 2.4, analysis remains limited to the role of material power in world 
politics. Conversely, ideational forces and their influence on individual policymakers are 
considered to have little impact on the behaviour of international actors by these 
paradigms (McDonald, 2013:64). The role of the EU’s values and their relationship with its 
                                                          
50 It is worth highlighting that these neorealism and neoliberalism have been further developed to explain 
the origin of state preferences. For example, neoclassical realism focuses on the relationship between 
states’ societies and political elites, which impact how states interpret and respond to the “murky and 
difficult to read” anarchic international arena (Elman and Jensen, 2013:26). Similarly, neoliberalism has 
been expanded to explain the role of domestic politics in European integration (See: Rosamond, 2000:135). 
In both cases however, the micro-level role of individual policymakers/officials is still neglected.  
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material interests in EU-China relations are central to this thesis, its middle ground 
philosophy and its conceptual basis of NPE. In this context, it is important to reiterate that 
Manners developed NPE in order to depart from these limited rationalist paradigms, their 
state-centrism and their neglect of ideational forces in the post-cold war period, to 
theorise the EU’s normative power (See Chapter 2.2).  
Beyond neorealism and neoliberalism, other more specialist IR theories also arguably fall 
short in their scope to capture the practical promotion of the EU’s normative power in 
EU-China dialogues. For example, Marxist theories narrowly explain the exploitation of 
developing countries by those that are more developed, while again being state-centric 
and focused on material power (Maguire, 2010:143-144). The latter is cast as being 
monopolised by the developed countries to create dependency relationships and 
engender interstate conflict (ibid.). While ideational forces play a role in Marxist theories, 
they are limited to those which support and normalise these conflict relations (ibid. p. 
145). Similarly, feminist IR theories focus specifically on revealing and critiquing 
“gendered assumptions and representations” (Whitworth, 2013:109) in world politics and 
their role in existing academic approaches. Although feminist theories depart from state-
centrism in their focus on “(gender-differentiated) people” (ibid., p. 110), this specificity 
means that they lack the scope to effectively theorise the practical role and significance of 
values in EU-China dialogues. 
On the contrary, IR constructivism strongly aligns with this thesis’s topic, middle ground 
philosophy and the conceptual basis of NPE, capturing the role of ideational forces in 
world politics (Manners, 2006i:169; Shen, 2011:23). In this fashion, the paradigm  
incorporates the role of material structures into its analysis of a socially constructed 
reality, based on the premise that social actors, through interaction with these structures, 
ascribe meaning to them (Checkel, 1998:325; Jupille et al., 2003:14; Parsons, 2010:89, 
90). Importantly, this relationship between structure and agency is cast as dynamic and 
multidirectional, as they shape one another to impact social action (ibid.). In this sense, 
the paradigm considers world politics to have both social and material dimensions which 
mutually constitute the behaviour of international actors (Jupille et al., 2003:14; Checkel, 
1998:326).  
Notably, values are argued to hold special significance as a social force by constructivists 
being considered to inform how international actors behave (Checkel and Moravcsik, 
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2001:220; Jupille et al., 2003:14-15). Significantly, these values shared by actors are 
considered to be dynamic and alterable via extraneous normative influences (ibid.). This 
captures value promotion from one actor to another, such as that between the EU and 
China through EU-China dialogues.  
Reflecting this privileging of values in world politics and their capacity to transform the 
preferences of international actors, IR constructivism represents the theoretical 
foundation of NPE and in turn, this thesis (Diez, 2005:635; Youngs, 2004:415; Whitman, 
2013:173). Manners (2006i:169) applies and expands IR constructivist approaches to 
theorise the EU’s international role as a normative power. NPE reflects a particularly 
influential contribution to the European studies sub-field of IR, which has been 
increasingly dominated by the constructivist perspective (ibid.). 
 
4.3 Research Methods 
 
4.3.1 The case study method  
 
The most suitable way to approach the research question “how is the EU operationalising 
its normative power in EU-China relations in practice?” is the case study method. This is 
because answering the question requires significant depth and detail. The case study 
method is ideal for this as it facilitates in-depth investigation of a limited number of cases, 
through a plurality of data sources, as a means of understanding a broader 
“contemporary phenomenon” (Noor, 2008:1602; See also: Tellis, 1997:1; Yin, 2003:13; 
2012:4).  
The close examination enshrined by the method is also considered to make it a proficient 
tool for understanding “complex” (Yin, 2003:2) interactions in the social world (See also: 
Noor, 2008:1602-1602). Reflecting these attributes, the case study method is thus well-
suited for this thesis’s nuanced, micro-level approach to the research question. This 
encompasses a focus on individual EU officials mainstreaming values with China and the 
impact of institutional mechanisms and their counterparts on such activities.  
To exploit the capacity for depth offered by the case study method, this thesis 
concentrates on a single case: EU-China relations. Single case studies allow researchers to 
focus exclusively and intensively on an individual unit of analysis, capturing nuances 
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largely unobtainable in multi-case analysis (Bennett and Elman, 2007:178; Gerring, 
2004:348; 2007:1; Yin, 2003:39-40; 2012:18). As little is known in existing scholarship 
about how EU officials practically operationalise the EU’s normative power in dialogues 
with third countries, a single case provides the greatest scope for nuance and explanatory 
power.  
The case study method importantly provides rigorous case selection criteria, which made 
it possible to identify and justify China as a single case for exploring the operationalisation 
of the EU’s normative power in practice (Bennet and Elman, 2007:172; Seawright and 
Gerring, 2008:294). In this context, China reflects arguably a single “crucial case” capable 
of expanding and refining a theory (in this instance NPE) (Bennett and Elman, 2006:462; 
Lijphart, 1971:692; Yin, 2003:40). This derives from the EU-China partnership displaying 
the greatest tension between EU material interests and mutual understanding on values 
in the EU’s external relations. As Shen (2011:11) highlights, it represents the most 
challenging case for the EU’s normative power in practice.  
Conversely, it is important to acknowledge that the depth offered by single cases comes 
at the price of the representativeness and capacity for generalization provided by multi-
case studies (ibid.). However, these limitations can be countered through the inclusion of 
within case variations. These provide the opportunity for further rich analysis “that only 
serves to better illuminate the case” (Baxter and Jack, 2008:548). To this end, this thesis 
focuses particularly on how EU officials practically mainstream the values of human rights 
and the environmental dimension of sustainable development in EU-China dialogues. 
These values were selected on the basis that they reflect the most and least controversial 
values in EU-China relations, effectively, two extreme cases for enquiry (Seawright and 
Gerring, 2008:294). 
This specific focus, in conjunction with a broad appraisal of EU value mainstreaming with 
China, allows for a comprehensive assessment of the EU’s normative power with China in 
practice. Additionally, the pursuit of a non-controversial EU value - the environmental 
dimension of sustainable development - also aids safe and productive data collection in 
China. A focus on sustainable development reduces the potential of misunderstanding 
and enhances the potential of getting access to Chinese officials, who will feasibly discuss 
this area. As noted in Chapter 3, many of the EU’s values are of great political sensitivity 
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to the Chinese side, particularly human rights, and there is decreasing tolerance for any 
political dissent in China, even by foreigners.  
 
4.3.2 The elite interview method  
 
Attributes 
The elite interview method reflects this thesis’s chosen tool for data collection. This is 
justified on the basis that the method is specially designed for accessing and interviewing 
elites, powerful individuals that directly impact upon political outcomes, such as the EU 
officials engaging in EU-China dialogues (Delaney, 2007:208; Richards, 1996:199; 
Stephens, 2007:205). Moreover, elite interviews also allow researchers to expand upon 
existing academic literature and policy documents through collecting first-hand accounts 
from practitioners that are actively shaping a topic of interest (Goldstein, 2006:669; 
Pierce, 2008:119; Stephens, 2007:205). This makes it well-suited for this thesis’s focus on 
value mainstreaming in EU-China dialogues, where there is a significant knowledge-gap.  
While this area is neglected in existing scholarship, there is also a lack of insight into the 
practical micro-dynamics of EU-China dialogues in publicly available official EU and 
Chinese documents. This reflects a strong motivation for this thesis’s pursuit of the elite 
interview method, as well as its overarching approach to the research question. Beyond 
this, the method importantly also makes it possible for researchers to multiply their 
interviews through exploiting participants’ inter-institutional networks (Goldstein, 
2002:671; Harrison, 2001:94; Richardson, 2014:182).  
On the flipside, the method can be problematic to implement. Gaining access to busy 
elites can be very challenging and this can foster small and unrepresentative samples 
(Aberbach and Rockman, 2002:673; Goldstein, 2002:669-670; Richardson, 2014:182). 
However, in the context of this thesis, the individuals operationalising EU-China dialogues 
work in very small groups, with often a single individual principally managing dialogues 
connected to a given policy sector (See Chapter 5.4). As a result, the 41 interviews with 
EU officials carried out for this project, supported by a further 8 contextual accounts 
(described below) reflect arguably a highly comprehensive and meaningful sample.  
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Another principal challenge facing researchers pertains to how interviewees can assert 
their power and authority to control the direction and content of interviews, or 
deliberately misrepresent events and spread disinformation for their own ends (McEvoy, 
2006:185; Morris, 2009:211, 213; Richards, 1996:201). Following the recommendations of 
elite interview literature, this thesis mitigated this issue through triangulating the 
substance in interviewee’s accounts with their colleagues and where possible EU, Chinese 
and joint official documents. These documents were publicly available on the websites for 
EU and Chinese institutions involved with EU-China dialogues. This thesis acknowledges 
that as a product of this, these documents often had multiple intended audiences i.e. the 
domestic public for legitimacy, messages to the other side (i.e. the EU or China) and 
internal working guidelines. Analysis was pursued critically on this basis.   
The selected documents included key texts from EU-China relations such as the latest 
joint strategy, each side’s strategies on EU-China relations, the joint statements following 
the annual high-level summits and the guiding policy documents and bilateral press 
releases framing each policy sector encompassed by the interview sample. To 
compensate for the comparative lack of English language and public documents from the 
Chinese side, some key Chinese speeches on EU-China relations were also included for 
analysis.  
As this thesis is seeking to explore the micro-level dynamics surrounding the background 
coordination and implementation of EU values during dialogues - which are closed to the 
public - the official documents described above tend to offer limited insights into their 
design and operationalisation. In this respect, the most pertinent insight from these 
resources relates to provision of the broad topics/objectives of each policy sector, which 
specifies or presents possible normative dimensions of dialogues. This provides an idea of 
how EU values could/should feature in dialogues. In rare cases, the minutes of dialogues 
are made available, but these documents tend to also be very limited; providing only a 
broad overview of the topics being discussed and often omitting any 
controversial/sensitive discussions due to these documents being public and typically 
subject to bilateral approval.  
Beyond this triangulating function, the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) and thematic documents 
on human rights and sustainable development were also selected to crucially establish 
the EU’s official discourse on value mainstreaming (See Chapter 6.2). This discourse 
65 
 
reflects the mainstreaming standards that EU officials are constitutional prescribed to 
follow in their dialogues with third countries. Through establishing these standards and 
their alignment with the ideal-type of NPE, this thesis is to able to tangibly assess the 
extent to which the EU’s normative power is being operationalised in EU-China dialogues 
in practice.  
 
Operationalising elite interviews: Sampling and delivery 
In terms of operationalising the elite interview method, the first step involved sampling 
and accessing participants. Using the snowball sampling technique (See: Richardson, 
2014:182; Tansey, 2007:18), which allows researchers to exploit interviewees’ personal 
networks to increase sample sizes, this project principally sought to secure as many 
interviews as possible with EU officials from the two EU institutions responsible for 
coordinating and implementing EU-China dialogues: the European Commission and the 
European External Action Service (EEAS). Within this context, the project aimed to 
encompass key policy sectors of EU-China relations, spanning all three pillars of the 
strategic partnership, including officials based in both Brussels and at the EU delegation 
to China in Beijing.  
The large scale and multifaceted nature of EU-China relations necessitated this thesis 
focusing on the area of greatest pertinence to the practical implementation of the EU’s 
normative power. This thesis focused specifically on the EU-level dialogues with China on 
the following basis. Firstly, NPE conceptualises the EU as an international actor, distinct 
from its member states and these dialogues reflect the primary forums of the EU-level 
bilateral relationship.  
Secondly, a focus on EU-China dialogues and the EEAS and Commission officials 
operationalising them, is also arguably justified on the basis that the mandates of these 
exchanges have been pre-agreed by EU member states and the European Parliament.  
Through this assumption, this thesis can pursue a detailed assessment of the practical 
implementation of the EU’s normative power in EU-China dialogues and omit the 
background agenda-setting of the EU’s external action. As described in Chapter 5, EEAS 
and Commission officials have significant autonomy in planning EU-China dialogues and 
their substance.  
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Beyond this central sample, this thesis has also sought to secure additional pertinent 
perspectives from other EU institutions, member states, NGOs and in particular, the 
Chinese side. These interviews, like the policy documents can be triangulated with the 
accounts from Commission/EEAS officials, providing additional context and crucially, 
include Chinese perspectives (where possible). Views from the Chinese side tend to be 
absent from existing literature.  
However, it is important to emphasise the difficulty of gaining access to Chinese officials. 
Open access to the Chinese government by civil society is not an institutionalised feature 
of China’s closed authoritarian system, being challenging even for Chinese nationals, let 
alone foreigners. Unlike the EU’s institutions, there is also no direct contact details for 
specific parts of Chinese institutions, beyond generic online contact forms or central 
phone numbers.  
Based on the strategy outlined above, this project secured 49 interviews; 42 accrued in 
three extended blocks throughout 2017, one in 2018 and six from a pilot study conducted 
in 2015. Breaking this down, 41 interviews were with EU officials. Their 
institutions/departments are displayed in Table 4.1, while Figure 4.1 displays how this 
sample encompasses a comprehensive number of dialogues from the EU-China Strategic 
Partnership. On top this, the author interviewed individuals from two EU member states 
(large and small), three NGO’s and three officials from the Chinese side (See Table 4.2).  
In keeping with the difficulties in accessing Chinese officials, interviews with the Chinese 
side were secured solely through snowball sampling, being based on Beijing interviewees’ 
own personal networks. These interviews would not have been obtainable through other 
means and on several occasions, EU officials’ Chinese counterparts rejected interview 
access, despite the existence of these personal networks.  
The interviews were also supplemented by participant observation at two internal EU 
events - one EU-China dialogue connected to social policy and an internal EU event 
featuring civil society and EU officials debating the future of another very high-profile 
dialogue. Participant observation involves: 
The active engagement of the researcher with the members of the community 




The method provides the opportunity to witness social action and gather “rich and 
detailed data” (ibid.). This again aligns with this thesis’s nuanced approach to the research 
question, which seeks to illuminate the little-known dynamics of value mainstreaming in 
EU-China dialogues. Through attending these events, particularly the EU-China dialogue, 
the author was able to observe the behaviour of the EU and Chinese sides. This provided 
valuable insights and context for EU value mainstreaming in practice, at the micro-level. 
The inherent subjectivity of these observations was countered through triangulation with 
interviews and policy documents (ibid.). A full list of the interviews conducted for this 




















Table 4.1 Sample breakdown: EU interviews 








DG Climate Action (CLIMA)  Brussels 
DG Communications Networks, Content and 
Technology (CONNECT) 
Brussels 
DG Development Cooperation (DEVCO) Brussels 
DG Environment (ENV)  Brussels 
DG Energy (ENER)  Brussels 
DG Economic and Financial Affairs (ECFIN) Brussels 
DG Education and Culture (EAC)  Brussels 
DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and 
SMEs (GROW) 
Brussels 
DG Justice and Consumers (JUST) Brussels 
DG Migration and Home Affairs (HOME) Brussels 
DG Mobility and Transport (MOVE) Brussels 
DG Research and Innovation (RTD)  Brussels 
DG Trade (TRADE)  Brussels 




Economic and Finance Section, EU delegation to 
China 
Beijing 
Information Society Media Section, EU delegation 
to China 
Beijing 
Science, Technology and Environment Section, EU 






ASIAPAC: Asia and Pacific Directorate Brussels 




GLOBAL Directorate Brussels 
Political Press and Information Section, EU 
delegation to China  
Beijing 
Council of the 
European Union 
 





Figure 4.1 EU-China dialogues captured by sample (EEAS, 2017i) 
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Table 4.2 Sample breakdown: Interviews with EU member states, NGOs and the Chinese side 
 
The interviews were conducted on the basis of informed consent. In advance of 
interviews, participants were provided with a document clearly articulating the research 
project, its objectives, the option for interviewees to withdraw at any time without 
explanation and crucially, a guarantee of strict anonymity (i.e. interviews were non-
attributable). This document had to be signed by participants in advance of interviews. 
Anonymity aided access to interviewees and maximised their openness during interviews 
and thus data quality.  
Interviews tended to last around 1hr 15mins on average and followed the best practice 
outlined by relevant literature. Interviews consisted of a semi-structured format with 
around 10 key questions and a number of sub-questions, which would flexibly alter in 
delivery depending on the flow of the conversation with the interviewee (Beamer, 
2002:92; Richards, 1996:202). The questions largely focused on the extent to which the 
EU’s values, both more broadly and in the specific cases of human rights and sustainable 
development, were being practically mainstreamed into EU-China dialogues; internal 
mechanisms for value mainstreaming; the conduct of the Chinese side in dialogues and; 





Republic of Ireland Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Beijing 
 




Client Earth N/A Beijing 
World Resources Institute N/A Beijing 
European Chamber of 
Commerce in China (EU) 
N/A Beijing 
State Council [PRC] Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Beijing 
State Council [PRC] Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Beijing 





The questions were designed to be non-leading and mitigate the subjective biases of the 
author, such as their personal views on EU and Chinese positions on values. This thesis 
also acknowledged that interviewees may interpret concepts such value mainstreaming, 
human rights and sustainable development differently from the author. In effect, there 
was a danger that the interviewer and the interviewee were talking about different 
things. To mitigate this, the author explained the research project and its objectives at the 
beginning of interviews in detail. Moreover, this thesis’s incorporation and analysis of 
policy documents, including those aimed at providing internal working guidelines, 
contributed to a synthesis between how this project interpreted these concepts and the 
EU’s internal definitions/understandings. The author also remained highly attentive 
during interviews to ensure that interviewees were engaging with and interpreting 
concepts in the manner intended by questions.  
Where possible, interviews were audio-recorded to maximise data richness and accurate 
recall, though this was dependent on the permission of the interviewee (Beamer, 
2002:92; Peabody et al., 1990:454). In practice, 30/49 interviews were audio-recorded, 
with permission far less common in Beijing than in Brussels, reflective of local security 
concerns. The remaining interviews were recorded with written-notes in real-time 
(including direct-quotations where pertinent) and immediately transcribed in full as soon 
as possible after interviews. In all cases, to ensure anonymity, officials’ names were 
redacted from transcripts. In some cases, this extended to redacting interviewees’ 
departments (or directorates) due to the potential of identification, considering the very 
small groups of people working in EU-China dialogues. 
Overall, the elite interview method reflects an ideal tool for answering the research 
question. The method makes it possible to access and interview EU officials 
operationalising EU-China dialogues and thus assess the practical implementation of the 




4.4 Data analysis  
 
Discourse analysis  
To fully exploit the data-richness garnered from the elite interview method, this project 
used discourse analysis. It reflects an analytical technique which focuses on the 
underlying meaning and patterns located in language, which inform shared social 
backgrounds or discourses which impact social action (Fairclough, 2003:5; Vroman, 
2002:264). The method thus has the capacity to make deeper observations about 
interview transcripts and policy documents than comparable methods, such as content or 
thematic analysis, which solely consider literal meaning (Fierke, 2009:84; Potter, 
2004:612, 613).  
Discourse analysis derives from poststructuralist approaches, which are closely associated 
with the works of Michel Foucault and claims that language is constitutive of social reality, 
meaning that prevailing linguistic categories (i.e. discourses) are considered to determine 
or produce social action, identities and material structures (Antaki, 2009:434; Hansen, 
2006:17, 173; Potter, 2004:607, 610). In this sense, poststructuralist approaches typically 
reject the existence of independent material structures, instead viewing the social and 
material worlds as similarly constituted by language (Hansen, 2006:22). Discourses are 
also importantly considered to be non-static/changeable, while texts are often viewed to 
play a central role in their articulation (Hansen, 2006:20-21, 174-175).  
However, discourse analysis represents a highly fragmented area of social science 
(Bryman, 2012:528, 540; Potter, 2004:607, 608). There is a plethora of variations as 
opposed to a universal mode of practice (ibid.). In the discipline of IR, scholars’ use of 
discourse analysis most closely resembles that of critical discourse analysis (CDA), which 
departs from poststructuralist approaches in its recognition of objective material 
structures, yet still recognises the power of discourses and the central role of texts 
(Hansen, 2006:xviii; Millken, 1999:225; Vroman, 2002:264; Wodak, 2004:185).51  
In this setting, IR scholars pertinently maintain that discourses determine the ideas and 
practices of individuals that speak/act on behalf of material structures like international 
                                                          
51 CDA scholars maintain that discourses have the potential to (and should) transform material structures, 
based on critical Marxist ideological foundations (Bryman, 2012:538; Fairclough, 2003:8; Fairclough and 
Wodak, 2004:357). Reflecting this, it is important to highlight that CDA has a strong critical facet which is 
less prominent in IR studies. 
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actors (Larsen, 2004:62; Milliken, 1999:229). Consequently, discourses can be seen to 
have a deterministic impact on how EU officials practically implement (or mainstream) EU 
values with China in EU-China dialogues. Moreover, the method can illuminate the official 
discourse on value mainstreaming found in EU policy documents and the extent to which 
the standards it prescribes align with NPE.  
Nonetheless, it is worth highlighting that a discourse analysis approach is largely absent 
from existing NPE and EU-China literature (See: Diez, 2005:615). This arguably connects 
again to existing literature neglecting the micro-level of the EU’s normative power, 
including the role of individual EU officials mainstreaming EU values. It is this level of 
analysis, focused on by this thesis, wherein discourse analysis is arguably most 
appropriate and effective at maximising analytical inference. 
Additionally, it is important to highlight that like IR proponents, this project adopts 
discourse analysis as an instrumental tool. It seeks to deeply examine the consistency of 
the ideational influences privileged by constructivist approaches, without importing 
discourse analysis’s traditional poststructuralist ideas (Larsen, 2004:63).52 On this basis, 
the project uses discourse analysis to analyse both transcripts of interviewees’ accounts 
and key policy documents.  
 
Employing discourse analysis 
There is no single, agreed technique for employing the discourse analysis in existing 
literature. This thesis’s use of the method was principally based upon the techniques 
outlined by Jennifer Milliken (1998), a widely cited schematic for employing the method 
in IR. 
The first step consisted of a close reading of the (anonymised) interview transcripts and 
policy documents, encompassing a careful observation of their “content, structure and 
meaning” (Bryman, 2012:538; See also: Barnutz, 2011:90). Thereafter, the discourses 
(both official and those expressed by interviewees) were identified through a process of 
                                                          
52 While constructivism and poststructuralism share an ideational focus, IR constructivism, the foundation 
of NPE, views reality as mutually constituted by social and material influences, acknowledging the role of 
external systemic pressures on international actors. Conversely, poststructuralism rejects the 




“analysis and abstraction”, which sought to “draw out… a general structure of relational 
distinctions and hierarchies” (Milliken, 1999:231). While there are multiple techniques for 
identifying discourses, this project adopted predicate analysis, which focuses on how 
nouns (e.g. China or the EU) are being constructed (predicated) by the “verbs, adverbs 
and adjectives” (Milliken, 1999:232) attached to them. As Milliken (1999:232-233) 
describes, through this technique, it is possible to observe the characteristics and roles 
being assigned to actors in each text.  
Predicate analysis was facilitated through a rigorous computer-assisted coding process, 
using NVivo software (Barnutz, 2011:93; Braun and Clarke, 2006:88-89). Through the 
steps outlined above, discourses in the interview transcripts and policy documents were 
identified and coded into categories, with the key discourses emerging through their 
prevalence across interviewees’ accounts. Notably, this process was undertaken 
according to a grounded theory logic, which sought to mitigate the preconceptions/bias of 
the researcher and let the data speak for itself (See: Antaki, 2009:436; Fierke, 2007:85; 
Milliken, 1999:234).   
More broadly, the author’s subjective biases were also countered through reflexively 
approaching interviewees’ accounts and being vigilant for potential alternative 
interpretations of their language. This crucially ensured that the author’s interpretation 
was what the interviewee intended.  
Following the identification of the discourses across the transcripts and policy documents, 
the final step of the process consisted of establishing how they impacted reality i.e. the 
practical implementation of the EU’s normative power with China (Milliken, 1999:236, 
242; See also: Fairclough, 2003:17; Vromen, 2010:264). More specifically, this step 
consisted of reflexivity about how the discourses were practically informing value 
mainstreaming in EU-China dialogues, including the approaches of EU officials and the 
reactions by their Chinese counterparts. This process also extended to what Milliken 
(1999:242) describes as play of practice. The concept refers to researchers capturing the 
dynamic nature of discourses in practice, particularly through reflecting upon how they 
are being reproduced in practice. In this sense, the project sought to identify whether 
certain EU individuals/institutions or official documents were serving to reproduce the 
discourses shared by EU officials.  
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Relatedly, the analysis also sought to contrast the key assumptions/perceptions of 
discourses, particularly those from the official discourse found in documents versus 
discourses expressed by interviewees. This is captured by what Milliken (1999:243) 
describes as the juxtapositional method, which seeks to juxtapose the truths expressed by 
discourses with the issues/events they fail to acknowledge. In other words, discerning 
how discourses are engaging with reality. Ultimately, as Milliken (1999:242) notes, 
reflexivity about how discourses are constituted, maintained and interact with one 




This chapter set out the research design for this thesis to answer the research question 
and address knowledge gaps in existing NPE and EU-China literature. The chapter first 
described this project’s methodology, including its middle-ground philosophical position 
and the IR approach of constructivism, which reflects the foundation of NPE, the 
conceptual basis of this thesis.  
Secondly, the chapter detailed the qualitative research methods adopted by this thesis. 
The case study method was illustrated to primarily frame the project, being used to select 
and justify China as a single case study for assessing the practical implementation of the 
EU’s normative power. It also underpins this thesis’s focus on human rights and the 
environmental dimension of sustainable development. Building on this, the elite 
interview method was justified as the most appropriate method for data collection due to 
its capacity to access and elicit in-depth accounts from officials involved in EU-China 
dialogues. The chapter importantly detailed this thesis’s operationalisation of the method 
including aspects like the interview sample and the official documents used for 
triangulation. Lastly, the chapter introduced discourse analysis, justifying its applicability 
on the basis that it could maximise the data-richness of interviews and most effectively 
assess the practical implementation of the EU’s normative power at the micro-level 








Before outlining the research findings, it is important to provide context for the reader 
into how EU-China dialogues function in practice and the responsibilities of the EU 
institutions operationalising them to promote or mainstream EU values. This chapter will 
first introduce the two EU institutions responsible for EU-China dialogues – the European 
Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) - and their constitutional-
legal relationship, regarding value mainstreaming in the EU’s external relations (Sections 
5.2.-5.3). Thereafter the chapter will describe the individuals/structures of these 
institutions responsible for EU-China dialogues (Section 5.4). Finally, the chapter will 
outline the characteristics and format of EU-China dialogues and the significance of this 
for value mainstreaming (Sections 5.5-5.6). 
 
5.2 EU Institutional roles and responsibilities for EU-China dialogues  
 
The two EU institutions responsible for operationalising EU-China dialogues are the 
European Commission and the EEAS. The Commission represents the EU’s executive 
which proposes EU laws/policies and manages their implementation through an extensive 
departmental civil service – the Commission Directorate Generals or DGs (EU, 2018i). 
While the DG’s largely have an internal focus, they importantly maintain responsibility for 
planning and implementing the dimensions of the EU’s external action relevant to their 
policy sector or wholly in the cases of trade, enlargement, development and 
humanitarian aid (EU Council, 2010:1; EEAS, 2018iii). 
Conversely, the EEAS, created with the 2009 Lisbon Treaty (operationalised in 2011), 
reflects an independent EU foreign service, responsible for coordinating and 
implementing the EU’s foreign and security policy, to make the EU’s external action 
“more consistent and visible” (EU Council, 2010:1-3; See also: Piris, 2010:250, 255). Pre-
Lisbon, these responsibilities were mandated to the Council of the European Union’s DG E 
and the Commission’s DG External relations (DG RELEX), both entities of which were 
absorbed into this new institution (ibid.).  
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The EEAS is headed by a specially created double-hatted post, the High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission 
(HR/VP) (Council, 2010:1-3; Piris, 2010:250, 255). Through the inclusion of a senior role in 
the Commission, the post is designed to ensure that the EEAS has the capacity to 
coordinate all aspects of external action at the EU-level (EEAS, 2018iv). 
Notably, the institution also includes temporary seconded diplomats from member 
states’ foreign services, which must occupy at least 33%, but no more than 40% of the 
staff (Council, 2010:1, 10-11; EEAS, 2015; 2018i; 2018ii). The incorporation of member 
states’ diplomats was part of a broader effort to facilitate a close working relationship 
between the member states foreign/defence ministries and this EU-level institution, 
which is also reflected in the HR/VPs additional role as President of the Foreign Affairs 
Council (EEAS, 2018ii).53  
These interinstitutional connections are designed to ensure the power and legitimacy of 
the EU’s external action, the mandate of which is dependent upon a consensus amongst 
the member states. Reflecting the above institutional responsibilities, in EU-China 
relations, the Commission DGs implement the diverse policy sectors encompassed by 
pillars 2 and 3 of the Strategic Partnership, while the EEAS implements the pillar 1 
political dialogues and coordinates all other dialogues (See Fig. 5.1 below).
                                                          
53 The Foreign Affairs Council formation brings together member states’ foreign ministers, as part of the 
HR/VP’s broader consensus-building role amongst the member states (EU Council, 2010: EEAS, 2018i). 
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Figure 5.1 EU-China dialogue architecture (EEAS, 2017i) 
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5.3 Attributing interinstitutional responsibility for EU value mainstreaming with 
China 
 
Due to their responsibility for operationalising EU-China dialogues, the two institutions 
are also de-facto responsible for promoting EU-China values through these diverse 
exchanges. However, while this reflects a collective responsibility, it is important to 
establish the extent to which the EEAS, as part of its overarching coordinating role, can 
enforce such mainstreaming activities on their Commission colleagues.  
This relationship is clarified by the Council decision establishing the organisation and 
functioning of the EEAS (Council, 2010:1). The document explicitly describes how the EEAS 
is limited to assisting the HR/VP in their capacity as Vice-President of the Commission 
through coordinating the EU’s external action (to aid coherency/effectiveness) “without 
prejudice to the normal tasks of the Commission services” (Council, 2010:1; See also: 
2010:7). In this sense, beyond foreign and security policy (i.e. pillar 1 EU-China dialogues), 
which is exclusively under EEAS management, the interinstitutional working relationship 
is established as one of “cooperation” (Council, 2010:3) between two autonomous 
institutions. The relationship is two-way and consultative, as opposed to the Commission 
DGs having any legal onus to enact the will of the EEAS (Council, 2010:3; Piris, 2010:248). 
Similarly, at the highest levels, the HR/VP does not have “the legal power to impose 
his/her decisions on his/her colleagues in the college” (Piris, 2010:248).  
Consequently, in the context of value mainstreaming in EU-China dialogues, the EEAS can 
merely promote such activities, as opposed to having the constitutional authority to 
legally enforce them on their Commission colleagues. However, both institutions are 
legally bound to the higher power enshrined by the Lisbon Treaty and its supporting 
(thematic/sectoral) documents, which establishes the official discourse and requisite 







5.4 Individuals and structures responsible for EU-China dialogues 
 
The European Commission 
To contextualise the empirical chapters, it is important to explain the 
individuals/structures in the Commission and the EEAS responsible for operationalising 
EU-China dialogues. In both institutions, very small groups of individuals plan and conduct 
the dialogues. Regarding the Commission, as most Directorate-Generals or DGs principally 
have an internal EU focus, they tend to have a single unit responsible for addressing the 
external dimensions of their policy sector (See example in Fig. 5.2). Using the EU’s official 
online directory (See EU, 2018ii), analysis of these units attached to the Commission DGs 
covered by this project, suggests that they contain 16 individuals on average,54 including 
2-4 administrative staff.  
In this context, typically only a single official will have responsibility for China, internally 
known as the China desk.55 However, in many DGs, this China portfolio will also reflect 
part of a broader regional or even global portfolio.56 These individuals have the primary 
responsibility for coordinating and negotiating the topics or themes of their dialogue(s) 
with the Chinese side (See Section 5.6), working closely with their parallel desk at the EU 
delegation to China in Beijing.57  
The analysis above excludes the DGs which are externally focused and have greater 
independence vis-à-vis the EEAS, of which this project encompasses two: DG Trade and 
DG International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO). The former, focused on the 
EU’s international trade relations, had at the time of writing, a 13 strong Unit dedicated 
to East Asia in Brussels, which included 5 officials focusing on China (EU, 2018iii). 
Notwithstanding this DG’s external focus, this team is unusually large. This is attributable 
to the scale and significance of EU-China economic relations, as described in Chapter 3.3.  
With regard to DG DEVCO, which coordinates the EU’s international development aid, the 
DG similarly hosts a regional unit dedicated to East and South Asian countries (EU, 
                                                          
54 Based on calculated mean of personnel from international cooperation units encompassed by the thesis’s 
interview sample. 
55 Interviews with officials from DG EAC on 17.06.2015 at 5.00pm and 24.02.2017 at 3.00pm in Brussels; 
Interviews with an official from DG ENV on 08.03.2017 at 11.00am, in Brussels; and an official from the 
European Commission on 23.05.2017 at 3.00pm, in Beijing. 
56 ibid. 
57 Interview with an official from DG GROW on 09.03.2017 at 3.30pm, in Brussels. 
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2018iv). However, as noted in Chapter 2.3.3, China is no longer considered a developing 
country as of 2017, so China-country capacity has been significantly drawn down in this 
DG during the period of this research project. As a result, DG DEVCO capacity on EU-China 
relations is now comparable to other DGs (i.e. a single individual given responsibility) and 
development cooperation is moving towards a donor-donor coordination format 
(managed by the EEAS) as opposed to donor-recipient.58 That being said, it is important to 
highlight the continued involvement in EU-China relations by individuals from DG DEVCO 
working with autonomous human rights funding instruments, principally the European 
Instrument for Democracy and Human rights (EIDHR) (See: EU Commission, 2018iv). 
Additionally, it is essential to highlight that beyond the China desk(s) dedicated to EU-
China relations in most DGs,59 other officials from throughout each DG, with thematic 
portfolios - issue-specific as opposed to country-specific - will also partake in dialogues 
depending on the theme. For example, the EU-China industrial policy dialogues which are 
themed to shipbuilding or automobiles will also include the appropriate experts from DG 
GROW,60 beyond the designated DG GROW China desk.61 Additionally, the bilaterally 
agreed themes of each dialogue can also lead to collaboration between DGs, to ensure 
the appropriate expertise is present. However, in this authors experience, such 
cooperation appears to be more theoretical than a reality due to the “silo mentality”62 of 
the DGs.63 Nevertheless, officials from DGs focusing on similar sectors do appear to 
spectate each other’s dialogues with China on an ad-hoc basis.64  
 
 
                                                          
58 Interview with a diplomat from the EEAS on 05.10.2017 at 11.00am, in Brussels 
59 The existence of a China desk will be dependent on a) the DG in question having an external dimension 
and b) an applicable bilateral dialogue with China. For example, China is a third country, so DG Enlargement 
manages no EU-China dialogues) 
60 DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW) 
61 Interview with an official from DG GROW on 09.03.2017 at 3.30pm, in Brussels. 
62 Interview with an official from the European Commission on 09.06.2017 at 3.00pm, in Beijing. 
63 Interview with an official from DG EAC on 10.02.2017 at 10.00am, in Brussels. 
64 Interviews with officials from DG GROW on 09.03.2017 at 3.30pm; DG EMPL on 03.10.2017 at 10.00am; 
and DG JUST on 11.10.2017 at 11.00am, in Brussels. 
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Figure 5.2 Organisation structure for DG Justice and Consumers (JUST): International Cooperation Unit [Anonymised] (EU Commission, 2018viii) 
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The European External Action Service 
Regarding the EEAS, there is an entire unit almost totally dedicated to EU-China relations: 
The China, Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, Mongolia Unit, known internally as the China 
Division (See EU, 2018v for the EEAS organisation chart). At the time of writing, the unit 
has 8 individuals, 2 of which are administrative staff. Beyond the Head and Deputy Head 
of Unit, the remaining 4 desks are responsible for coordinating multiple clusters of sectors 
(often thematically similar) managed by the Commission DGs and specific Pillar 1 political 
dialogues, which are exclusively EEAS managed (EU, 2018vi). These allocations change 
over time, however, during this thesis’s data collection, one desk for example was 
responsible for EU-China economic dialogues (i.e. coordinating DGs TRADE, ECFIN, GROW 
etc), while another principally covered the political dialogues focusing on 
security/defence and those dedicated to individual regions.65 It is worth highlighting that 
some of these individuals in the China division also have responsibility for the EU’s 
relations with Hong Kong and Macao, Taiwan or Mongolia (ibid.) 
Beyond the China Division, individuals from the EEAS’s GLOBAL Directorate also have a 
significant role in EU-China relations (EU, 2018vii). The directorate includes thematic units 
which focus on issues such as human rights and climate change (ibid.).66 These individuals, 
which effectively act as an additional coordinating force for the thematic priorities of EU 
relations with third countries like China, often play a role in planning and operationalising 
EU-China dialogues.67 These individuals typically have regional or even global portfolios 
(ibid.).68  
Throughout the empirical chapters, the term EU officials will collectively capture 
practitioners from both the EEAS and the Commission. Individually, EEAS staff will be 
described as EEAS diplomats and Commission staff will be described as officials from DG 
X, or if greater anonymity is required, simply Commission officials. This distinction 
between the two institutions is reflective of the EEAS alone reflecting a foreign service, 
populated by diplomats. 
                                                          
65 Interviews with diplomats from the EEAS on 09.04.2015 at 11am; 20.02.2017 at 11.00am and 05.10.2017 
at 11.00am, in Brussels.  






5.5 The categorisation of EU-China dialogues and its significance for value 
mainstreaming in practice 
 
5.5.1 The importance of level in EU-China relations and the Chinese party-state structure 
 
The final section of this chapter pertains to the characteristics and format of EU-China 
dialogues, providing important context into how EU-China dialogues function in practice 
and the implications of this for value mainstreaming. Firstly, dialogues are categorised by 
level. While this is significant for any formal diplomatic exchange, indicating the political 
importance of the channel and the seniority of those in attendance, it is particularly 
important in the case of China. It also has direct implications for EU value mainstreaming.  
As noted in Chapter 3.5.1, the most influential ancient Chinese schools of thought 
prescribe a strict hierarchy to maintain social harmony/order, wherein authority is 
delegated and centralised to those deemed most capable according to the governing 
principles (e.g. education, morality, ideological convergence). This is reflected in 
contemporary Chinese political culture, meaning that the designated level of an EU-China 
dialogue will strongly determine not only its likely impact, but the power of those on the 
Chinese side to affect meaningful change on value-related issues.  
The impact of this political culture is both practically intensified and complicated by 
China’s party-state structure. In this sense, real power on the Chinese side derives from 
parallel positions in the senior levels of both the state and party apparatus, the latter of 
which holds ultimate power (Li, 2016:40-44). In this vein, a Vice-Premier who sits on both 
the Executive Committee of the Chinese government’s cabinet - the State Council - and 
the Politburo, which is a top party body, is likely to have much greater practical influence 
on Chinese policy than Ministers limited to the Party’s lower level Central Committee 
body, in conjunction with their State Council Executive Committee seat (Li, 2016: 71-72; 
88-89; See: Fig 5.3 and Table 5.1 below).  
Similarly, the Vice-Ministers that chair most EU-China dialogues (i.e. those at working-
level) hold neither top state nor (typically) top party positions and will thus have a 
comparatively restricted mandate and decision-making authority for engaging with the 
EU, impeding any value mainstreaming efforts.69 However, it is worth highlighting that 
                                                          
69 Interview with an official from DG TRADE on 15.02.2017 at 4.00pm, in Brussels. 
85 
 
the personal connections of a given interlocutor on the Chinese side (i.e. 
familial/factional/collegial), likely unknown to the EU side, may equate to influence 
disproportionate to their station, transcending these institutional norms (See: Li, 2016:17-
24; 207-47). Based on this author’s interviews, knowledge of where power truly lies on 
the Chinese side, either officially or unofficially, tends to be limited among EU officials 
engaging in EU-China dialogues.  
As described in greater depth in Chapter 7.3, these potential power constraints on the 
Chinese side during dialogues mean that officials may be unable to speak with authority 
about anything beyond the pre-agreed agenda for the dialogue, as opposed to merely 
unwilling to do so. They often have to delegate decisions to the upper levels of the party 
and state apparatus.70 This is highly problematic in the context of the practical 
implementation of the EU’s normative power, as EU officials may be deterred or 
prevented from mainstreaming EU values as a result. 
 
5.5.2 The Chinese party-state structure and the official party-state discourse on values  
 
Relatedly, it is also significant to highlight that the party-state structure and its capacity to 
determine whether officials can or cannot discuss values in EU-China dialogues, is closely 
linked to the implementation of the official party-state discourse in this area, which it 
ensures is strictly shared and expressed by Chinese officials. As Guo (2013:283) highlights, 
mirroring China’s domestic governance, the Party and its ideology plays a strong role in 
Chinese foreign policy, setting out its “principles and policy guidelines”, often anchored 
around concepts and slogans.  
Importantly, the official party-state discourse on values appears not to be limited to 
officials merely articulating a word-for-word dissemination of China’s official position on 
individual values. Instead, it may also extend to Chinese officials expressing an outright 
refusal to engage in discussions on values, particularly those that are deemed particularly 
controversial like human rights. While this crucially aligns with “non-interference in each 
other’s internal affairs” (Guo, 2013:283), one of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 
                                                          
70 Interview with an official from DG GROW on 09.03.2017 at 3.30pm, in Brussels. 
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which heavily guide Chinese foreign policy,71 it is also alluded to in China’s guiding EU-
China strategy - China’s policy paper on the EU (2014) - and the joint EU-China 2020 
Strategic Agenda for Cooperation (2013). 
These documents describe discussion of human rights solely in the context of the 
dedicated dialogue, alluding to a potential refusal to discuss the value out with these 
compartmentalised bilateral exchanges. In this vein, China’s policy paper on the EU (2014) 
explicitly stipulates conducting “human rights cooperation within the dialogue 
framework” (MoFA, 2014). Notably, reaffirming analysis in Chapter 3.6, even within the 
context of the human rights dialogue, these documents suggest that China and by 
extension the official party-state discourse, is seeking to limit discussion of human rights 
to areas deemed palatable. In this vein, the Strategic Agenda for Cooperation describes 
strengthening the human rights dialogue through constructive discussions solely in 
“jointly agreed key priority areas” (EEAS, 2013), while China’s policy paper on the EU 
notes that: 
The Chinese side is ready to continue human rights dialogue with the EU based on 
the principles of mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs …The EU 
side should …stop using individual cases to interfere in China's judicial sovereignty 
and internal affairs [emphasis added]. (MoFA, 2014) 
The implication of these quotes that the Chinese side may refuse to engage with any 
aspects of human rights it does not wish to discuss, including individual cases or individual 
civil and political rights as a facet of the value more broadly.  
A potential refusal to discuss sensitive EU values by Chinese officials in EU-China 
dialogues, informed by a facet of the official party-state discourse, has far-reaching 
implications for the practical implementation of the EU’s normative power. If EU officials 
are avoiding mainstreaming sensitive values like human rights based on resistance (real or 
expected) by Chinese interlocutors, they could be seen by observers and the Chinese side 
to be complying with the official party-state discourse themselves and indirectly 
endorsing the Chinese interpretation of these values. 
                                                          
71 The Mao-era Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence developed, which emerged in 1954, are i) mutual 
respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; ii) mutual non-aggression; iii) non-interference in each 
other’s internal affairs; iv) equality and mutual benefit; v) and peaceful coexistence (Guo,2013:283). 
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Shklar’s (1989) landmark political philosophy essay, the Liberalism of fear, can inform 
greater insights into these dynamics and highlight more profound implications for the 
EU’s normative power. Shklar (1989:29) suggests that fear of “cruelty and the fear it 
inspires”, and the totalitarian governance that enables it, represents the foundation of 
liberal values (including human rights and rule of law) and their continued relevance (See 
also: ibid. p.23).72 Reflecting this, if the EU side is failing to confront China’s totalitarian 
system and the conflicting interpretations of universal values it encompasses, it would 
reflect an act of self-harm which erodes the EU’s values and their continued relevance. EU 
officials would be effectively giving into the fear that the EU’s values are designed to 
guard against. As Shklar (1989:29) notes, “Systematic fear is the condition that makes 
freedom impossible”. 
                                                          
72 This argument is particularly relevant for the European context, with the EU’s values born out of a fear of 
repeating the conflict and genocide of the Second World War (See Section 2.3.1). 
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Table 5.1 Mapping Power on the Chinese side: Typical parallel state and party posts  
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5.5.3 The categorisation of EU-China dialogues by level 
 
Having established the significance of level for value mainstreaming, due to its 
relationship with China’s party-state structure, this section outlines how the dialogues are 
categorised on this basis. Table 5.2 summarises this below.  
 
Table 5.2 Categories of EU-China dialogues (Collated via ESPO, 2013: See Appendix ii) 
 
Level Seniority of 
Chair(s) on the EU 
side 
Seniority of Chair 




  Seniority  
   of Level 
 


























At the highest level is the EU-China summit which takes place once a year, alternating 
between Brussels and Beijing. The summits are co-chaired by the top EU leadership, 
including the Presidents of the Commission and the Council, as well as the Chinese 
Premier, who is head of the State Council and has a prominent seat on China’s most 
senior party body, the Politburo Standing Committee (See: Appendix ii, EU, 2017ii, Table 




addressing priority areas of EU-China relations, including dimensions which are too high 
impact or sensitive to be addressed in other lower-level forums (EU Council, 2017ii; ECFR, 
2017). The HR/VP, the EU’s Ambassador to China and the Commissioner for Trade are 
also in attendance at these ultra-high-level exchanges (EU Council, 2017ii). Beyond this 
central forum, the summits tend to have instalments of other EU-China dialogues taking 
place on the fringes, depending on what is politically prominent or has simply not taken 
place already that year (EU, 2017i).  
 
Senior ministerial and ministerial level dialogues 
The next level down, are the three senior ministerial level dialogues topping each pillar of 
the strategic partnership; the high level strategic, economic and people-to-people 
dialogues (Refer to Fig 5.1). These exchanges are typically co-chaired by Commission Vice-
Presidents (including the HR/VP) on the EU side and Vice-Premiers or State Councillor’s 
from the Chinese side (See Table 5.3). On both sides, these individuals tend to have 
thematic portfolios encompassing multiple policy sectors (Appendix ii). For example, the 
High-level Economic Dialogue is co-chaired by the Commission Vice-President responsible 
for coordinating all economic DGs and the Chinese Vice-Premier which oversees all 
economic Chinese ministries (See: BBC, 2018ii; EU Commission, 2018ix:5; Li, 2016:71-72). 
The High-Level People-to-People Dialogue (HPPD) reflects an exception where the 
Commissioner for Education, Culture, Youth and Sport co-chairs on the EU side (See 
Appendix ii). It is also worth noting that the relevant EU Commissioners also attend the 
other two senior ministerial dialogues (ibid.). 
Below the senior ministerial dialogues are the standard ministerial dialogues which 
remain very senior and are chaired by Commissioners on the EU side (heading the various 
DGs) and Ministers on the Chinese side (heading the Chinese ministries) (See Appendix ii). 
It is important to note, as displayed in Table 5.3 below, that the high-level prefix is not 
restricted to the senior ministerial dialogues described above. More broadly, it is 




officials from both sides will spectate the exchange.73 This makes it possible for high-level 
decisions/clarifications to inform and improve the efficiency of working level exchanges.74 
 
Working-level dialogues 
Lastly, the remaining majority of EU-China dialogues are at working level. These dialogues 
are typically chaired on the EU side by a Director-General or Deputy Director-General - 
individuals which are just below the Commissioners in seniority - and Vice-Ministers on 
the Chinese side.75 In theory, the working level dialogues approach technical areas which 
can be resolved at lower levels while delegating more controversial issues to the 
ministerial dialogues.76 As outlined in Section 5.5.1, the level of the Chinese co-chair in 
these working level dialogues is significant for value mainstreaming, as the EU is 
conducting an exchange with individuals lacking top-tier party and state posts, with the 











                                                          
73 Interview with an official from DG TRADE on 15.02.2017 at 4.00pm, in Brussels. 
74 ibid. 
75 Interviews with officials from the European Commission on 18.05.2017 at 4.00pm, in Beijing; and 
09.03.2017 at 3.30pm (DG GROW), in Brussels.  
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*Interviews suggest that this 
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5.6 The format of EU-China dialogues 
 
Concerning the format of EU-China dialogues, most dialogues take place on an annual 
basis and alternate between Brussels and Beijing. Based on interview accounts and 
dialogue agendas obtained by the author, the attendance of dialogues is variable, but 
between 10-20 individuals on each side (i.e. 20-40 in the room) appears to be average (EU 
Commission, 2017iii).79 The delegation on each side will consist of the co-chairs that differ 
depending on the level of the dialogue, along with the relevant officials, which will 
include the primary EEAS or Commission China desk which has coordinated the dialogues, 
their Chinese counterparts and additional experts from each side.80 This can include civil 
society individuals such as representatives from NGOs, businesses or academia.81 
Moreover, all dialogues are simultaneously interpreted in English-Mandarin.82 
The length and format of the dialogues is variable and sector-specific but will typically last 
1-2 days in a multi-section structure (EU Commission 2017i). A typical example would 
involve a diplomatic exchange for the first half of the dialogue before a section bringing 
together civil society individuals with officials from both sides (ibid.).83 If dialogues last 
two days, study visits appear to be commonly incorporated.84 For example, the EU-China 
human rights dialogue in June 2017 saw the Chinese delegation taken to visit a refugee 
centre in Brussels, after a diplomatic exchange the previous day and a roundtable with 
civil society in the morning (EEAS, 2017iv).85  
 
In terms of the substance of the dialogues, they are themed, meaning that both sides 
agree on areas that are of mutual interest for that particular policy sector.86 For example, 
the first ministerial-level Legal Affairs dialogue in 2016 focused on e-commerce and 
consumer protection, while the second instalment in 2017 focused on better regulation 
                                                          
79 Interviews with officials from DG JUST on DG CLIMA on 16.02.2017; 01.03.2017 at 10.00am and DG ENV 
on 08.03.2017 at 11.00am, in Brussels. 
80 Interviews with officials from DG JUST on 01.03.2017 at 10.00am; DG GROW on 09.03.2017 at 3.30pm; 
and diplomat from the EEAS on 07.10.2017 at 10.00am, in Brussels.   
81 ibid.  
82 Interview with a diplomat from the EEAS on 31.05.2017 11.00am, in Beijing. 
83 Interviews with officials from DG JUST on 01.03.2017 at 10.00am and 11.10.2017 at 11.00am; and DG 
GROW on 09.03.2017 at 3.30pm, in Brussels. 
84 Interviews with an official from DG EMPL on 03.10.2017 at 10.00am and EEAS diplomats on 09.04.2015 at 
10.00am and 07.10.2017 at 10.00am, in Brussels. 
85 Interview with a diplomat from EEAS on 07.10.2017 at 10.00am, in Brussels. 
86 Interviews with officials from DG JUST on 09.02.2017 at 10.30am, 01.03.2017 at 10.00am and 11.10.2017 




and improvement of the quality of legislation.87 This bilateral negotiation of themes in 
advance of dialogues is highly significant for EU value mainstreaming. It reflects an 
opportunity for EU officials to lobby for topics which connect to EU values during the 
planning/design phase of dialogues. 
 
Finally, it is important to highlight that while this thesis focuses primarily on how EU 
officials mainstream values within dialogues, according to the format above, some 
examples in the findings make reference to cooperation programmes and projects.88 
These reflect a common output of many EU-China dialogues and consist of mutual 
agreement to co-fund further cooperation between experts from both sides, in order 
share/build knowledge in a given area for a time limited period. Perhaps the most 
numerous and high-profile cooperation programmes and projects have taken place in the 
context of environment and climate cooperation, largely in mainland China. Many of 
these were majority or wholly funded by the EU in light of China’s pre-2017 status as a 
developing country.89 For example, the EU-China Environmental Governance Programme 
lasted five years (2010-2015) and consisted of 15 grant-based pilot projects and legal 
seminars across multiple Chinese provinces, “to improve environmental governance by 
enhancing public participation and corporate responsibility in China” (EU Commission, 





To conclude, the analysis throughout this chapter provided contextual insight into how 
EU-China dialogues function in practice and the implications of this for value 
mainstreaming. This reflects a crucial backdrop to the subsequent empirical chapters and 
their assessment of the practical implementation of the EU’s normative power. In this 
                                                          
87 Interviews with officials from DG JUST on 09.02.2017 at 10.30am, 01.03.2017 at 10.00am and 11.10.2017 
at 11.00am. 
88 For the purpose of clarification, cooperation programmes reflect multiple individual projects under the 
auspices of a broader issue (e.g. water quality), while cooperation projects are limited in scope to a specific 
area/purpose. 
89 As of 2017 China is no longer considered a developing country by the EU and not eligible for Official 
Development Assistance (ODA). 




regard, the European Commission and the EEAS were established as the two EU 
institutions responsible for the operationalisation of EU-China dialogues, with insights 
provided into the small groups of individuals who manage the dialogues and their 
bureaucratic structures.  
The relationship between the two institutions was also explored in the context of 
mainstreaming EU values with China in practice. To this end, it emerged that while the 
EEAS cannot enforce such actions by their Commission colleagues, both institutions are 
equally bound to the value mainstreaming standards expressed in the Lisbon Treaty 
(2009). Lastly, the chapter outlined the characteristics and format of EU-China dialogues. 
In this context it emerged that dialogues are categorised by level, based on the seniority 
of participants. Due to the importance of hierarchy in China’s opaque decision-making 
systems, it emerged that the level of dialogues had implications for officials practically 









Interviewees’ accounts suggested that value mainstreaming in EU-China dialogues was 
rarely taking place in practice, departing from the standards encompassed by the EU’s 
official discourse and normative power Europe (NPE). In this context, Chapter 6 first 
establishes the EU’s official discourse on value mainstreaming found in documents 
(Section 6.2), providing a crucial reference point for the mainstreaming standards that EU 
officials should follow. The official discourse is revealed to prescribe systematic value 
mainstreaming in all dialogues with third countries, which aligns with NPE’s ideal-type 
conceptualisation of the EU and its mechanism of procedural diffusion.   
Section 6.3 focuses on analysis of the elite interviews carried out for thesis. The analysis 
shows that systematic value mainstreaming is not taking place in EU-China dialogues. It 
also reveals that these dynamics can be explained through the discourses shared by EU 
officials. These fall into two discursive categories: organisational discourses and those 
surrounding China’s role. The latter is addressed in Chapter 7, while this chapter explores 
the two organisational discourses, invoked by officials when discussing the topic. 
Thereafter the chapter highlights how these discourses may be being enabled or actively 
reproduced by the language found in the EU’s China country strategy (6.5). Finally, the 
chapter details how a lack of coordination of value mainstreaming in the EU’s internal 
meeting mechanisms - in Brussels and Beijing - connects to the established discourses 










6.2 Establishing the official discourse on the practical implementation of EU 
norms 
 
6.2.1 The Lisbon Treaty: Article 21 and supporting articles 
 
While historically implicit in EC/EU treaties when the normative power thesis was 
developed in 2002, the 2009 Lisbon Treaty for first time explicitly stated in article 21.1 
that the EU’s external action is built upon its values, being: 
Guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and 
enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world [the EU’s values 
are then listed] (EU, 2010i:28) 
Article 21.1 also clarifies that the EU’s partnerships with third countries will be predicated 
upon those actors sharing the EU’s values (EU, 2010i:28). Additionally, Article 21.2 notes 
that the EU “shall define and pursue common policies” (EU, 2010i:28) and work with 
international partners to realise its values internationally, while Article 21.3 describes 
how the “development and implementation of the different areas of the Union’s external 
action” (EU, 2010i:29) will be based upon the overarching normative objectives 
elucidated in 21.1 and 21.2.  
It is important to acknowledge that this constitutional document has multiple audiences. 
It is intended for domestic consumption, legitimising the EU’s external action to member 
states’ citizens, as well as presenting a mandate to third countries. However, the 
document also has practical implications for EU officials’ activities. In this sense, it 
formalises an official discourse on value promotion with third countries.  
This normative basis for the EU’s external action is reinforced throughout the Lisbon 
Treaty. For example, Article 22.1 (Chapter 1, Title V) describes how the EU’s “strategic 
interest and objectives”, identified by the Council shall be based upon Article 21. This all-
encompassing and agenda-setting role of EU values reinforces the notion that they should 
play a central role in all EU-China dialogues, regardless of substance.   
Moreover, Title VI, Article 47, states that “the Union shall have legal personality” (EU, 
2010i: 41), which establishes (for the first time) that the EU formally represents an 
international actor distinct from its member states, that can build bilateral relationships 




87). This is pertinent, as it resolves past and widely disputed90 legal ambiguities about the 
EU’s actorness. It also arguably reinforces the legal power of the Lisbon Treaty and thus 
the EU’s obligations, including the normative basis of its external action.  
Conversely and of great importance to EU-China dialogues, Part Five, Title 1 details how 
each key policy sector of the Union’s external action “shall be guided by the principles, 
pursue the objectives and be conducted in accordance with… Chapter 1 of Title V”, 
reaffirming Article 21. This explicit reinforcement of Article 21 also takes place in the 
sections dedicated to individual policy sectors.91  
Lastly, it is worth noting that Article 24.3 (Chapter 2, Section 1), highlights how beyond 
the EU level institutions (which reflect the focus of this thesis), member states are legally 
bound to “support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly” 
(EU, 2010i:30) and “refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the 
Union” (EU, 2010i:30). As the Union’s interests are based upon the EU’s values, this 
means that member states are obliged to actively reinforce the EU’s values with third 
countries, such as China. This constitutional prescription appears to stand in contrast to 
portrayals of weak unity on value promotion by member states in existing literature (See 
Chapter 3.7). 
In the context of applying discourse analysis, despite the Lisbon Treaty explicitly 
suggesting that the EU’s values holistically underpin the EU’s external action, it is 
challenging to discern the practical implications for value mainstreaming in EU-China 
dialogues. The key reference for value mainstreaming, Article 21.1, remains vague and 
open to interpretation.  
While the EU being “guided” (EU, 2010i:28) by its values could imply practitioners actively 
and systematically seeking to integrate EU values into all dialogues with third countries (a 
hard interpretation), it could also refer to a far more passive arrangement, where 
diplomats’ activities are merely informed by EU values, acting as a backdrop for their 
engagement with third countries like China and not explicitly featuring in dialogues (a soft 
interpretation).  
                                                          
90 As Piris (2010:87) articulates, pre-Lisbon Treaty, ‘the exact scope of… [the EU’s] legal personality’ was 
disputed in academic and governmental circles. 
91 For example, Title II, Article 207, ‘The common commercial policy shall be conducted in the context of the 




Unfortunately, existing literature appears unable to clarify this inherent ambiguity. For 
example, Jean Claude Piris (2010:243), involved with the treaty’s drafting,92 maintains 
that the intended reading of the article is that the EU’s values are “applicable to all 
sectors of external policy, in addition to their own specific objectives [emphasis added]”. 
While this clarifies that the EU’s values have a role in all EU-China dialogues, it remains 
unclear what this applicability entails for practical mainstreaming activities by EU officials. 
 
6.2.2 Further interpreting Article 21 
 
However, the analysis of supplementary thematic policy documents below, connected to 
the promotion of human rights and sustainable development, further clarifies the official 
discourse and its practical implications for value mainstreaming. Following this, a hard 
interpretation of Article 21 emerges. The analysis also reveals a sub-discourse which 
infers that existing mainstreaming practices by EU officials are not meeting the 
standards/practices prescribed by this (clarified) official discourse. This arguably alludes 
to the existence of different discourses being shared by EU officials, which inform 
alternative approaches to value mainstreaming in dialogues (as elucidated later in this 
chapter).  
The documents analysed below differ in their intended audiences, with some 
predominantly working guidelines for EU officials and others also being aimed at EU 
citizens and third countries. All serve to build a clearer picture of the practical 
prescriptions of the official discourse. 
It is also worth highlighting that while this thesis focuses on the promotion of human 
rights and sustainable development, the absence of comparable documents dedicated to 
the external promotion of other EU values (which are collectively specified in Article 21), 
suggest that the official discourse, clarified below, is applicable to the promotion of all EU 
values with third countries.  
Moreover, it is important to note that the key human rights policy documents also 
encompass rule of law (as well as liberal democracy). This reinforces the EU’s conceptual 
                                                          
92 Jean-Claude Piris was legal adviser to the Council during the negotiation and adoption of the 2009 Lisbon 





linkage between rule of law and human rights in its external action which is 
institutionalised in EU-China relations (See Chapter 3.6). Conversely, as noted in Chapter 
3.5, liberal democracy is side-lined from EU-China relations. 
 
Key human rights documents 
Concerning human rights, arguably the most relevant document is the Strategic 
Framework and Action Plan for Human rights and Democracy (EU Council, 2012i) and its 
updated 2015-2019 Action Plan (EU Commission 2015i). These jointly reflect the guiding 
documents for the promotion of human rights and democracy in the EU’s external action 
and are principally aimed at EU officials. The document states that: 
Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union has reaffirmed the EU’s determination 
to promote human rights and democracy through all its external actions. (EU 
Council, 2012i:2)  
Building on this, it notes in the case of human rights that “The EU will promote human 
rights in all areas of its external action without exception [emphasis added]” (EU Council, 
2012i:2), before listing all major sectors of cooperation with third countries. The language 
infers that EU officials should be actively mainstreaming human rights into their dialogues 
(“promote”), as well as suggesting that this practice is applicable to all dialogues with 
third countries, regardless of sectoral substance.  
The 2015-2019 Action Plan, a stock-taking update for the above document, further 
reinforces this hard interpretation of Article 21. It emphasises the need for “better 
coherence and consistency” by the Commission and the EEAS: 
Through mainstreaming human rights considerations into the external aspects of 
EU policies, particularly with regard to trade/investment, 
migration/refugee/asylum and development policies as well as counter-terrorism. 
(EU Commission, 2015ii:6) 
Interestingly, the language also suggests that existing human rights mainstreaming 
activities by the Commission and the EEAS are not meeting the strict standards of the 
official discourse, chiefly in the sectors specified. In particular, the idea that EU officials 




appears to align with the dominant criticism of NPE, that material interests prevail in the 
EU’s external action (See Chapter 2.4). Importantly this language is also identifiable in 
other key human rights policy documents, making it arguably a sub-discourse of the 
official discourse on value mainstreaming.  
These clarifications of the official discourse are reinforced and expanded by the Council of 
the European Union’s annual reports on human rights and democracy promotion.93 These 
documents seek to display the EU’s work every year in internationally promoting human 
rights. As a result, unlike the documents above, there is greater emphasis in displaying 
the EU’s prioritisation and resolve in promoting human rights to EU citizens and third 
countries. Nevertheless, they also importantly aim to reaffirm EU officials’ practical 
obligations to promote human rights. For example, the 2014 report describes the need to 
“mainstream human rights considerations into the full range of EU external policies” (EU 
Council, 2015:11) while the 2016 report states that: 
Human rights issues should not be confined to human rights dialogues … [but] 
included in the agenda of other meetings, including political or other dialogues. 
(EU Council, 2017i:7)  
As well as shoring up the notion that human rights should be mainstreamed into all 
sectoral dialogues with third countries, the language in the quote once again suggests 
that in practice, human rights promotion is seldom taking place beyond the dedicated 
dialogue (i.e. promotion “should not be confined human rights dialogues”).  
However, most pertinently, the report further clarifies the official discourse, describing 
the need for the “systematic mainstreaming of human rights [emphasis added]” (EU 
Council, 2017i:5). In this respect, the document expands upon the language found in the 
Strategic Framework/Action Plan documents, with the word “systematic”, suggesting that 
human rights mainstreaming should be operationalised by officials through active and 
purposeful actions. This language is also clearly displayed in the EU’s Global Strategy,94 
which is aimed at similar audiences. It states that “we must… systematically mainstream 
                                                          
93 This thesis focuses on 2014, 2015 and 2016 Annual reports (See: EU Council, 2015; 2016; 2017i), which 
cover the chronology of this project’s extensive research interviews. The reports are released the year after 
the material they cover. For example, the 2014 report was published in 2015.  
94 Full title: Shared Vision, Common Action, a Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union’s 




human rights and gender issues across policy sectors and institutions [emphasis added]” 
(EU, 2016i:11).  
Another key example, which reaffirms the argued substance of the official discourse is the 
European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs’ (AFET) only report to date on EU-
China relations (2015). The document, which directly informed the 2016 Elements for a 
new EU strategy on China document (See Section 6.4.3),95 “calls on the EEAS to ensure 
that human rights are high on the agenda in relations and dialogues with China” (EU 
Parliament, 2015i:11) and “urges the EU to continue pressing for an improvement of the 
human rights situation in China whenever dialogues are held at any level” (EU Parliament, 
2015i:18).  
The language explicitly highlights how human rights should not only feature in all 
dialogues (i.e. “whenever dialogues are held at any level”) but that these issues should be 
at the forefront of exchanges (“high on the agenda”). This confirms the notion of 
systematic mainstreaming activities by all officials in every dialogue. Additionally, the 
quotes also display the argued sub-discourse, suggesting that officials are not integrating 
human rights into every dialogue with China (i.e. AFET “urges the EU to continue pressing 
for an improvement of the human rights situation in China”). 
Finally, it is important to highlight that the need for systematic value mainstreaming is 
reinforced in sector-specific documents. A particularly notable example pertains to trade 
and investment, an area cast by existing literature as prone to side-lining EU values. Trade 
for all - Towards a more responsible trade and investment (2015) seeks to present an 
integral role for values in EU trade policy and it is aimed at domestic and external 
audiences, as well as informing the working practices of EU officials.  
The document explicitly reinforces the argued clarification of the official discourse, 
through its recognition that “trade policy can be a powerful tool to further the 
advancement of human rights in third countries” (EU Commission, 2015iii:25) and it is 
committed to “ensure the implementation of the provisions on trade and investment of 
the EU 2015-2018 human rights action plan” (ibid. p.26). Notably, the document is 
inherently framed according to the sub-discourse suggesting that existing value 
                                                          




mainstreaming practices are not meeting the standards of the official discourse. In this 
vein, it describes how the strategy is reflective of the Commission needing to adapt: 
Its approach to trade policy to take all of these lessons on board …meaning it will 
be more effective, more transparent and will not only project our interests, but 
also our values. (ibid.) 
The above analysis suggests that the EUs official discourse on value mainstreaming can be 
clarified as EU values should be systematically mainstreamed into all dialogues with third 
countries. The analysis also alludes to a sub-discourse casting existing practices as not 
meeting these standards.  
 
Key sustainable development documents 
Although often being dedicated to internal EU policy as well as external relations, key 
sustainable development documents - encompassing the environmental dimension 
focused upon by this thesis - appear to confirm this argued clarification of the official 
discourse. The EU’s response to the UN’s 2030 Agenda for sustainable development at the 
international level, Next steps for a sustainable future: European Action for Sustainability 
(2016) and its accompanying action plan (Key European action supporting the 2030 
Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals), reflect arguably the key contemporary 
reference documents for the EU’s promotion of sustainable development in practice.  
Like several documents analysed above, the central Next steps for a sustainable future 
document is intended for multiple audiences. It aims to assert the EU’s commitment to 
sustainable development to EU citizens and third countries as well as promote the value’s 
inclusion in EU officials’ activities. Conversely, its accompanying action plan has primarily 
an internal focus, being designated as a “Commission staff working document” (EU 
Commission, 2016ii:1).  In a broad context, the central document describes how:  
The Commission will mainstream the Sustainable Development Goals into EU 
policies and initiatives, with sustainable development as an essential guiding 
principle for all of its policies. (EU Commission, 2016i:18)  
Aligning with the clarified official discourse, the language suggests that mainstreaming 
sustainable development is relevant to all EU policy sectors. Additionally, its 




EU officials should be prioritising sustainable development and its promotion in all of 
their activities, including dialogues with third countries.  
This is reaffirmed by a section in the document dedicated to the EU’s external action. It 
states, with reference to the guiding UN document, that “the vision of the 2030 Agenda is 
fully consistent with the objectives of EU external action, including the pursuit of 
sustainable development” (EU Commission, 2016i:13).96 Reinforcing the applicability of 
sustainable development to EU-China dialogues, the document emphasises that the 
promotion of sustainable development is not restricted to lower income developing 
countries, but “more advanced developing countries” (like China) in the context of “more 
differentiated partnerships in accordance with our partners' development paths and 
needs” (ibid.). 
Importantly and mirroring the human rights documents, the document suggests the need 
for systematic mainstreaming activities by Commission and EEAS diplomats, noting that: 
Keeping track of progress in a systematic and transparent way is essential… the 
Commission will carry out more detailed regular monitoring of the Sustainable 
Development Goals in an EU context [emphasis added]. (EU Commission, 
2016i:16) 
The language here also notably alludes to the sub-discourse suggesting that existing 
mainstreaming practices are not meeting the standards of the official discourse. Existing 
monitoring of sustainable development is cast as not sufficiently detailed and 
necessitating the creation of a new reference framework for officials. Reaffirming this, the 
accompanying action plan casts mainstreaming the value as an ongoing work in progress, 
describing the Commission’s “commitment …to further mainstreaming it [sustainable 
development] into its policy-making” (EU Commission, 2016ii:2).  
However, this interlinked sub-discourse appears be softer than that found in the human 
rights documents. The language alludes almost solely to weak institutional mechanisms 
for mainstreaming sustainable development, as opposed to EU officials actively side-lining 
the value from dialogues. Arguably, this emphasises how sustainable development, 
particularly its environmental facet, is largely uncontroversial with third countries, unlike 
                                                          
96 This is explicitly reaffirmed in the accompanying action plan which reaffirms sustainable development’s 
applicability “both within the EU and through EU external action” (EU Commission, 2016ii:2) and the need 




human rights. This suggests that officials may be more amenable to raising the value in 
practice.  
 
6.2.3 Summarising the official discourse and its implications 
 
Overall, the analysis of key sustainable development documents confirms the substance 
of the official discourse as: EU values should be systematically mainstreamed into all 
dialogues with third countries. This clarification, representing a hard interpretation of 
Article 21, aligns with NPE’s ideal-type and the mechanism of procedural diffusion, which 
captures active and purposeful actions by EU officials to integrate values into dialogues 
with third countries like China. It also allows for a distinction to be made between officials 
systematically mainstreaming values in Brussels and Beijing, theorised by overt diffusion 
(See Chapter 2.3.3). The relationship between NPE and the official discourse is 
summarised in Table 6.1 below.  
 
The clarified official discourse also importantly aligns with broader definitions of 
mainstreaming. For example, in the context of gender, the Council of Europe defines 
mainstreaming as: 
 
The (re)organisation, improvement, development and evaluation of policy 
processes, so that a gender equality perspective is incorporated in all policies at all 
levels and at all stages, by the actors normally involved in policy-making. (COE, 
2018) 
 
Similarly, in associated academic literature De Waal (2006:10) describes mainstreaming as 
“deliberate, planned [and] intended strategy” necessitating “deliberate and focused 
interventions at every level”. Both definitions capture active and systematic attempts by 
individuals to incorporate gender into all their activities. 
 
It is also worth highlighting that implied ideal end-point of any type of mainstreaming 
efforts is that the desired activities become so ingrained that systematic actions are no 
longer necessary. As the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment 




attention to gender equality will pervade all policies” (UN Women, 2018). Similarly, in the 
case of EU value mainstreaming, one EEAS diplomat described how “If mainstreaming 
succeeds, it’s invisible”.97  
 
Reflecting the official discourse and expanding upon the established roles of the EEAS and 
the Commission in EU-China dialogues (Chapter 5.4), the following behaviour would be 
expected by the EEAS and Commission officials operationalising EU-China dialogues. 
Firstly, considering the EEAS’s coordinating role, it would be expected that EEAS 
diplomats are actively promoting systematic value mainstreaming amongst their 
Commission colleagues, both through ad-hoc contacts and formal meeting mechanisms. 
Secondly, it would be expected that officials from both institutions would be undertaking 
systematic activities to design EU values into their dialogues with China and explicitly or 
implicitly raising them with their counterparts. However, the sub-discourse identified in 
documents suggests that EU officials may not be realising these expectations in practice, 













                                                          




Table 6.1 Convergence between the EU’s official discourse on value mainstreaming and NPE 
EU’s official discourse on value 
mainstreaming 
 
Normative power Europe (NPE) 
• The EU’s external action is 
informed by its values  
 
(Lisbon Treaty [2009], Article 
21.1) 
 
• Ideal-type conceptualisation theorises the EU’s 
values as its defining international identity 
• EU values should be 
systematically mainstreamed 
into all dialogues with third 
countries  
 
(Clarified official discourse) 
• The EU should aspire to prioritise its values in its 
external action. 
• Procedural diffusion theorises how the EU 
actively and purposely shares its normative 
power through institutionalised relationships 
with third countries, encompassing bilateral 
dialogues. 
• Overt diffusion informs a theoretical distinction 
between value mainstreaming by Brussels-





6.3 Assessing the practical mainstreaming of EU values in EU-China dialogues: 
Summarising the research findings 
 
Bar those individuals operationalising the human rights dialogue, the analysis of 
interviewees’ accounts found that officials were not systematically mainstreaming values 
into EU-China dialogues. This applied to both EEAS and Commission officials based in 




At the most general level, interviewees explicitly suggested that systematic 
mainstreaming of EU values was not taking place in their dialogues. Reflecting this, the 
author first asked all interviewees about their primary objectives in dialogues. While the 
raison d'être of any dialogue is defined by its sectoral policy focus, in almost every case, 
the interviewees centred exclusively on the technical/material dimensions of their 
dialogues, while neglecting to specify any normative objectives or systematic value 
mainstreaming practices. This was reinforced by their responses to more specific 
questions focusing on the extent to which EU values (both more broadly and human 
rights and sustainable development specifically) were being integrated into their 
dialogues.  
This broad finding, that there is a lack of systematic value mainstreaming in EU-China 
dialogues, appears to support the suggestion in existing literature that the EU is side-
lining its values in favour of its material interests. However, this project’s original focus on 
the micro-level processes of EU-China dialogues, uncovers more nuanced explanations for 
the apparent weakness of the EU’s normative power with China in practice.  
Discourse analysis of interviewees’ accounts revealed that EU officials justified this lack of 
systematic value mainstreaming through two discursive categories. Firstly, the 
organisational discourses highlighted institutional dynamics and understanding of roles 
and responsibilities as rationales for individual behaviour related to value mainstreaming. 
Discourse 1 cast value mainstreaming as implicit to EU-China dialogues, so requiring no 
further efforts by officials to realise and discourse 2 portrayed value mainstreaming as 
not relevant to officials’ specific policy sectors, instead being the responsibility of other 
designated individuals/dialogues.  
The second category pertained to China’s role in impeding value mainstreaming in EU-
China dialogues. These discourses captured how the actions of the Chinese side were a 
primary rationale for individual value mainstreaming behaviour. In this vein, discourse 3 
characterised China’s expected obstructive response to mainstreaming the most 
controversial EU values as a principal barrier. Relatedly, discourse 4 cast mainstreaming 
these controversial values as pointless, as well as risky, due to a perception amongst 
officials that their counterparts would be most likely unable to meaningfully impact 
Chinese policy connected to these areas. This view appeared to be informed by the 




Lastly, discourse 5, which can be characterised as China is not listening to the EU and it 
should be, captured frustrations on the EU side that China was not aligning with EU 
values. It appeared to inform didactic approaches in the rare instances when 
mainstreaming did take place and a pessimism perpetuating these approaches, at the 
expense of more creative/effective strategies. 
Beyond this, it emerged that a lack of understanding of China on the EU side, based on 
limited cultural and linguistic knowledge amongst officials, appeared to also be 
contributing to these discourses (See Chapter 8). The analysis also importantly identified 
and assessed existing value mainstreaming practices by EU officials (See Chapter 9). 
Encompassed by the concept of partial mainstreaming, it appeared that EU values were 
sporadically entering dialogues, irrespective of a lack of systematic efforts to incorporate 
them by officials. This was seemingly based on EU values being pre-built into all sectors of 
EU-China relations.  
It also emerged that the EEAS was undertaking ad-hoc efforts to promote value 
mainstreaming amongst their Commission colleagues. These activities highlight that EU 
values are underpinning EU-China dialogues in practice and thus the existence of the EU’s 
normative power with China in practice. However, the analysis also revealed that these 
activities were limited in scope versus the systematic actions prescribed by the official 
discourse. Consequently, they are unable to fully realise the ideal-type of NPE with China. 
This chapter will focus specifically on the organisational discourses specified above, 
before Chapter 7 addresses the discourses surrounding China’s role. The examples 
analysed below display both how systematic value mainstreaming is not taking place in 
practice (often in an explicit fashion) and crucially, how the organisational discourses are 
informing this.  
Notably throughout these examples, the language often alludes to other discourses. In 
particular, EU officials often also expressed discourse 3, which, as described in the 
following chapter, appeared to be the dominant discourse impacting the practical 
implementation of the EU’s normative power. Reflecting this, interviewees could be seen 
to generally attach negative connotations to value mainstreaming, associating such 





Finally, it is important to emphasise that the interviews reflect a different context to 
policy documents. Unlike the premeditated language in documents which is politically 
calibrated towards civil society and third countries, officials’ responses in the non-
attributable interviews conducted for this thesis, tended to be more spontaneous and 
reflective of the reality of EU-China dialogues. While, as noted in Chapter 4, it is possible 
that interviewees adjusted their accounts due to my status as a scholar, their consistently 
frank and mutually reinforcing responses which revealed activities that diverged from the 
official discourse, arguably indicated otherwise. Their activities were being portrayed in a 
manner which did not look favourable for the EU or even necessarily themselves. 
Generally, it appeared that interviewees did not consider the role of values in their 
dialogues, with questions effectively prompting them to think about and justify the role of 
values on the spot. This emphasises the lack of systematic value mainstreaming taking 
place in practice. 
 
6.4 Organisational discourses 
 
6.4.1 Discourse 1: EU values implicit in EU-China dialogues 
 
Examples of discourse 1, surrounding the perception amongst EU officials that values are 
implicit to their dialogues and therefore require no additional activities to realise, could be 
identified in the accounts of Brussels-based and Beijing-based officials, across the breadth 
of EU-China relations. This included the Pillar 2 Economic & sectoral dialogues and Pillar 3 
People-to-People dialogues (PPD) operationalised by the Commission, and the Pillar 1 
Political dialogues implemented by the EEAS, which also coordinates all other dialogues. 
The discourse appeared to be most prevalent in the accounts of those involved with Pillar 
3.  
Additionally, it is important to highlight how discourse 1 connects with criticisms of the 
EU’s normative power being un-reflexive and neo-colonial (See Chapter 2.4). The 
discourse encompasses a perception that the EU’s external action is inherently good and 
meeting the ideal standards of the EU’s values, as opposed to requiring constant vigilance 
and reflexivity to deliver. It can also be argued that the discourse is effectively meeting 




do not require additional systematic actions to operationalise, informs such issues not 
being tabled in EU-China dialogues.  
 
Pillar 2: Economic & sectoral dialogues 
Regarding Pillar 2 dialogues, a notable example could be seen in the account of a DG 
Trade (TRADE) official. Mirroring many interviewees, they emphasised that their 
objectives surrounded sector specific issues, in this case solely connected to EU economic 
interests, with no mention of EU values embodied by Article 21/NPE. When asked about 
the role of values in trade dialogues, they appeared to have to think about how this 
dimension entered their activities. They described how EU values like human rights and 
sustainable development were “under the surface” of their dialogues with the Chinese 
side, which “are just sort of built on, part of our values…and [our] understanding that this 
is what is good”.98 In line with discourse 1, the language first explicitly suggests that EU 
values are not being systematically integrated into dialogues, as they are already 
passively informing exchanges with the Chinese side (i.e. “under the surface”).  
Providing deeper insight into this, the interviewee then describes how the dialogue is 
inherently normative as a) the sectoral substance is based upon EU-values (“part of our 
values”) and b) they, as EU officials believe in these values (“[our] understanding that this 
is what is good”). Additionally, the language implies that EU values reflect a passive, 
abstract dimension of their dialogues with China (“just sort of built on” EU values), as 
opposed to an active, systematically integrated component.  
The discourse was similarly identifiable in other sectoral dialogues. For example, the 
author asked an official from DG JUST about the extent to which human rights dimensions 
were being systematically designed into the EU-China Legal-Affairs Dialogue (LAD). In 
response they described how: 
That’s implicit. I mean, obviously the upfront objective is better discussion of… 
understanding of our respective legal systems, but if that leads to positive 
progress in other areas, then that’s a good thing.99 
                                                          
98 Interview with an official from DG TRADE on 10.03.2017 at 3.00pm, in Brussels. 




As in the previous example, the interviewee can be seen to openly concede that EU 
values (in this case human rights) are not being systematically integrated into their 
dialogue. This justified on the basis that the technical substance and objectives of the 
dialogue have an “implicit” normative, as well as material basis. Reaffirming this passive 
role ascribed to EU values in the dialogue, the interviewee infers that any progress in 
China realising EU human rights standards would reflect an unintentional, but welcome 
by-product of this dialogue (i.e. “if that leads to positive progress in other areas, then 
that’s a good thing”).  
The interviewee also suggests that this implicit, background role of values, as opposed 
one of parity with sector-specific technical objectives, is almost self-evident (i.e. 
“obviously the upfront objective is…”). This emphasises the ingrained nature and thus 
power of the discourse, as well as its impact on mainstreaming practices. Interestingly, 
the notion of an “upfront objective” also connects to discourse 3 and the associated fear 
of explicitly raising values with the Chinese side for fear of obstructive responses. 
As described in Chapter 3, the LAD has been designed to promote human rights indirectly 
through promoting areas of rule of law palatable to the Chinese side. However, the 
example above highlights that active attempts to integrate human rights or even rule of 
law dimensions into exchanges during the planning and implementation of each dialogue 
are not taking place. Consequently, not only are the interviewee’s activities running 
contrary to the official discourse, but the lack of background discussion to design EU 
values into the channel (even indirectly) calls into question the validity and effectiveness 
of the LAD. 
Strong examples of Discourse 1 could also be identified in the accounts of Commission 
officials involved in the overlapping climate change/energy/environment sectors. Akin to 
the DG TRADE example above, one DG Climate Action (CLIMA) official described having 
exclusively technical objectives with China, surrounding the international climate 
negotiations. Responding to a question about the role of values in their dialogue 
(particularly human rights and sustainable development), they stated that “on a meta-
level we can always tell of values”, before elaborating that “with China, [when] engaging 
with this regime” it is a “natural process” that “values are shared and discussed”.100  
                                                          




The question prompts the interviewee justify their lack of systematic value 
mainstreaming according to the rationale of discourse 1, with values being “shared and 
discussed” cast as an inherent outcome from exchanges (i.e. a “natural process”). This is 
reinforced by their characterisation of values existing on an abstract “meta-level” as 
opposed to something more substantial that requires purposeful actions to realise. 
Additionally, the suggestion that we can “always tell of values” at this meta-level, again 
alludes to the ingrained nature of the discourse and its tangible impact on value 
mainstreaming.  
 
Pillar 3: People-to-People Dialogue(s)  
Discourse 1 appeared to be particularly dominant in the accounts of Commission officials 
operationalising Pillar 3 People-to-People dialogues (PPD) from DG Education and Culture 
(EAC). As one official noted, in the context of general value promotion with China:  
Let's say that explicitly it's not very often that these elements come up, but in the 
projects we support, implicitly we very strongly support our values. [For example] …in 
education …we have been supporting a project which is called …’EU-China tuning’ 
where we intend to make our higher education systems more compatible, more 
coordinated in a way, and this helps, in the longer term, also the recognition the 
accreditation of the diplomas that the students take, the support of mobility of 
students …and as the result, we push …inject, or to share at least our values also in 
terms of educational methodologies …in the higher education systems in China.101  
As in prior examples, the interviewee confirms that systematic value mainstreaming is not 
taking place, with EU values “not very often” being explicitly raised with the Chinese side. 
Displaying discourse 1, they then suggest that this lack of explicit mainstreaming is 
justified by the cooperation programmes and projects - which reflect a key outcome from 
these dialogues - being implicitly based upon EU values.  
The example they provide emphasises how passive this connection to EU values is in 
practice. They portray a very long-term and subtle promotion of EU values, which is 
predicated upon limited (if any) direct action by the EU side. In this sense, the discourse is 
                                                          




informing activities which are far removed from the systematic mainstreaming practices 
envisioned by the official discourse. Much like the DG TRADE example analysed above, 
the interviewee also implies that they are sufficiently promoting EU values with China 
because DG EAC officials believe in these values and this impacts dialogues (“implicitly we 
very strongly support our values”).  
Supporting these conclusions, the interviewee more explicitly described how their lack of 
systematic mainstreaming activities derived from the rationale of discourse 1:  
It’s almost implicit and obvious …because in any type of activities, I mean, even in 
the negotiation on trade areas, there is our position which of course reflects a 
range of values …I mean, when you discuss environment there are of course, 
principles behind that reflect our values.102 
Aligning with prior examples, their language portrays individual sectors of the EU’s 
external action as inherently normative with (“principles behind [them] reflect our 
values”) and thus no further action is required by EU officials to realise them. Their 
language also again alludes to the power of discourse 1, through suggesting that such 
perspectives are almost self-evident (“implicit and obvious”) and “of course” reflect EU 
values.  
In another example, an official involved with cultural dialogues, described how “no, I 
must say we…we don’t mention human rights issues during our HPPD [High-level People-
to-People Dialogue] or …cultural policy dialogue”.103 They justified this lack of systematic 
mainstreaming on the basis that: 
Our cultural cooperation actually is based on the 2005 UNESCO Convention …for 
the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions.104  
Mirroring their colleague, the interviewee appears to justify their non-integration of 
human rights into the dialogues on the inherently normative basis of PPD (i.e. “the 2005 
UNESCO Convention” informing cultural dialogues), with its connections to individual civil 
and political rights, particularly freedom of expression. Again, the implication is that no 
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further action is necessary to realise EU values in exchanges, departing from the 
systematic value mainstreaming prescribed by the official discourse.  
Qualifying the examples above, it is important to acknowledge that PPD differs from 
other pillars of EU-China relations, in being built upon the premise of facilitating civil 
society exchanges between the EU and China through official-level dialogues, to increase 
mutual understanding on areas like values. In this sense, it is portrayed as less 
instrumental and agenda-based than other dialogues. However, although this may explain 
why discourse 1 is particularly strong in PPD, these officials are still bound by the 
standards of the official discourse. They should be systematically designing the EU’s 
values into all PPD dialogues and their outcomes.  
 
Observation of the themes and the general trajectory of PPD suggests that China, unlike 
the EU side, views the dialogues very strategically. For example, cultural dialogues are 
skewed towards cultural and creative industries (an economic interest) and educational 
exchanges designed to give Chinese nationals access to world class universities in 
Europe.105 Additional key examples of discourse 1 from pillar 2 and 3 dialogues can be 
seen in Table 6.2 below. Extended examples are presented in Appendix iii.
                                                          













Quoted example Analysis 
DG Energy (ENER) 
[BRU] 
1. “Part of the agenda is definitely 
issues like human rights, like 
sustainable development but 
it’s not that… [explicit], we 
don't discuss it all the time, 
[it’s] in the strategies it’s in 
our minds it’s, in the back of 
our heads. It’s definitely in, but 
then it really depends on which 
dialogue you are [working 
with], so the higher values are 
there, I mean are really 
there”.106 
 
• Alludes to a lack of systematic mainstreaming in dialogues “we don’t discuss it all the time”.  
• Suggests EU values are being promoted inherently due to their inclusion in the EU’s strategic 
documents and their personal belief in them (“definitely” in “our minds …in the back of our 
heads”).  
• EU values are thus portrayed as operating in the background and passively impacting 
exchanges.  
  
• Example also displays discourse 2: 
 
▪ The interviewee infers that value mainstreaming is dependent on the policy sector in 
question (“it really depends on which dialogue you are [working with]”).  
▪ They also imply that there are isolated sectors wherein the EU values are particularly 





                                                          









2. The interviewee described how 
human rights was “not really 
explicitly” included in their 
dialogue, despite their 
“aware[ness] that these 
elements, that these issues 
have spill over into human 
rights”.  
 
In addition, the interviewee 
later remarked that human 
rights represented an 
“idealistic” dimension of their 
sector, while addressing 
technical/material issues like 
China’s market sustainability 
and overcapacity, represented 
the “realistic” dimension.107 
• Interview overtly suggests they are not systematically mainstreaming human rights into their 
dialogues because it implicit in the sectoral substance being discussed.  
• Despite recognising the relevance of human rights to the dialogue, they are not actively 
integrating based on the rationale of the discourse (“these issues have spill over into human 
rights”) 
• Example also displays discourses 3, 4 and 5 in suggesting that value promotion is an 
“idealistic” pursuit unlikely to engender meaningful outcomes, while the pursuit of “realistic” 
EU material interests will do so.  
 
• The language alludes to: 
▪ A perception that value is promotion is likely to antagonise the Chinese side (discourse 
3) 
▪ A view that Chinese counterparts will not be able to impact Chinese policy connected to 
controversial EU values (discourse 4)  















                                                          




DG Education and 
Culture (EAC) [BRU] 
3. The interview described how 
they are not systematically 
mainstream values: 
 
“Except if we consider that in 
the artistic freedom… freedom 
of expression, is one of those 
values in human rights… but we 
do [that] in a… indirect way, I 
mean, we are not going to talk 
about Ai Weiwei... we don’t do 
it. We recall the principles of 
our cultural engagement… that 
we do, but... there is no 
offensive …[to] actually take 
on… human rights 
infringements”108  
 
• Explicitly suggests that human rights is not being systematically integrated into their dialogue 
(“we don’t do it”). 
• This is emphasised by interviewee having to identify a human rights dimension on the spot 
(i.e. “artistic freedom” a subcomponent of freedom of expression). 
 
• Suggests a lack of background discussion dedicated to mainstreaming normative dimensions 
to EU-China cultural dialogues 
• This is reaffirmed by the interviewee equating systematic mainstreaming of human rights to 
raising the controversial individual case of Ai Weiwei, as opposed to a multidimensional 
activity encompassing more subtle approaches.  
• For example, dialogues could address less controversial areas of mutual interest, like the role 
of women and people with disabilities in cultural and creative industries. 
 
• Discourse 1 also displayed by suggestion that systematic mainstreaming is not required 
according to the rationale of discourse 1 (“we do [that] in a… indirect way … we recall the 
principles of our cultural engagement”).   
• Example also displays discourse 3 with value mainstreaming cast as a negative activity likely 





                                                          




EEAS coordination and Pillar 1 Political dialogues 
Discourse 1 was also identifiable in the accounts of EEAS diplomats, which operationalise 
Pillar 1 dialogues and coordinate all others. For example, one Beijing-based diplomat 
described how “values are built into our conscience …there are not rational decisions to 
politicise certain areas” and that any engagement with China on areas such as climate 
change and development was inherently normative in nature.109  
The language explicitly displays discourse 1 and strongly approximates the analysed 
Commission examples. The interviewee suggests that values implicitly inform all EU 
activities and thus require no further efforts to realise, by virtue of a) the normative basis 
of the EU’s external action and b) EU officials believing in these values (“values are built 
into our conscience”). The implied lack of systematic mainstreaming is also overtly 
confirmed by the notion that there are no “rational decisions” to integrate EU values. 
Additionally, the characterisation of value mainstreaming “politicising” exchanges alludes 
to discourse 3, wherein concern over China’s negative response to discussing 
controversial values, acts as a deterrent to mainstreaming by officials.  
As a product of their coordinating role, EEAS diplomats sharing discourse 1, appeared to 
inform them enabling or actively reproducing the discourse amongst their Commission 
colleagues. A particularly strong example could be seen in the account of a diplomat 









                                                          




That’s …our role, to think of it from that [normative] angle, but they [Commission 
officials] [don’t]…For instance, non-discrimination. You may be discussing 
industrial standards, but if there’s a standard that’s discriminatorily applied to 
foreign operators, the non-discrimination principle is going to come up and it’s 
going to be present in the discussions with China, even if we haven’t [asked 
Commission officials to raise it] …I think that’s the power of it, that, we, because 
of where we come from, because they’re part of our culture and our approach to 
the issues, they [values] just happen naturally in our discussions with other 
countries. Partly because they [values] are embedded in our regulations, partly 
because they’re embedded in our culture, they do come up.110 
The interviewee displays discourse 1 through suggesting that their Commission colleagues 
will inherently promote EU values - as well as interests - in the dialogues (“they just 
happen naturally in our discussions with other countries”). Characteristic of the discourse, 
they also suggest that this de-facto inclusion of values derives from Commission officials 
believing in these values (“where we come from, because they’re part of our culture and 
our approach to the issues”) and them being pre-designed into sectoral policy 
documents. Through validating the notion that their Commission colleagues are 
sufficiently promoting EU values though their activities on an inherent basis, the example 
displays how EEAS diplomats may be enabling or actively reproducing the discourse 
through their coordination activities.  
Moreover, the example given by the interviewee displays a conflation between EU 
interests and values. The non-discrimination principle cited by the interviewee appears to 
refer to discrimination against EU businesses in the Chinese market (an infraction of WTO 
norms and EU economic values),111 as opposed to a question of discrimination in a human 
rights context, encompassed by NPE and Article 21 (i.e. discrimination against minorities 
or women). It could be argued that this apparent confusion highlights the extent to which 
systematic value mainstreaming is not taking place in practice: these issues may be 
seldom discussed during the planning and design of EU-China dialogues. The above 
example also notably displays discourse 2 in suggesting that value mainstreaming 
                                                          
110 Interview with a diplomat from the EEAS on 05.10.2017 at 11.00am, in Brussels. 
111 EU (WTO) liberal economic values are based on the same philosophical basis as liberal political/individual 




represents the sole responsibility of the EEAS in EU-China dialogues (“That’s …our role, to 
think of it from that angle”).  
Finally, a diplomat involved with the Legal Affairs Dialogue (LAD) appeared to reaffirm 
how the EEAS enables or actively reproduces discourse 1 in practice. They rejected the 
notion that EU values needed to be systematically mainstreamed into the LAD and 
described how the themes of e-commerce and consumer protection, chosen for the 
inaugural instalment in 2016, were “values in abstract… [they are] very practical [and] 
bring benefits to EU citizens”.112 The suggestion that EU values are being adequately 
shared in the LAD because of their passive connection to the themes being discussed - 
which most explicitly connect to EU material interests - displays discourse 1. 
The interviewees’ language also implies that because the discussion of these themes with 
China will be beneficial to “EU citizens”, they meet EU values. In this sense, discourse 1 
underpins a perception that pursuing EU material interests, meets EU values in parallel 
and no independent value mainstreaming activities are necessary. Lastly, the interviewee 
makes an interesting distinction between the technical themes being “practical” and 
value promotion being “abstract”. The language mirrors the DG CLIMA example and its 
suggestion that EU values are being passively shared through dialogues at an abstract 
meta-level and thus requiring no purposeful actions to realise. However, the language can 
also be connected to discourse 3 and the perception that value mainstreaming will likely 
undermine dialogues (i.e. be impractical). 
Crucially, the above example also suggests that EEAS officials, like their Commission 
colleagues are not systematically mainstreaming human rights or (even rule of law) 
through the LAD, according to the rationale of discourse 1. This reinforces the notion that 
the discourse is impeding the dialogue in meeting its potential as an effective channel for 
indirectly promoting human rights. Arguably, if the value was systematically designed into 
exchanges, informing the choice of themes with the Chinese side, the dialogue would 
have greater capacity to promote the value.  
Lastly, it is worth highlighting that discourse 1 did not appear to be shared by those EEAS 
diplomats involved with EU-China human rights promotion. This is unsurprising, as these 
individuals’ portfolios inform the active coordination and implementation human rights, 
                                                          




precluding any question of inherent activities. An additional example displaying EEAS 
diplomats sharing discourse 1 can be seen in Table 6.3 below. 
 















1. “It’s not as if in every 
dialogue human rights is 
featured… the values are 
embedded… it’s not as if 
we have to think of 
Article 21”113 
• Implies that systematic 
mainstreaming practices is 
not taking place according 
to the rationale of 
discourse 1.  
• This is reflected in the 
notion that they do not 
“have to think of Article 
21” in EU-China dialogues 
and that values are implicit 















                                                          




6.4.2 Discourse 2: EU values not relevant to all policy sectors 
 
Discourse 2 was also identifiable across all EU-China dialogues and in the accounts of both 
Brussels-based and Beijing-based officials. The discourse captures officials’ legitimising a 
lack of systematic value mainstreaming according to the rationale that such activities are 
not relevant to their policy sector and instead the responsibility of designated 
individuals/dialogues. While silos are common in any organisation, a division of labour 
with value mainstreaming contravenes the prescriptions of the official discourse found in 
documents and the aligning ideal-type of NPE. Additionally, akin to discourse 1, discourse 
2 informs EU values not being systematically tabled in EU-China dialogues and thus 
arguably supports Chinese as opposed to EU interests, in ensuring that these issues are 
raised as infrequently as possible.  
 
Pillars 2 & 3  
Concerning Pillar 2 dialogues, a key example of discourse 2 was identifiable in the account 
of a Beijing-based DG TRADE official. The interviewee noted how their focus was on 
meeting EU economic interests with China in trade dialogues and their activities were 
underpinned by a normative “toolkit” derived predominantly from the WTO, as opposed 
to the EU’s Article 21. They cast this as a “different enforcement system” to their 
colleagues from the EEAS.114  
Displaying discourse 2, the language overtly suggests that the interviewee is not 
systematically mainstreaming EU values - as defined by Article 21/NPE - on the basis that 
such activities are not applicable to EU-China trade dialogues. Instead they are cast as the 
exclusive responsibility of the EEAS. This division of labour is justified by the interviewee 
according to the argument that DG TRADE’s engagement with China is informed by 
alternative rules/standards to the EEAS, connected to EU material interests and economic 
values (i.e. a WTO “toolkit” which reflects a “different enforcement system”).  
These inferences were further supported elsewhere in the interviewee’s account, as they 
clarified their objectives in trade dialogues. In response to being questioned about the 
                                                          





extent to which EU values practically featured in their dialogues, they noted that their 
“mission” was “to open markets… to solve problems” as well as “be practical…[and] 
change the situation”.  The language reaffirms the rationale of discourse 2, that EU-China 
trade dialogues are concerned solely with meeting EU economic objectives (their 
“mission”) and the Article 21/NPE values are not applicable. This was reinforced by the 
interviewee later describing how, in the context of addressing cybersecurity concerns 
with China, the value dimensions of the issue, specifically human rights dimensions, were 
“not my mission”.  
The language also suggests that meeting EU economic interests is a “practical” pursuit 
which will have concrete outcomes (“change the situation” and “solve problems”). This 
implies a perception that value mainstreaming is impractical and that the pursuit of such 
activities will leave the EU’s pressing economic objectives unsolved. It also arguably 
connects to concerns about dialogues being torpedoed by China when such issues are 
raised (discourse 3); counterparts being unable to impact Chinese policy on these issues 
(discourse 4) and; a pessimism that China will never accept the EU interpretation of 
controversial values (discourse 5).  
A similar division of labour, in keeping with discourse 2, was inferred by another official 














To tell you the truth, we have not gone into the depth of this in our dialogues 
…there is a recent dialogue on rule of law [legal affairs] …and here, you know, all 
of us DG's could be putting things in the agenda [of the dialogue] and try to 
change [China], basically because it’s not abstract, it’s how we operate in a 
hundred things, no? So, I think it’s a good idea to talk about it and let's see how 
much we can feed it. 
Interviewer: So that would be your channel, that would be your instrument when 
it comes to [integrating EU values]? 
That would be the channel yes, I don't have anything in the current… architecture 
of our relations... [i.e. the promotion of rule of law is not applicable to any 
dialogues the interview is working with].115 
Here, the interviewee explicitly suggests that rule of law is not relevant to their dialogue 
(“I don't have anything in the current… architecture of our relations”) and it is not being 
systematically mainstreamed as a result (“we have not gone into the depth of this in our 
dialogues”). This is reaffirmed by their admission that the value has not featured 
prominently or even explicitly in industrial dialogues to date (“we have not gone into the 
depth of this in our dialogues”) and that they (“think it’s a good idea to talk about it”), 
implying that they are not doing so already.  
Building on this, they suggest that the Legal Affairs Dialogue (LAD) represents a uniquely 
plausible channel for promoting rule of law in EU-China relations (“that would be the 
channel”), which all Commission officials should be contributing. Arguably, the 
implication is that discourse 2 is widely shared and that with the establishment of this 
“recent dialogue on rule of law”, Commission officials can now outsource all rule of law 
related issues, which have not been getting raised with China (“all of us DG's could be 
putting things in the agenda and try to change [China]”).  
Again, this implied division of labour is strongly at odds with the systematic value 
mainstreaming in all EU-China dialogues promoted by the official discourse found in 
documents. Discourse 2 is also reaffirmed by the interviewee suggesting that rule of law 
is “not abstract”, alluding to a perception that many EU values lack applicability to sectors 
                                                          




focusing on very technical issues connected to EU material interests (like industrial 
cooperation).  
Ironically, officials operationalising the LAD - portrayed above as uniquely normative 
channel - also invoked discourse 2. For example, one DG JUST official noted that: 
I think the Chinese had a fair point, we already have this human rights dialogue 
and it’s not ours and you can make your own judgements from what other people 
say about it...but if we start a separate dialogue which is called rule of law and we 
take the kind of liberal definition of it, then you’re duplicating something which is 
already there and not producing so much good.116  
The interviewee suggests that they are not mainstreaming rule of law and human rights 
because they are already covered by the EU-China human rights dialogue, managed by 
the EEAS, thus reflecting needless duplication (“if we start a separate dialogue which is 
called rule of law and we take the kind of liberal definition of it, then your duplicating 
something”). Notably, the interviewee also alludes to how the Chinese side has pushed to 
keep rule of law and human rights off the table during the design of the LAD, reinforcing 
the notion that discourse 2 supports Chinese interests.   
The above example also supports the argument that the organisational discourses are 
limiting the potential of the of the LAD to indirectly promote human rights (and rule of 
law) with China. Additionally, when coupled with the DG GROW example above, it 
appears that the dialogue is being viewed by Commission officials as an isolated channel 
for compartmentalising rule of law promotion in EU-China dialogues. However, it is not 
performing this function in a systematic fashion.  
Bolstering the above analysis, interesting examples of the discourse were also identifiable 
in the accounts of officials connected to the interrelated climate/environment/energy 
sectors. In this vein, a DG Environment (ENV) official described how value mainstreaming 
was “in principle, a role for the EEAS”.117 Similarly, they elaborated that their cooperation 
with the Chinese side was “very successful” as a “technical discussion”.  
Here, the language overtly reflects discourse 2 in suggesting that EU-China environmental 
dialogues are restricted to technical discussion(s) and EU values are not applicable, 
                                                          
116 Interview with an official from DG JUST on 09.02.2017 at 10.30am, in Brussels. 




instead being the responsibility of the EEAS, in EU-China political dialogues. Moreover, 
mirroring previous examples, the interviewee’s language also alludes to the prevalence 
and power of the discourse in suggesting that the implied division of labour is a matter of 
“principle”. This was reaffirmed by the interviewee later adding that the lack of values in 
EU-China environmental cooperation was due to “the nature of the policy”, as if EU 
values inherently did not apply to EU-China environmental cooperation.  
The interviewee’s language can also be seen to reflect discourse 3 as they imply that 
value mainstreaming would undermine their dialogues with China, fostering unsuccessful 
outcomes (i.e. it’s “very successful” as a “technical discussion). An additional example in 
Table 6.4 displays a DG CLIMA official similarly delegating responsibility for value 
mainstreaming to the EEAS and like their DG GROW colleague, also to DG JUST via the 
LAD.  
This commonality between the examples reaffirms the shared nature of the discourse and 
the somewhat ironic dynamics where Commission officials side-line rule of law based on 
the premise that their DG JUST colleagues will raise it, when these individuals are in turn 
shifting responsibility for value mainstreaming to the EEAS.  
Interestingly, officials from these sectors did not appear to consider the promotion of 
sustainable development as relevant to their dialogues with China, despite the connection 
between the environmental dimension of the value and the sectoral substance. In this 
respect, one official from DG Climate Action stated that “we are not seeing it [sustainable 
development] as a value point”. When asked whether other EU values like human rights 
featured in climate change dialogues, they stated, “not at all frankly”.118  
Similarly, a DG ENV official noted that they “just discussed environmental issues”,119 as 
opposed to EU values, while a DG Energy (ENER) official described how “environment or 
even social, labour standards, they[‘re] always mentioned” in the context of non-
normative “technical substance” of EU-China energy dialogues.120  
These examples can be seen to strongly reflect discourse 2, with the officials explicitly 
suggesting that sustainable development, along with all other EU values, are not 
applicable to their dialogues with China. However, their language also displays that much 
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119 Interview with an official from DG ENV on 08.03.2017 at 11.00am, in Brussels. 




of the substance of these dialogue (e.g. environmental issues or climate negotiations) 
would nevertheless fall under the environmental dimension of sustainable development. 
As a result, mainstreaming sustainable development appears to be taking place, but not 
as a product of systematic activities by officials to share a value with China. Instead, 
mainstreaming is sporadically taking place, without officials necessarily aware of it, 
informed by values being pre-built into guiding policy documents which dictate the 
substance.  
Crucially, as hinted at in the DG ENER example, these dynamics seem to apply to 
mainstreaming other EU values too, with social/labour standards connecting to human 
rights promotion. These activities are arguably explained through the concept of partial 
mainstreaming, addressed in in Chapter 9. These activities display how EU values do 
underpin EU-China dialogues in practice, but they poorly compensate for the systematic 
actions prescribed by the official discourse in documents and are thus unable to fully 
realise the ideal-type of NPE. Additional key examples of discourse 2 from Pillars 2 and 3 




    Table 6.4 Additional key examples of discourse 2 from Pillar 2 and 3 dialogues 
EEAS Directorate/ Department and 
location (Brussels [BRU]/Beijing 
[BEI]) 
 
Quoted example Analysis 
DG Justice and Consumers (JUST) 
[BRU] 
1. “It’s a kind of natural instinct to say, 
‘well we have our dialogue why do 
we need to invest time in something 
else which is run by someone 
else’”.121 
 
• Displays the power of discourse 2 with interviewee suggesting that it 
is a “natural instinct” to side-line human rights because it is dealt 
with in another dialogue (“which is run by someone else”). 
 
 
DG Justice and Consumers (JUST) 
[BRU] 
 
2. “It evolved …we would think of four 
subjects… and they [the Chinese 
side] said: ‘well they’re all okish, but 
in particular we like regulations, 
that’s our number one’, and then we 
saw the development for legal 
codes, we said ‘ok, can we discuss 
that and they said … ‘we’d prefer 
better regulation’ and then we said 




• Suggests that the process for choosing the dialogue’s themes does 
not include any systematic attempt to include EU values (“it kind of 
evolved” …it’s just a discussion”). 
• Situation portrayed where both sides pragmatically lobby for the 
most desirable themes, dynamics arguably informed by both 
organisational discourses. 
• No suggestion that the EU side is pushing for themes with a human 
rights dimension and instead happy to accommodate China’s 
preferences (which avoid EU values and focus on technical areas).  
 
• Without systematic processes to incorporate values on the EU side, 
dialogues will arguably gravitate towards technical issues which are 
non-controversial and mutually palatable – reflected in the agreed 
themes in the quote. 
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EU Delegation to China, Information 
Society Media Section [BEI] 
3. Official described how one of their 
colleagues working with human 
rights in the EEAS “does exactly the 
same as I do”, but with “a different 
checklist”, before they described 
how more broadly “we have a 
division of labour” with the EEAS (in 
terms of norm promotion) and that 
human rights promotion was “not 
my portfolio”.123  
 
• Suggests that they are not systematically mainstreaming human 
rights in dialogues since it is inapplicable to their sector (“not my 
portfolio”) and instead the responsibility of the EEAS (“we have a 
division of labour”).  
• Mirrors in-text DG Trade example through inferring that they are 
bound by alternative, sector-specific standards which depart from 
those informing their EEAS colleagues (“a different checklist”). 
 
 
EU Delegation to China, Information 
Society Media Section [BEI] 
 
4. “What is explicitly mentioned in the 
treaties [in terms of Article 21] does 
not enter into my job”. 
 
5. “These things don’t really enter the 
work here”.124 
 
• Quote 4 infers that Article 21/NPE values are not applicable to their 
dialogues. 
• Reaffirmed by quote 5 suggesting that that systematic 
mainstreaming is not taking place in their dialogue. 
DG Climate Action (CLIMA) [BRU] 6. Official described how EU values 
were “much more discussed” in the 
dialogues managed by their 
colleagues in the EEAS and DG 
Justice and Consumers (JUST), 
before adding that “obviously we 
are not doing that”.125   
• Describes how EU values are the isolated responsibility of their 
colleagues in the EEAS and DG JUST and not relevant to their 
dialogue. 
• Displays the power of discourse 2, implying the rationale is 
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DG Education and Culture (EAC) [BEI] 7. “Rule of law or on human rights …I 
don’t really deal with this, so I feel it 
is best to ask [name of the human 
rights desk at the delegation] who is, 






8. “We did mention ...the NGO law but 
of course from the perspective of 
the impact that might only have 
academic cooperation I mean all the 
other perspectives, all the other 
NGOs, as I say, I don’t deal with 
that”.126 
 
• Quote 7:  
▪ Rule of law and human rights portrayed as not relevant to their 
sector (“I don’t really deal with this”).  
▪ Interviewee reinforces this explicit portrayal of discourse 2 by 
suggesting author should ask the EEAs about value 
mainstreaming. 
▪ EEAS, implied to have exclusive responsibility for values in EU-
China dialogues  
 
• Quote 8: 
▪ Reaffirms discourse 2 through suggestion that China’s NGO law 
was narrowly approached on the basis of concerns over future 
academic cooperation. 
▪ Suggests they eschewed the law’s significant human rights 
implications as it was not their responsibility (“all the other 
perspectives …as I say, I don’t deal with that”). 
 
                                                          




EEAS coordination and Pillar 1 Political dialogues 
EEAS diplomats could be seen to confirm the existence of discourse 2 amongst their 
Commission colleagues (See Table 6.5, quote 1). However, as in the case of discourse 1, 
the analysis suggested that they shared, and thus de-facto enabled/reproduced discourse 
2 through their coordination activities. Displaying this, a Beijing-based diplomat involved 
with the LAD described how: 
We have to separate this from the human rights dialogue… keep the issues 
separate unless they ask …If you already have a dialogue on human rights, why do 
you need another?127  
Closely approximating the language of their Commission colleagues, the interviewee 
suggests that human rights is not applicable to their dialogue because it is already 
addressed in the human rights dialogue. Additionally, they fascinatingly imply that it will 
be determined by the Chinese side whether human rights will be integrated into the 
exchange (“keep the issues separate unless they ask”). This reflects an unlikely prospect 
given China’s desire to avoid human rights being tabled. It again highlights how discourse 
2 is serving to support China’s interests in supressing discussion of values in EU-China 
dialogues. The quote also reaffirms how systematic human rights mainstreaming is not 
taking place through the LAD, limiting its potential as an indirect channel for promoting 
the value.  
The above interviewee also invoked discourse 2 as a justification for not mainstreaming 
the environmental facet of sustainable development into future LADs - e.g. pursuing the 
theme of environmental governance. They stated that “it makes no sense to raise 
sustainable development” in the dialogues without the “relevant Commission experts …I 
don’t expect my colleagues from DG Justice to speak about sustainable development”.128 
Here, the interviewee suggests that because DG JUST officials do not have the portfolios 
that most closely connect to sustainable development (they are not the “relevant 
Commission experts”), they should not be addressing it with the Chinese side in practice 
(“it makes no sense to raise sustainable development”).  
                                                          





The interviewee also highlights how they are not encouraging value mainstreaming 
amongst their Commission colleagues on this basis (“I don’t expect my colleagues from 
DG Justice to speak about sustainable development”). They also allude to the self-evident 
logic and thus power of discourse 2 (i.e. “it makes no sense). Reflecting this, the LAD can 
be seen to holistically eschew systematic value mainstreaming (i.e. not just human rights 
and rule of law) based on discourse 2. 
In a related example, an EEAS diplomat involved with human rights promotion expressed 
discourse 2 in describing how the human rights dialogue reflected the “evil twin” of the 
LAD, which they cast as the “nice twin”, adding that “one is the confrontation, one is the 
coordination … [and that there was] not an overlap on purpose”.129 Again, the implication 
is that human rights mainstreaming is not applicable to the dialogue and the EEAS is 
enabling or actively reproducing this separation amongst their Commission colleagues.  
The interviewee also arguably invokes discourse 3, with the language framing human 
rights mainstreaming as a negative activity which will provoke obstructive responses from 
the Chinese side (i.e. the notion of an “evil twin” and value mainstreaming reflecting 
“confrontation”). This example is particularly poignant, as it suggests that discourse 2 may 
be shared by the officials working with human rights, where promotion of systematic 
value mainstreaming would be most expected. In this sense, while the analysis in section 
6.4.1 indicated that diplomats with a human rights portfolio did not share discourse 1 
(values are implicit to EU-China dialogues) they did appear to share discourse 2 and the 
selective mainstreaming practices it promotes, which depart form the official discourse 
found in documents.  
In a final key example, an EEAS diplomat involved with coordinating EU-China climate 
change cooperation described how the environmental dimension of sustainable 





                                                          




If you look at DG CLIMA, the culture of DG CLIMA, they are not diplomats …they 
are more… experts. And so experts work as experts very well. And DG CLIMA 
people may not be aware [about the value dimensions] - and its normal, it’s not a 
criticism, it’s just how it works everywhere - that we have difficulties on trade, 
difficulties on property rights respect, with China. So we probably work in silos 
ourselves and the role of the EEAS as much as possible, is to try to have the whole 
picture and then not having some contradictions in our policies… with China.130  
Like their Beijing-based EEAS colleague involved with the LAD, they infer that value 
mainstreaming is dependent on the expertise of the official. In this case, the suggestion is 
that as experts on climate change value mainstreaming is inapplicable for them. 
Additionally, the interviewee suggests that they accept, and by-proxy enable or actively 
reproduce this inferred division of labour among their Commission officials, in line with 
discourse 2 (“experts work as experts very well …we probably work in silos ourselves and 
the role of the EEAS as much as possible, is to try to have the whole picture”). In this 
fashion, they are validating behaviour at odds with the systematic value mainstreaming in 
all dialogues prescribed by the official discourse found in documents. 
Mirroring past examples, the language also alludes to the prevalence and power of 
discourse 2, suggesting that its prescriptions are natural and widely accepted (“its normal, 
it’s not a criticism, it’s just how it works everywhere”). Similarly, they suggest that every 
sectoral dialogue is ostensibly too busy with sector-specific challenges with China to 
mainstream values (“we have difficulties on trade, difficulties on property rights”). 
Additional key examples can be seen in table 6.5 below and extended examples are 
presented in Appendix iii.
                                                          




     Table 6.5 Additional key examples of discourse 2 from EEAS diplomats 
EEAS Directorate/ 




Quoted example Analysis 
GLOBAL Directorate 1. “It’s [human rights mainstreaming] not 
always done at more junior officials’ 
level… Where people consider that they 
have only one file, it’s only this file.”131 
 
• Displays confirmation by an EEAS diplomat that their Commission colleagues 
often eschew human rights mainstreaming on the basis that it is not 
applicable to their dialogues (“they have only one file, it’s only this file”). 
 
GLOBAL Directorate 2. “I would say it’s very… technical and 
isolated from the human rights 
discussion… when your speaking about 
climate policy, you’re speaking about 
big instruments like ETS [Emissions 
Trading Scheme], you’re not speaking 
about conditions of work, of the 
worker, how much they… when you are 
talking about energy efficiency, it’s the 
same… so you really don’t get into the 
more political and human 
dimension.”132 
 
• Reinforces that discourse 2 is shared and by-proxy enabled/reproduced by 
EEAS diplomats amongst their Commission colleagues. 
• Language infers that human rights mainstreaming is not applicable to EU-
China climate change cooperation due (“it’s very… technical and isolated 
from the human rights discussion”). 
 
• Also implied that Moreover, it is implied that the scale and complexity of 
climate change cooperation is such that officials are too busy for value 
mainstreaming (“you’re speaking about big instruments like ETS …so you 
really don’t get into the more political and human dimension”.).  
• Portrayal of human rights as a political dimension invokes discourse 3, with 
the issue framed as a controversial “political” issue likely to create tensions.  
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ASIAPAC: Asia and Pacific 
Directorate [BRU] 
3. When asked about the extent to which 
human rights was featuring in EU-China 
environment/climate/energy dialogues, 
the interviewee described how “we 
have the human rights dialogue [for 
that]”. They added that the dialogue 
represented “an instrument, better for 
that purpose” and that you have to 
“use your instrument carefully 
depending on the context”.133 
 
• Suggests that human rights mainstreaming is not applicable/the 
responsibility of Commission officials operationalising 
climate/environment/energy dialogues. 
• Discourse 2 also invoked for EU-China dialogues more broadly with 
suggestion that value mainstreaming is limited to specific dialogues (i.e. you 
have to “use your instrument carefully depending on the context”). 










ASIAPAC: Asia and Pacific 
Directorate [BRU] 
4. How shall I put it… there is also I 
suspect increasing resistance on our 
side you know, coming from quarters, 
in particularly, when it comes to trade 
and investment …you have people who 
can be very dogmatic about trade and 
they almost see trade as a pure… 
policy.134 
• Alludes to the existence of discourse 2 amongst their Commission colleagues 
managing EU-China trade and investment dialogues. 
• Suggests these officials believe that their dialogues should be restricted to 
economic issues with China (“you have people who …see trade as a pure… 
policy”). 
• Power/prevalence of discourse 2 captured by suggestion that these 
individuals are “very dogmatic”. 
• Invokes discourse 3 in suggesting that DG TRADE officials seek to keep their 
dialogues “pure” i.e. detached from controversial EU values likely to create 
tension.  
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6.4.3 The EU’s 2016 China Strategy  
 
Analysis of the China-country supplement of the EU’s 2016 Global strategy, Elements for a 
new strategy on China (2016), suggested that the document may also be enabling or 
actively reproducing discourse 2 amongst EU officials. The strategy displays pragmatic 
language which appears to depart from the official discourse.  
It describes how the “EU needs its own strategy, one which puts its own interests at the 
forefront in the new relationship” [emphasis added] (EU, 2016ii:5) along with promoting 
“universal values”. Building on this, it notes that “the EU's engagement with China should 
be principled, practical and pragmatic, staying true to its interests and values” (ibid.). 
While, as described in Chapter 2, EU values and interests overlap, the language arguably 
alludes to a distinction between EU material interests and the Article 21/NPE values, 
placing emphasis on the former (“practical and pragmatic”).  
On the surface, the document appears to reaffirm the official discourse, paraphrasing 
Article 21 (ibid.) and promoting the “mainstreaming [of] key themes and objectives across 
all EU-China dialogues” (ibid. p. 19). However, the latter statement encompasses the 
mainstreaming EU material interests, while such prescriptions are broadly qualified with 
the suggestion of “concentrating resources on a smaller number of priorities where the 
EU has the greatest added value” (ibid.). The document also importantly omits any 
stipulation of systematic value mainstreaming in dialogues.   
Taken together with quotes above can be seen to enable and reproduce discourse 2. The 
language alludes to a “practical and pragmatic” approach to EU-China dialogues, 
validating officials focusing exclusively on the sector-specific substance most likely to 
have successful outcomes, while side-lining the Article 21/NPE values. The suggestion of 
EU interests being at the “forefront” of the relationship, may also be serving to permit 
such activities justified by discourse 2.  
Displaying this argued enabling role of the EU’s 2016 China strategy, one DG TRADE 
official described how: “I do what I can in the most efficient [way]” and it is “not practical 
or pragmatic [emphasis added]” to seek to raise value-related issues in all channels and 
“talk about my baggage in every situation”.135  The interviewee appears to paraphrase the 
                                                          




document to support their invocation of discourse 2. They suggest that value 
mainstreaming would not be appropriate for their dialogues, reflecting an inefficient use 
of time and resources compared to a narrow focus on trade issues.  
The official also suggests that their position is informed by a negative framing of value 
mainstreaming. They cast such activities as controversial, tactless and most effectively 
dealt with in the right setting, like the human rights dialogue (i.e. I wouldn’t “talk about 
my baggage in every situation”). This portrayal of value mainstreaming, in keeping with 
discourse 3, is reinforced by the image of “baggage”, akin to the idea of emotional 
baggage. The interviewee infers that EU officials could undermine their dialogue if they 
do not consciously ensure that their values are kept separated from the exchange.  
As a caveat to this argued enabling/reproducing role of the EU’s 2016 China strategy, it is 
important to highlight the context of the document, which supplements the Global 
Strategy (2016). As articulated in the latter document, which displays similarly pragmatic 
language emphasising EU interests, the documents were produced at a time when the EU 
was facing numerous existential threats. These included potential disintegration following 
Brexit, the migration crisis and continued Eurozone instability. Nevertheless, the Global 
Strategy places greater emphasis on promoting EU values than the China strategy. It 
specifies the need for “systematically mainstreaming human rights across policy sectors” 
(EU, 2016i) in line with the established official discourse on value mainstreaming. 
Reflecting this, the alignment between the language found in the China strategy and the 
discourses invoked by officials operationalising EU-China dialogues is potentially 
significant. The connection between the document’s language and discourses invoked by 
officials may be partly explained by these officials having been consulted or even 
contributed to the strategy. Either way, the document appears more representative of 
the state of the EU’s normative power in practice with China than the practices 







6.5 Lack of systematic value mainstreaming in Internal EU coordination 
meeting mechanisms  
 
Finally, reinforcing conclusions throughout this chapter that the EEAS shares and thus de-
facto enables or reproduces the organisational discourses, interviewees revealed that 
systematic value mainstreaming was not being coordinated through the internal 
coordination meeting mechanisms in Brussels and Beijing, overwhelmingly managed by 
the EEAS.  
 
Brussels: The China Country Team 
In Brussels, the EEAS chairs a (non-compulsory) meeting for all Commission China desks 
called the China Country Team (CCT), which typically takes place every two months and 
for up to half a day.136 Brussels-based interviewees unanimously described how 
discussion of EU values in these meetings was rare and discussion of value mainstreaming 
strategies for individual sectors unheard of. Instead, the agenda was dedicated to basic 
strategic coordination across EU-China dialogues, commonly framed by officials as an 
“exchange of information”.137 
Meetings encompassed elements such as establishing common positions on prominent 
issues and current events impacting the bilateral relationship138, a “de-brief”139 following 
summits/key dialogues and video-link communication with the delegation in Beijing.140 It 
also emerged that meetings could be themed to specific sectors.141 For example, one 
interviewee described how one meeting focused on DG JUST officials “talking about the 
future [EU-China] legal affairs dialogue …[and] consumer issues”,142 while others 
described sessions dedicated to the 2018 EU-China Year of Tourism and industrial 
policy.143  
                                                          
136 Interview with an official from DG GROW on 09.03.2017 at 3.30pm. Interviewers with EEAS diplomats on 
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137 Interview with an official from DG EAC on 17.06.2015 at 5.00pm, in Brussels. 
138 Interviews with EEAS diplomats on 20.02.2017 at 11.00am; 23.03.2017 at 11.00am; 05.10.2017 at 
11.00am and 10.10.2017 at 10.00am, in Brussels.   
139 Interview with an official from DG JUST on 09.02.2017 at 10.30am, in Brussels. 
140 Interview with an official from DG EAC on 10.02.2017 at 10.00am, in Brussels. 
141 ibid.  
142 Interview with an official from DG JUST on 09.02.2017 at 10.30am, in Brussels. 
143 Interviews with officials from DG EAC on 10.02.2017 at 10.00am and DG GROW on 09.03.2017 at 




Interviewees’ accounts provided greater insight into the lack of coordination of 
systematic value mainstreaming in CCT meetings. For example, when asked about 
whether value dimensions of individual sectors were raised in the CCT meetings, a DG 
ENV official stated that “not really, I don’t think there is such”. They added that the CCT 
was “basically like a debrief – the EEAS gets an understanding of who is doing what, [to] 
get an understanding in the sectoral fields”.144 The interviewee’s language explicitly 
reinforces both the lack of any substance discussing EU values and the broad exchange of 
information format of the meetings. In another key example, one DG EAC official noted 
that: 
 I don't think that there is specific discussion on this area, on how we transmit, 
convey values through our activities …I mean, it can take place …there are some 
dedicated meetings to a specific area such as the human rights [dialogue].145 
Again, the interviewee confirms that systematic coordination of value mainstreaming is 
not taking place. They portray discussion of values as an unusual phenomenon which is 
ad-hoc in nature, as opposed to an institutionalised feature of all meetings (i.e. “it can 
take place”). This is reinforced by the implication that human rights discussion is 
compartmentalised into dedicated sessions on the human rights dialogue (“there are 
some dedicated meetings to a specific area such as the human rights [dialogue]”). As this 
dialogue takes place once a year, it can be inferred that discussion of human rights in 
these meetings may also be limited to an annual basis. 
This absence of explicit discussion and coordination of EU values in CCT meetings was 
confirmed by EEAS diplomats. For example, when asked about the role of values in 
meetings, one diplomat reaffirmed the broad remit of the meetings. They noted that “our 
job is to bring all DGs into one room” for “information exchange” and to “look for 
overlap… [and] areas of cooperation” as well as provide “broader context”.146  
Conversely, they suggested that there were no systematic efforts to coordinate value 
mainstreaming and discussion of values would be dependent on whether “we have 
specific issues like the NGOs law”.147 Reaffirming this sporadic role of values in meetings, 
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another diplomat described how, in the context of human rights, discussion was limited 
to ad-hoc “human rights updates” and a “de-brief” for the annual human rights dialogue. 
They portrayed these activities as “a way to remind them [the Commission DGs] of 
…horizontal principles that should be in their documents”.148  
The language suggests that the EEAS is viewing these isolated reports on human rights 
issues and dialogues as a passive means of promoting human rights mainstreaming in 
other dialogues (“a way to remind” Commission colleagues), without any active 
coordination of such. Interestingly, the human rights updates in these meetings described 
by the interviewee were absent from Commission accounts entirely, emphasising both 
the rarity of these issues being discussed and the passive manner in which the value is 
featured.  
Ultimately, the lack of coordination of value mainstreaming in these Brussels-based CCT 
meetings can be seen to depart from the official discourse found documents. In this 
context, the EEAS would be expected to promote systematic value mainstreaming 
amongst their Commission colleagues. These dynamics also arguably connect to the 
discourses established in this chapter. 
Unlike the Beijing-based meetings described below, explicit examples displaying this 
linkage were rare in Brussels-based interviewee’s accounts. However, inferences can be 
made based on the above analysis. In this sense, a lack of discussion of values in the CCT 
meetings can be connected with perceptions that values are implicit to EU-China 
dialogues (discourse 1) and that value mainstreaming is not relevant to every dialogue 
(discourse 2).  
Supporting this, one EEAS diplomat appeared to invoke discourse 2. They suggested that 
their coordinating role with Commission officials entailed ensuring that each dialogue was 
most effectively used to implement key policy documents.149 As dialogues are primarily 
designed to achieve their specific sectoral objectives, this appears to enable a side-lining 
of values by officials. 
The absence of coordination of value mainstreaming in CCT meetings can also be linked 
with the discourses pertaining to China’s role, described in Chapter 7. In particular, those 
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discourses justifying an avoidance of such activities on the basis that they will likely 
antagonise the Chinese side and undermine exchanges (discourse 3), and be pointless due 
to counterparts being unable to impact value-related Chinese policy (discourse 4). As a 
result, value mainstreaming may not be getting discussed in the CCT due to a perception 
among EEAS diplomats that it may be counterproductive to many dialogues or their 
Commission colleagues will consider it such and dismiss it.   
 
Beijing: Meetings at the EU delegation to China  
Comparison between the CCT and meeting mechanisms at the Beijing delegation, further 
supported a connection between the discourses and a lack of coordination of value 
mainstreaming. In this vein, Brussels-based interviewees often argued that the format of 
the CCT mechanism made it inappropriate for value mainstreaming. As one DG EAC 
official noted, “it’s only half a day, well maximum …there so many DG issues, so many 
dialogues, so it’s more of an exchange of information”.150  
The interviewee suggests that meetings are limited to basic coordination due to the 
unwieldy number of sectors and DGs managing them, coupled with the very limited time 
ascribed for individual meetings. Interviewees also often suggested that alternative 
smaller meeting mechanisms would be more appropriate for coordinating value 
mainstreaming, perhaps bringing together clusters of DGs working in similar sectors (i.e. 
GROW/TRADE/ECFIN), chaired by the relevant EEAS desk.151 
However, the meeting mechanisms at the EU delegation to China appeared to fulfil these 
criteria. They were much smaller and more regular, including weekly meetings bringing 
together the heads of section, internal section meetings (not all chaired by the EEAS) and 
monthly delegation meetings attended by all staff.152 Nevertheless, despite their more 
manageable format, particularly those weekly formations, it emerged that much like the 
CCT, meetings were restricted to broad technical coordination. Similarly, values were only 
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incorporated on an ad-hoc basis, with no systematic coordination of value mainstreaming 
in dialogues.  
As one Commission official stated, “I don’t see a lot of discussions of that kind in the 
internal meetings”.153 This infers that explicit discussion of values in meetings - including 
sustainable development and human rights - is rare. Building on this, an EEAS diplomat 
described how “in a perfect world it would be great if human rights was raised in every 
meeting”, but discussion of the value and its promotion was “not done in a systematic 
way”.154 The language here suggests that much like in Brussels, EEAS diplomats are not 
systematically incorporating human rights into meetings.  
The lack of coordination of value mainstreaming in these more manageable meetings, 
suggests that logistical considerations are not principally informing such activities not 
taking place. This supports the argument that there is a deeper explanation for this 
neglect: the discourses shared by officials. This was reinforced by Beijing-based 
interviewees. 
When asked about the extent to which EU values featured in internal meetings, a DG 
TRADE official appeared to invoke discourse 2. The interviewee described how “we think 
from a commercial perspective” in internal section meetings and suggested that 
discussion of Article 21/NPE values would not take place due to their inapplicability to 
trade dialogues.155  
Similarly, another Commission official connected to environment/energy/climate 
described how “there is no discussion of values. I mean people report about their work, 
it’s really work place …it’s not a political discussion place”.156 Again, the official expresses 
discourse 2 in suggesting that values are not featuring in Beijing-based meetings because 
they are not applicable to their own and their colleagues’ roles/dialogues (“people report 
about their work”). The example also appears to display discourse 3. The characterisation 
of values as a “political” issue, arguably supports the argument that mainstreaming may 
not be being discussed in meetings because officials consider such activities a threat to 
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sector-specific objectives. In effect, value mainstreaming may reflect a taboo topic. This 
appeared to be reinforced by the interviewee adding that: 
 People are very respectful of the others’ files, so you don’t tend to go and argue 
…have a political argument about someone else’s file.157 
Overall, this section has displayed how a lack of systematic mainstreaming of EU values in 
EU-China dialogues appears to extend to the background coordination meeting 
mechanisms, typically managed by the EEAS. Whilst interviewees in Brussels appeared to 
blame the scale and infrequency of their CCT meetings as a reason for this oversight, 
comparable dynamics in the smaller Beijing-based meetings suggests a linkage with the 
discourses justifying a lack of systematic value mainstreaming. Additional examples 
displaying the lack of coordination of value mainstreaming in internal meetings can be 
seen in Table 6.6 below.
                                                          








and location (Brussels 
[BRU]/Beijing [BEI]) 
 






SMEs (DG GROW) [BRU] 
1. Interviewer: Are they [the EEAS via the CCT] 
saying: look how can we sort of push EU 
values into dialogues?  
 
DG GROW: I don't think so... as values. I don't 
think that's the way it's communicated, no.158 
 
• Conforms that systematic coordination of value 
mainstreaming in all EU-China dialogues is taking place 




Political, Press and 
Information Section, EU 
delegation to China [BEI] 
2. Interviewer: The [EEAS] China Division Chairs 
the China Country team meeting and you 
have all the Commission Desks, but basically 
this is just an exchange of information. There 
is not effort to say right your sector rules the 
law and on what rights issues can you raise in 
your next dialogue? 
 
Interviewee: Exactly, it is the same [here in 
Beijing]. 
(interviewer: It’s similar here?). It is more or 
less the same …yes.159 
 
• Reinforces how coordination of value mainstreaming is 
not taking place in smaller and more frequent Beijing-
based meetings. 
• This supports the notion that the EEAS neglecting such 
discussion is informed by discourses shared by officials, 
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Political, Press and 
Information Section, EU 
delegation to China [BEI] 
3. “Being in a meeting with a person who is 
dealing with the, with human rights, then of 
course, from this perspective … [human 
rights] are always in the background, because 
there is someone who just deals with it, 
officially deals with it and officially raises all 
these questions with the Chinese, etc, etc.”.160 
 
• Interviewee confirms that coordination of human rights 
mainstreaming is not taking place in Beijing-based 
meetings. 
• They suggest that such activities are not necessary as 
someone at delegation, who attends these meetings, 
works with human rights.  
• This reflects discourse 2 and supports the argument 
that discourses shared by officials are informing a 
neglect of values in meetings. 
 
EEAS  ASIAPAC: Asia and Pacific 
Directorate [BRU] 
4. When asked about whether value 
mainstreaming was coordinated through the 
CCT, an EEAS diplomat stated that: 
 
“The China country team, because of the 
frequency with which it happens and because 
of the number of people it involves, tends to 
be more about… a political update on how 
things have moved on, [the] situation in 
China, bilateral relations … opportunities to 
say right, does anybody have any difficulty, 
does anybody need help for instance …It’s 
that sort of, of discussion …it’s also about 
exchanging information and agendas”161 
• Confirms that value mainstreaming is not being 
coordinated by EEAS via CCT meetings. 
• Suggests that such activities cannot be pursued through 
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EEAS ASIAPAC: Asia and Pacific 
Directorate [BRU] 
5. If we needed to influence the dialogue in any 
sort of way, I would definitely not choose a 
country team to do it because there’s too 
many …people round the table that don’t 
have anything to do with the dialogue if that 
was what we wanted, I would do it in a 
smaller format.162 
 
• Again, confirms lack of coordination of value 
mainstreaming in CCT and a logistical justification by 
EEAS diplomats for this. 
• Interviewee suggests that smaller meetings would be 
more appropriate for such activities. 
                                                          






This chapter displayed how, departing from the EU’s official discourse on value 
mainstreaming and NPE’s aligning ideal-type conceptualisation, values are not being 
systematically mainstreamed into EU-China dialogues by EU officials. This superficially 
aligns with the criticisms of NPE that the EU’s material interests take precedence over its 
values (See Chapter 2.6.3). However, in line with this thesis’s original micro-level 
approach to the topic, discourse analysis of transcripts from interviews with EU officials 
revealed deeper explanations for these dynamics. 
In this context, it emerged that officials justified an absence of systematic value 
mainstreaming through two discursive categories: organisational discourses and 
discourses surrounding China’s role. This chapter focused on the former category invoked 
by interviewees. Discourse 1 captured how a lack of value mainstreaming was justified on 
the basis that such activities were implicit to EU-China dialogues and thus required no 
further efforts by officials. Discourse 2 justified a neglect of these practices due to a 
perception that value mainstreaming was not relevant to all EU-China dialogues and 
instead the responsibility of isolated dialogues and individuals. These discourses appeared 
to support Chinese, as opposed EU interests in limiting the discussion of values in EU-
China dialogues.   
The discourses appeared to apply equally to officials based in Brussels and Beijing, as well 
as in the context of both human rights and the environmental dimension of sustainable 
development. Regarding the former, it notably emerged that these discourses were 
limiting the potential of the EU-China Legal Affairs Dialogue (LAD) to promote human 
rights indirectly with China. Concerning sustainable development, it was revealed that 
officials considered the value inapplicable to their dialogues (discourse 2), despite much 
of the substance falling under the value. This appeared to be captured by the concept of 
partial mainstreaming, which captures how value mainstreaming takes place sporadically 
in dialogues, due to EU values being pre-built into dialogues. As described in Chapter 9, 
despite displaying how values underpin EU-China dialogues, such partial activities have 





The analysis also suggested that EEAS officials, managing pillar one dialogues and 
coordinating all others, shared and thus enabled or actively reproduced the 
organisational discourses. This appeared to extend to a lack of coordination of value 
mainstreaming in the internal meetings mechanisms in Brussels and Beijing, chaired by 
the EEAS. The chapter also suggested that the EU’s 2016 China strategy may be similarly 
serving to enable or reproduce the discourses informing a lack of systematic value 









This chapter focuses on the category of discourses characterising China’s role in EU-China 
dialogues as a primary justification for a lack of systematic value mainstreaming. Section 
7.2 examines discourse 3, which reflects arguably the dominant discourse invoked by 
officials. The discourse captures a perception that raising the most controversial values in 
dialogues will foster obstructive behaviour by China and undermine exchanges. The 
section also details how this discourse extends to the human rights dialogue and China’s 
efforts to impede it.  
Discourse 4, outlined in Section 7.3, surrounds the interlinked view on the EU side that 
raising EU values with China is not only risky, but pointless, as opaque Chinese 
counterparts will likely be unable to impact Chinese policy connected to EU values. These 
two discourses are arguably informed by genuinely obstructive actions and practices by 
the Chinese side, which act as a deterrent to EU mainstreaming efforts. Importantly, as 
China’s real or expected resistance towards discussing controversial values with the EU in 
dialogues appears to be informed by a facet of the official party-state discourse on values 
(See Chapter 5.5.2), EU officials avoiding value mainstreaming in dialogues in response, 
could be seen to be complying with the Chinese party line and indirectly endorsing the 
official Chinese position on human rights. This failure to challenge China’s official 
interpretation of values in dialogues arguably reflects an existential threat to the EU’s 
values and their continued relevance.  
Conversely, discourse 5, approached in Section 7.4, appears to be rooted in the actions of 
the EU side. This highly nuanced discourse surrounds a perception on the EU side that 
China is not listening to the EU and it should be. The discourse appears to inform a lack of 
reflexivity amongst officials which connects to unsuccessful and counterproductive 
approaches in the rare instances when values are raised with the Chinese side 
(particularly via the human rights dialogue). It also seems to deter value mainstreaming in 
all other dialogues, like discourses 3 and 4.  Reinforcing the conclusions in Chapter 6, it 
appears that all of these discourses primarily support Chinese as opposed to EU interests 




7.2 Discourse 3: The Chinese side’s conduct during EU-China dialogues impedes 
the practical promotion of EU values  
 
Examples of discourse 3 were identifiable across all pillars of EU-China dialogues, 
encompassing both EEAS and Commission officials’ accounts in Brussels and Beijing. The 
discourse captures how officials justify not mainstreaming the most controversial values 
in EU-China dialogues on the basis that it will trigger obstructive responses by China, 
comprising exchanges. Discourse 3 is therefore of great relevance to this thesis’s focus on 
human rights, but not applicable to the comparably uncontroversial environmental 
dimension of sustainable development. 
Discourse 3 differs from the organisational discourses through not necessarily being 
based upon the first-hand experiences of EU officials. In this fashion, the discourse 
appears to be often informed by the experiences of those few officials who are raising 
controversial EU values with China, particularly EEAS diplomats involved with the human 
rights dialogue. As a result, China’s obstructive behaviour in this dialogue, which is 
uniquely dedicated to promoting an EU value in EU-China relations, appears to be 
legitimising a lack of value mainstreaming in all others. It seems to reflect a cautionary 
tale for the consequences of pursuing such activities with China. 
The discourse is also arguably informed by officials’ first-hand experiences of China 
obstructing discussion of other issues - not connected to the Article 21/NPE values - 
which it does not want to discuss (e.g. reform of state-owned enterprises or 
overcapacity). It is also possible that China is actively contributing to the climate of fear 
associated with the discourse. It may be building on and perhaps embellishing a 
perception on the EU side that any attempts to mainstream controversial EU values will 
trigger obstructive behaviour. Crucially, as an avoidance of discussing controversial EU 
values in dialogues reflects an official party-state discourse expressed by Chinese officials, 
EU officials eschewing value mainstreaming based on real or expected resistance from 
interlocutors could be seen to represent a compliance with this party line. This arguably 
has significant implications for the EU side, neglected by seemingly complacent officials, 
having the potential to be perceived by observers and the Chinese side as an indirect 
acceptance and legitimisation of the official Chinese position on controversial values like 
human rights. It also importantly reflects evidence that the flow of values between the EU 




and acquiescing to China’s values. Moreover, as noted in Chapter 3.5.1, this interaction 
solely with the official party-state discourse on controversial EU values is coming at the 
expense of heavily suppressed, alternative interpretations of these values which are 
present in Chinese civil society (See Chapter 3.5.1).  
Beyond this, it is crucial to emphasise the deeper implications of the EU being perceived 
to comply with and de-facto endorse China’s official party-state discourse on values, 
illuminated by Shklar’s (1989) work, which was described in Chapter 5.5.2. As the EU’s 
values and their relevance is informed and empowered by a fear of totalitarian 
governments and the cruelty they enable, EU officials neglecting to confront China’s 
conflicting values actively erodes the EU’s values and their continued relevance. It 
represents an act of self-harm by EU officials to the EU’s normative power, wherein they 
effectively capitulate to the very fear - and one that may be being actively cultivated by 
the Chinese side in dialogues - that the EU’s values are designed to confront.  
 
Pillar 2: Economic & sectoral dialogues 
Concerning Pillar 2 dialogues, a key example could be seen in the account of a Beijing-
based DG TRADE official. They described how “if we integrate human rights [into trade 
dialogues] it might antagonise” the Chinese side, while addressing a “purely business” 
approach will attain “more traction”.163 The language explicitly suggests that the 
interviewee is not mainstreaming human rights into their dialogues (i.e. “if we integrate” 
human rights), while discourse 3 is invoked to justify this choice. This is displayed by their 
suggestion that a) such activities are being eschewed on the basis that they will upset 
China (“it might antagonise [the Chinese side]”) and b) that they are instead focusing 
exclusively on trade issues. Unlike discussion of the Article 21/NPE values, this “purely 
business” approach is cast as the most likely to engender productive exchanges with 
China (i.e. attainting “more traction”).   
An official from DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (GROW), also 
appeared to invoke the discourse in justifying their avoidance of mainstreaming 
controversial values with China, particularly rule of law. They described how: “obviously 
                                                          




taking these things head on with the Chinese side is… they consider [it] very disrespectful, 
they don't respond well” and elaborated that:  
It’s easier to talk economy in the end, because we can boil it down to more 
palatable things …Another reflection is you know, you can try to talk a lot to 
somebody about something but if they don't want to talk, you are only going to 
lose your time.164 
The interviewee’s language again suggests that they are legitimising an avoidance of 
value mainstreaming due to an expected negative response by the Chinese side (“they 
consider [it] very disrespectful, they don't respond well”). The interviewee also infers that 
the linkage between mainstreaming and such behaviour by the Chinese side is almost 
self-evident (obvious). This alludes to the strength of the discourse on the EU side and 
displays the climate of fear associated with it, which the Chinese side may be actively 
contributing to. In this context, the interviewee’s language also interestingly displays that 
their eschewing of value mainstreaming is informed by and aligning with the desires of 
their interlocutors, which are described as viewing the EU side raising such issues as “very 
disrespectful”. This supports the notion that discourse 3 is practically informing a de-facto 
compliance with and endorsement of China’s official party-state discourse on values, 
which seeks to avoid engagement with the EU on controversial values. 
Like the first example, the discourse is notably informing the interviewee limiting their 
agenda to sector-specific economic matters. This substance is cast as “easier” than 
discussion on controversial EU values with China (i.e. “more palatable”). Lastly, the quote 
explicitly reinforces how discourse 3 is informing them avoiding systematic value 
mainstreaming. The interviewee suggests that they perceive such activities to be not only 
counterproductive, but futile, due to the Chinese side’s expected obstructive reaction to 
any attempts to do so by the EU side (“if they don't want to talk, you are only going to 
lose your time”).  
Another key example can be seen in the account of an official from DG Justice and 
Consumers (JUST) connected to the EU-China Legal Affairs Dialogue (LAD). As noted in 
previous chapters, the dialogue represents a key focus for this thesis. This is due to the EU 
considering rule of law an enabler of human rights and the LAD institutionally reflecting 
                                                          




this connection, through its design as an additional channel to promote human rights with 
China (See Chapter 3.6). The interviewee described how: 
We’ve designed it, so, as I say the title, not rule of law, but legal affairs dialogue, 
so it’s been designed to not, set these alarm bells ringing and, … you can still raise 
value issues. But in the speech of our Director General, [who] will be opening it, 
we do not talk about human rights and …the legal situation, arbitrary arrest, we 
talk about legal affairs because that would be the guarantee to get everyone 
walking out in 5 minutes.165 
The official suggests that the design and function of the LAD has been informed by the 
concerns associated with discourse 3. They describe how the title of the dialogue has 
been designed not to provoke an immediate negative reaction from the Chinese which 
would compromise exchanges. This is captured by the image of an alarm being triggered 
(“alarm bells ringing). The interviewee also suggests that while “you can still raise value 
issues” in this format, they are not doing so, invoking discourse 3 to justify this. They infer 
that they are carefully avoiding any discussion of human rights during dialogues out of a 
fear that the Chinese side will leave the table (“everyone walking out in 5 minutes”). The 
power of discourse 3 is portrayed by their suggestion of the certainty of this outcome 
from human rights and rule of law mainstreaming (i.e. it is “guaranteed” to trigger a 
negative reaction from China).  
While the discourse appears to be informing controversial EU values not being explicitly 
included in the example above, it does not preclude these values - particularly human 
rights - being indirectly designed into the dialogue as envisioned by its creators. However, 
the interviewee’s account suggested otherwise, noting that: 
We have to have fruitful discussions, and… I mean the thing [dialogue] is only as 
good as… as much as both sides have an active interest in it, yeah? which is 
probably not the case with the human rights dialogue. So we have to find stuff 
which is… mutually interesting, so better regulation, you know, we’ve got 
something to bring [to] the Chinese, something they want… [similarly, regarding 
the theme of] the civil code.166 
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The language suggests that discourse 3 is being used to justify a gravitation towards 
picking more technical themes in the LAD. Like the other examples analysed, the 
interviewee infers that concern over upsetting the Chinese side is leading to them focus 
on areas which align with China’s interests (“we have to have fruitful discussions …. stuff 
which is… mutually interesting”). As China has no interest in discussing the more 
normative angles of judicial cooperation, it makes it less likely that themes more explicitly 
connecting to controversial EU values will be picked. This is displayed in the themes they 
suggest - “better regulation” and “the civil code”. Akin to the previous (DG GROW) 
example, the interviewee also appears to infer an acceptance of the Chinese side’s 
unwillingness to discuss value-related issues, reflecting a de-facto compliance with and 
legitimisation of the official party-state discourse on values.  
The interviewee’s inferred side-lining of EU values in the LAD is reinforced by them 
pitching the human rights dialogue as an example of how discussion of values is not likely 
to be productive with China. This also suggests that they associate value mainstreaming in 
EU-China relations with human rights promotion and the human rights dialogue. This 
reinforces the notion that the challenges of the human rights dialogue reflect a 
cautionary tale for the consequences of mainstreaming controversial values with China, 
deterring such activities by officials in other dialogues. 
The interviewee displayed an awareness that potential themes for future dialogues, 
including gender equality (women’s rights) were connected to EU values, when 
prompted. But it appeared that these dimensions were not actively discussed on the EU 
side between the Commission and the EEAS officials operationalising the dialogue, nor 
systematically integrated into the dialogue. The EU did not appear to be lobbying for 
themes on a value basis. Instead the interviewee described how such connections could 
become more explicit in the future – in their words “further down the line”.  
In the short-term this seems unlikely, given the prevalence of discourse 3, which along 
with the perceptions that values are implicit to the LAD (discourse 1) and value 
mainstreaming is inapplicable (discourse 2), appear to be justifying EU values not being 
systematically designed into the dialogue. This reinforces the argument in Chapter 6 that 
these discourses are informing the LAD not meeting its potential as an effective channel 




A last key example from Pillar 2 dialogues was found in the account of a DG Energy (ENER) 
official. The interviewee was asked about the extent to which they instrumentally 
integrated EU values - human rights and rule of law were given as example by the 
interviewer - into their dialogues. They brought up the EU’s 2016 China Strategy (See 
Chapter 6.4.3) and stated that: 
I don't think you can read it as, in everything we do with the Chinese, one way or 
another we are addressing this [values] no …It would not work, it would really 
stop cooperation in many areas if we go there with our energy issues and we 
[raised values]. I am glad some people do it, I think we should have this human 
rights dialogue and I think at some level it, with very good personal contact, very 
good bonding, then maybe we could address it directly once in a while but in 
general, as a general strategy to address it in every dialogue we have, I think it’s 
impossible, it would not work.167  
The interviewee invokes discourse 3 in suggesting that they are not systematically 
mainstreaming values into energy dialogues due to concerns that it would compromise 
the dialogue. The extent of the threat posed by such activities and thus the power of the 
discourse is strongly reflected in their language. They suggest that value mainstreaming 
would be incompatible with the successful attainment of their sector-specific objectives 
(“It would not work …I think it’s impossible”) and would cut off multiple dimensions of 
EU-China energy cooperation (“it would really stop cooperation in many areas”).  
The posited incompatibility also links with discourse 2 and the suggestion that value 
mainstreaming is not appropriate for all dialogues, as does the notion that such activities 
should be limited to the human rights dialogue (“I am glad some people do it, I think we 
should have this human rights dialogue”). 
Relatedly, like the DG JUST examples, the interviewee appears to associate value 
mainstreaming predominantly with human rights and the human rights dialogue. This 
reaffirms how discourse 3 is informed by the experience of others, with the human rights 
dialogue again framed as a cautionary tale of the consequences of mainstreaming 
controversial values with China. 
                                                          




The example also displays how discourse 3 challenges the official discourse on value 
mainstreaming found in documents. The interviewee suggests that systematic value 
mainstreaming in all dialogues reflects a prospective and unrealistic strategy, as opposed 
to standards which they should be following (“as a general strategy to address it in every 
dialogue … I think it’s impossible, it would not work”). The example also interestingly 
supports the argument in Chapter 6.4.3 that the more pragmatic language of the EU’s 
China strategy is serving to reproduce the discourse justifying a lack of systematic 
mainstreaming in EU-China dialogues.  
Finally, the interviewee suggests that strong interpersonal relations, lacking from their 
dialogue, would reflect a prerequisite for value mainstreaming. While this can be taken at 
face value, it also arguably alludes to the rarity of such high-quality relationships between 
officials on each side. As described in Chapter 8, a lack of cultural and linguistic 
knowledge among EU officials - which aids the formation of such close relationships - was 
revealed by this thesis to represent another dimension informing a lack of systematic 
value mainstreaming in EU-China dialogues and in turn, the weakness of the EU’s 
normative power with China.  
 
Pillar 3: People-to-People dialogue 
Discourse 3 was also identifiable in Pillar 3 People-to-People dialogues (PPD). For 
example, in response to a question about whether there was an instrumental effort to 
side-line human rights in their dialogues, an interviewee stated that: 
Indeed, that will be the reason [that human rights issues aren’t raised]. Because it’s 
clear that if [we] started any meeting with our cultural counterparts talking about Ai 
Weiwei, then we can stop the meeting. Because if every time we did a meeting we 
start[ed] with Ai Weiwei... of course I mean, there will be no room for cultural 
cooperation …They will resent it again... as an interference and …they are very 
sensitive.168 
The interviewee invokes discourse 3 in suggesting that they are avoiding human rights 
mainstreaming based on concern over upsetting their counterparts. They reaffirm the 
                                                          




language of their colleagues above through casting human rights mainstreaming as likely 
to trigger immediate negative consequences (“we [might as well] stop the meeting”). The 
interviewee also suggests that any inclusion of human rights in dialogues would override 
the agenda and preclude any discussion of sector-specific (cultural) substance (“there will 
be no room for cultural cooperation”). Their language reinforces the probability and 
magnitude of these consequences through describing how insulted and angry their 
counterparts will be if human rights is raised (“they will resent it ... as an interference 
…they are very sensitive”). Moreover, the language here reflects a particularly strong 
example of how discourse 3 may also be informing a de-facto compliance with and 
endorsement of the official party-state discourse expressed by their interlocutors. The 
interviewee suggests that they are effectively complying with their counterparts desire 
for human rights not to be tabled on the basis that it is an “interference” in China’s 
internal affairs, word-choice that directly aligns with one of China’s Five principles of 
peaceful coexistence (non-interference in each other’s internal affairs) and its articulation 
in China’s 2014 strategy on EU-China relations (See Chapter 5.5.2). 
Like other examples analysed, the quote also displays the power of the discourse in 
presenting these consequences as obvious/self-evident (“it’s clear”). Moreover, the 
interviewee appears to cast their EEAS colleagues’ negative experiences of the human 
rights dialogue as justification for not mainstreaming human rights. They appear to 
equate human rights mainstreaming with raising individual cases with China that are 
likely to provoke tensions, as opposed to a more subtle and indirect strategy (“if [we] 
started… any meeting …talking about Ai Weiwei”). Additional examples of discourse 3 in 




  Table 7.1 Additional key examples of discourse 3 in Pillar 2 and 3 dialogues  
Directorate (General)/ 
Department and location (Brussels 
[BRU]/Beijing [BEI]) 
Quoted example Analysis 
DG Justice and Consumers (JUST) 
[BRU] 
1. If you address the questions of governance 
and transparency head on with China, 
something like a human rights dialogue, you 
don’t get very far. 169 
 
• Suggests that raising controversial EU values in dialogues is pointless, 
as their counterparts will simply will not engage with it. 
DG Environment (ENV), staffing 
high-profile cooperation 
programme, [BEI] 
2. The minute you say human rights all sorts of 
alarm bells [start] ringing, so don’t, we don’t 
like to call it that, although I think 
internationally environmental rights are 
considered human rights, you know, that’s 
part of the human rights basket but we 
wouldn’t call it that because we’d be asking 
for trouble. So basically, I never use the word 
democracy, I never use the word human 
rights, even though a lot of the stuff that I’m 
doing is very much up that street.170 
 
• Displays China’s expected immediate negative reaction to 
mainstreaming human rights (“the minute you say human rights”). 
• China is portrayed as entering a state of alert (“all sorts of alarm bells 
[start] ringing”).  
• Alarm bell imagery also used by DG JUST official in-text. 
 
• Invoking discourse 3, interviewee suggests that they are not 
mainstreaming human rights explicitly with China, in light of these 
expected consequences.  
• However, interviewee appears aware connections between their 
activities and controversial EU values. 
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EU Delegation to China, 
Information Society Media Section 
[BEI] 
3. “Will it affect me [being requested by senior 
staff to mainstream values]? Of course. The 
Chinese don’t want to hear it …We have a 
more substantial discussion through 
bracketing it out [i.e. focusing on sector-
specific areas of mutual interest]”.171 
 
• Suggests that interviewee views value mainstreaming as a negative 
activity, impeding their sector specific objectives.  
• Infers that interviewee avoids mainstreaming EU values over 
concerns that China will be inattentive, and dialogues will be 
unproductive (“The Chinese don’t want to hear it”). 
• Suggests that they focus on sector-specific technical substance with 
China as a result (“We have a more substantial discussion through 
bracketing it out”). 
• Alludes to ad-hoc coordination of human rights mainstreaming by the 
EEAS at the EU delegation. 
 
• Captures EU officials feel they have a personal stake in the success of 
the dialogue.  




EU Delegation to China, 
Information Society Media Section 
[BEI] 
4. “If you have something they want, or they 
think you will shut down something credibly 
…this is when something happens. 
Otherwise, nothing happens, zero …What 
justifies us [being] here is making change on 






• Implies that value mainstreaming is effectively a waste of time as the 
Chinese side will not engage with it, because it does not align with 
their interests and the EU has no credible leverage to enforce values 
(i.e. conditionality).  
• They suggest that if they were to pursue such activities, they would 
be carrying out a pretend scenario which departs from reality (“it’s 
like live-action role play”) 
• Invoking discourse 3, interviewee suggests that as a result, they are 
eschewing values mainstreaming in favour of sector-specific areas of 
mutual interest. 
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DG Education and Culture (EAC) 
[BRU] 
5. “So let’s say …that we [do not] very openly 
talk of this kind of thing because we also 
know, we are very aware that in China there 
is a very in particular now under Xi Jinping, 
there is a very, cautious approach with 
respect to other culture's values.” There has 
been a very explicit, speech from Xi Jinping 
recently …about the western values that we 
have to fight …and they have to preserve 
Chinese values, which is understandable, I 




• Suggests that values are not being explicitly mainstreamed in PPD 
due to an expected negative response by China (“we [do not] very 
openly talk of this kind of thing …we are very aware that in China 
…there is a very, cautious approach with respect to other culture's 
values.”). 
• Example highlights China’s role in reproducing discourse 3 through its 
behaviour (“There has been a very explicit, speech from Xi Jinping 
recently).  
• It thus displays how the discourse is not just based on paranoia on 
the EU side or second-hand experiences of particular 
dialogues/officials. 
• Displays unusual reflexivity about the contested nature of the EU’s 
values and China alternative interpretation of them (“they have to 












                                                          




Pillar 1: Political dialogues  
While EEAS diplomats operationalising Pillar 1 dialogues could be seen to share and thus 
enable discourse 3, the strongest examples were found in the accounts of those 
individuals involved with the human rights dialogue (key examples pertaining to other 
political dialogues displayed in Table 7.3 below). These interviewees displayed an 
interesting facet of the discourse. As opposed to an expected response by China 
informing value mainstreaming not taking place, these diplomats invoked discourse 3 in 
perceiving China’s obstructive conduct as the principal barrier to their active promotion of 
human rights.  
Akin to their EEAS colleagues not involved with the human rights dialogue, these 
diplomats appeared to be enabling the discourse in Commission-led dialogues. However, 
as opposed to doing so actively through their routine coordination activities, these 
individual’s negative experiences with China appeared to passively inform other officials 
eschewing value mainstreaming. As highlighted in the previous section, the human rights 
dialogue seems to represent a cautionary tale invoked by officials to legitimise discourse 
3.  
Notably, China’s obstructive behaviour during these dialogues, which explains the weak 
outcomes observed by internal and external critics of the framework, supports the 
suggestion made in Chapter 3.6 that China has emerged as the key beneficiary of the EU-
China human rights dialogue. In exchange for an opaque, closed-door dialogue, where it 
can (and does) refuse to engage in meaningful discussions on human rights with the EU, it 
has been able to end annual public condemnation at the multilateral level. Maximising 
this benefit for the Chinese side, as described above, its efforts to undermine the dialogue 
are also serving to deter discussion of controversial EU values in all other dialogues. The 
examples below encompass two dimensions: a) China’s obstruction of EU diplomats’ 
promotion of human rights during human rights dialogues and b) China’s obstruction of 








a) China’s obstruction to EU human rights promotion during human rights dialogue 
Regarding the former, interviewees described how the Chinese side tended to get 
aggressive and obstruct discussion of sensitive human rights issues during human rights 
dialogues. As one EEAS diplomat noted: 
I always say, there are trigger words, so if you start mentioning some words then 
normally …the Chinese delegation gets rather upset, about things …And basically I 
think they [get] quite angry and they are quite kind of shouting you know why are 
you always raising this issue [treatment of the Falun Gong followers],  or the Tibetans 
you know, you are talking about 3 million people, the population of China is 1.4 
billion …and Hong Kong was also a trigger.174 
The notion of “trigger words” conveys how China will immediately and furiously shut 
down discussion of pressing human rights concerns on the EU side (“they [get] quite 
angry …shouting”). These trigger words are revealed to be associated with sensitive issues 
for China, which are perceived to threaten its governance and territorial integrity: the 
Falun Gong religious sect, Tibet and Hong Kong.  
The quote also captures how these dynamics are ingrained and frequent. The interviewee 
describes how they “always say, there are trigger words”, alluding to extensive first-hand 
experience. This is also reflected in the suggestion that the Chinese side provides 
standardised replies, which portrays the regularity of such obstructive behaviour, where 
they refuse to meaningfully engage in discussion with the EU on these issues (e.g. “why 
are you always raising this issue [emphasis added]”). These dynamics were reinforced by 
another interviewee:  
There are certain words that they don’t want to hear, at all, which infuriates them. 
To speak about Tibet, to speak about the Uighur …and they don’t want to speak 
about it.175 
As in the case above, the notion is that specific terminology/topics trigger an immediate 
angry response (“certain words …which infuriates them”). However, the interviewee 
more overtly suggests that this obstructive behaviour stems from a conscious effort on 
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the Chinese side not to engage meaningfully with EU human rights concerns (“they don’t 
want to hear [it] …they don’t want to speak about it”).  
Interestingly, the repetitive nature of these dynamics in dialogues also connects to 
discourse 5, surrounding the notion that China is not listening to the EU and it should be 
(addressed in 7.3.1). China’s obstructive behaviour may be partly provoked by the EU 
adopting a didactic approach to promoting its interpretation of human rights. 
The analysis suggested that this obstruction by China was particularly acute when the EU 
raised individual cases (i.e. those pertaining to specific people) (See also: EU Council, 
2015:197). This aligns with existing literature and EU and Chinese documents. As noted in 
Chapter 3.6, China publicly opposes this practice and considers it contrary to the 
“principles of mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs” (MoFA, 2014). 
Reflecting this, one diplomat stated that “the Chinese react very badly when we raise 
individual cases”.176 They described how in the last dialogue they attended, the Chinese 
side threatened to “cancel the rest of dialogue” prematurely and preceded to give “30-
minute lectures” on each case.177 This highlights an additional form of obstruction 
conducted by China, beyond angry dismissal of topics: tactically absorbing the limited 
time period of the dialogue to sabotage the agenda. 
This was supported by another EEAS diplomat. They described how China “flood[s] the 
meetings with every detail about the daily routine” of individuals in question, giving the 
example of Mr X got up at 8.00am and then went to the bathroom at 08.02am etc. The 
language here portrays China’s obstruction as overwhelming the EU’s capacity to 
promote human rights, saturating the dialogue with irrelevant content. 
Interviewees’ accounts notably highlighted that this instrumental time-wasting strategy 
extended beyond discussion of individual cases to the dialogues as a whole. As opposed 
to obstructing discussion of individual cases on principle, China appeared to be engaging 
in a comprehensive strategy to stymie the human rights dialogue. As one EEAS diplomat 
summarised: 
 
                                                          





The quality of exchanges went down significantly [in recent years], so this is why 
the [EEAS] colleagues have the impression of talking to a brick wall; because you 
say something, they reply something else, they read out of the paper and they 
make sure the paper is 40 pages long and it’s going to take half the day and that 
they’re just going to read it very slowly …it’s one of the diplomatic techniques of 
how to obstruct a meeting.178 
The diplomat’s language suggests that genuine two-way communication is not taking 
place, impeding practical human rights promotion. This is reflected in the suggestion that 
EU comments/questions are being repeatedly deflected by the Chinese side (“you say 
something, they reply something else)” and the description of engaging China in these 
dialogues being like “talking to a brick wall”. This simile strongly conveys how the EU side 
feels that nothing they say in the dialogue is being engaged with or internalised.  
Displaying China’s argued time-wasting strategy, the interviewee suggests that 
interlocutors instrumentally read out copious material for as long as possible to 
undermine the dialogue (“they read out of the paper and they make sure the paper is 40 
pages long and it’s going to take half the day and …[they] read it very slowly”). This 
language reflects discourse 3, in suggesting that China’s actions are the principal reason 
for the ill-functioning of the dialogue (i.e. “the quality of exchanges”). This is reaffirmed 
by their description of the Chinese side adopting a well-known diplomatic technique. 
Additionally, China’s obstructive behaviour is cast as intensifying over time, with the 
“quality” of dialogues having gone “down significantly [in recent years]”). 
Beyond these strategies of shutting down discussion of specific issues or time-wasting, 
interviewees also described how China obstructed dialogues through using its (legitimate) 
capacity to raise concerns about human rights within the EU.179 Chinese interlocutors 
were characterised as raising issues/cases specifically with the intent of highlighting the 
EU’s hypocrisies, embarrassing it and countering the EU’s criticisms of China, through 
holding the EU account to its own (internal/external) legal standards. For example, the 
EEAS diplomat quoted above described how:  
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It’s very clever the way they do it, because their holding us accountable to our 
own laws and to what we’ve signed up, which is exactly we’re doing to them … but 
they say, well look at your own member states and look at the freedom of media 
in Hungary.180  
All interviewees connected to human rights promotion suggested that China’s obstructive 
behaviour had intensified in recent years. 181 Reflecting on the 2017 dialogue, one EEAS 
diplomat noted that China was “much more aggressive” than in the past, with their 
counterparts described as “confrontational” and having “no willingness for the 
cooperation side” in the exchange.182 They added that despite efforts on the EU side to be 
as respectful and calm as possible, the Chinese side nonetheless made accusations to the 
contrary. For the interviewee, this suggested that their counterparts were following a 
script designed to strategically undermine the exchange.183  
 
b) Obstruction of the format and organisation of EU-China human rights dialogues  
Interviewees also described China’s efforts to disrupt the format and organisation of the 
human rights dialogue. Regarding the format, interviewees described how in the past, 
China had unilaterally refused to continue conducting the dialogues biannually and 
catalysed a scrapping of the accompanying civil society seminars.184 In more recent years, 
officials highlighted how China has sought to lower the seniority of the officials chairing 
the dialogue (i.e. the level) and thus its significance.185 It emerged that the EU’s refusal to 
capitulate to China on this area resulted in the dialogue not taking place at all in 2016.186 
As one EEAS diplomat elaborated:  
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They suggested to send a Deputy Director General, which is at a lower level, which 
is what actually they had suggested in 2014 and we had lots of exchanges and we 
said, we do not agree with holding [it] at lower level, because we are more 
interested in being able to talk at a level where we can have the illusion of being 
able to influence the policymaking. [The] illusion.187  
The interviewee’s language captures how the Chinese side had intensified its requests 
that the dialogue’s level be lowered since 2014. This is reflected in the suggestion that 
across multiple coordination meetings prior to the planned 2016 dialogue, the issue was 
persistently raised by the Chinese side, despite the EU’s opposition to the premise (“we 
had lots of exchanges and we said, we do not agree with holding [it] at lower level”).  
Additionally, the diplomat’s word choice of “illusion” casts the Chinese side as 
disingenuously giving the EU the impression that they are open to meaningful discussion 
of human rights through holding the dialogue at a more senior level. Through trying to 
lower the level, the interviewee suggests that China does not even want the EU to have 
the “illusion” that it can seriously discuss human rights. This reflects an attribution of 
blame for the unproductivity of the dialogues, squarely on the Chinese side, displaying 
discourse 3.  
The word choice also alludes to a strong degree of pessimism which is connected to 
discourse 5 (China not listening the EU when it should be doing so). In this sense, EU 
officials expect poor outcomes from the dialogue due to China’s obstructive conduct, but 
they want to pretend (have the “illusion”) that they can make headway, if they are 
engaging with a more senior Chinese official.  
Capturing these intensifying Chinese efforts to undermine the format of the dialogue, 
another EEAS diplomat described how the following year (2017), the EU “had to accept 
the lower level, or no dialogue at all”.188 In this sense, despite the “principle-based 
objection” in 2016, China’s renewed opposition to holding the dialogue at the established 
level, was such that the EU was pressured into capitulating, a controversial decision which 
saw NGOs refuse to be involved with the dialogue in any capacity (See: HRW, 2017iii).189  
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Beyond these stark efforts to alter the format of the dialogue, interviewees highlighted 
long-running attempts by the Chinese side to stymie the organisation of dialogues. As one 
EEAS diplomat noted: 
But even organizing a dialogue once a year is quite a challenge, and last year 
[2014] actually the dialogue took place at the beginning of December and we had 
almost given up …and they came back a month before Christmas, more or less, 
and they said ‘it would be nice to organize it, how about’, so it was not exactly 
Christmas eve, but it was like  23rd of December, we said ‘come on’, [so] they said 
‘how about the 31st?’190  
Here, difficulties in agreeing on the dates for human rights dialogues - portrayed as a 
basic aspect of bilateral cooperation - is highlighted as symbolic of just how obstructive 
the EU finds China’s actions (“even organizing a dialogue once a year is quite a 
challenge”). The language suggests that the EU had persistently approached the Chinese 
side and been rejected to the stage that they had ostensibly ceased efforts and assumed 
that the dialogue would not take place (“we had almost given up”).  
Supporting this characterisation of the Chinese side as critically impeding the dialogue’s 
organisation, the interviewee also describes how the Chinese side approached the EU at 
the last minute (“they came back a month before Christmas”) and initially suggested 
public holiday dates that the EU side could not accept in practice. Consequently, the 
above quote strongly displays discourse 3, with the Chinese side cast as the principal 
impediment to the EU’s promotion of human rights through this dialogue. 
Citing examples from more recent years, these dynamics appear to have continued or 
even increased. This mirrors an apparent intensification of China’s obstruction during 
dialogues. In this vein, an EEAS diplomat noted that in 2017: 
That sort of stuff hasn’t changed, we’ve probably become better at dealing with it 
by experience …that they might offer to have the next human rights dialogue on 
Easter, on the good Friday …that doesn’t surprise us.191 
The language captures how China’s disruptive actions have been long-running to the 
extent that it has become almost institutionalised for the EU side (i.e. they are “better at 
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dealing with it by experience”), while the proposition of unworkable dates “doesn’t 
surprise” them. This reinforces the notion that EU diplomats ostensibly expect poor 
outcomes from the dialogue due to China’s behaviour.  
Emphasising the continuation of these challenging dynamics, diplomats described how 
the 2017 dialogue date was settled with less than a weeks’ notice, while China,192 for the 
first time, threatened that “we won’t hold the HR dialogue [at all]”, unless the EU 
refrained from mentioning China in its annual human rights statement at the multilateral 
level.193 More dramatically, another diplomat felt that the Chinese side were seeking to 
“eradicate the dialogue … by making it so difficult to [conduct and] discuss” human 
rights.194 They added that China had been successful in doing so with the US, Sweden and 
France, leaving few bilateral human rights dialogues in existence.195 EEAS diplomats also 
described China’s significant obstruction towards any EU attempts to deliver diplomatic 
demarches to the Chinese mission to the EU in Brussels, stymieing this formal channel for 
the EU to official express human rights concerns (See Table 7.2, Quote 4).196 
China’s increasing intransigence in the organisation and during human rights dialogues 
can be explained by certain key developments. These include China’s increasing 
international power vis-a-vis the EU; its increased economic significance for the EU and 
individual member states; along with the “authoritarian and nationalist”197 policies of Xi 
Jinping. Additional examples of discourse 3 relating to the organisation and delivery of the 
human rights dialogue can be seen in Table 7.2 below. An extended table can be found in 
Appendix iv. 
 
c) Obstruction of Human rights public statements  
It emerged that the EU can compensate for China’s obstruction of the human rights 
dialogue through the publication of strongly-worded public statements. The statements 
express the EU’s human rights concerns - including specification of individual cases - on 
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the EU’s and member states’ websites.198 They are strongly opposed by China which 
sought to restrict discussion of human rights through establishing the dialogue in 1998 
(See Chapter 3.6). Reflecting this, China attempts to obstruct even this compensatory 
mechanism for the difficulties facing the human rights dialogue. The statements require 
unanimous approval by the EU 27 and it emerged that China actively lobbies individual 
member states to break unity. As one EEAS diplomat stated: 
Countries like Hungary who are very much under the spell of China’s economic 
diplomacy and the 16+1s …who prefer not to raise themselves bilaterally, human 
rights issues with China …[they] would actually prefer, not like even the EU to 
raise any of it.199 
China’s role in these countries challenging EU unity on human rights promotion is 
reinforced by the characterisation of them being under a “spell”, as if China is controlling 
them by proxy, through “economic diplomacy”. Supporting this, Greece notably blocked 
the EU’s annual statement condemning China’s human rights environment at UN Human 
Rights Council (UNHRC), for the first time in history (Reuters, 2017). This was widely seen 
to be linked to recent Chinese investment and background lobbying (ibid.).200 This 
outcome, which neither side expected, led to China being effectively forced to the table in 
2016, due to its threat - mentioned above - to cancel the human rights dialogue if the 
UNHRC statement included China. 
Overall, the analysis in this section has displayed how, in line with discourse 3, diplomats 
operationalising the human rights dialogue consider China’s obstructive actions as the 
principal impediment to the efficacy of the dialogue, as opposed to any strategic 
deficiency on the EU side. Summarising this, an EEAS diplomat stated that there was “an 
absence of positive will on the Chinese side ...not an absence of mutual 
understanding”.201 Moreover, as highlighted throughout this chapter, these negative 
experiences appear to be being shared by officials beyond the human rights dialogue. 
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They are invoked as a cautionary tale of the consequences of value mainstreaming, 
legitimising discourse 3 and an avoidance of value mainstreaming in their dialogues. 
 
d) Caveats to China’s obstruction of EU-China human rights dialogues  
It is important to qualify the analysis above, insofar as China’s highly obstructive 
behaviour, which appears to be severely undermining the human rights dialogue, is linked 
to China’s opposition to the nature/principle of the dialogue itself. As described in 
Chapter 3.6, while China pushed for the human rights dialogue in exchange for an end to 
public annual resolutions at the multilateral level, the dialogue is still effectively 
predicated on the notion that China should be adhering to and regularly held accountable 
by the EU (and more broadly Western) interpretation of human rights.  
In this fashion, China’s growing power since the emergence of the dialogue framework in 
the mid-late 90s, its increasingly authoritarian and nationalistic policies, along with its 
greater economic parity with the EU, have contributed to it becoming less willing to 
entertain any compromise with the EU on human rights. As described in Chapter 5.5.2, 
China’s official party-state discourse on values considers such exchanges an infringement 
of its sovereignty. This extends to China’s obstructive behaviour towards EU value 
mainstreaming efforts more broadly in all EU-China dialogues. For China, the EU does not 
have a justifiable basis for challenging China’s human rights situation according to 
EU/Western standards and it obstructs such discussion accordingly. 
That being said, it is crucial to reaffirm that while China is less willing to meaningfully 
engage in the human rights dialogue, it does not mean that the framework it not strongly 
in its interest. As described above and in Chapter 3.6, China has not only successfully 
compartmentalised discussion of human rights in EU-China relations into an opaque, 
closed-door dialogue in exchange for an end to multilateral resolutions, publicly  
criticising its policies, but it has been able to ensure these dialogues are ill-functioning 
and unproductive.  Moreover, as an added bonus for China, this obstruction of the 





    Table 7.2 Additional key examples of discourse 3 relating to the human rights dialogue 
EEAS Directorate/ 
Department and location 
(Brussels [BRU]/Beijing [BEI]) 
 
Quoted example Analysis 
ASIAPAC: Asia and Pacific 
Directorate [BRU] 
1. There was …moments where it quite clearly 
got very tense, there were questions that 
we asked which were not answered 
basically, but on certain issues it is actually 
possible to engage. So I think that’s 
positive202  
 
• Highlights tensions during human rights dialogues (“there was …moments 
where it quite clearly got very tense”) 
• Suggests China refuses to engage with issues it does not want to discuss 
(“there were questions that we asked which were not answered 
basically”). 
• Infers that the EU often gets this response and that meaningful discussion 
is exceptional (“on certain issues it is actually possible to engage). 
• Interviewee casting these rare instances as “positive” highlights the extent 
of China’s obstruction and unproductivity of dialogue. 
  
 
GLOBAL Directorate [BRU] 2. “We know that [they] put forward the 
history and they did during the [2016] 
dialogue …the envoy [Chinese chair] said: 
…you have destroyed China, in the 19th 
century -  they have a very long memory - … 
and how can you tell us now that we are 
doing wrong on human rights, this is your 
fault? Give us the time to develop again.203 
 
• Displays how China obstructively deflects criticism of its human rights 
record through lecturing the EU on historical grievances. 
• China argues here that it lacks capacity to reform human rights based on 
European colonialism in 19th century. 
• Interviewee suggests this strategy by China is typical (“We know that [they] 
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ASIAPAC: Asia and Pacific 
Directorate [BRU] 
3. “it’s very difficult to get dates and agree on 
the agenda, well in advance of the dialogue 
because we keep saying this a way for us to 
ensure good preparation, the presence of 
experts but normally you are told like 
maybe six weeks before those are the dates 
and then we agree on the agenda.”204 
 
 
• Displays how China obstructs the organisation human rights dialogue 
through providing dates at the last minute. 
• Suggests that China does this reduce the preparedness of the EU side and 
thus stymie the dialogue. 
• Interviewee suggests that China conducts this behaviour despite the EU 
repeatedly highlighting the importance of dates organised well in advance 
(“we keep saying this a way for us to ensure good preparation”) 
 
 
ASIAPAC: Asia and Pacific 
Directorate [BRU] 
4. “We can do a diplomatic demarche directly 
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which 
they’re receiving less and less and we have 
hard times getting appointments to deliver 
the demarche, the fax machines are 
broken, the emails are not working, the 
phone lines are busy …For a massive 
international player with centuries of 
history and maturity of international 
relations it is actually very immature 
behaviour not to want to want to face the 
issues that are difficult for them or where 
we don’t agree on. It’s very immature.”205 
 
• Captures how China obstructs any EU efforts to officially register human 
rights concerns through a diplomatic demarche. 
• Interviewee’s language casts such behaviour as not only impeding EU 
human rights promotion, but intrinsically sub-par, being cast as childish in 
nature (“with centuries of history and maturity of international relations it 
is actually very immature behaviour”) 
• Suggests this obstructive behaviour is intensifying (“they’re receiving 











                                                          





ASIAPAC: Asia and Pacific 
Directorate [BRU] 
5. When there is a crisis situation created and 
this one is created by the Chinese, we have 
a crisis when it comes to engaging on the 
human rights issues… then in fact it opens 
lots of other doors for the EU to be active 
on human rights through statements, 
through debates, through… letters, through 
other exchanges …That’s for the me the 
silver lining206 
 
• Displays how the EU has compensated for the low productivity of the 
dialogue through public statements. 
• Language emphasises the high impact and severity of China’s actions 
on the human rights dialogue. The dialogue portrayed as being in 
“crisis” and the public statements a “silver lining” 
• Explicitly invokes discourse 3 in suggesting that China’s obstructive 
conduct is the reason for inefficacy of the human rights dialogue 











                                                          




  Table 7.3. Additional key examples of discourse 3 in Pillar 1: Political dialogues (excluding the human rights dialogue)  
EEAS/Council of the 
European Union 
Directorate (General)/ 




Quoted example Analysis 
ASIAPAC: Asia and Pacific 
Directorate [BRU] 
1. “The minute you label it human rights 
…they’re irked by it”.207 
 
 
• Suggests that explicitly raising human rights with China will trigger an immediate 
negative response. 
 
ASIAPAC: Asia and Pacific 
Directorate [BRU] 
2. The interviewee described how if human 
rights is raised out with the human rights 
dialogue the Chinese have said – “we have 
the human rights dialogue for that”.   
 
They also suggested that the EU had to 
carefully calibrate the substance of its 
dialogues to maximise their impact. In this 
context, they expressed concern about 
human rights negatively affecting other 
dialogues. The interviewee described how 
“[you have to] use your instrument carefully 
depending on the context” 
 
• Displays an example of how China refuses to discuss human rights beyond the 
human rights dialogue and in turn, how the EU’s apparent compliance with this 
could be perceived to represent a de-facto endorsement of the official party-
state discourse on values. 
• Infers that human rights may be counterproductive or even futile outside the 
human rights dialogue. 
• Suggests that the diplomat may be reproducing discourse 3 amongst the 
Commission officials whose dialogues they coordinate. 
 
                                                          




ASIAPAC: Asia and Pacific 
Directorate [BRU] 
3. The interviewee described how if the EU 
raised “individual civil and political rights 
…they take notes and that’s it … they don’t 
enter in political discussions”.208 
 
• Highlights how the Chinese side will not engage with the EU on human rights 
(“they don’t enter in political discussions”) impeding mainstreaming. 
• Suggests that the interviewee does not consider human rights mainstreaming a 
productive activity in the dialogues they coordinate operationalise.  




ASIAPAC: Asia and Pacific 
Directorate [BRU] 
4. “In some cases, some people don’t want to 
deal with human rights because it’s a bit of a 
‘party pooper’ (laughs) …some colleagues 
are a bit more reluctant to bring up human 
rights issues because it quite clearly does 
spoil the atmosphere.”209 
 
• Displays the prevalence of discourse 3 on the EU side in suggesting that officials 
are “reluctant” to raise human rights based on the expected negative response 
by the Chinese side. 
• Alludes again to how the EU side could be perceived to be de-facto complying 
with China’s official party-state discourse on values. 
• Suggests there is an expectation that dialogues will be critically undermined (i.e. 
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ASIAPAC: Asia and Pacific 
Directorate [BRU] 
5. “Raising awareness is already a big thing… 
having it as an itemised item on the agenda 
probably going too far, also because if we 
push too hard there, it may antagonise the 





• Displays concern amongst EU officials that mainstreaming values is going to 
“antagonise” the Chinese side. 
• Suggests that the EEAS official feels like merely “raising awareness” amongst 
Commission officials is enough and including values on the agenda could be 
risky (“probably going too far”). 
 
• Supports the argument that the EEAS is enabling or actively reproducing 
discourse 3. 
• Also alludes to an enabling of discourse 1 with suggestion that EU officials 




DG Foreign Affairs [BRU] 6. “The problem with human rights [is] that 
also you have to see how the other side will 
react… and it’s true that if you raise human 
rights, the approach with China these days is 
not to engage in any meaningful discussion 
with you … we’ve found in the last couple of 
years …if you raise human rights from the 




• Suggests that human rights mainstreaming will compromise dialogues due to 
the response of China (“if you raise human rights …you basically don’t have any 
dialogue”).  
• Suggests that the Council of the European Union may also be enabling discourse 
3 amongst EU officials, framing human rights mainstreaming as problematic. 
 
 
                                                          
210 Interview with a diplomat from the EEAS on 05.10.2017 at 11.00am, in Brussels. 




7.3 Discourse 4: China’s opaque institutional structures and practices impede 
the mainstreaming of EU values 
 
While not as prevalent as discourse 3, interviewees also invoked discourse 4 as a 
justification for not systematically mainstreaming EU values. The discourse captured a 
perception amongst officials that their counterparts would be likely unable to impact 
Chinese policy connected to controversial EU values. This was informed by interlocutors 
perceived hierarchal positions and portfolios, along with the opacity of China’s decision-
making systems. While discourse 4 was present in the accounts of both Brussels-based 
and Beijing-based officials, it appeared to be less prevalent in the latter, due to greater 
grasp of Chinese working practices. Nonetheless the EU’s general lack of understanding of 
China, described in Chapter 8, may be fuelling discourse 4 on the EU side. 
Like discourse 3, the assumptions informing discourse 4 appeared to often not be based 
on the personal experience of EU officials, but the shared experiences of those individuals 
which have mainstreamed EU values with China and experienced negative consequences. 
The discourse also seemed to be informed by officials’ experience of Chinese officials 
refusing to discuss (not value-related) areas deemed not be under their responsibility. 
Consequently, officials appeared to have not necessarily attempted to mainstream values 
with their Chinese counterparts, but nevertheless avoided doing so under the expectation 
that they would reject responsibility. Notably, akin to discourse 3, the eschewing of value 
mainstreaming by EU officials informed by discourse 4, could also be perceived as a 
compliance with and de-facto endorsement of the official Chinese party-state discourse 
on values. It also reaffirms the notion that values are flowing two-ways in EU-China 
dialogues, with the EU effectively engaging with and acquiescing to China’s values. As 
noted in Chapter 5.5, the party-state structure is actively reproducing the official 
discourse on values through its hierarchy, tightly controlling the agenda of dialogues and 
instructing officials to refuse to engage with controversial values (beyond the human 
rights dialogue framework). Additionally, as noted in Section 7.2, the EU’s perceived 
compliance with this official party-state discourse has deeper implications, beyond a de-
facto endorsement of China’s official position on values, representing a self-inflicted 
erosion of the EU’s values and their continued relevance. 
However, discourse 4 is also grounded in the working reality of China’s institutional 




dialogues do not deal with China’s policy connected to controversial EU values, as part of 
their portfolios. Instead these areas are solely dealt with by the Ministry of State Security 
and the State Council.212 Reflecting this, the interviewee described how “it is difficult to 
have a conversation on these issues …raising these [sensitive value-related] issues with 
people who do not have the capacity to discuss them”. If these issues were directly raised 
in dialogues, the interviewee stated that it was common for the Chinese side to deny 
responsibility for them and the capacity to engage.213  
Officials also described how the Chinese side would often refuse to engage with any issue 
not specified in the dialogues’ pre-agreed agenda, which was approved by their (opaque) 
hierarchy. Although rarely mentioned in the context of value promotion, officials often 
displayed frustration that their counterparts lacked flexibility in dialogues to discuss or 
make decisions on issues.214 As one DG TRADE official noted, they are “very controlling” 
and “if anything is raised that is not on their agenda, they won’t engage with it”.215 
Similarly, an official from DG GROW stated: 
It’s true that… if you put up a proposal to the table out of the blue, they are 




Regardless of whether the Chinese side is accentuating the incapacity of interlocutors to 
engage with controversial EU values, these institutional dynamics appear to be invoked 
by EU officials as justification for not mainstreaming EU values. Some of the strongest 
examples were identified in the accounts of officials connected EU-China trade dialogues. 
For example, one DG TRADE official described how “we deal with the Ministry of 
Commerce” and that “the focus would be a bit different if we were dealing with the State 
Council”.217 The language implies that the values are not being integrated into the agenda 
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because their counterpart is the “Ministry of Commerce”, but they would include these 
issues if they were engaging with the State Council (i.e. “the focus would be a bit 
different”).  
An EEAS diplomat connected to trade dialogues also displayed discourse 4. They 
suggested that directly raising values with the Ministry of Commerce would needlessly 
risk upsetting the Chinese side as “you would have the wrong interlocutor on the other 
end of the table”.218 The language here categorically suggests that the applicability of 
value mainstreaming is determined by the Chinese interlocutor. It also alludes to the EEAS 
potentially enabling or actively reproducing the discourse through their coordination 
activities. 
Another, Beijing-based DG TRADE official displayed how the opacity of China’s decision-
making structures catalysed discourse 4. They noted that: 
In principle, we should know who we should be talking to …I’m not sure we know 
the decision-making process (on the Chinese side).219 
They added that “once China is transparent enough to have the conversation… the ideal 
conversation [on values]” they could move forward on issues like this and it would “not 
limit trade relations”. The interviewee suggests that they are not mainstreaming EU 
values because they are unsure whether their counterparts can meaningfully impact 
Chinese policy in their areas. They also appear to invoke discourse 3 in expressing concern 
that such activities would undermine trade dialogues (“limit trade relations”). In this 
sense, a lack of confidence about their interlocutor’s remit informs them viewing value 
mainstreaming as not worth the risk. While such knowledge may be unobtainable for EU 
officials, the example potentially reflects how a lack of knowledge on the EU side may be 
fuelling the discourse.  
Interestingly, an official from DG JUST connected to the Legal Affairs Dialogue (LAD), 
wherein the State Council is the interlocutor also invoked discourse 4. They noted that 
“the State Council, are the State Council... I don't think they're really into promoting, 
value-based issues”.220 Again, the language displays the nature of the interlocutor being 
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invoked as a justification for not mainstreaming EU values. However, they are invoking 
this discourse in the context of one of the few Chinese interlocutors which can credibly 
impact controversial EU values.  
Arguably, this reaffirms how discourse 4 may be fuelled by a lack of knowledge about the 
decision-making structures of the Chinese side. It also alludes to how the discourse is 
being informed by second-hand experiences and not personal attempts to mainstream EU 
values.   
Moreover, the above example significantly displays that discourse 4 is impacting the LAD 
and limiting its potential for promoting human rights. It is informing a perception that 
discussion of any EU values with the State Council - it can be inferred, even in an indirect 
manner - would be pointless. As China sought to actively eschew the normative 
dimensions of judicial cooperation through the LAD (See Chapter 3.6), it is possible that 
the State Council has instrumentally sought to present itself as unable to discuss anything 
but highly technical judicial issues. In this sense, the quote may allude to an acceptance 
on the EU side of this status-quo stipulated by the Chinese side where values are not 
discussed in the LAD and in turn, a compliance with the official party-state discourse. 
Diplomats involved with the human rights dialogue also invoked a facet of discourse 4. 
They described how the interlocutor provided by the Chinese side – the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MoFA) – was not directly involved in Chinese human rights policy.221 As 
one diplomat noted:  
If you discuss the NGO law for example, it is not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
who will ultimately decide what will happen with that law or how it will be 
implemented it’s much more the security ministry.222 
Similarly, one of their colleagues described how it is “almost impossible to set anything 
up” in terms of projects following dialogues.223 While the MoFA bring experts on human 
rights from other ministries into the dialogue, they stated that “it is a bit of a hurdle” for 
the EU to access these people afterwards, as their sole interlocutor is the MoFA.224 
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Consequently, the Chinese interlocutor for the human rights dialogue is portrayed as an 
additional form of obstruction.  
 
7.4 Discourse 5: China is not listening to the EU and it should be 
 
While discourses 3 and 4 appear to derive from genuinely obstructive behaviour/practices 
from the Chinese side, discourse 5 seemed to be rooted in the actions of the EU side. This 
nuanced discourse invoked by officials, surrounds a perception that China is not listening 
to the EU and it should be. The discourse has two key facets which challenge systematic 
value mainstreaming and by extension, the EU’s normative power with China.  
Firstly, the discourse encompasses unsuccessful attempts by EU officials to mainstream 
EU values in the few instances where this is taking place, particularly in the human rights 
dialogue. Officials invoking the discourse, repeatedly attempt to share EU values and 
simultaneously dismiss any alternative Chinese positions. This conduct appears to be 
motivated by a belief in the universal applicability and superiority of the EU’s values, 
which countries like China are expected to replicate without significant divergence.  
It also connects to assertions by scholars that the EU’s normative power may be being 
implemented in a manner lacking reflexivity, which could be interpreted as neo-colonial 
by recipients or external observers (See Chapter 2.4). This, in turn, highlights a potentially 
negative dimension of the official discourse on value mainstreaming found in documents, 
if it is operationalised without sufficient reflexivity. Reflecting this, interviewees’ language 
tends to establish an unequal, teacher-pupil relationship between the EU and China. The 
former is often cast as superior and more knowledgeable, having the capacity to 
determine the true interpretation of international law/standards and the most effective 
systems of political governance, to which China should be adhering. Conflicting positions 
from the Chinese side are concurrently dismissed as inferior or incorrect. Officials’ 
accounts suggest a dynamic interaction where China reacts to these approaches by the 
EU, through seeking to assert its own alternative interpretation of these 
values/practices/ideas. Consequently, discourse 5 captures how both sides talk at cross 
purposes. This highlights the importance of acknowledging that the Chinese side is 
capable of similar lecturing behaviour, as reflected in Section 7.2, in the context of the 




Interviewees’ accounts also suggest that these dynamics lead to frustration on the EU 
side, with China’s non-compliance informing didactic approaches to value mainstreaming. 
These approaches appear to be not only unsuccessful but counterproductive, seemingly 
catalysing China’s obstructive behaviour (i.e. informing discourse 3). Moreover, even if 
officials recognise the ineffectiveness of these strategies, a belief that China should be 
accepting the EU’s superior position leads to them to persevere, nonetheless. In this 
sense, the pursuit of more diplomatic and less didactic strategies is limited by the 
discourse. These effects appear to be compounded through a pessimism amongst 
diplomats that China will comply in the future.  
However, it is crucial to emphasise that this conduct by EU officials, informed by 
discourse 5, is rooted in a lack of reflexivity about how, pedagogically, they are 
implementing the official discourse found in documents and how their counterparts will 
interpret it. In this regard, these mainstreaming approaches and the perspectives that 
inform them, which could be viewed as neo-colonial by a historically sensitive Chinese 
side or when assessed by an external observer, are not necessarily rooted in genuinely 
neo-colonial perspectives amongst EU officials. This is supported by analysis in Chapter 8, 
which suggests that limited understanding of China, including its culture and language, is 
underpinning a default position of Eurocentrism amongst most officials in EU-China 
dialogues. Importantly, the chapter also highlights that the lack of understanding is 
mutual in nature and informing comparably problematic Sinocentrism on the Chinese 
side.  
Discourse 5 also notably has a second facet which relates to officials who are not 
mainstreaming EU values and invoke the discourse as a justification for not doing so. In 
this sense, as with discourses 3 and 4, first-hand experience did not appear to be a 
prerequisite for discourse 5. For these officials operationalising the majority of EU-China 
dialogues, the perception that China should be embodying the EU’s values and is not 
doing so is arguably contributing to a perception that value mainstreaming can only be a 
conflictual exercise which will undermine exchanges.  
In this sense, it deters such activities while linking with discourse 3 and the concern over 
upsetting China. The pessimism associated with the discourse appears to compound 




this fashion, discourse 5, like discourses 1-4, support Chinese as opposed to EU interests 
through informing values not being tabled in dialogues.  
The discourse was prevalent among Brussels-based and Beijing-based officials across 
most EU-China dialogues. Officials connected to EU-China economic dialogues reflected 
an interesting exception. Reinforcing conclusions surrounding discourse 2, they appeared 
to display a different version of the discourse that centred exclusively on China’s non-
compliance with WTO norms (EU economic values), as opposed to the Article 21/NPE 
values.  
Similarly, the discourse appeared to be much less prevalent in Pillar 3 PPD than other 
sectors. This is likely due to the substance of the dialogues facilitating contacts between 
civil society actors, rather than aiming for behavioural outcomes by China. Crucially, 
unlike discourses 3 and 4, which were seemingly restricted to promotion of the most 
controversial EU values, discourse 5 appeared to be relevant to the promotion of both 
sustainable development and human rights.  
 
Pillar 2: Economic & sectoral dialogues 
Particularly strong examples of the discourse were identifiable in the context of the EU-
China Legal Affairs Dialogue (LAD). As an EEAS diplomat involved with it noted:  
When you look at what they’re doing with the judiciary, when you look at what 
they’re doing [with] the provincial governments and what they call the rule of law, 
because they don’t define the rule of law in the same way we do …that’s where 
we have to be careful, so we engage with them on better regulation agenda, we 
want them to keep their word, because for our businesses, there is a massive 
interest there, rule of law is one of the biggest obstacles, but at the same time we 
see that under the name of rule of law, [they are] trying to bring consistency to 
the application of the law or to their judiciary, there is a massive discrepancy 
between how they approach criminal law or civil law and, and how they 
sometimes let the power trickle down.225 
                                                          




Displaying discourse 5, the interviewee infers that China’s interpretation of rule of law 
(“what they call the rule of law”) is inferior to that of the EU’s and should be altered to 
reflect the EU’s superior, universally applicable definition. This is reinforced by their 
criticism of China’s attempts to bring “consistency” to its judicial system, yet wrongly 
continuing practices which depart from the EU model. In this sense, although less explicit 
than the human rights dialogue, the premise of the LAD is still that China should 
internalise and reproduce the EU’s superior system.  
The language also suggests that the EU side has been trying to promote rule of law 
through specific dialogues with China (including the human rights dialogue), but it does 
not feel that this has been successful, irrespective of China’s assurances. They describe 
how China has given its “word” to realise rule of law, yet the EU perceives honouring this 
to equate to a duplication of the EU’s values and associated practices. Expanding upon 
this, the interviewee suggests that any divergence from the EU interpretation of the value 
is not only wrong, but dishonest/disingenuous (i.e. “we want them to keep their word”). 
In effect, China not reforming in line with the EU’s suggestions is perceived by the 
interviewee (and perhaps the EU side more broadly) as a question of trust, since any 
agreement by the Chinese side to enhance rule of law can only be measured according to 
EU standards.  
There also appears to be no recognition on the EU side of any Chinese historical/cultural 
precedent for intervention by the central power (i.e. emperor or the party-state 
leadership) in the interest of maintaining state cohesion (See Chapter 3.5.1). Reinforcing 
the teacher-pupil dynamics associated with discourse 5, China’s legal system is also 
overtly cast as being wrong (i.e. China needs to “bring consistency to the application of 
the law or to their judiciary”).  
The interviewee also invokes discourse 3 in suggesting that the EU needs to be “careful” 
in addressing rule of law with China, avoiding explicit reference so not to undermine the 
exchange. This is reflected in their pursuit of technical themes (better regulation) in the 
dialogue and emphasis on aiding European businesses.  
Building on this, a DG JUST official highlighted how pessimism that China will ever accept 
the EU position on rule of law was also informing an avoidance of value mainstreaming 




 The party’s always going to be above the law. Yeah, fine, we're not going to 
change that, but if you can at least get more transparency into the legal 
system…226 
Arguably, discourse 5, like discourses 1-4, is limiting the potential of the LAD to act as an 
indirect channel for human rights. The discourse informs a perception that value 
mainstreaming is zero-sum and can only be conflictual in nature. It is being invoked, like 
discourse 3, to justify a focus on technical themes and an aversion towards incorporating 
values, even in an indirect fashion.  
Key examples of discourse 5 were also found in accounts connected to the interrelated 
climate/energy/environment sectors, in the context of promoting the environmental 
dimension of sustainable development. The examples fell into two categories. Firstly, 
interviewees invoked the discourse as they reflected upon the EU’s historical approach in 
convincing China to adopt sustainable development. Secondly interviewees invoked 
discourse 5 in connection to the areas of the EU interpretation of sustainable 
development which China is perceived to have not fully internalised.  
It is important to clarify that China has actively sought EU expertise in this sector. To an 
extent there is therefore a willing mentor-mentee relationship where China adopts EU 
best practice. However, China has arguably never consented to a teacher-pupil 
relationship where it holistically adopts the EU’s values/practices/standards. This is 
reinforced by the existence of ecological civilisation, which reflects a distinct Chinese 
interpretation of the environmental dimension of sustainable development (See Chapter 
3.4). As described in Chapter 3.4, the existence of ecological civilisation again supports 
the notion that values are flowing two ways in EU-China dialogues and alludes to the 
nuanced dynamics suggested in Chapter 2.4, with China appearing to reframe sustainable 
development, as opposed to merely accepting or rejecting the value in a binary fashion. 
Interestingly, the analysis below also highlights that the EU is resisting or even outright 
rejecting this alternative interpretation of the value. 
Concerning the EU’s historical approach to promoting sustainable development with 
China (category 1), a DG Energy (ENER) official provided a key example. They described 
how: 
                                                          




I think they have changed …even though in some parts it's a developing country 
but they now maybe... [are] themselves convinced of sustainable development …I 
don't feel that we are now trying to convince them that there is a need 
anymore.227 
The language alludes to long running dynamics where the EU has repeatedly promoted 
sustainable development in dialogues, which China has now internalised (“I don't feel that 
we are now trying to convince them”). The interviewee also arguably hints at historical 
frustration on the EU side that China wasn’t changing despite the EU’s efforts to convince 
them (i.e. now they have finally listened). Additionally, they appear to suggest that any 
continued divergence from the EU value is a question of underdevelopment (“even 
though in some parts it’s a developing country”). There is no recognition of an alternative 
Chinese interpretation of the value which would inform different policies.   
Interestingly, the interviewee appears to remain unsure about the extent to which China 
has genuinely been “convinced” by the EU interpretation of sustainable development (i.e. 
I think they have changed). This hints at areas where China is wrongly, from the 
perspective of the EU side, continuing to diverge. It also alludes to lack of understanding 
of China (See Chapter 8).   
Other interviewees more explicitly appeared to invoke discourse 5 in describing how 
China was presently failing to internalise aspects of the EU interpretation of sustainable 
development. An official from DG Environment stated that:  
I’m not sure that sustainable development is that well implanted, not just in 
China, but all Asia … they [China] have to implant it into their policy, but not 
because they believe it.228 
The interviewee suggests that China’s alignment with the EU interpretation of sustainable 
development is somewhat superficial, being based upon China’s material self-interest 
(“they have to implant it into their policy”) as opposed to an internalisation (they do not 
“believe it”). This implies that China should be fully approximating the EU interpretation 
of the value, because of its superiority and self-evident applicability. The interviewee 
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reaffirms this by the word choice of “believe”, which portrays the EU interpretation as 
reflecting some sort of higher power (it should be believed in). 
Like the LAD example above, the quote also suggests that China is being disingenuous 
with the EU by not internalising sustainable development to the EU’s satisfaction. Again, 
it portrays a perception amongst officials that there is only the correct EU interpretation 
of the value and any divergence is China being difficult.  
Supporting these inferences, the interviewee explicitly dismissed the validity of ecological 
civilisation, describing it as a “buzzword”229. This word choice implies that it is mere 
rhetoric and lacks substance vis-à-vis the environmental dimension of sustainable 
development. Similarly, they noted that “they try to emphasise it… that they are 
different”.230 The language here reinforces a dismissal of any legitimate Chinese 
interpretation of sustainable development. It suggests that China is not different and 
should holistically adopt the EU interpretation of the value and associated standards. 
Additionally, the example alludes to the Chinese side attempting in vain to convince the 
EU of their national/cultural context and how it informs a different version of sustainable 
development (“they try to emphasise it”).  
Interestingly, a China official from the Ministry of Environmental Protection also appeared 
to allude to the dynamics/approaches informed by discourse 5 on the EU side. In the 
context of an environmental cooperation programme in mainland China, they described 
how the EU was keen to promote its model for solid waste management holistically. 
However, the Chinese side wanted to focus on specific elements which aligned with 
China’s circumstances and priorities, implicitly encompassed by ecological civilisation. 
They elaborated how China wanted to gain EU expertise in the areas where the European 
model would be relevant and adaptable to China’s particular needs. Specifically, the areas 
of ship recycling and soil remediation.  
Reflecting this, the interviewee described how they communicated to the EU that “at 
first, it will be good enough for us to discuss these two main problem[s] – fix these 
problems first”.231 Conversely, they described how “Instead the EU wanted to support the 
                                                          
229 ibid.  
230 ibid.  





whole section”,232  in other words, integrate all categories of EU solid waste management 
into the cooperation programme and thus promoting the EU model in its entirety. 
Moreover, the interviewee added that it took at least three meetings for the conflict to 
be resolved. 
The example displays how the EU perceives its interpretation of the environmental 
dimension of sustainable development and associated practices/standards to be superior 
and universally applicable. The EU appears to have expected China to replicate the EU 
model. There is no recognition of any alternative Chinese interpretation and the 
circumstance underpinning this. Additionally, the example highlights how this belief on 
the EU side legitimises repeatedly promoting its interpretation of sustainable 
development and potentially in a didactic fashion (it took three meetings to resolve). The 
example also displays how both sides were talking at cross purposes, with the Chinese 
side trying and failing to communicate its position to an inattentive EU. 
It is worth noting that other Chinese interviewees also appeared to allude to the 
dynamics informed by discourse 5 on the EU side and the possible neo-colonial 
interpretations of how EU officials are approaching value mainstreaming. For example, an 
official from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) described how EU value 
promotion equated to “I am God, you must put forward this” and added that instead of 
“preaching ideas and values”, the EU should be open to “learn from the world”.233 
Additionally, China’s two policy papers on EU-China relations similarly appear to hint at 
these dynamics/interpretations associated with discourse 5. The 2003 paper emphasises 
the importance of addressing “disagreements in a spirit of equality and mutual respect” 
(MoFA, 2003). This suggests that China does not feel like it is being treated as an equal 
partner and the EU is didactically asserting the superiority of its values. The 2014 paper 
portrays comparable meaning in describing how: 
The two sides have disagreements and frictions on issues of value[s] …China 
believes that these issues should be properly handled through dialogue in the 
spirit of equality and mutual respect and encourages the EU to move in the same 
direction. (MoFA, 2014) 
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A final key example consolidates the inferences throughout this section, with an official 
from DG Energy (ENER) noting, particularly in relation to human rights, that:  
The Chinese have this real skill to give you the impression that they listen, and 
they discuss, and [it] doesn't actually go in. I think it's very limited [the extent to 
which they listen to the EU].234 
The quote captures how frustration on the EU side, caused by China’s non-compliance, 
informs didactic approaches by officials. The interviewee suggests that they perceive their 
Chinese counterparts to be instrumentally deceptive, as their attentiveness to the EU 
promoting its values is not being followed by any of the prescribed changes (“this real skill 
to give you the impression that they listen, and they discuss”).  
Moreover, the suggestion that “it doesn’t actually go in”, arguably infers that it should 
being going in and China should be internalising and replicating the EU’s superior values 
and standards. This is reaffirmed by the interviewee implying that China’s engagement 
with these issues, despite appearances is “very limited”. The language portrays an 
unequal relationship, where China should be learning from the sage-like EU. Additional 
key examples from Pillar 2 are presented n Table 7.4 below. 
 
Economic dialogues 
It is crucial to highlight that the discourse took a different form in EU-China economic 
dialogues. Instead of the language suggesting that China should be embodying EU values, 
comparable language was focusing on how China should reform in line with the EU’s 
superior economic standards and the frustration/pessimism following non-compliance. In 
this sense, EU officials appeared to be pursuing approaches that similarly lacked critical 
reflexivity when promoting EU economic standards and the WTO norms underpinning 
them. Moreover, while this reaffirms that officials working in these sectors are not 
systematically mainstreaming EU values, it more interestingly reinforces conclusions from 
the analysis of discourse 2. It emerged that officials managing EU-China economic 
dialogues appeared not to consider the Article 21/NPE values as their responsibility in 
practice, instead being exclusively bound to enforce WTO economic norms. This alludes 
                                                          




to the strength of discourse 2 in challenging systematic value mainstreaming in this 
sector. 
For example, in the context of conflicting EU and Chinese information about the Chinese 
economy, including production output and carbon emissions, one Beijing-based DG 
TRADE official described how “one problem here” is that “you have different realities 
…different stories from the Chinese side”.235 The language suggests that the economic 
information being communicated by China and the positions underpinning it, are fictional 
stories, which depart from reality (“you have different realities …different stories from 
the Chinese side”).  
While China’s economic information is often considered be officially altered for political 
reasons,236 the example displays a deeper perception of the relationship – one that is 
unequal, where the EU is the superior/more knowledge partner. The EU’s understanding 
of China’s domestic economy and its shortcomings is cast as the truth or reality, which 
China should recognise/approximate.  
There is a complete dismissal of what China is communicating to the EU on the ground 
and no legitimacy is ascribed to the Chinese position. This was reinforced by the 
interviewee later describing “another interesting story” where “you have a Chinese 
discourse at the highest levels that China is the leader of globalisation …a white 
knight”.237 The initial quote also infers frustration that China is not listening to the EU in 
the economic relationship, with conflicting understandings of China’s economy cast as 
“one problem” of many.  
These frustrations were more explicitly displayed by another Beijing-based Commission 
official, as they described how bilateral conflict over the Market Economy Status (MES) 
issue (See Chapter 3.3) prevented agreement of a joint statement at the 2017 EU-China 
summit. They stated that: 
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The Chinese didn’t agree in the end …they, they took everything together, the 
joint statement failed on trade issues, the same as last year (Interviewer: the 
market economy thing?) yes …it’s the…same issue …We can’t give them what they 
want, we can’t …I find it unnerving personally …that the Chinese don’t come to 
understand that.238 
The interviewee portrays repeated attempts by the EU to communicate the legitimacy of 
its position on MES, without success, over multiple summits. They portray the EU’s 
position as fixed and based upon a higher logic which the Chinese side should accept if 
they want MES recognition from the EU, before undertaking the expected economic 
reforms. Again, the EU is established as the superior partner, which can legitimately judge 
China’s alignment with international trade norms and act accordingly.  
The interviewee suggests that they are frustrated by China’s non-compliance, hinting at 
didactic behaviour on the EU side which may be counterproductive to resolving the issue 
(“I find it unnerving personally”). The example also suggests that China has also been 
trying to assert its alternative interpretation of WTO norms, but this is not seen as 
legitimate by the EU. This was reinforced by Premier Li Keqiang’s speech at the 12th EU-
China business summit. He noted that: 
China has fully honoured its commitments as a member of the WTO, and other 
members are supposed to do the same …it is in the interests of the EU to observe 
multilateral rules and uphold the multilateral system. Article 15 of China's WTO 
Accession Protocol is a "sunset clause," which obliges all members to 
unconditionally cease, upon the date of its expiry …analogue country 
methodology in their anti-dumping investigations against China [i.e grant MES]. 
(Xinhua, 2017)
                                                          































1. I was here [in Beijing] ten years ago 
and the logic was really …on climate 
change, and the European Union 
was the preacher of climate change 
on the world… it was very much 
about convincing China that you 
take this narrative and the issue and 





• Suggests that the EU has repeatedly promoted sustainable development with China, 
under the auspices of climate change (i.e. “very much …convincing China”) 
• Portrays how China has been lobbied to adopt the EU’s “narrative” - its 
interpretation of sustainable development. 
• Superiority of this interpretation is reflected characterisation of the EU as a 
“preacher of climate change on the world”. 
• Ascribes religious quality to EU value which other countries should believe in.  
• Suggests an unequal relationship where China learns from the EU and replicates it 







                                                          










2. “The drafting is poor …  
they think the legislation not being clear 







• Suggests that China’s legislation is inferior to the EU’s standards, cast as better 
“quality”. 
• Chinese side is cast as an unequal partner which is naïve in comparison to the 
knowledgeable EU (“they think the legislation not being clear is a positive quality”). 
• Implies that China should reform its legal system to replicate the EU’s. 
• Interviewee displays no acknowledgement of China’s alternative historical/cultural 









3. Official described how it was 
“absurd to assume that in a dialogue 
between [their DG and] the 
Chinese” that “you could raise 
human rights …it would literally not 
achieve anything”.241 
 
• Suggests that value mainstreaming is not taking place in dialogues. 
• Interviewee justifies this on the basis that such activities would be pointless (“literally 
not achieve anything”). 
• Displays how discourse 5 informs a pessimism amongst officials that mainstreaming 
will be successful, deterring them from doing so. 
• Strength of pessimism (and discourse 5) displayed by the interviewee suggesting that 
such activities would be successful was senseless or illogical (“absurd”). 
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Pillar 1: Political dialogues 
Discourse 5, surrounding the notion that China is not listening to the EU and it should be, 
was most strongly identifiable in the accounts of EEAS diplomats involved with pillar one 
political dialogues. This highlights how EEAS diplomats share the discourse and through 
their coordination activities, actively/passively reproduce it and the approaches, lacking 
reflexivity, that it informs. While Table 7.5 presents broader examples, the discourse was 
particularly prevalent amongst individuals connected to the human rights dialogue. As 
one diplomat stated: 
There is also a reluctance [on the EU side] because the Chinese …they always say 
‘mutual understanding bla-deh-bla-deh-bla’ and there is reluctance on our part 
also to engage on certain topics... because they seem to think if they keep on 
explaining to us certain things we’re going to accept them and they are things that 
we cannot accept because it’s not, it’s totally antinomic.242 
The example captures how a belief in the inherent superiority of the EU position and that 
China should be accepting it, is informing the EU not recognising or even engaging with 
any alternative Chinese positions in key areas of human rights (“there is reluctance on our 
part also to ... engage on certain topics”). This is reaffirmed by the suggestion that China’s 
positions are “totally antinomic” to the EU interpretation of human rights, inferring that 
they are paradoxical to the EU’s correct understanding of international legislation. 
It is also reflected in the interviewee suggesting that they are wholly dismissive of China 
attempting to legitimise its opposing perspectives during dialogues “they always say 
‘mutual understanding bla-deh-bla-deh-bla’”. Through mimicking the Chinese side, the 
interviewee reaffirms that they do not consider their positions to have any validity. This 
exert also importantly alludes to how discourse 5 is informing a didactic approach by 
officials to promoting the EU interpretation of human rights with China on the basis that 
it is superior, and that China should be accepting it. Such didacticism is also reflected in 
the interviewee suggesting that China is repeatedly attempting to explain its alternative 
position, but the EU will continue to remain inattentive (“they seem to think if they keep 
on explaining to us certain things we’re going to accept them”).  
                                                          




Diplomats also appeared to use references to international (UN) documents as a primary 
strategy to promote human rights and support discourse 5, along with the approaches it 
informs, displaying a lack of reflexivity e.g. China should be listening to the EU because of 
international legal reference X. The use of these documents appeared to legitimise the 
EU’s repeated and often didactic assertions during dialogues that its interpretation of 
human rights was superior. As one diplomat noted: 
What we can do and do do, is to remind China that they have international 
obligations, that they have signed up to the universal declaration of human rights 
and they have signed the international convent on civil and political rights and we 
can remind them that they need to ratify that, that there are principles in that 
…and the universality of human rights is something that we do not want to break 
…and that’s the basis. You cannot go to China and …try to make China adopt or act 
on something they have not signed up to, that’s an illusion right. So that’s not our 
agenda. What we are trying to do is make them respect the obligations that they 
have already signed up to.243 
 
The example suggests that the use of international documents to support the EU 
interpretation of human rights fosters an almost self-righteousness amongst officials. The 
interviewee presents the EU reading of these documents as the only correct one, which is 
universally applicable, incontestable and that China is legally obliged to comply with. This 
is reinforced by the interviewee suggesting that the EU is merely enforcing external 
standards for the common good (“the universality of human rights is something that we 
do not want to break”). Aligning with prior analysis, China is again established as the 
junior partner vis-à-vis the EU, the latter of which already conforms to the correct human 
rights standards.  
These power relations also appear to underpin the interviewee casting the key objective 
of the human rights dialogue as being to “make them [China] respect the obligations that 
they have already signed up to”. This notion of making China conform to the EU’s human 
rights standards also importantly alludes to the didactic manner in which the EU is 
asserting its interpretation of human rights through referencing international documents. 
This is reaffirmed by the interviewee’s suggestion that the EU repeatedly promotes its 
                                                          




position with China during dialogues (“What we can do and do do, is to remind China that 
they have international obligations”).  
The language here also implies that this didactic approach has not been successful to date 
and gaining compliance by the Chinese side reflects a work in progress (“What we are 
trying to do” [emphasis added]). Nevertheless, the interviewee suggests that they will 
continue using it on the basis that China should be complying. Promoting human rights in 
a less didactic fashion (not assertively citing legal references) is cast as a naïve pursuit, 
informed by their past negative experiences with China (“you cannot go to China and …try 
to make China adopt or act on something they have not signed up to, that’s an illusion”). 
This displays both how discourse 5 is informed by frustrations on the EU side and how it is 
engendering and perpetuating ineffective mainstreaming strategies. More implicitly, the 
example also captures how the EU is unreceptive to China’s interpretation of human 
rights, being convinced that its position is supported by international law. Another EEAS 
diplomat’s account reinforced how discourse 5 is being supported by the referencing of 
international documents. They stated that:  
One argument that we have [been] using more and more is actually… because 
they say ‘human rights, Western values, you are talking to us like a teacher would 
speak to a pupil and …those days are over basically’… But we are saying ‘look, you 
have signed up to a number of conventions, you have committed to the 
international human rights system and standards…so basically this is what you 
have to respect… the obligations that you have under these international 
instruments’. Because then they can’t throw back at us the fact that its ‘Western 
values’, well they will still do it.244 
The language again suggests that China should be listening and complying with the EU 
interpretation of human rights, an interpretation vindicated by international documents. 
In this sense, the EU is once more portrayed as having a superior, more knowledgeable 
role to China, where it can determine the accurate interpretation of international law 
(“we are saying ‘look …you have committed to the international human rights system’”).  
The example also again captures how discourse 5, with support from international 
documents is informing a didactic approach to promoting human rights on the EU side. 
                                                          




This is reflected in China being effectively ordered to accept the EU’s interpretation of 
human rights (“you have committed to the international human rights system and you 
know standards…so basically this is what you have to respect”). It is also displayed by how 
the interviewee characterises China’s response - it perceives the EU to be treating it as a 
subordinate partner and reminiscent of how a teacher lectures a pupil (“you are talking to 
us like a teacher would speak to a pupil”).  
The notion of lecturing also reaffirms that the EU tends to repeatedly assert its 
interpretation of human rights during dialogues, despite China’s non-compliance, under 
the perception that China should be accepting it (reaffirming discourse 5). Lecturing also 
alludes to how the EU side’s didactic approaches are engendering unidirectional 
communication during the dialogues. The EU appears to be actively dismissing any 
attempt by the China to assert its alternative position. As the interviewee notes “they 
can’t throw back at us the fact that you know its Western values”. This reinforces the lack 
of reflexivity on the EU side associated with discourse 5. There appears to be little 
awareness that such didactic approaches to promoting human rights could be interpreted 
as neo-colonial by their counterparts due to historical sensitivities and thus 
counterproductive.   
Mirroring the previous examples, the interviewee suggests that this assertive approach 
has been ineffective, as they expect that China will continue to disagree with the EU 
position on human rights in the future (“well they will still do it”). However, there is no 
indication that the interviewee is considering a change in strategy, if anything it seems 
that they will intensify this oft-used didactic approach (an “argument that we have [been] 
using more and more”). Again, this is arguably explained by Discourse 5 legitimising the 
superiority of the EU’s position/approaches and China’s need to comply. The interviewees 
expectation that China will still dismiss EU human rights standards also alludes to the 
pessimism illuminated by discourse 5 which impedes a change in strategy. 
Supporting these conclusions that discourse 5 is informing a perception that the human 
rights dialogue can only be approached in this didactic manner, one diplomat described 
how there were conscious efforts before the 2017 human rights dialogue to “avoid 
coming across as lecturing”245. Their language both confirms a historical EU penchant for 
                                                          




repeatedly promoting its interpretation of human rights and an awareness of its 
inefficacy. However, they also described how the dialogue represented the “ultimate 
threat” to each side and that the confrontation in the dialogue “needed to take place” as 
part of a “political showdown … [and] toxic material comes out in that format”.246  
The interviewee suggests that discourse 5 informs EU officials being somewhat blinkered 
in viewing the human rights dialogue as an inherently conflictual exchange, with each side 
posing a threat to the other in a fight which needs to take place. Reaffirming this, such 
conflict is framed as being embedded in the “format” of the dialogue, while discussions 
are expected to be harmful for each side (“toxic”). This reaffirms how discourse 5 is 
having a negative impact on the EU’s normative power, underpinning ineffective 
approaches and eschewing more diplomatic common ground strategies.  
This notion of EU officials exclusively perceiving the human rights dialogue to be a 
conflictual affair, legitimising didactic approaches, was reflected in another key example. 
Again, concerning the 2017 human rights dialogue, they described how in advance of the 
exchange, they handed their counterparts “an envelope containing 330 individual cases… 
which was immediately considered interference by the EU”.247  
As noted earlier in this chapter and Chapter 3.6, China publicly expresses opposition to 
this practice by the EU during dialogues. Moreover, other interviewees suggested that the 
EU has a long history of conducting such activities in advance of each dialogue.248 Within 
this context, the interviewee suggests that the EU side is handing over this material under 
the full knowledge that it will antagonise their counterparts, however, they are doing so 
nonetheless. This again highlights how a perception that China should be listening to the 
EU legitimises didactic approaches, which EU officials perpetuate despite the knowledge 
that these approaches have not been effective to date. 
Lastly, officials displayed a pessimism that China would ever accept the EU interpretation 
of human rights. This is arguably contributing to officials eschewing alternative, more 
diplomatic and less didactic approaches to values mainstreaming. As one diplomat noted: 
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If we can get them engaged in some kind of dialogue or at least if you can get them to 
listen to what we are saying, I think it’s already improving.249 
The interviewee suggests that they consider existing exchanges to be so unproductive 
that they cannot be legitimately classified as a “dialogue”. Moreover, the notion that if 
China was simply attentive to the EU’s positions it would reflect an improvement, 
highlights the incredibly low expectations held by the diplomat (“at least if you can get 
them to listen to what we are saying …it’s already improving). However, this expectation 
also alludes to how such pessimism is not informing a re-think of the EU’s strategy. 
Instead, in line with discourse 5, they portray improvement as only being measured by 
China accepting the EU interpretation of human rights. This displays how pessimism also 
contributes to a blinkering amongst officials, where they perceive that value 
mainstreaming can only be highly assertive or didactic due to the legitimacy of the EU 
position.  
Another diplomat supported these conclusions in describing how in advance of the 2017 
human rights dialogue, the EU side were considering the impending exchange as “fine, as 
long as they shout and don’t leave”. This again infers incredibly low expectations on the 
EU side. The interviewee suggests that the dialogue would be considered successful if 
both sides merely remained at the table for the full duration of the dialogue, while any 
progress on substance is so unlikely it’s not worth speculating on. Similarly, the 
expectation that the Chinese side would get upset, highlights that the EU side is sticking 
to didactic approaches based on the perceived inherent superiority of the EU position. 
Additional examples of discourse 5 connected to the human rights dialogue can be found 
in Table 7.6 below.
                                                          




Table 7.5 Broad examples from Pillar 1: Political dialogues 
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EEAS Quoted example  Analysis 
Political, Press and 
Information Section, EU 
delegation to China [BEI] 
1. “If the Chinese are emerging as global players, 
they need to ascribe to universal values …these 
are proven as universal values”.250 
 
• Reinforces the portrayal of China as a junior partner vis-à-vis the EU 
• Portrays China as not yet a major international actor and perhaps will not 
become one, unless it aligns with the universal values promoted by the 
EU. 
• Universal values are cast as uncontested. The EU interpretation is framed 
as the only correct one and the no recognition of any alternative Chinese 
interpretation (“proven as universal values”) 
• Alludes to didactic approaches by the EU as it turns to international legal 
references to assert the superiority of its position in the face of Chinese 
non-compliance. 
 
ASIAPAC: Asia and Pacific 
Directorate [BRU] 
2. “They are (only) changing in line with how we’d 
like them to be in some areas, like climate change, 
but there are other areas where there are 
different priorities between the EU and China.  
There has been disconnect between the EU’s 
expectation of change versus outcome”.251 
 
• Portrays an unequal relationship where China should be “changing” in line 
with the superior EU values/practices/standards, at the EU’s discretion. 








                                                          
252 Phone interview with a diplomat from the EEAS on 31.01.2017 at 11.00am, from Brussels 
253 ibid. 
Office of the EU Special 
Representative for Human 
Rights 
3. “I think that we have seen a lot of progress in the 
last few decades and … and I think the West has 
been very helpful with that …it’s the West and the 
European project [the EU] that has been 
enormously helpful in training China’s legal 
profession for example, teaching them about 
international law, teaching them about human 
rights…”.252 
• Infers an equal relationship between the EU and China. 
• China framed as being assessed according to the extent to which it is 
meeting the EU’s correct standards. 
• This is display by the notion EU describing “progress” and “teaching” china 
about EU values/practices/standards, which suggests a teacher-pupil 
relationship. 
• EU sharing these aspects cast as an altruistic activity, reinforcing the 
notion that the EU considers them inherently superior and no Chinese 
alternatives to be legitimate.  
 
Office of the EU Special 
Representative for Human 
Rights 
 
4. “I’ve never been one of those people who sort of 
expected China to immediately turn into a 
Western style country, but I expected that it 
would kind of be a long historical process… I 
think if you have that perspective China has 
moved [forward] and the West has been helpful 
[in moving] it along. That [doesn’t] mean that we 
don’t see sometimes backlashes, or things going 
in the wrong direction, which I think we have also 
seen in China in the past few years ...if you take 
the long view …I still think it’s very important 
that we continue to engage and that we continue 
to try to lure them, to adhere to a sort of rules 




• Displays a perception on the EU side that should replicate the EU’s 
superior values/practices/standards 
• The interviewee judges progress on this basis.  
• Again implies unequal relationship. 
• Anything not aligning with the EU’s expectations is cast as not only wrong 
but moving backwards (“the wrong direction”) i.e. moving backwards.  
• Reaffirms that the EU’s values/practices/standards are considered the 
only correct approach.   
• Alludes to the conflict to date on values and the ineffectiveness of existing 
EU strategies (“it’s very important that we continue to engage”). 
• This also infers that individuals on the EU side think that the EU should not 
continue to engage on values. Captures frustrations from China’s non-
compliance which inform discourse 5 
• Portrays the EU repeatedly promoting the EU interpretation on 
controversial values in dialogues until China finally accepts it. 





Table 7.6 Additional key examples of discourse 5 relating to the human rights dialogue 
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EEAS Quoted example  Analysis 
ASIAPAC: Asia and Pacific 
Directorate [BRU] 
1. Right, ok, they might feel lectured or they 
might feel that it’s not a level playing field, 
but that’s where the universality of human 
rights comes into play.254 
 
• Alludes to how officials reference international documents to support the 
perceived superiority of the EU interpretation of human rights. 
• Suggests that this approach tends to be didactic nature, informed by frustrations 
that China is not complying. 
• Infers that China is not treated as an equal partner, being lectured by the EU 
(teach-pupil imagery). 
• Interviewee is aware that the Chinese side finds this approach disrespectful but 
will continue to do so in future dialogues nonetheless (“that’s where the 
universality of human rights comes into play”). 
• Perception that China should be listening to the EU (discourse 5) justifies this 
didactic approach. 
 
ASIAPAC: Asia and Pacific 
Directorate [BRU] 
 
2. The interviewee described how they had 
discussed human rights promotion strategies 
for engaging with China with Japanese 
officials. The interviewee stated that they 
recommended that “you start by praising 
people and it’s true, that for a very long time 
we go to straight to the criticism”. 255 
 
• Alludes to didactic approaches to promote human rights by the EU side which 
criticises China in dialogues. 
• Suggests that the EU asserts its superior position and extends no legitimacy to the 
Chinese interpretation of human rights (“we go to straight to the criticism”). 
• Displays recognition that the EU has eschewed more diplomatic approaches. This 
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3. So …the next stage [from promoting human 
rights in dialogues] is to monitor the 
implementation and hold them accountable 
to their word, that’s where we need to 
concentrate on …they’ve started consulting 
us on legislation, now they do these public 
consultations. We have given them feedback 
on counter-terrorism, cyber security, national 
security… foreign NGOs, e-commerce 
legislation, we’re giving them police 
community… religious affairs (yeah) all these 
amendments, all this legislation we are giving 
feedback. Are they being taken into account? 
Not so much. But at least we’re establishing a 
written record of where we see 
discrepancies, where we see threats …where 
we do not see eye to eye.256 
 
• Portrays an unequal relationship, where the EU polices the extent to which China 
is adhering to superior EU standards in its legislation (“monitor the 
implementation)”. 
• Equates the adherence with EU standards to a question of trust (“hold them 
accountable to their word”).  
• Reinforces how strongly the EU side believes that its values/practices/standards 
reflect the only correct model.  
• Also suggests EU has the authority to determine if China is acting in line with its 
words.  
• Interviewee acknowledges that existing EU outlook/approaches to human rights 
promotion are not successful but makes no suggestion of the need for exchange. 
• Perpetuation is justified on the basis that China should be listening to the EU 
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ASIAPAC: Asia and Pacific 
Directorate [BRU] 
 
4. When you feel in despair that all… [that] 
nothing is happening with China or that this 
human rights issues and everything, you go 
talk to the EUSR [EU Special Representative 
for Human Rights], he will draw from the 
experiences of other regions in the world 
…I’ve listened to him and he does inspire you 
when he talks about, you know, how it’s not 
a zero sum game, how it’s still worth 
pursuing and how in his travels around the 
world he sees the perceptions of how EU is a 
stronghold of human rights still, despite all 
the crises we’re going through.257 
 
• Captures how pessimism about China listening to the EU limits the pursuit of 
alternative strategies which are less didactic. 
• Word choice of “despair” strongly captures this sense of pessimism through its 
suggestion that there is a loss of hope on the EU side. Reaffirmed by the notion 
that “nothing is happening” and only listening to the EUSR encourages them that 
“it’s still worth pursuing”. 
• Allusion to a perception on the EU side that promotion of human rights can only 
conflictual, legitimised by discourse 5 (“he does inspire you when he talks about 
how it’s not a zero-sum game”). 
• Nevertheless, interviewee made no indication that they were seeking to adopt a 




7.5 Conclusions  
 
Supporting the conclusions from Chapter 6, this chapter displayed how Commission and 
EEAS officials were also justifying a lack value mainstreaming based on discourses casting 
China as the principal impediment to such activities. Like the organisational discourses, 
these discourses were informing Commission and EEAS officials not fulfilling their 
expected roles in systematically mainstreaming values in all EU-China dialogues, 
institutionally coordinated by the latter. These discourses, in turn, were also contributing 
to the weakness of the EU’s normative power with China practice.  
Discourse 3 captured how EU officials were avoiding mainstreaming the most 
controversial values into EU-China dialogues (e.g. including human rights, but not 
sustainable development) on the basis that such activities would likely trigger obstructive 
behaviour by China and compromise exchanges. This discourse appeared to be the 
dominant discourse invoked by officials to legitimise a lack of value mainstreaming. 
Relatedly, discourse 4 referred to how officials considered value mainstreaming pointless 
as well as perilous to the success of dialogues, due to the perceived incapacity of their 
Chinese interlocutors to impact China’s policy in these sensitive areas. These two 
discourses appeared to be principally informed by genuinely obstructive actions by China.  
Discourse 5, however, appeared to be rooted in the EU’s actions, which undermined its 
normative power. The discourse related to a perception that China is not listening to the 
EU and it should be and displayed two key facets. Firstly, the discourse appeared to 
inform a lack of reflexivity amongst EU officials, engendering approaches to value 
mainstreaming and associated perspectives that could be interpreted as neo-colonial by 
their Chinese counterparts and external observers. In this fashion, officials were found to 
be repeatedly attempting to promote EU values with the Chinese side in the few 
dialogues where this is taking place – particularly the human rights dialogue - while 
dismissing any alternate Chinese interpretations. China’s repeated non-compliance 
appeared to engender frustration on the EU side, underpinning didactic approaches 
which were unsuccessful or even counterproductive. These approaches appeared to be 
perpetuated nonetheless by a conviction that China should accept the correct EU 




Secondly, discourse 5 appeared to justify an avoidance of value mainstreaming in all other 
dialogues, informing officials framing such activities as inherently conflictual and unlikely 
to be successful. 
In this context, it emerged that for all three discourses, personal experience of 
mainstreaming values with China did not appear to be a prerequisite for sharing these 
discourses. The negative experiences of those individuals which had conducted these 
activities, particularly those connected to the human rights dialogue, appeared to act as a 
cautionary tale for others, legitimising an avoidance of value mainstreaming on the basis 
of discourses 3-5.  
Additionally, like the organisational discourses, these discourses surrounding China’s role 
appeared to practically support Chinese, as opposed to EU interests in informing EU 
values not being tabled in dialogues. For discourses 3-4, it seemed that China may be 
even actively contributing to a perception among EU officials that value mainstreaming 
will compromise dialogues. In this context, it was argued that as real or expected 
resistance from the Chinese side towards discussing controversial values appears to be 
informed by a facet of the official party-state discourse, an eschewing of value 
mainstreaming based on discourses 3 and 4 could be perceived by observers and the 
Chinese side as a compliance with this party line and an indirect endorsement of the 
official Chinese position on these values. This highlighted the importance of recognising 
the two-way flow of values in EU-China dialogues, displaying the EU effectively engaging 
with and acquiescing to China’s values. Moreover, as illuminated by Shklar (1989), it 
emerged that, as the EU’s values and their relevance is informed and empowered by a 
fear of the cruelty engendered by totalitarian governments, EU officials failing to assert 
the EU’s values with China, particularly on the latter’s request, represents an act of self-
harm which actively erodes the EU’s values and their continued pertinence. These 
dramatic implications seemed to be neglected by a complacent EU side, which was 
prioritising the smooth attainment of sector-specific objectives.  
The analysis also suggested that discourses 3-5 were similarly limiting the potential of the 
EU-China Legal Affairs Dialogue (LAD) to act as an effective channel for promoting human 
rights, deterring value mainstreaming through the dialogue. Moreover, again it emerged 
that EEAS diplomats, through sharing these discourses, were playing a role in enabling or 




This appeared to also take place passively in the context of the EEAS’s (negative) value 
promotion experiences being invoked as a justification for avoiding systematic value 






























Previous chapters uncovered discourses justifying a lack of systematic value 
mainstreaming by EU officials in EU-China dialogues. This chapter goes beyond these 
discursive practices, examining an additional factor that appeared to be weakening the 
EU’s normative power in practice: a lack of understanding of China amongst EU officials. 
The analysis suggests that this deficit could also be contributing to the discourses 
legitimising an avoidance of value mainstreaming, most explicitly, those surrounding 
China’s role (discourses 3-5). In this sense, insufficient knowledge about China amongst 
EU officials may be informing a lack of reflexivity about their approaches to value 
mainstreaming and a limited capacity to identify and pursue common ground in these 
controversial areas with resistant Chinese interlocutors. This suggests that in the absence 
of requisite knowledge and understanding, officials are engaging with China on a 
Eurocentric basis which is negative to bilateral relations. However, this chapter 
importantly highlights that there is a mutual lack of understanding in EU-China relations, 
alluding to the existence of comparably problematic Sinocentrism on the Chinese side. 
Consequently, as suggested in Chapter 3.6, ethnocentrism can logically be seen to reflect 
the default position for most individuals on each side unless efforts are taken to enhance 
mutual cultural and linguistic understanding. 
Section 8.2 first reveals how interviewees’ language alluded to limited understanding of 
China and its motivations on the EU side, a deficit seemingly supported by EU and Chinese 
policy documents. Section 8.3 then describes how this lack of understanding may stem 
from limited Chinese cultural and linguistic knowledge among EU officials. Lastly, section 
8.4 provides important caveats to the potential impact of the EU improving capacity in 







8.2 Language displaying a lack of understanding on the EU side 
 
Interviewees’ accounts often explicitly suggested a broad and fundamental lack of 
understanding of China, its institutional structures, culture and motivations on the EU 
side. The deficit was present in the accounts of Brussels-based and Beijing-based officials 
from both the European Commission and the EEAS. However, as discussed in Section 8.3, 
a minority of individuals, due to personal experience/initiative, displayed a greater 
understanding of China. 
 
Pillar 2 Economic & sectoral dialogues and Pillar 3 People-to-People Dialogue 
At the most basic level, Commission officials involved with Pillar 2 and 3 dialogues often 
broadly alluded to a lack understanding of China in interviews, which negatively impacted 
their dialogues. An official from DG Environment (ENV) provided a notable example. They 
described how in recent years they had conducted “a very interesting exercise”, where 
they sought to ascertain “how many dialogues do we have” - asking both the EU and 
Chinese side. The interviewee revealed that China considered there to be more 
environmental dialogues than the EU: “they perceived some environmental projects as 
dialogues”.  For the interviewee, this reflected an “example of the cultural differences 
that affect every sphere of cooperation.”  The quotes display how a bilateral lack of 
understanding is such that each side does not agree on the format and consistency of 
bilateral cooperation i.e. what constitutes a dialogue. In this sense, the example highlights 
how such misunderstanding affects not only EU officials, but also their counterparts. 
However, the most interesting examples, involved officials describing building 
understanding with their counterparts as a principal, yet long-term objective for their 
dialogue, where little progress had been made to date. For example, an official from DG 
Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (EMPL) described how the purpose of their 
dialogues was to “understand what’s happening in China …to learn what is going on 
there” as well as influence China’s development of “labour standards”. This language 
suggests that despite years of bilateral cooperation in this sector (since 2005),258 the EU is 
                                                          




still trying to improve basic understanding of China’s systems and motivations along with 
their alternative cultural foundations.  
Arguably such basic knowledge represents a crucial platform for effectively 
mainstreaming the value dimensions of this sector, providing officials with the capacity 
and confidence to pitch EU values in a (reflexive) fashion which will resonate with the 
Chinese side. The language in the above example was interestingly reproduced during a 
dialogue connected to this sector that the author attended. The EU co-chair stated in 
their opening remarks that “the development of China’s social system is little known [to 
the EU]” and they described how they were “interested in knowing the situation in 
China”.259  
The analysis of examples from Pillar 3 People-to-People dialogue(s) (PPD) supported 
these inferences. PPD can be seen to inherently support the existence and importance of 
a lack of understanding. As noted in Chapter 3.6, it was specifically established to resolve 
a mutual lack of understanding in EU-China relations and by proxy, the negative 
ethnocentric tendencies it appears to inform on each side. However, interviewees 
involved with PPD suggested that this desire to build basic understanding remained 
unchanged in 2017, 5 years after PPD was established: 
So the main objective is in fact to help people to understand each other from the 
two sides and also, this, facilitation of easier understanding, mutual 
understanding.260 
While the continuing need to build basic understanding arguably implies limited progress 
to date, another interviewee more explicitly confirmed this and its severity. They 
described how progress in facilitating EU and Chinese civil society contacts through 
official-level dialogues was being impeded – somewhat ironically – by the bilateral lack of 
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It’s like a contradiction …and that’s one of the problems ...with China… because 
indeed it’s mainly a dialogue between …high level administrations and their 
representatives. You know, what we are trying to do, but I must say it’s not easy, 
it’s …[to move] more in the direction of people-to-people context and to try also 
to reach out to the civil society, we are trying to move from a very, indeed, official 
dialogue to something more concrete people-to-people, but I must say it takes 
time and it’s not [easy]… obviously the Chinese have a different perception, I 
mean we all know this, it’s extremely centralised …civil society doesn’t have the 
same meaning there …it’s a long way, we are not there yet. But this is the 
direction.261 
Aligning with observations in the very limited existing literature on PPD (See Chapter 3.6), 
the interviewee highlights that in practice, PPD is not functioning as intended by the EU 
side. It remains a top-down exchange due to China’s approach, which stymies the building 
of links between each side’s civil societies to aid EU-China dialogues, as envisioned. They 
cast this reality, which contrasts with the EU’s expectations as a “contradiction”. While 
the interviewee displays a knowledge of China’s top-down governance, its implications 
for civil society and its role in informing the diplomatic impasse, the notion that both 
sides are unable to agree on the dialogues’ basic format and its objectives alludes to a 
broader mutual lack of understanding. This aligns with the DG ENV example and 
emphasises the depth of the bilateral lack of understanding. 
Similarly, the official infers that they are unsurprised about this situation (“the Chinese 
have a different perception, I mean we all know this”), while such foundational 
disagreement is portrayed as only “one of the problems ...with China”. This alludes to 
numerous tensions affecting EU-China cooperation (i.e. the prevailing lack of 
understanding), which are far from being resolved (“it’s a long way, we are not there 
yet”).  
Conversely, it is important to recognise that improved knowledge on the EU side would 
not necessarily enhance PPD, due to China’s working practices and the barrier they 
present coupled with the comparably limited European knowledge amongst Chinese 
officials, being largely unimpacted by any actions on the EU side (See Section 8.4). 
However, more informed perspectives about China’s institutional systems and their 
                                                          




cultural basis may aid greater compromise which could enhance these dialogues. 
Additional key examples alluding to lack of understanding of China in Pillar 2 and 3 













Quoted example Analysis 
DG Education and 
Culture (EAC) [BRU] 
1. “I guess not everybody has a clear idea of what China 
is…what we can expect from China and …what they 
actually want …I mean they are not clear either but 
maybe it’s on purpose.”262 
 
• Suggests a lack of understanding on the EU side. 
• EU officials cast as lacking fundamental knowledge about China and its 
objectives. 
• Appears to be blame China and its opacity for this lack of knowledge. 
• Connects to discourse 4 and officials avoiding value mainstreaming due to 













                                                          





Local Staff, EU 
Delegation to China 
[BEI] 
2. The interviewee described how “I think that the EU side 
needs to do more research… [on] the way of the 
Chinese government… Chinese people’s thinking”. They 
added that EU officials “were arrogant” and that there 
was “a lot of misunderstanding” in political exchanges 
with China. The interviewee reiterated that human 
rights was sensitive, but “could be handled differently.” 
Instead, they interviewee said that the EU “should 
share stories” about life in the EU, using case studies 
that let Chinese people know they could live like that 
(with regard to for instance levels of gender equality, 
like long maternity leave) 263 
 
• Explicitly confirms lack of understanding and its negative impact on EU-
China relations (“there is a lot of misunderstanding).  
• Blames this on the EU side’s lack of knowledge.  
• Suggestion that officials need to educate themselves about fundamental 
features of Chinese culture and political systems.  
• Alludes to connection between this lack of understanding, insufficient 
reflexivity on the EU side and the didactic approaches to assert EU 
objectives it informs (“human rights could be handled differently”). 
• Officials’ perceived superiority of EU interpretation of values captured by 
suggestion that officials are “arrogant”. 
• Suggests less didactic approaches for promoting human rights, which are 
effectively ruled-out by discourse 5 and the perception that China should be 
accepting the EU interpretation of values. 
 
DG Education and 
Culture (EAC) [BRU] 
3. The interviewee noted that the general objective of the 
cultural affairs dialogue with China (and HPPD more 
broadly) was to “go down [to the non-official level] and 
make sure that what is shared is really shared and what 
is learned is really learned …so far it has been hyped 
…but rigid exchanges [in practice].264 
 
• Reiterates how PPD is not resolving a lack of understanding due – ironically 
– due to a lack of understanding.  










Local Staff, EU 
Delegation to China 
[BEI] 
4. The interviewee said that there were “only official 
contacts” and that “if you randomly asked a Chinese 
student on your [Renmin University of China] campus, 
they wouldn’t know about HPPD …it’s not people-to-
people but official-to-official.”265 
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Building understanding an objective in EU and Chinese policy documents 
It is also worth highlighting that building understanding and trying to tackle an existing 
and significant knowledge-gap, often reflects a principal objective in EU and Chinese 
policy documents. In this context, the joint EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for 
Cooperation (2012) displays typical language found throughout EU documents on China. It 
describes how the (Pillar 1) High-Level Strategic Dialogue reflects a “platform to increase 
mutual understanding, deepen mutual trust, and build common ground” (EEAS, 2013:3). 
The language alludes to a dearth of understanding in the relationship, limited trust and 
the need to reach common ground as a key objective.  
A more recent example is reflected in the EU’s guiding strategic document on EU-China 
relations, Elements for New Strategy on China (2016) (See: Chapter 6.4.3), which 
describes how:  
The EU should network its analytical resources so as to correctly assess the 
motivations of Chinese policy and capitalize on opportunities to strengthen EU-
China relations. (EU, 2016ii:18)  
The language infers that to date, the EU has not been correctly assessing China’s policies 
and their motivations, and that every possible opportunity on the EU side should be 
exploited to resolve this. This reinforces the picture of a lack of basic understanding of the 
Chinese side, which the EU seeks to remedy as a priority objective.  
Notably, the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs’ (AFET) sole 
communication on EU-China relations (2015) makes the connection between a deficit in 
understanding and bilateral disagreement over values (specifically human rights), 
describing it as an: 
Important source of conceptual differences leading to [a] lack of understanding 
and distrust in EU-China relations and limiting progress in the EU-China human 
rights dialogues. (EU Parliament, 2015:18) 
The quote captures how a deficit in understanding derives from a disagreement over 
values, yet it also importantly infers that a deficit in knowledge about each side’s 
culture/language/institutions is impeding any resolution of this, fostering a hostile 




between a lack of understanding and the discourses impeding EU value mainstreaming, 
described in Chapters 6 and 7.  
References to a bilateral lack of understanding are also frequent in policy documents and 
press releases connected to individual sectors of EU-China cooperation. These documents 
often premise cooperation on building or deepening mutual understanding. For example, 
the Joint Statement on Dialogue and Cooperation on Climate Change (2010) describes 
establishing a regular climate change dialogue to “deepen mutual understanding” (EU 
Commission, 2010), while the Legal Affairs Dialogue is cast as a “platform to exchange 
experiences on the Rule of Law and increase mutual understanding” (EU Commission, 
2016iii) in the press release following the inaugural dialogue.  
Similarly, the Work Plan 2017-2018 of the EU-China Roadmap on Energy Cooperation 
(2018) describes the need to “create common understanding” (EU Commission, 2017iv) in 
almost every aspect of energy cooperation. In this case, it emerged in interviews that the 
dialogue had been frozen for several years due to bilateral conflict, largely over an 
inability to cooperate on energy security.266 China considered the issue geopolitical and 
the relationship in this area to be one of competition rather than cooperation.267 This has 
resulted in energy security being replaced in future dialogues - which restarted in 2017 - 
with the less contentious area of international energy markets.268 This development itself 
alludes to a bilateral lack of understanding.   
It is important acknowledge that the language identified in the above examples reflects 
diplomatic jargon which is not unique to EU-China relations. However, considering its 
prevalence in EU documents and the analysis of interviewees’ accounts throughout this 
chapter, it appears to be more consequential for EU-China relations. Limited mutual 
understanding is impeding bilateral relations, particularly in the case of values.  
Comparable language is also present throughout China’s two policy papers (2003 & 2014) 
on the EU to date (See: MoFA, 2003; 2014). For example, the 2014 paper describes how 
the China-EU Industrial Dialogue Consultation Mechanism should be “enhanced …[to] 
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Discussion of international energy markets reflects EU-China cooperation as major international energy 





increase mutual understanding, resolve differences, expand common ground” (MoFA, 
2014). The lack of understanding was also displayed during Xi Jinping’s state visit to the 
EU in 2015, where he used his speech at the Colleges of Europe (Bruges) as an 
“opportunity to describe …what a country China is” reflecting the need to improve mutual 
knowledge. He detailed fundamentals aspects of Chinese society, culture and history to 
the EU audience. For example, he stated that:  
To observe and understand China properly, one needs to bear in mind both 
China’s past and present and draw reference from both China’s accomplishments 
and the Chinese way of thinking …One can hardly understand China well without a 
proper understanding of China’s history, culture, the Chinese people’s way of 
thinking and the profound changes taking place in China today. (European 
Commission, 2014iii) 
The language infers that there is an incomplete and limited understanding of China 
amongst Europeans, including its history, culture and societal development. While this 
sentiment is aimed at multiple audiences, including European civil society (particularly 
academia), it is also directed at the official level on the EU side. Additionally, it is 
important to emphasise that the lack of understanding is not limited to the EU side, being 
mutual in nature, as described in most policy documents. As President Xi noted in the 
same speech:  
To move our relationship forward, China needs to know more about Europe, and 
Europe needs to know more about China. (ibid.)  
Consequently, remedying the mutual lack of understanding requires action by both the 
EU and China.  
 
Pillar 1 Political dialogues: Identifying linkages between a lack of understanding and the 
discourses impeding value mainstreaming 
As the EEAS coordinates EU-China dialogues, diplomats from the institution provided the 
strongest examples alluding to a lack of understanding of China, often explicitly 
recognising its existence and significance. Moreover, their language importantly appeared 
to suggest a linkage between this knowledge-gap and the discourses justifying a lack of 




discourse 5 were particularly prominent. A lack of reflexivity in officials’ value 
mainstreaming approaches and their didactic nature, seems to be symptomatic of limited 
understanding of China and the historical/cultural basis of its positions. As one diplomat 
stated:  
I think …that we are failing …to understand China and China’s strategy as well 
…one thing I think is really, I mean I find it quite funny and I think it is a good 
illustration of people not understanding what China’s about… you know some of 
my colleagues have written [the] great paradox that China is sometimes 
liberalizing, you know liberalizing its economy , not its political [sphere] …but it’s 
only a paradox if you are Western.269 
Here, the diplomat’s language portrays a challenge in understanding China and its 
bilateral and global approach/objectives, which is cast as an ongoing shortfall by the EU 
(“we are failing …to understand China and China’s strategy”). Displaying this, the 
interviewee’s vignette captures how individuals from the EU side are unable to identify 
with fundamental aspects of China’s governmental system and the logic underpinning 
this, narrowly assessing it according to a Western perspective.  
The language thus hints at the argued connection between the bilateral lack of 
understanding, the lack of reflexivity associated with discourse 5 and the didactic 
approaches to promoting values it informs. It infers that EU officials express an 
expectation that China should approximate the EU’s superior model of political 
governance and related values, without recognising any alternative Chinese model and its 
historical/cultural origins, in order to reflexively calibrate approaches. Interestingly, the 
interviewee appears to infer that they view this lack of understanding amongst their 
colleagues as a form of naivety (“I find it quite funny”), reinforcing that this knowledge-
gap reflects a deficit on the EU side. 
Another diplomat alluded to this shortfall in describing how “what is surprising is the 
Chinese system …the lack of knowledge on the EU side [about this]”.270 Their language 
suggests that the EU side has limited understanding of China’s decision-making systems. 
The depth of this is captured by them expressing surprise at the extent of it. The example 
also notably displays a connection between the lack of understanding and discourse 4, 
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which legitimatises an avoidance of value mainstreaming on the basis that interlocutors 
are perceived to be unlikely to impact relevant Chinese policy. In this sense, limited 
understanding of China’s institutional systems may be exaggerating their opacity. 
An EEAS diplomat, with greater knowledge of China, highlighted the linkage between the 
EU’s lack of understanding of China and human rights mainstreaming, aligning with the 
AFET report analysed in the previous section. The diplomat noted that:  
Regarding China now …I think we, there is a widespread lack of understanding … 
of Chinese culture in this house …sticking to the speech the universality of human 
rights etc., which is true on the paper, but I mean …if you go to Asia, Japan as well, 
you will see that the notion of privacy for instance, of the individual, of individual 
compared with all of the collectively or the community, It’s totally different. And it 
has some consequences, in terms of how the Chinese see human rights.271 
The interviewee alludes to the extent of the lack of understanding of China on the EU 
side, describing it as “widespread” and spanning across the EU’s institutions (“in this 
house”). Additionally, like the first example, they appear to suggest a degree of naivety 
and ignorance on the EU side, with officials dogmatically “sticking” to the EU 
interpretation of human rights in an ineffective fashion which lacks reflexivity, while 
remaining ignorant to the cultural basis which informs the conflicting (official) Chinese 
interpretation (“if you go to Asia …it’s totally different”). This reinforces a connection 
between the EU’s knowledge-gap and the didactic approaches to human rights 
mainstreaming captured by discourse 5. 
This linkage was similarly implied by another highly informed EEAS diplomat - due to their 
status as a seconded official from an EU member state - in the context of value 
mainstreaming more broadly. They described how: 
 China is moving …not into aggression, but into assertiveness. Why should they 
…after 170 years of humiliation, listen to the foreigners pontificating about how 
they should run their country?272  
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The interviewee suggests that their EEAS colleagues are not adequately recognising 
China’s sensitivities towards the EU seeking to promote its model and associated values. 
This again alludes to the pursuit of didactic, non-egalitarian approaches, justified by 
discourse 5. 
Interestingly, one EEAS diplomat suggested that this lack of understanding has been a 
long-running challenge, having progressed little since working with China in DG External 
Relations (pre-Lisbon treaty): “I was working with China issues 7 years ago and …things 
haven't evolved enormously”.273 The dramatic impasse at the 19th EU-China summit 
(2017) described in Chapter 7.4, also reinforces the scale and significance of this lack of 
understanding on both sides. A joint statement failed to be agreed for the second 
consecutive year, despite these bilateral summits being designed to be relatively 
depoliticised set-piece events.  
 
8.3 Limited cultural and linguistic knowledge on the EU side 
 
The apparent lack of understanding of China amongst EU officials and its potential linkage 
to the discourses impeding value mainstreaming, appears to be largely rooted in limited 
cultural and linguistic knowledge. This deficit on the EU side and its significance are 
illustrated in sections 8.3.1 and 8.3.2, before Section 8.3.3 addresses its material basis. 
Notably, many of the examples provided below derive from the aforementioned minority 
of EU officials who have greater understanding of China and reflexivity. These individuals, 
which have gained cultural and linguistic knowledge through their own initiative – as 
opposed to EU training – emphasised their value-added. They tended to criticise the lack 
of these skills amongst their colleagues and linked their absence to ongoing bilateral 
tensions and misunderstandings. Additionally, the analysis supported the argued 
connection between a knowledge-gap on the EU side and the discourses justifying a lack 
of systematic value mainstreaming. Discourses 3-5, surrounding China’s perceived role in 
challenging value mainstreaming, seemed to be particularly fuelled by limited cultural and 
linguistic knowledge. 
 
                                                          




8.3.1 Cultural knowledge 
 
Concerning cultural knowledge, interviewees alluded to a capacity gap on the EU side and 
described its profound negative impact on their day-to-day engagement with the Chinese 
side. Unsurprisingly, cultural knowledge tended be stronger at the EU delegation in 
Beijing, than in Brussels, due these officials being physically based in China and some 
limited language training (See section 8.3.3). However, it is important to stress that the 
EU does not provide any dedicated cultural training to its officials, irrespective of their 
institution.274 Consequently, such knowledge relied on the personal experience/initiative 
of officials.  
In a key example, a Commission official from the Information Society Media Section at the 
delegation highlighted this knowledge-gap amongst their colleagues in the context of 
China’s legal system. They described how: 
Cultural knowledge goes a long way there …we assume that trust and systems 
should work in the way they do the EU …[however] Chinese law is way less precise 
…I can get angry all day about imprecise laws, but to have this [European] 
expectation of the governance the law… they don’t have this here.275 
The official’s language infers that limited cultural knowledge on the EU side is leading to 
incorrect assumptions about China’s legal system and its historical precedent (“cultural 
knowledge goes a long way there”). Aligning with discourse 5, the interviewee appears to 
allude to a lack of reflexivity on the EU side and a perception that China should reform its 
legal system in accordance with the EU’s superior standards (“we assume that trust and 
systems should work in the way they do the EU”). Relatedly, they also hint at the 
frustrations this engenders amongst their colleagues and suggest that any resulting 
didactic approaches to assert EU standards, are likely to be unsuccessful. This is reflected 
in the notion that if they (or their colleagues) got “angry all day”, it would not change the 
Chinese interpretation of rule of law. The language here also alludes to the pessimism 
informed by discourse 5 and how it deters value mainstreaming.  
The interviewee reaffirmed this connection between discourse 5 and a lack of knowledge 
amongst EU officials in suggesting that criticising China’s legal system according to the 
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EU’s standards “will achieve nothing, it is based on a wrong assumption” (i.e. that China’s 
legal system should closely approximate the EU’s superior standards).276 More broadly, 
the interviewee emphasised that this cultural deficit was “definitely worse in Brussels” 
where people “don’t understand the difference between different parts of the Chinese 
government”.277  
Supporting this, interviewees also rarely displayed knowledge about the crucial role of 
informal working relationships - or guanxi278 - in building effective relationships with their 
counterparts, enhancing exchanges and creating a favourable environment for addressing 
more controversial issues (like values). A DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship 
and SMEs (GROW) official described how “it is crucial” to have such relationships where 
“we do feel we have access, we can call them”. 279  However, they inferred that there was 
a lack of such awareness amongst their colleagues, noting that “I try also to discuss with 
colleagues the importance of building up the relationship”.280 Similarly, a DG ENV official 
stated that “If there is no trust, forget it … [the Chinese side] won’t respond to calls, 
emails”.281  
Additionally, few officials that were interviewed demonstrated knowledge of other key 
Chinese cultural features such as maintaining face, not addressing issues directly and the 
avoidance of saying no to proposals out of politeness, all of which can create tensions in 
dialogues if misunderstood by the EU side. As two Brussels-based officials (DG TRADE and 
DG GROW) noted, whom, like their colleagues quoted above, had greater Chinese 
knowledge:  
TRADE: In Chinese culture you never get straight to the point …they rarely express 
their desires overtly …they find it disturbing that we are so direct.282 
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GROW: So you always get a yes but it depends on the kind of yes, because 
sometimes yes is no and sometimes yes is yes …whereas we tend to be pretty 
much straight forward.283 
These examples again suggest a connection between a lack of cultural knowledge and the 
discourses justifying an avoidance of value mainstreaming. Discourses 3 and 4 in 
particular, may be partially informed by i) misperceived actions by China or ii) 
unintentional cultural faux pas by EU officials, which may be catalysing China’s 
obstructive behaviour.  
An official from the Trade Section at the EU delegation to China supported these 
conclusions, describing the consequences of EU officials lacking knowledge about the role 
of hierarchy in Chinese culture: 
It was the minutes of the Chair’s meeting, so the highest-level meeting of the 
Connectivity Platform and …we discussed the agenda of the meeting. And [in] the 
agenda, we had added a director, [a] managing director from the EEAS …so you 
had the …European Chair, the Chinese Chair and then this managing director from 
the EEAS. And they say no, this is not possible. And on my side, the EU side, 
everyone took this as a political issue about the EEAS, like we don’t want to have 
the EEAS there and you know, I [was] telling them no, no, no [interviewee laughs] 
it’s not about the EEAS against or not, it’s that for them, typically you have a 
[single] Chair, you have a Chair. And the others are below …this [is a] matter of 
levels, you cannot introduce a third element just like that over there …I was the 
only one there because of my experience and my knowledge, that understood 
that it’s not a political [issue] and it’s just an issue of protocol …to find the right 
place where I could place this person, the others, didn’t have that kind of 
reflex[ivity] …I have gone through this situation, the one I just described, many 
times.284 
The interviewee’s language displays how this politically important dialogue - connected to 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative285 - was almost compromised by a lack of cultural 
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knowledge. The role of hierarchy on the Chinese side appears to have been totally 
overlooked by the EU side when compiling their delegation for the dialogue. Similarly, bar 
the interviewee, even senior officials on the EU side seem to have been unable to identify 
that China’s refusal to approve the agenda was derivative of this elementary cultural 
dimension (“this [is a] matter of levels, you cannot introduce a third element just like 
that”).  
The above example is particularly significant because it highlights that a deficit in cultural 
knowledge reaches politically significant dialogues and is also prevalent amongst senior 
EU officials. Moreover, the interviewee explicitly suggests that these sorts of occurrences 
are not isolated incidents (“I have gone through this situation, the one I just described, 
many times”). They also allude to the value of cultural knowledge on the EU side, noting 
that this skill-set was key to resolving the impasse (“I was the only one there because of 
my experience and my knowledge, that understood”).  
Relatedly, the example displays how cultural knowledge can lessen or avoid tensions 
which derive from simple cultural miscommunications, with the interviewee describing 
how their colleagues immediately became defensive in the wake of China’s refusal to 
approve the agenda (“everyone took this as a political issue”). As a result, a linkage can 
again be made between a lack of cultural knowledge and the discourses linking to China’s 
behaviour, in this case discourse 3. The example displays how China’s reaction to the EU 
contravening the cultural norm of hierarchy was misinterpreted by many on the EU side 
as obstructive behaviour.  
Importantly, if cultural knowledge appears to aid the mitigation of tensions during 
relatively uncontroversial technical exchanges, it can be inferred that in the context of 
mainstreaming EU values, such skills are likely to be of even greater utility. The 
interviewee quoted above also later described how cultural knowledge made it possible 
to be more assertive with counterparts. They noted that: 
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Sometimes you can also say, ‘look, I’m sick with your rules’ because one of the 
main problems we have is lack of coordination, on the Chinese side …you cannot 
just accept and say ok that’s the way it is. No, sorry …if this element is not entirely 
in your hands, then you have to reach out to that other person, who works [on it] 
together. For God’s sake, because otherwise it’s not possible [to move forwards] 
…it’s about understanding …not jumping to conclusions, which is what happens 
when you don’t understand the other side ...it’s also about pushing them.286 
Their language suggests that cultural knowledge has informed them avoiding conflict and 
misunderstandings with their counterparts (“it’s about understanding …not jumping to 
conclusions, which is what happens when you don’t understand the other side”). 
However, it also suggests that this knowledge engenders a confidence, giving them the 
capacity to read their counterparts and know where they can “push” their counterparts 
without comprising cooperation. This again suggests that such skills may aid value 
mainstreaming, allowing officials to identify opportunities to discuss values and in a 
manner which is less likely to cause conflict.  
Reinforcing this, officials who had this cultural knowledge also tended to stress its 
practical value. However, they emphasised that they had gained this knowledge solely 
through their own personal experience/initiative rather than EU training. As a Brussels-
based official from DG GROW stated, “I think it is indispensable, I have studied the 
Chinese culture on my own, so I believe I know, and I think we all should know that, as 
China desks”. The quote captures how the interviewee considers cultural knowledge a 
crucial skill for engaging with China (“indispensable”), while inferring that such knowledge 
is uncommon amongst their colleagues (“I think we all should know that”). Similarly, an 
official from DG Environment described their knowledge as “a matter of personal 
interest”.  
While cultural knowledge tended to be de-facto stronger at the EU delegation in Beijing, a 
deficit in this area was nonetheless identifiable. Displaying this, one member of local staff 
(a Chinese national) described how the EU side would use traditional Chinese drawings 
for logos in public campaigns, which “look strange to the Chinese [people]”, but 
                                                          




“attractive” to EU officials.287 Additionally, they described how in the context of an annual 
reception at the delegation, their EU colleagues would “delete lower level officials” from 
the guest list, on the basis that they only want senior Chinese officials to attend.288  
The interviewee noted that this was against the advice of local staff, since the Chinese 
political norm for an event of this status was for senior officials to send lower level 
colleagues in their place. As a result, the lower level officials lost face from not being 
invited personally. This highlights how EU officials are lacking Chinese cultural knowledge 
and are making significant cultural faux pas as a result, which are likely to have 
implications for the bilateral dialogues. It also suggests that there is even cultural 
misunderstanding between Chinese staff and European officials at the delegation. This 
appears to reflect a somewhat ironic microcosm of the lack of understanding in the 
bilateral relationship. 
Lastly, interviewees from the Chinese side also appeared to allude to the existence and 
impact of a cultural knowledge-gap on the EU side. Reflecting this, the author asked a 
scholar from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) about what the EU could 
learn from China. They stated that “the EU can learn of Chinese culture, a culture of 
harmony”, before emphasising that China had a “different political culture, different 
perception[s] about the world”.289 They also described how “we must pay attention to 
the tinted glasses …with wrong stereotypes by the Europeans”.290 This appears to hint at 
a tendency on the EU side not to recognise any alternative Chinese 
values/standards/practices and their cultural basis, captured by discourse 5. The language 
also suggests that the EU is viewing China purely from a narrow Eurocentric perspective 
(“tinted glasses”). Additional examples of a lack of cultural knowledge on the EU side are 
presented in Table 8.2 below.
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1. “For them [the Chinese] personal contact is 
extremely important and once you really 
bond - it’s difficult because they do have a 
different mind-set - but if you bond a little 
bit then they are willing to go a little bit 
further …so I think if you can move forward 
on areas of common ground, if you get a 
good personal contact …I could imagine that 
even maybe in the human rights working 
group meeting, that if it had another name, 




• Suggests that establishment of informal personal relations or Guanxi is 
a crucial prerequisite to productive dialogues (“extremely important”). 
• Suggests that understanding this and operationalising it can allow 
officials to make progress in controversial areas. 
• Infers that it may aid mainstreaming sensitive EU values (“even maybe 
in the human you can make some progress”). 
• Language also casts the human rights dialogue as a key example of 
unproductive dialogue with the Chinese side. Aligns with EU officials 
invoking the human rights dialogue as a cautionary tale for the 
consequences of value mainstreaming, linking to discourse 3 (See 
Chapter 7).  
                                                          












2. “The interviewee described how “certain words 
in our vocabulary … [the Chinese side] will 
approach these ideas in a different way”. They 
gave the example of civil society and human 
rights.  They added that “the concept of all 
these things are not the same in China …These 
type of gaps (of conceptual understanding) 





• Displays how a lack of cultural knowledge is preventing the EU from 
effectively discussing human rights with China. 
• Suggests that both sides conceptualise key words associated with 
human rights differently. 
• Highlights the extent of bilateral misunderstanding if both sides are 





3. “When we make long comments on draft law in 
China …it’s the type of comment …for instance 
[on] the [Chinese] social order. There is plenty 
of social order in the Chinese system but it 
corresponds to something …it’s a clear notion 
for [the] Chinese, what social order is. You 
know, you cannot say what do[es] this bit 
define? It’s not defined [by China]. This is the 
reaction we have, but it shows a complete lack 




• Suggests that EU officials lack fundamental knowledge about China. 
• Interviewee explicitly confirms this: “it shows a complete lack of 
understanding, of Chinese culture” 
• Displayed by the notion that officials are extensively questioning 
these basic cultural features on draft Chinese legislation “we make 
long comments”.  
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4. “We were trying to set up a meeting with 
the Vice-Chairman of [the] NDRC …who is 
ministerial level …we needed to find two 
hours for the Commissioner to go to [the] 
NDRC, to the meeting. And a colleague of 
mine was telling [me]… ‘why doesn’t he 
come to the convention centre?’ And I say 
…’a minister will never come to a convention 
centre for an event that his ministry is not 
organising, just for the sake of having a 
bilateral meeting …with a European 
Commissioner’, no, [it] doesn’t happen. 
‘Why doesn’t he come to the hotel for a 
breakfast?’ A Chinese minister doesn’t go to 
a hotel for a breakfast …so, in the end it’s 
very often about small things like this and 
you can lose a lot of credibility …if you make 
this, this request to the Chinese side ‘why 
don’t they come to the hotel?’ [its] a face 
issue isn’t it? …[And] the Chinese side will 
say, oh, these guys don’t know anything 





• Displays a lack of Chinese cultural knowledge on the EU side and how it 
is present at the EU delegation as well as in Brussels. 
• Highlights its negative impact on EU-China relations. 
• Faux pas in ad-hoc contacts and the organisation of exchanges is likely 
to impact dialogues. 
                                                          




8.3.2 Linguistic knowledge 
 
The analysis suggested that there was an even more profound deficit in the context of 
linguistic knowledge on the EU side, being rare not only in Brussels, but Beijing. These 
skills arguably contribute and empower cultural knowledge, aiding officials in 
understanding and building relationships with their counterparts as well as their 
confidence to assert objectives.  
It emerged that the language training made available to EU officials compared poorly to 
other major diplomatic actors (including large member states), restricted solely to those 
at the EU delegation and even then, being small-scale and voluntary in nature.295 As a 
result, EU officials were overwhelmingly found to have minimal or no proficiency in this 
area, with skills again largely dependent upon the personal experience/initiative of the 
official in question. Interestingly, there was an identifiable disparity between those 
lacking language skills who considered them of little practical importance, particularly 
versus cultural knowledge, and those who had such skills viewing them as quasi-
indispensable.  
Reflecting on this, an official from the Information Society Media Section at the EU 
delegation described the EU’s deficiency in this area as “a relative weakness” and noted 
that “cultural-linguistic knowledge amongst diplomats [was] limited” whereas if you 
looked at the US, Russia or the UK the situation was different.296 Focusing on the UK, they 
described how diplomats got a “two-year programme” whereas they were offered “60 
one-to-one lessons”, but they could only do a fraction of these lessons in practice as “they 
were busy”.297 This combination of minimal training provision and an expectation to 
undertake it on top of challenging, understaffed posts at the delegation was reinforced by 
a member of local staff from the delegation. They suggested that EU officials rarely 
completed more than a small amount of the available lessons.298 
The extent of this capacity-gap on the EU side was compounded by a diplomat from the 
British Embassy in Beijing. They described how the two-year training given to UK 
diplomats in Beijing was compulsory, provided on a one-to-one basis and undertaken in 
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isolation before diplomats even began their posts.299 It emerged in other interviews that 
France and Germany, making up “the big three”300 EU member states with the UK, also 
provided similarly extensive training to their diplomats. 
Reinforcing this skill deficit on the EU side, one Brussels-based official noted that “few of 
us read Chinese, I don’t”301, while the EU’s Climate change desk – a crucial post in EU-
China relations – described in an interview with the DG Environment official publication 
Environment for Europeans, that they’d “love to learn Chinese properly” (EU Commission, 
2016iv). This emphasises that despite the offer of language tuition, busy officials have 
little capacity to take the classes and properly develop their skills, unlike their colleagues 
from large member states. 
Importantly, numerous officials highlighted the negative effect that this deficit in Chinese 
language skills was having on EU diplomacy and by extension, value mainstreaming. A 
Beijing-based official from DG Trade described how, “we are in an absurd situation” and 
like their colleague from the Information and Media section, lamented EU training 
“compared to the investment of the UK or the US”.302 Notably, they added that “I’m not 
sure if it would solve our problems… but it’ll help us know where we are”.303  
Their language suggests that although they do not consider language training a panacea 
for EU-China relations, they consider it an important (missing) asset for aiding exchanges. 
The interviewee also alludes to the extent of the EU’s lack of understanding of China - 
they are unsure about status/quality of bilateral relations - and infers that these skills 
would help resolve this (it’ll help us know where we are”).  
Supporting these inferences, the interviewee added that “you can do a lot with 
interpreters and local staff… [but] I miss the immediacy” and noted that “I’d like to read 
Xi’s speeches [in Mandarin]”, because the Chinese meanings of words differ from the 
“meanings we think they have”.304 Reflecting upon their comments, the interviewee 
stated, “I think we can do better”.305 The language again points to a capacity deficit on 
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the EU side which is impinging upon EU-China relations, with the EU side potentially 
misunderstanding China’s interpretation of words/concepts/ideas. This once again 
reinforces the idea that discourses 3 and 4 could be partly informed by misperceived 
obstruction by China. 
Interestingly, a number of officials lacking linguistic skills tended to downplay their value 
on the basis that interpreters were present at dialogues. As one official from the 
delegation’s Political, Press and Information Section noted: 
It is not 100% necessary and anyway in official meetings you go with the 
interpreter …you don’t really have the possibility to mingle with [interlocutors], in 
the social sense.306  
However, officials who did have these skills tended to challenge this view, emphasising 
their crucial role during dialogues in mitigating misunderstandings. As an official from the 
Trade Section at the delegation stated:  
I’m very often stricken by… after meeting with the Chinese, the interpretation of 
my colleagues, what they have said is very different from my interpretation and I 
think that’s because of the knowledge and that’s because also of even the 
interpretation because you see, I see quite often, the English translation of 
Chinese concepts.307 
Here, the interviewee emphasises the utility of cultural and linguistic language, suggesting 
that in the absence of such knowledge, their colleagues are frequently (i.e. “very often”) 
coming out of dialogues with incorrect understandings of China’s positions/perspectives. 
In this sense, their colleagues are cast as being ill-equipped to effectively engage with 
China, as even with Mandarin-English interpretation, meaning is being lost in translation 
and linguistic and cultural knowledge is necessary to acquire a full understanding.  
Another EEAS diplomat also emphasised how linguistic skills tangibly enhanced dialogues 
and the pursuit of favourable outcomes by the EU side. They stated that “I think it does 
make a difference when you speak their language”, describing how, coupled with cultural 
knowledge, it “gets you respect” and builds informal guanxi relationships.308 They added 
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that with this guanxi established, your counterparts will subtlety “let you know what’s 
really the score” if the Chinese side is playing hard ball and discreetly whisper to you 
“look this is off the record, I’m speaking to you personally”.309 They added that “you’re 
never going to get there without the language” and that, with regard to the EU not 
providing linguistic training for officials “I think they’ve got it wrong”.310 
Mirroring conclusions surrounding the utility of cultural knowledge, if language skills are 
generally fulfilling the role of reducing misunderstandings and aiding compromise in 
dialogues, it can be inferred that such skills would be of particular utility to the discussion 
of controversial EU values. Misinterpretation in these sensitive discussions could mean 
the difference between finding common ground and dialogue collapse.  
Additionally, it appears that linguistic skills contribute to cultural knowledge in boosting 
confidence and assertiveness on the EU side, creating a capacity to judge the likely impact 
of actions. One Beijing-based DG ENV official involved with a cooperation programme, 
described how their skills and the relationships they engendered, allowed them to pursue 
potentially controversial environmental rights without causing controversy. They noted 
that:   
Because I sort of know how to walk the walk and talk the talk. I think I can get 
away with a lot more ...I get generally a lot more trust, therefore I can get more 
done.311 
Overall, it appears that a deficit in linguistic knowledge, as well as cultural knowledge, can 
be linked with the China’s role discourses impeding value mainstreaming. It may be 
informing misperceived obstruction by China or catalysing such conduct by interlocutors 
through EU faux pas (discourses 3 and 4). Similarly, misunderstandings may be 
contributing to a lack of reflexivity on the EU side and the didactic approaches to value 
mainstreaming it informs (discourse 5). An additional key example reinforcing the 
importance of linguistic skills to EU-China dialogues is presented in Table 8.3.
                                                          
309 ibid. 
310 ibid.  
311 Phone Interview with an official from the European Commission based in Beijing on 23.06.2015 at 











Quoted example  Analysis 
DG Environment 
(ENV) [BEI] 
It makes a huge difference 
[being able to speak 
Mandarin]. It makes a huge 
difference …for example my 
Chinese [counterpart] …I 
couldn’t communicate with 
him the way I do …if I didn’t 
speak Chinese and I talk with 
him all the time and we can 
have one-on-ones …it’s not 
just speaking mandarin, it’s 
also understanding how 
these people think and how 
to deal with them …it’s a 
whole cultural thing right?  
 
               
• Emphasises the value of linguistic skills in EU-China relations. 
• Displays how linguistic skills complement and empower cultural knowledge (“it’s a whole 
cultural thing right”). 






8.3.3 Limited cultural and linguistic knowledge: A question of resources?  
 
Importantly, interviewees also provided insights into why the cultural and linguistic 
knowledge on the EU side was so limited – a question of resources. As one Commission 
official noted “cultural-linguistic knowledge amongst diplomats [is] limited at the 
delegation …partly because we lack resources”.312 Similarly, it emerged that in Brussels, 
(voluntary) language training options had been rescinded over time, described by a DG 
ENV official as being “a matter of cost …up to a few years ago, we could learn any 
language”.313 
In this sense, for the EU to equip its officials, particularly those based in Beijing, with 
similar capacity to those from larger EU member states like the UK, it would necessitate a 
large investment. This appears to be problematic for several key reasons. Most explicitly, 
the EU’s budget is under perpetual pressure by the member states which fund and 
approve it. Foreign policy is primarily a member state competence and at the EU-level, it 
is considered by them to be a question of value-added as opposed to a delegation of 
authority (the sectors of trade, climate change and development reflect notable 
exceptions). As a result, EU delegations also have vastly reduced staff versus those of 
larger member states’ embassies: the EU delegation to China has 140 staff,314 whereas 
the UK has one embassy and four consulates, employing thousands across China (FCO, 
2018).315  
Additionally, there appears to be an enduring assumption that diplomats seconded to the 
EEAS from member states, who do have these skills, can plug this capacity gap at the EU 
level, particularly in the delegations. As one official noted, “our Mandarin expertise, 
mostly we draw from the national foreign policy services”.316 Notably, EU officials often 
emphasised the capacity of their seconded colleagues to achieve more in EU-China 
relations, which reaffirms the value of these skills, which most EU officials lack.317 While it 
is important recognise that these individuals, as well as the minority of EU officials with 
greater knowledge, will to some extent pass on their experience, this is arguably sub-
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optimal. Examples in this chapter suggest that such background dynamics are not tangibly 
improving understanding of China amongst EU officials.  
The last two factors that make enhancing cultural-linguistic training problematic are more 
systemic. Firstly, the EU’s external action is complicated by the fact that the European 
Commission, which is responsible for most dialogues, is not a foreign service - unlike the 
EEAS – which are the institutions allocated such training for other international actors.318 
Secondly, EU institutional career structures cultivate generalists that typically rotate 
between countries/regions in their portfolios every four years as opposed to the country-
specific specialists trained by member states like the UK.319 In the case of the latter, the 
expectation is that the state is making an investment in officials, which will pay-off 
through multiple postings in that country throughout their career.320 It is worth 
highlighting that the Chinese side also differs from the EU in training specialists in its 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), emphasising the relative weakness of the EU vis-à-vis 
international actors of comparable calibre, in this respect.321  
For the EU, making such a high investment in individuals who will not necessarily use 
these skills beyond their post is comparably problematic. As one EEAS diplomat stated, 
“we don’t stay in our posts long enough, to make the investment in foreign languages”.322 
Language training is also partially complicated by EU officials already being multilingual as 
a prerequisite for employment,323 unlike their colleagues from member states. In this 
sense, they are already expected to have learned multiple languages to secure posts and 
may be resistant to institutional pressure to learn more. This is not to mention a 
perception amongst some EU officials that the career-flexibility offered by their generalist 
skill-set is attractive (i.e. not restricting them to one country).324  
Nevertheless, several interviewees emphasised the need for reforming the existing 
system. The diplomat quoted above added that it was time to “stop the merry-go-round” 
(four-year rotations) on specific issues, particularly to foster “instilment, memory, 
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continuity” in priority areas with China such as human rights, security and multilateralism 
(encompassing human rights) creating “real experts”.325 This once more reinforces the 
linkage between cultural-linguistic capacity and effective value mainstreaming. 
Other interviewees maintained that even a very modest compulsory training course, 
particularly in Chinese culture and institutional systems would make a large difference. As 
one official from the Trade Section at the EU delegation noted: 
We lack expertise and I do think that anyone coming should receive a good …week 
long training or two weeks training …but I mean language, ok, I understand …it’s a 
lot of money and the Americans or the Brits, they put a lot of money into that and 
I think, some people say that it’s too much money and that it’s wasted in a way. I 
can disagree, but I understand it’s a lot of money. But… a simple two-week 
training, full day, ten full days, only on China, China’s system, how it works, what it 
is, what it means, how to understand about the Chinese you know this is, I’m 
talking about, what? 80 hours? 80 full hours of training on China before you come 
here and work with the Chinese. That’s the minimum.326 
The interviewee reaffirms the Chinese knowledge deficit on the EU side, suggesting that 
“we lack expertise” at the delegation and that “anyone” posted at the delegation should 
receive training, alluding to the absence of such skills. The extent of this deficit is 
emphasised by them describing how their colleagues need to be taught basic knowledge 
about China (i.e. “how it works, what it is, what it means”) and that this capacity reflects 
the “minimum”, that EU officials currently lack. It is also reinforced by the interviewee 
prescribing such a modest training program for officials which addresses elementary 
information about Chinese systems and culture (“a simple two-week training …I’m talking 
about, what, 80 hours?”). While the example is focused solely on the capacity-gap at the 
EU delegation to China, it can be inferred that if these skills are so essential for engaging 
with China on the ground, then they are crucial also for Brussels-based officials.  
Supporting these conclusions, an EEAS diplomat described how a month-long course 
“would be extremely useful to them [officials], [and] stop them making unmentionable 
mistakes”.327 The notion of “unmentionable mistakes”, infers that cultural faux pas are 
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tangibly impacting dialogues with China. Like their Commission colleague above, the 
interviewee also emphasised basic cultural knowledge as a bare-minimum. They noted 
how “I wouldn’t bother with the language” but “at least pronounce the names right …few 
things upset the Chinese more than foreigners pronouncing their names wrong”.328 
Similarly they stated that “it’s useful to understand the government system, guanxi … the 
pressures of your counterparts” and their “educational background”.329 Their language 
once more reaffirms just how severe the knowledge gap is amongst many on the EU side .   
 
8.4 Caveats – qualifying the impact of improved Chinese cultural and linguistic 
knowledge on EU value mainstreaming 
 
The analysis throughout this chapter has suggested that a lack of understanding of China 
amongst EU officials is weakening the EU’s normative power and potentially contributing 
to the discourses justifying an avoidance of systematic value mainstreaming. However, it 
is important to stress that the effects of improving these skills on the EU side would likely 
be tempered by several significant caveats.  
Firstly, as mentioned earlier in the chapter and reflected in EU and Chinese policy 
documents, the lack of understanding is mutual in nature, applying to both sides. China 
should also be enhancing the European knowledge of their officials to counter 
Sinocentrism, adjusting their practices to avoid misunderstandings with the EU. In a 
cultural context, this includes being more direct and clearer about their positions – for 
example saying yes and no definitively – as well as having greater understanding and 
patience with the alternative social and diplomatic norms practiced by EU officials. 
Concerning language, while English proficiency is more common amongst Chinese officials 
than vice-versa, particularly amongst younger officials and extending beyond the MoFA 
specialists,330 greater efforts could be made to further enhance this capacity on the 
Chinese side.  
More profoundly, irrespective of improvements in cultural and linguistic skills on either 
side, Chinese officials’ working practices will still reflect a serious impediment to value 
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mainstreaming. On a broad level, building meaningful relationships is limited by a 
tendency amongst Chinese interlocutors to avoid social contact with EU officials - classed 
as foreigners - out with the official setting. As an official from the Science and Technology 
Section at the EU delegation stated: 
It doesn’t matter… how good your Chinese is, if you are not Chinese you cannot 
get this sort of [relationship] …I find the Chinese …maybe it is their culture, [or] 
the fact that they were very closed for a long time, they are not used to working 
with foreigners.331 
Mirroring this, many officials described how their counterparts would not socialise with 
them beyond dialogues (even in the context of working lunches etc.), an attribute which 
is likely impeding the formation of guanxi. Additionally, as described in Chapter 7.3 in the 
context of discourse 4, Chinese working practices within dialogues pose an even greater 
challenge for EU officials. In particular, the tendency of Chinese interlocutors to strictly 
stick to pre-agreed agendas, leaves little room for cultural or linguistic skills to improve 
discussion of values, unless such issues are explicitly featured in the agenda (which is rare, 
bar the human rights dialogue). As a Commission official from the Economic and Finance 
section at the delegation noted: 
There is a very good chemistry between the Vice-Premier …and our Vice-
President, who are the main counterparts in our High-Level Economic Dialogue 
[HED] …but [the Chinese Vice-Premier] comes in and he has …his scripted speech 
and I think there is really nothing new …so there is no dynamic in this discussion, 
there is very little which comes out, except really negotiations and vision of 
course, but when you don’t have negotiations you just talk.332 
The interviewee suggests that irrespective of high-quality relations between officials, the 
dialogues remain very static, reflecting an environment which deters mainstreaming 
amongst officials (captured by discourse 4). Their language infers that the HED has little 
room for anything bar negotiations on economic issues of interest to both sides (“there is 
very little which comes out, except really negotiations and vision”).  
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Beyond this, it is also crucial to highlight that the impasse over PPD described in Section 
8.2, is also strongly, perhaps even predominantly rooted in China’s institutional practices 
(i.e. highly centralised top-down governance), as opposed to an incapacity on the EU side 
to build mutual understanding. 
The above quote also importantly hints at another crucial aspect impacting value 
mainstreaming, which is unaffected by the cultural-linguistic knowledge of either side – 
the personalities in the room. The relationship between the Chinese Vice-Premier and EU 
Vice-President co-chairing the HED may be one purely based on personal rapport, as 
opposed to cultural or linguistic knowledge. In this sense, the outcome of dialogues is also 
informed by the social skills of the officials on each side and the resulting relationship.  
Supporting this, an official from DG ENV outlined how it was “difficult to find common 
ground for discussions” in the ministerial-level Environmental Policy Dialogue “which is a 
pity”, due to a lack of rapport between the EU Commissioner and the Chinese minister co-
chairing the exchanges.333 They described how the “two personalities don’t get on”, 
partly due to one individual being from a technical background the other being a 
politician.334 Similarly, the Commission official from the Economic and Finance Section 
quoted above described how the rigid working practices of the Chinese side were 
intensified when there was a poor rapport between interlocutors (unlike the HED), noting 
that: 
I’ve seen this when the, when the chemistry is not working well, then this thing is 
even worse, there is nothing, there is really only reading, reading, reading and 
then bye-bye.335  
Additionally, the author has observed that EU officials working with EU-China human 
rights promotion tend to be very passionate about the value. This arguably intensifies a 
lack of reflexivity on the EU side, contributing to them being much more assertive with 
China and thus partial towards the didactic mainstreaming approaches associated with 
discourse 5. Officials with less professional and emotional investment in human rights 
may be inherently more restrained, reflexive and potentially more effective in their 
approach. Somewhat counter-intuitively, it seems that assigning these portfolios to 
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officials which strongly believe in human rights may be detrimental to improving the EU’s 
human rights agenda with China. In all of the examples above regarding the role of 
personality, it is unclear whether greater cultural-linguistic knowledge on each side would 
improve the quality of exchanges. 
Beyond the role of the Chinese side and personalities in the room, it is important to 
qualify the impact of enhanced cultural-linguistic knowledge to value mainstreaming, 
through focusing on the track-record of large member states. While, as noted in Chapter 
3.7, there is a tendency amongst member states to compartmentalise value-related 
issues to the EU level, the big three (UK, France and Germany), which do provide their 
diplomats with cultural-linguistic skills, also actively promote EU values, particularly via 
human rights dialogues. However, these states have not made major breakthroughs to 




This chapter has displayed how a lack of understanding of China amongst EU officials may 
be contributing to the weakness of the EU’s normative power and the discourses 
informing it. In this sense, not only is systematic value mainstreaming not taking place in 
line with EU’s official discourse found documents and the ideal-type of NPE, but the EU 
side has been unable to adjust its strategy for value promotion to the China context. 
The analysis throughout this chapter suggested that this fundamental lack of 
understanding of China, reinforced by EU and Chinese policy documents, is rooted in 
limited Chinese cultural and linguistic knowledge on the EU side. While this knowledge-
gap and the Eurocentrism it informs, seemingly afflicts EU-China relations in a holistic 
sense, it appears to be particularly pertinent to value mainstreaming, where the subject 
matter is sensitive and misunderstandings more likely and higher impact.  
This was reflected in the accounts of officials which did have these skills due to personal 
experience/initiative. They demonstrated greater reflexivity and were able to both avoid 
misunderstandings and be more assertive in promoting EU objectives with their 
counterparts. In effect, they could read their counterparts and pitch discussion points in a 




The impact of these skills on the EU’s normative power with China was also reflected in 
an apparent connection between a lack of cultural-linguistic knowledge amongst officials 
and the discourses justifying an avoidance of systematic mainstreaming, particularly 
discourses 3-5. The analysis inferred that misperceived Chinese intransigence as well as 
EU cultural faux pas, fostering obstructive behaviour by the Chinese side, may be 
contributing to discourse 3. Similarly, a lack of knowledge about China’s institutional 
systems may be exaggerating the genuine opacity of China’s structures, intensifying the 
deterrence effect to value mainstreaming of discourse 4. Lastly, the lack of reflexivity and 
counterproductive value mainstreaming approaches associated with discourse 5 (China is 
not listening to the EU and it should be) may be also be informed by a lack of knowledge 
about China’s alternative interpretations of values and historical/cultural basis of this.  
This connection to discourses 3-5 suggested that insufficient knowledge of Chinese 
culture and language was informing EU officials engaging with China on a Eurocentric 
basis, which was negative to EU-China dialogues, particularly in the context of finding 
common ground on controversial values. However, the chapter also importantly qualified 
this through emphasising that the lack of understanding was mutual in nature, with 
comparably problematic Sinocentrism on the Chinese side. In the absence of sufficient 
knowledge and understanding, ethnocentrism was argued to represent the default 
position for each side. 
While not identifiable in the examples throughout this chapter, a speculative link could 
also be made between the lack of understanding and the two organisational discourses. A 
lack of confidence, based on limited cultural-linguistic knowledge, about how to pitch 
value mainstreaming with China, may be contributing to a perception that 1) values 
implicitly feature in EU-China dialogues and 2) values are not relevant to officials’ specific 
sectors.  
Reflecting these arguments, a lack of understanding on the EU side appears to represent 
an additional and perhaps crucial causal factor in the practical implementation of the EU’s 
normative power with China, contributing to the discourses identified throughout this 
thesis. However, as section 8.4 highlighted, resolving this issue is problematic, as even if 
the EU enhances the skills of its officials, the lack of understanding is also underpinned by 
factors out with its control. Being mutual in nature, its remediation also necessitates 




default Sinocentrism, as well as adjustments to Chinese working practices. Moreover, the 
important role of the personalities of officials on each side and the relationships between 









Chapters 6-8 suggest that EU officials are not systematically mainstreaming values into 
EU-China dialogues, in line with the official discourse found in documents and the ideal-
type of NPE. This appears to be legitimised by five key discourses and a potentially 
interrelated lack of understanding of China. However, this thesis also identified value 
mainstreaming activities which are taking place in EU-China dialogues. These are crucial 
to acknowledge and assess, significantly highlighting how values do underpin EU-China 
dialogues and thus the existence of the EU’s normative power with China.   
In this context, Section 9.2 introduces the concept of partial mainstreaming, which 
captures how EU values are sporadically featuring in dialogues by virtue of them being 
pre-built into each sector of cooperation with China. The analysis suggests that these 
partial efforts are limited in scope versus systematic actions to fully realise the ideal-type 
of NPE. Moreover, they appear to be enabled/tolerated by diplomats from the European 
External Action Service (EEAS).  
Section 9.3 describes the other notable mainstreaming activity taking place: the ad-hoc 
efforts by EEAS diplomats to coordinate value mainstreaming amongst their Commission 
officials. Like partial mainstreaming, these activities appear to be limited, in comparison 
to systematic actions to realise value mainstreaming, with such dimensions not 
necessarily included in these ad-hoc interinstitutional communications or discussed in an 
explicit manner.  
However, Section 9.4 provides deeper insight into these dynamics. It emerges that the 
EEAS’s logistical capacity and most pertinently, interinstitutional tensions with the 
Commission, are limiting its potential to coordinate systematic value mainstreaming. This 
also provides an alternative explanation for EEAS’s apparent enabling or active 





9.2. Partial mainstreaming 
 
Concerning partial mainstreaming, which captures how EU values are being sporadically 
tabled during dialogues despite a lack of systematic practices, some additional 
clarifications are required. Firstly, this phenomenon appears to derive from EU values 
already being to some extent pre-built into many policy sectors of EU-China dialogues. 
This can be observed in the implicit or explicit references to EU values in these sectors’ 
guiding documents. For example, the Commission’s Trade for all (2015) strategy describes 
how:  
The EU’s trade and investment policy must respond to consumers’ concerns by 
reinforcing corporate social responsibility initiatives and due diligence across the 
production chain with a focus on the respect of human rights and the social – 
including labour rights – and environmental aspects of value chains”. (EU 
Commission, 2015iii:20) 
The quote displays how discussion of corporate social responsibility, including labour and 
environmental standards takes place in trade dialogues with third countries. These areas 
are underpinned by human rights and sustainable development, meaning that if they are 
discussed by officials, value mainstreaming is indirectly taking place, irrespective of 
whether they have consciously made these connections when operationalising the 
dialogue. As labour and environmental standards have technical as well as normative 
dimensions, these issues are particularly prone to being partially mainstreamed, without 
any consideration of their value implications.  
Documents guiding People-to-People Dialogues, also reflect this pre-built role of EU 
values. The follow-up actions found in the High-level People-to-People Dialogue second 
round (2014) document describes how: 
The two parties will regularly discuss the latest developments on specific aspects 
of gender equality including economic empowerment for women, women’s 
political participation, violence against women and work life balance. (EU 
Commission, 2014iv:4)  
In this case, the discussion of women’s rights in these dialogues reflects a facet of human 




mainstreaming human rights, even if they are not framing it as such. Additional key 
examples from documents underpinning other sectors of EU-China relations can be seen 

















Human rights (Freedom of expression): 
 
1. “The development of IoT [internet of things] may also raise privacy concerns since smart objects will collect 
more and new kinds of data, including personal data, and exchange data automatically, which may lead to a 
perception of loss of control by citizens. IoT may further provoke ethical questions pertaining in particular to 
individuals’ autonomy, accountability for objects behaviour, or the precautionary principle.” (EU Commission, 
2016v:9) 
 
N/A  Belt and Road Forum – 
EU common messages 
(2017) 
 
(Informs the EU-China 
Connectivity Platform) 
Human rights, rule of law 
and sustainable development: 
 
2. “We have also learned a lot about how to assess the impact of infrastructure projects on the environment 
and on the local communities who will be most directly affected. It is our responsibility to put this into 
practice for future projects and not repeat the mistakes of the past. Fulfilling the commitments of the Paris 
Agreement provides Asia and Europe with countless opportunities to invent new and better ways to produce, 
consume, invest and trade, in full synergy with the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development. Sustainability 
assessment must include all aspects: economic viability, fiscal sustainability, climate and environment-
friendly and social sustainability.” (EU, 2017) 
 
3. A level-playing field for trade and investment based on full adherence to market rules and international 
norms is a critical condition if we want to maintain the political momentum for better connectivity in Asia 











4. Against the background of multiple challenges related to addressing climate change, environmental 
degradation and energy security and changing market conditions, China and the European Union have a 
mutual interest and role to promote low-carbon development, protect the environment, address climate 





It also is important to differentiate partial mainstreaming from the systematic value 
mainstreaming promoted by the EU’s official discourse found in documents, which aligns 
with the ideal-type of NPE and broader definitions of mainstreaming in academia and 
policymaking circles (See Chapter 6.2.3). The standards encompassed by the official 
discourse would see officials from the Commission and the EEAS systematically 
identifying the normative dimensions of their dialogues and ensuring that they feature in 
all exchanges. However, in practice, we find that EU values are entering dialogues 
sporadically and not featuring in every exchange.  
Moreover, officials appear to be often unaware of the presence of these value 
dimensions in dialogues, due to the absence of systematic attempts to operationalise 
them. Partial mainstreaming thus inherently leads to pertinent value dimensions being 
left unaddressed. Reflecting these features, partial mainstreaming prevents officials from 
fully exploiting the normative aspects of their dialogues directly or indirectly with China. 
The scope of these partial efforts is therefore dramatically limited versus systematic value 
mainstreaming, which can fully realise the EU’s normative power in EU-China dialogues. 
Beyond this, it is also crucial to make the distinction between partial mainstreaming and 
the implied ideal end-point of value mainstreaming (described in Chapter 6.2.3), wherein 
systematic activities are so well ingrained that officials plan and raise EU values with third 
countries, without requiring formal systematic mechanisms to do so. Partial 
mainstreaming is distinct from this in capturing how officials are not carrying out 
systematic actions, having had no entrenched experience of doing so over time. In effect, 
the ideal end-point of mainstreaming, requires the existence of institutionalised 
mechanisms, which then melt away and systematic actions become second nature. This 
seems to be unattainable in EU-China dialogues until such systematic practices are 
institutionalised. 
Additionally, it is worth highlighting that EU values being pre-built into EU-China dialogues 
may not only be informing partial mainstreaming, but the prevalence of discourse 1 
amongst officials. The role of values in guiding sectoral policy 
documents/communications may be contributing to a perception amongst officials that 
EU values passively feature in their activities and thus no further actions are required to 




Examples of partial mainstreaming could be identified across all three pillars of EU-China 
dialogues and present in the accounts of both Brussels and Beijing-based officials working 
for the EEAS and the European Commission. Aligning with conclusions in Chapters 6-7, 
that the EEAS was enabling or actively reproducing the discourses justifying a lack of 
systematic value mainstreaming, the EEAS appeared to tolerate and thus enable partial 
mainstreaming in Commission-led dialogues.  
 
Pillars 2 & 3: Trade dialogues 
Some of the strongest examples of partial mainstreaming were identifiable in EU-China 
trade dialogues where human rights, rule of law and sustainable development appeared 
to feature indirectly in dialogues despite a lack of systematic efforts. Regarding rule of 
law, which is considered to be an enabler of human rights by the EU, one DG Trade 
(TRADE) official noted that, “we are quite focused on [rule of law]” but “we don’t frame it 
internally as rule of law”.336  
The interviewee’s language infers that rule of law is appearing in trade dialogues, but this 
is not a product of systematic activities. This is reflected in the suggestion that rule of law 
is often not being discussed by name behind the scenes directly (“we don’t frame it 
internally as rule of law”). Instead, it can be inferred that DG TRADE officials are largely 
focusing on the extent to which China is adhering to WTO and free market principles, 
issues which, while linked to the economic dimensions of rule of law, are not being 
internally recognised as value aspects of EU-China trade dialogues and systematically 
mainstreamed accordingly.  
This emphasises the limited capacity of partial mainstreaming to realise the EU’s 
normative power, versus systematic actions. Connections between the sector-specific 
substance and rule of law are not being fully exploited with China to further discuss the 
value. Notably, the social dimension of rule of law, most directly connected to human 
rights, appears to be being neglected altogether in the context of these partial efforts.  
The interviewee also appears to recognise and accept the existence of partial 
mainstreaming, effectively explaining to the author that the lack of systematic activities 
to realise EU values is normal/natural. This seems to support the speculated connection 
                                                          




between partial mainstreaming and discourse 1, with the interviewee seemingly satisfied 
that rule of law is being operationalised without any explicit efforts to realise it. 
Reinforcing these inferences, the interviewee elaborated that: 
We certainly do mention rule of law…but quite often we are dealing with so many 
issues [like] overcapacity, market economy status…. the EU wants to discuss a lot 
of laws.337 
Their language reaffirms, quite decisively, that rule of law related issues are being 
included in their dialogues. Interestingly, they also infer that rule of law may be being 
occasionally raised explicitly - by name - with the Chinese side. However, because there 
does not appear to be any efforts to systematically mainstream the value into these 
dialogues, explicit discussion of it seems to be seldom taking place. This is reflected in the 
interviewee suggesting that rule of law is somewhat buried by sector-specific priorities 
(“quite often we are dealing with so many issues”). Moreover, making connections with 
the first example, the language alludes to a situation where rule of law is only being 
explicitly mentioned due to its perceived status as an enabler of EU economic standards, 
as opposed to a multidimensional EU value to be promoted with the Chinese side, which 
has connections to human rights. 
Significantly, the sector-specific issues cast as dominating the agenda at the expense of 
rule of law (“overcapacity, market economy status”), also support the existence of partial 
mainstreaming. These areas have profound rule of law dimensions, reinforcing the notion 
that the value is sporadically bleeding into exchanges in an indirect fashion, irrespective 
of a lack of systematic mainstreaming activities or even recognition of such by officials. 
This is supported by the interviewee inferring that rule of law is effectively encompassed 
by the EU asserting its economic standards with China (“the EU wants to discuss a lot of 
laws”).  
It is also worth highlighting that partial mainstreaming of rule of law in EU-China trade 
dialogues appears to be also partly informed by an institutionalised perception that the 
value’s economic dimension should be disentangled from its more social/human 
dimensions. As one Beijing-based DG TRADE official noted “rule of law is not just a value 
question… it is a business question”.338 Similarly, an EEAS diplomat from the delegation 
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described how their colleagues from the Trade section dealt with “rule of law from a 
material interests angle” and that the value dimension probably “did not even cross their 
minds” and was “not their job”. This a) alludes to how the EEAS tolerates partial 
mainstreaming and b) reaffirms the institution’s role in enabling the discourses justifying 
a lack of systematic value mainstreaming. Discourse 2 is also invoked in the interviewee’s 
suggestion that value mainstreaming is not the job of their DG TRADE colleagues.339  
Additional examples of partial mainstreaming in trade dialogues were also identifiable in 
the context of sustainable development and human rights. Regarding sustainable 
development, a Beijing-based DG TRADE official described how it represented the sole EU 
value applicable to their sector (displaying discourse 2) and reflected “a clear part of the 
[comprehensive] investment agreement [CIA]”340 with China. This example is interesting, 
as the interviewee recognises the role of the value in exchanges, but as opposed to it 
being systematically designed into all trade dialogues, it is cast as being isolated to the 
CIA. Crucially, even in this context, the implication is that the only reason it is being 
promoted is because it has been pre-designed into the EU’s rulebook for free trade 
agreements (FTAs). 
Notably, the sustainable development chapter of the CIA, like all contemporary EU FTAs, 
also includes human rights dimensions (encompassed by the social dimension of 
sustainable development), displaying how human rights is also being partially 
mainstreamed via the CIA. This is reinforced by the interviewee not appearing to identify 
this value dimension of the CIA with the Chinese side, suggesting it is being indirectly 
mainstreamed during negotiations.  
Additionally, it emerged that China’s 2015 Cyber Security Law had been raised in trade 
dialogues, with concerns raised about the privacy of employees working for European 
businesses in China. However, despite this being connected to individual civil and political 
rights, EU officials did not appear to be framing this as a question of mainstreaming 
human rights. This was reflected in one interviewee’s response to a question about 
whether the EU had threatened economic repercussions for this Chinese law, based on 
human rights concerns. They noted that “I’m not sure we do the linkage in that way”.341 
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While this may allude to the EU not applying economic conditionality to China on the 
issue, it also hints at how DG TRADE officials are not making the connections between 
their concerns and their human rights dimensions. As result, the value appears to be 
being partially mainstreamed with China.  
 
Pillars 2 & 3: Employment and Social dialogues 
Other key examples of partial mainstreaming could be identified in the context of 
employment and social affairs dialogues, where much of the sector-specific substance 
passively connects to human rights. An official from DG Employment, Social Affairs and 
Inclusion (EMPL) described how they addressed rights “that don’t threaten the regime” 
and that “civil and political rights are not discussed” in dialogues with China.342 However, 
they also described how one of their recent dialogues had focused on the theme of 
employment regulations which involved discussion of how “to improve free speech in the 
workplace”.343 They added that this was not “not the same sensitivity as individual civil 
and political rights”.344  
In these quotes, the interviewee first categorically describes how individual civil and 
political rights are not addressed in their dialogues, whereas non-controversial socio-
economic rights do feature in their dialogues. Nevertheless, as displayed in an example 
related to this sector in Table 6.2 (Chapter 6), this role of socio-economic rights is not 
systematic. Officials consider the value to be passively promoted through employment 
and social affairs dialogues, with human rights, “not really explicitly” being included.345 
In this sense, as well as highlighting how discourse 1 is legitimising a lack of systematic 
value mainstreaming, the examples highlight how socio-economic rights are being 
sporadically tabled in these dialogues, nonetheless. 
More pertinently, the above example also alludes to how individual civil and political 
rights are bleeding into these dialogues without any systematic design or even awareness 
by the interviewee. Free speech, contrary to the interviewee’s claim, reflects an individual 
civil and political right, in any context. Additionally, the example suggests that the 
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interviewee has an aversion towards raising these more controversial dimensions of 
human rights for fear of upsetting the Chinese side. This is reflected in the notion that 
these areas are “sensitive” and “threaten the regime” and reinforces how discourse 3 is 
being used to justify an avoidance of systematic value mainstreaming with China.  
An EEAS diplomat reaffirmed that partial mainstreaming of high-sensitivity human rights 
was taking place in employment and social affairs dialogues. They noted that they 
attended one of the dialogues and “couldn’t believe” that their Commission colleagues 
were “talking about collective bargaining” and “women’s access to the labour market”,346 
issues which were difficult to broach in the human rights dialogue. This example also 
implicitly highlights how the EEAS tolerates partial mainstreaming by their colleagues, 
failing to intervene to improve awareness and instil systematic mainstreaming practices - 
i.e. they “couldn’t believe” these controversial dimensions of the sector were being 
raised, because they were under the impression that this was not taking place.  
Partial mainstreaming of sustainable development was also identified in these dialogues. 
A DG EMPL official described how dialogues with the Chinese side were under the 
conceptual auspices of a “green economy” and “green jobs”, but they did not frame these 
elements of their dialogues as an exercise in value mainstreaming. Encapsulating this, 
they recognised that it was “very much [a] value… our goal [of] climate change” while 
being “also very practical”.347  
The language in these quotes portrays a situation where sustainable development is 
existing passively behind very technical discussions with the Chinese side, as opposed to 
being considered a normative dimension which is systematically mainstreamed into 
dialogues. An additional key example from Pillar 2 is presented in Table 9.2, while 
Appendix v provides examples of partial mainstreaming from the author’s first-hand 
experience of an EU-China employment and social affairs dialogue.
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Delegation to China 
[BEI] 
1. The interviewee stated that “these 
things [EU values] don’t really 
enter the work here” and framed 
their commentary on issues like 
data protection as a technical 
business issue, as opposed to a 
question of promoting EU values, 
noting that Chinese “laws have 
clauses… that target our guys”.348 
 
• Suggests that mainstreaming of the Article 21/NPE values does not take place in their 
dialogues (they “don’t really enter the work here”). 
• However, alludes to data protection being frequently raised with the Chinese side. This issue 
has strong connections to individual civil and political rights. 
• Nevertheless, the interviewee suggests that it is being approached purely in the context of 
concern for European businesses “laws have clauses… that target our guys”. 
• In line with partial mainstreaming, the example suggests: 
a) Human rights related issues are being sporadically tabled in communications 
technologies dialogues. 
b) The interviewee does not appear to be explicitly aware of these connections and is 




                                                          




Role of the EEAS in enabling partial mainstreaming  
The analysis of EEAS diplomats’ accounts appeared to confirm that they recognised and 
thus enabled partial mainstreaming amongst their Commission colleagues. For example, 
in reference to their colleagues managing the Pillar 2 communication technologies 
dialogues and implementing the Pillar 1 cyber security dialogue, one EEAS diplomat 
stated that “if they say they don’t work on human rights, they are [working on it, in their 
dialogue] …you don’t have to sit down and discuss [it with them]” to ensure that they 
mainstream the value.349 They described one particular example where their colleagues 
had unilaterally “identified a problem” with China’s 2015 Cyber Security Law and its 
apparent enabling of limitless government access to all China-based data/information.  
The interviewee alludes to a recognition that their colleagues in this sector are potentially 
unaware that they are mainstreaming human rights with China in their dialogues, despite 
these issues entering into exchanges (“if they say they don’t work on human rights, they 
are”). However, they also suggest that they are not taking any further action to raise 
awareness amongst their Commission colleagues about the human rights dimensions of 
this sector, nor promote systematic value mainstreaming. Instead, they seem to be 
satisfied that the value is being raised in this sporadic, non-systematic fashion (“you don’t 
have to sit down and discuss [it with them]”). In this sense, there is a toleration of partial 
mainstreaming and through inaction, complicity in these practices at odds with the 
official discourse found in documents and the ideal-type of NPE.  
Interestingly, the interviewee also appears to express an if it’s not broken, don’t fix it 
mentality. This is arguably rooted in an awareness that there is an aversion to value 
mainstreaming amongst their Commission colleagues and perhaps even some recognition 
of the discourses being used to justify this. In this sense, there appears to be a reluctance 
by EEAS diplomats to highlight the connections between sectoral substance and EU 
values, lest they risk EU values not being raised at all by their Commission colleagues. For 
example, on the basis that they consider value mainstreaming inapplicable to their 
dialogue (discourse 2) or expect such activities to antagonise their counterparts 
(discourse 3).  
                                                          




As the above example extends to the Pillar 1 cyber security dialogue, as well as the pillar 2 
dialogues associated with this sector, it reflects evidence that partial mainstreaming may 
extend into EU-China political dialogues, many of which are wholly operationalised by the 
EEAS. Supporting the above inferences, another EEAS diplomat described how:   
Even at the technical level …they’re (Commission officials) doing more of that, 
than they actually realise themselves, simply because …where they’re coming 
from is our, is the European standards laws of regulations and that’s embedded in 
it, so even if they don’t realise it, there’s a lot more in there than, and they 
[realise], but if they don’t realise it, that’s where we come in and give that ….I 
know that DG’s often complain that, you know what value added, does the EEAS 
bring?350 
The interviewee explicitly confirms the existence of partial mainstreaming amongst their 
Commission colleagues, who are cast as doing more value mainstreaming “than they 
actually realise themselves”, due to EU values being “embedded” in European standards, 
laws and regulations. Unlike the previous example, while the interviewee appears to 
recognise partial mainstreaming and infer that such activities are natural, taking place 
regularly (Commission officials are “doing it”), they suggest that the EEAS can and does 
intervene to raise awareness (“if they don’t realise it, that’s where we come in”).  
However, such interventions appear to be very ad-hoc and dependent on communication 
between the Commission DGs and the EEAS, the former which is wary of EEAS input (i.e. “I 
know that DG’s often complain that, you know what value added, does the EEAS bring?”). 
The example therefore also highlights how a toleration of partial mainstreaming by the 
EEAS is partly informed by the challenges posed by interinstitutional tensions with the 
Commission, as well as concern over triggering discourses legitimising an avoidance of 
such activities. This interinstitutional dimension is addressed section 9.4. 
Finally, the above example also reinforces conclusions from Chapter 6. The interviewee 
appears to allude to the EEAS sharing and enabling discourse 2, through casting more 
technical exchanges as less likely to feature value mainstreaming (i.e. “even at the 
technical level”). Further key examples of the role of the EEAS in partial mainstreaming 
can be seen in Table 9.3 below.
                                                          










Quoted example Analysis 
ASIAPAC: Asia and 
Pacific Directorate 
[BRU] 
1. “Nowadays it’s very difficult to discuss 
trade and investment if you are not 
going to discuss for example coal 
labour standards or corporate social 
responsibility, so that is also, in a 
away, discussing some human rights 
you know”351 
 
• Suggests that Commission officials from DG TRADE are raising issues connecting to EU 
values, even if they are not aware of it. 
• Infers that the EEAS is aware of partial mainstreaming dynamics but tolerates them. 
• The interviewee makes no suggestion that they intend to raise awareness amongst 




ASIAPAC: Asia and 
Pacific Directorate 
[BRU] 
2. The interviewee described how their 
DG TRADE colleagues were “more 
technically minded, less politically 
minded” and that while they were 
“less engaged with human rights 
issues”, they “indirectly” covered 
issues such as labour regulations and 
public procurement, that are 
interlinked.352 
 
• Infers that partial mainstreaming is taking place in trade dialogues. 
• Captured by the notion that labour regulations and public procurement “indirectly” 
link to human rights which DG Trade officials are not necessarily aware of. 
• Supports the notion that the EEAS is tolerating such activities with interviewee 
suggesting that such oversight by their Commission colleagues is normal/natural. 
• Also displays discourse 2 in suggesting that values are not relevant to trade dialogues 
(i.e. their colleagues are “more technically minded, less politically minded …less 
engaged with human rights issues”). 
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Political, Press and 
Information Section, 
EU delegation to 
China [BEI] 
3. For sure, labour standards …are highly 
important and I [have] …not been in 
the trade section or the 
environmental section [of the EU 
delegation] but I am sure those are 
factored into the negotiations …but I 
bet if you talked to the people who 
are doing it they would say we are not 
helping human rights cases, at best 
they would say, well this is about rule 
of law, but more than likely they 
would say, this is our professional 
competence, it is about labour.353 
 
4. Things like labour standards, 
environmental standards, these are 
things which officials in the EU 
Commission are, it is just part of them, 
they know it, they do it, they 
understand because that’s what 
happens in Europe, and …these are 
not diplomats, these are trade 




• Again, displays how the EEAS recognises and tolerates partial mainstreaming in EU-
China trade dialogues (“I bet if you talked to the people who are doing it they would 
say we are not helping human rights cases…”) 
• Labour standards approached as technical issues, detached from their human rights 
basis (“more than likely they would say, this is our professional competence, it is 
about labour”). 
• Alludes to the EEAS sharing and enabling discourses legitimising a lack of systematic 
value mainstreaming.  
• In this fashion, the interviewee displays discourse 2 in suggesting that value 
mainstreaming is not applicable to EU-China trade dialogues (“these are not 
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9.3 EEAS activities promoting value mainstreaming  
 
Departing from partial mainstreaming, it is also important to recognise the ad-hoc efforts 
to promote value mainstreaming in Commission-led dialogues by EEAS diplomats from 
the institution’s China, Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, Mongolia Unit (a.k.a. the China 
Division). As noted in Chapter 5.4.2, the Unit has primary responsibility for coordinating 
EU-China dialogues. These ad-hoc efforts seemingly reflect a counter-force to the 
challenges to value mainstreaming posed by both the discourses described in Chapters 6-
7 and the lack of understanding of China detailed in Chapter 8. They also superficially 
appear to reflect the EEAS behaving in line with the expectations of the EU’s official 
discourse found in documents i.e. coordinating systematic value mainstreaming in all EU-
China dialogues (See Chapter 6.2.3). 
However, the analysis revealed that these activities were relatively weak and low-impact 
in practice. Their ad-hoc and non-explicit nature appeared not to fulfil the EEAS’s 
expected role according to the official discourse, nor the realisation of such systematic 
practices in EU-China dialogues. As a result, these EEAS ad-hoc coordination efforts 
mirrored partial mainstreaming in being limited in their scope to fully realise the ideal-
type of NPE versus the pursuit of systematic practices. These would involve the 
methodical coordination of value mainstreaming through new or existing internal 
meeting mechanisms, like the China Country Team (CCT) (See Chapter 6.5). 
Additionally, the analysis suggested that EEAS diplomats were instrumentally restraining 
themselves from pursuing more assertive - and by extension systematic - promotion of 
value mainstreaming with their Commission colleagues. This supports prior conclusions in 
this chapter that the EEAS is tolerating sub-par mainstreaming practices. Moreover, akin 
to partial mainstreaming, it appears that this restraint may be partly informed by 
logistical limitations and interinstitutional tensions between the EEAS and the European 
Commission. Both aspects appear to limit the capacity of the EEAS to affect the substance 
of all EU-China dialogues through ad-hoc contacts with the Commission DGs. This 






Mainstreaming Activities  
A key example displaying the EEAS’s mainstreaming efforts could be found in the account 
of a diplomat involved with bilateral human rights promotion. They described the active 
attempts by them and their colleagues to monitor the substance of EU-China dialogues 
and if necessary, intervene:  
We go to every single DG of the European Commission, because there is so much 
engagement and so many dialogues and we talk to them – when is your next 
dialogue? What are you going to do? What’s on the agenda and how are you going 
to… practically implement EU strategy and how you are you going to keep in mind 
that we have problems on this, this, this and that area and that we also have to 
not forget our values and also have to…?355 
The interviewee suggests a comprehensive, yet ad-hoc process (“we go to every single 
DG”), where, with a pre-designed set of questions, EEAS diplomats actively approach the 
Commission China desks incorporated by their thematic portfolio (See chapter 5.4), to 
coordinate the substance of dialogues. In the case of human rights, the portfolio is unique 
in being horizontally applicable to all EU-China dialogues.  
However, EU values are notably cast by the interviewee as only one aspect of these ad-
hoc communications, which encompass numerous issues (i.e. including EU material 
interests or sector specific priorities), as opposed to a priority area which is approached in 
isolation to promote systematic value mainstreaming (“we also have to not forget our 
values”). Crucially, the suggestion that officials would “forget” EU values without 
prompting, also arguably alludes to the lack of systematic mainstreaming in EU-China 
dialogues, captured throughout previous chapters.  
Regarding their specific portfolio of human rights, the interviewee provided greater 
insight into their activities. They stated that: “to put it very bluntly, I mean this is 
oversimplifying it, get everything you can discuss under sectoral issues”356. This comment 
alludes to attempts to encourage the promotion of human rights indirectly with the 
Chinese side, by including it in the agendas explicitly or implicitly of other EU-China 
dialogues. The need for these issues to be siphoned off from the human rights dialogue, 
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by lobbying their Commission colleagues, importantly alludes to China’s obstruction 
during these exchanges and a perception on the EU side that China is the problem-partner 
in the dialogue. This reaffirms the prevalence of discourses 3 and 5 on the EU side which 
blame China for a lack of systematic value mainstreaming.  
Similarly, the initial quote appears to reference discourse 3 in alluding to a situation 
where problems with China are so numerous that Commission officials require the EEAS’s 
assistance to keep track (“how you are you going to keep in mind that we have problems 
on this, this, this and that area”). The interviewee also appears to hint at the sheer 
number of EU-China dialogues (“there is so much engagement and so many dialogues”) 
and the logistical challenge this poses to the EEAS in coordinating value mainstreaming 
(See Section 9.4).  
Another EEAS diplomat connected to EU-China economic dialogues, described a similar 
active process of scrutiny and enforcement, providing an example of how they recently 
stepped in to amend an EU-China agreement drafted by one of the DGs, which neglected 
EU material interests: 
A particular DG wanted to conclude … [a] research cooperation agreement and 
kind of by chance, the annex listing of the priority sectors coincided with those in 
Made in China 2025… there were [no EU] interests, only the Chinese ones… [which 
was] something that we couldn’t possibly let go ahead. So, it wasn’t just the EEAS, 
there were other DG’s that pointed this out, because they were more responsible 
for certain …sectors that could potentially have been hurt, but we managed to 
reconduct that, agreement in a way that’s more balanced. So, it’s not a good 
example for you in the sense that …I’m not referring to rule of law or human 
rights, but it would have been exactly the same sort of process.357 
This example importantly highlights how beyond those individuals in the China Division 
working directly with human rights, value promotion reflects one of many issues 
coordinated by EEAS diplomats with their Commission officials. In this sense, discussion of 
values is not necessarily featured in these interinstitutional ad-hoc communications and 
the process is not systematic.  
                                                          




Impact of EEAS activities promoting value mainstreaming 
The limitations of these coordination activities for value mainstreaming were displayed 
first and foremost in EEAS diplomats’ own explicit confirmation that they were seldom 
successful in practice. For example, when asked about the extent to which they felt that 
their Commission colleagues were acting upon their suggestions, one EEAS diplomat 
connected to human rights promotion described how “it’s touch and go, I mean [sighs]… 
it’s not very quantifiable, yeah, it not very [sighs]… people might be hard to convince”.   
Their language portrays a challenging situation where their colleagues are just as likely to 
reject requests as act upon them (“it’s touch and go”). Moreover, their clarification that 
“it’s not very quantifiable” can be interpreted in several ways. Firstly, it captures how 
value mainstreaming does not necessarily featuring in all EEAS-Commission contacts 
explicitly (so it’s difficult for the interviewee to quantify). It also arguably hints at the 
difficulties in measuring the outcomes with China if Commission officials are carrying out 
such activities (i.e. trade objectives can be quantified unlike value promotion). More 
profoundly, it infers a lack of certainty by the interviewee about whether they are 
successfully convincing their colleagues to mainstream values. This again captures the 
role of interinstitutional tensions in impeding the EEAS’s mainstreaming activities, a 
notion which is reaffirmed by the repeated sighs in the quote which suggest challenging 
or even confrontational relational dynamics between the Commission and the EEAS. 
Relatedly, the example also importantly hints at the existence and power of the 
discourses impeding value mainstreaming and their connection with the apparent low 
success-rate of the EEAS’s suggestions (“people might be hard to convince”).  
Consolidating this linkage, the interviewee provided an example of the resistance they 
face: 
Most research people …think: this is science and this is for the sake of science and 
we are just engaging in research and this is not politicised and we shouldn’t, you 
know, start talking about [human rights]… but then they have to understand that 
even if you’re talking about collection of data and breach of privacy for the sake of 
science and research, it’s still breach of privacy and your still treading on the 
individual rights …sometimes, some people might be hard to convince.358 
                                                          




The language explicitly alludes to the impact of discourse 2 in hindering value 
mainstreaming in research and cooperation dialogues and by extension, the EEAS’s 
coordination efforts. This is reflected in the notion that “most research people” perceive 
human rights as inapplicable to their dialogues and cooperation programmes/projects 
with China (i.e. “this is science …and we shouldn’t you know start talking about [human 
rights]”). It is also reinforced by the suggestion that these individuals lack awareness of 
the value dimensions of their sector and their related responsibilities to uphold them 
(“they have to understand that even if you’re talking about collection of data and breach 
of privacy for the sake of science and research, it’s still breach of privacy”).  Similarly, the 
example appears to reference discourse 3 as another basis of resistance to the EEAS’s 
coordination efforts, with the suggestion that these Commission officials are avoiding 
value mainstreaming so as not to create tensions with the Chinese side (“we are just 
engaging in research and this is not politicised”).  
Significantly, it is also worth highlighting that Commission interviewees typically played 
down or denied that EEAS attempts to promote value mainstreaming in their dialogues 
were taking place. This supports the notion that values are not always featuring in these 
ad-hoc coordination efforts by the EEAS and underlines the limited success of diplomats 
in convincing their Commission colleagues to carry out such activities. Beyond this, it can 
be argued that the low-impact of the EEAS’s activities is inherently reflected in the main 
finding of this thesis, that systematic value mainstreaming is not taking place in EU-China 
dialogues.   
 
Indirect approaches 
However, Commission officials denying the existence of the EEAS’s mainstreaming efforts 
also potentially alludes to another interesting dimension of these ad-hoc practices. A 
diplomat connected to human rights suggested that promoting value mainstreaming 
amongst their Commission colleagues was often intentionally pursued in an indirect 




I don’t have to label it human rights [when communicating with colleagues], 
although when they see me, people know, it says human rights on my forehead.359  
The language here infers that in ad-hoc contacts the interviewee seeks to indirectly 
promote human rights by avoiding the nomenclature and explicit reference to their 
portfolio as well as through re-framing (re-labelling) of the issues, ostensibly as technical 
areas. However, the quote also suggests that their physical presence is negative for 
promoting human rights mainstreaming with Commission colleagues. The notion that 
other EU officials physically seeing them as the individual working with human rights 
would make them inattentive to mainstreaming the value, highlights the aversion 
towards such activities, captured by the discourses elucidated in Chapters 6-7.  
The interviewee provided an interesting example of how they framed human rights issues 
in this indirect technical manner in EU-China health dialogues. They described how they 
urged their applicable Commission colleagues to raise treatment of drug users with China. 
This theme links to individual civil and political rights yet reflects an area which is “so 
vague and subjective in application”360 (i.e. it’s ostensibly about resolving a public health 
issue of mutual interest). Their language again suggests that if Commission officials were 
made aware that they were promoting a human rights issue with China, it would make 
them less likely to do so, linking to the discourses challenging value mainstreaming. The 
interviewee feels that they have to resort to subtler strategies that do not directly frame 
the issue as such (i.e. a “vague and subjective” connection to human rights). 
The above example also displays a fascinating parallel between the manner in the which 
the EEAS is promoting value mainstreaming with their own colleagues and with the 
Chinese side, beyond the human rights dialogues. In both instances, there is an effort to 
avoid an awareness that human rights is being discussed, lest they risk the issue not being 
broached at all. Moreover, both aspects can be linked with the discourses justifying a lack 
of systematic value mainstreaming. EEAS officials are concerned about a) triggering 
resistance to value mainstreaming by their colleagues and b) triggering obstruction by the 
Chinese side, when these issues are explicitly raised in dialogues.  
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Interestingly, this connection between internal and external strategies for value 
mainstreaming was explicitly made by one EEAS diplomat, who described the need to: 
Work on the messages… that we could adapt to different situations and that 
would make it more acceptable, well first to our Commission colleagues and then 
also to the Chinese, so this is definitely something we have to work harder on.361 
Importantly, the notion that EU values are not “acceptable” to either their EU colleagues 
or the Chinese side reinforces the argued connection between the pursuit of these 
indirect approaches along with the existence, strength and impact of the discourses 
impacting value mainstreaming (“this is definitely something we have to work harder 
on”). Lastly, it is worth highlighting how this concern over triggering the discourses shared 
by their colleagues, links the weakness of the EEAS’s ad-hoc coordination efforts with its 
tolerance of partial mainstreaming. In the latter case, such tolerance appears to also 
derive from concern over their Commission colleagues not mainstreaming values at all if 
awareness about these value dimensions is raised. Additional examples displaying the 
EEAS’s ad-hoc coordination activities to promote value mainstreaming are presented in 
Table 9.4.
                                                          




  Table 9.4 Additional key examples displaying the ad-hoc efforts by the EEAS to promote value mainstreaming  




Quoted example Analysis 
ASIAPAC: Asia and 
Pacific Directorate 
[BRU] 
1. “We can establish cross relation between files and 
negotiate trade offs and try to find compromises 
that way. So, it doesn’t always work but at least 
we try. so that’s the double service we can offer, 
DG’s …But for that we need to be involved in what 
they do.”362 
 
• Suggests that the ad-hoc coordination conducted by the EEAS with Commission 
DGs is very broad and there is no specific value component.  
• Infers that such coordination is not always, or perhaps even seldom successful: 
▪ The language portrays the EEAS having the capacity to coordinate dialogues 
as a “service” which “can” be taken advantage of, but this is not taking place 
(“we need to be involved in what they do”). 
▪ This alludes to interinstitutional tensions, hinting that Commission DGs are 
reluctant or even resistant to let the EEAS participate in dialogues and their 
substance. 
▪ Suggestion that “it doesn’t always work” infers sporadic compliance by 
Commission DGs with any EEAS recommendation. 
• Interviewee also portrays resignation about the situation (“at least we try”). This 
reinforces the notion that the EEAS are tolerating and thus enabling a lack of 









                                                          




ASIAPAC: Asia and 
Pacific Directorate 
[BRU] 
2. “I mean part of it is to make people understand 
that it does not always have to be a confrontation. 
It does not always have to be… I don’t know, with 
a halo on your head and wings on your back that 
you’re going to you know… you have to become a 
missionary on human rights to be able to realise 
these things”.363 
 
• Infers a perception amongst Commission officials that value mainstreaming 
can only be conflictual and will undermine exchanges (“always have …a 
confrontation”), being a very explicit and naively idealistic activity (“you 
have to become a missionary on human rights”). 
• Their language suggests this perception is ingrained amongst officials. 
• This reflected in them describing the need to “make” their colleagues 
“understand” how and why they should be mainstreaming human rights. 
• This prevalent and internalised view amongst officials alludes to the 
discourses surrounding China’s role (3-5) and suggests they are impeding 
the EEAS’s ad-hoc value mainstreaming coordination activities. 
 
ASIAPAC: Asia and 
Pacific Directorate 
[BRU] 
3. “The fact that it’s now written out there and that 
mainstreaming has become a popular term, 
doesn’t mean that we haven’t been doing it for 
ages, (Int: mhmm)  uhm, erh,… it’s good to point it 
out as to raise awareness and do it a bit more 




• Displays how value mainstreaming has historically not been a systematic 
process in the EU’s external actions. 
• Suggests that EEAS officials tolerate and enable the lack of such practices 
amongst their Commission colleagues. 
• Raising awareness for more systematic activities cast as an optional activity 
as opposed to a priority, to meet the EU’s obligations with China and EEAS’s 
own expected behaviour (“it’s good to point it out”).  
• They appear accept the status quo, suggesting mainstreaming is sufficiently 
taking place (“it’s always been done”). 
• Interviewee casts systematic mainstreaming practices prescribed by the 
Lisbon Treaty (where it’s “now written out”) as idyllic standards as opposed 
to obligations that all EU diplomats should be adhering to. 
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9.4 Limitations to interinstitutional value mainstreaming: Logistics and 
resistance 
 
Building on conclusions throughout this chapter, it is crucial to address how the limited 
impact of the EEAS’s ad-hoc mainstreaming efforts and the institution’s tolerance of 
partial mainstreaming may also be linked to 1) its logistical capacity and 2) 
interinstitutional tensions with the Commission. Both elements arguably impede EEAS 
diplomats’ attempts to promote value mainstreaming amongst their colleagues and 
intensify the strength of the discourses challenging value mainstreaming. Additionally, 
these limitations reflect an additional explanation for the EEAS’s apparent enabling or 




The EEAS’s ability to coordinate the substance of all EU-China dialogues beyond a formal 
mechanism like the CCT is inherently limited by the small size of the unit principally 
responsible. As described in Chapter 5.4, the China Division’s seven diplomats coordinate 
more than 50 dialogues between them, as well as operationalising specific pillar 1 
dialogues. This logistical reality may be contributing to the EEAS’s apparent tolerance of 
partial mainstreaming. In this sense, it could be argued that the China Division simply 
does not have the human resources to influence the substance of dialogues more 
thoroughly and instil more systematic mainstreaming practices. Similarly, such limited 
capacity may be contributing to the apparent low-impact of the EEAS’s ad-hoc value 
mainstreaming efforts. A perception amongst Commission officials that the EEAS is not 
fulfilling such a role may be derivative of diplomats not having the time/resources to 
address the role of values in every dialogue.  
However, it can be argued that if the coordination of systematic value mainstreaming was 
incorporated into a formal mechanism akin to the CCT, which brings together thematic 
clusters of DGs or all DGs into a more manageable group, then the EEAS’s logistical 
limitations would be countered. Similarly, if formal mechanisms were introduced to 




their dialogues, then it would negate the current situation, where the EEAS has the lone 
role of ensuring value mainstreaming is carried out in all EU-China dialogues.  
 
Interinstitutional tensions 
Conversely, interinstitutional tensions between the EEAS and the Commission appear to 
be far more ingrained and reflect a greater barrier to the EEAS’s capacity to influence 
Commission officials and in turn, maximise its power as a co-equal entity, as defined in 
the Lisbon Treaty (See Chapter 5.3). These interinstitutional tensions largely derive from 
the founding of the EEAS, whereupon, the Commission ceded responsibility for many 
areas of the EU’s external action to a new institution – the EEAS - closely linked with the 
member states foreign services, upon their demand. As one EEAS interviewee 
summarised: 
We are a very strange animal …this is what some member states wanted but that 
generated a lot of mistrust on the part of some Commission Services, because it’s 
like it could not be part of the Commission because those member states do not 
trust the Commission and want to reduce the power of the Commission …it was a 
clear indication of how the European Commission is perceived by some of the 
[member] states.365 
While initial teething problems appear to have been resolved under HR/VP Mogherini’s 
leadership,366 interviewee’s accounts portrayed continued resentment about the creation 
of this new institution and resistance to its participation in Commission affairs – still often 
deemed to reflect interference, as opposed to value-added cooperation. The extent of 
these interinstitutional tensions and their practical impact was effectively captured by the 
EEAS diplomat quoted above, when describing how their Commission colleagues 
perceived the EEAS: 
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It’s not popular at all. In fact, some of them regard us as a kind of ‘virus’ and 
they’re afraid that they might be contaminated [interviewer laughs]. No, it’s 
true.367  
Firstly, the interviewee explicitly infers that many, if not most Commission staff have a 
negative view of the EEAS (“It’s not popular at all”). Thereafter, the interviewee provides 
insight into not only the gravity of this resentment but its practical impact, with language 
suggesting that the Commission officials avoid contact as far as possible with their EEAS 
colleagues. They are cast as viewing any interaction as a potential existential threat that 
could risk critically undermining their activities (such as the EU-China dialogues they 
operationalise). This is captured by the comparison of the EEAS to a “virus”, which could 
contaminate Commission officials through exposure. Notably, the interviewee suggests 
that this comparison is not an exaggeration in response to the interviewer’s 
laughter/disbelief, casting it as “true”.  
This was later reaffirmed when the interviewee described how the founding of the EEAS 
was perceived by the Commission as a “re-nationalization of foreign policy”, threatening 
the independence and efficacy at the EU-level, and as a result:  
Some parts of the Commission were also afraid that we would - so I’m not joking 
when I said we would contaminate them - that we would also contribute to [a] 
weakening of the Commission and export our bad practices to the European 
Commission.368   
Here the virus metaphor is reinforced and expanded upon with language casting 
Commission officials as being concerned about being “weakened” in their activities by 
exposure to the EEAS’s (constitutionally established) coordinating role and associated 
working methods, which are perceived negatively due to their connections to the 
member states (i.e. “bad practices”). Crucially, like the prior quote, the language alludes 
to how the interinstitutional tensions practically impact the EEAS’s capacity to influence 
Commission activities (i.e. they want to avoid contact with the EEAS). This supports the 
argument that such dynamics partway inform the EEAS’s toleration of partial 
mainstreaming and the low-success of its ad-hoc mainstreaming activities. 
                                                          





This relationship between interinstitutional tensions and the EEAS’s capacity to influence 
dialogues appeared to be supported by another EEAS diplomat speaking specifically about 
value mainstreaming. They described how:  
You can’t force people to actually use the [the EEAS’s recommendations]... you 
know we’ve got background, we’ve got speaking points and …if we could try and 
be a little more creative as well …that might be helpful.369 
The idea that you’d need to “force” Commission officials to follow recommendations 
from the EEAS on raising values with China, emphasises the level of resistance faced by 
EEAS diplomats and alludes to the extent to which it acts as a barrier to their efforts. The 
example can also be seen reference the existence and power of the discourses impeding 
value mainstreaming, with the suggestion that “creative” approaches are necessary to 
convince their Commission colleagues to mainstream values with China.  
The interviewee also notably elaborated that “[we need to be] a bit more creative and 
maybe a bit more subtle”.370 This interestingly suggests that the indirect strategies for 
promoting value mainstreaming which are currently being pursued by some EEAS 
diplomats, reflects an example of the sort creative approaches promoted above. 
Nevertheless, the notion of adopting “creative” or more “subtle” approaches appears to 
refer to the EEAS seeking to work around the discourses impeding value mainstreaming.  
Another EEAS interviewee reinforced the practical limitations faced by the EEAS in light of 
these relational dynamics, describing how:  
In many of the areas, in fact in most of the areas, the DG responsible for the 
subject area has the lead and organises the dialogue and, that’s it. Basically as, I 
see our role …so far as possible taking part in those dialogues. If we can be 
involved in the agenda setting, or at least comment on it.371 
Here the interviewee emphasises the limited power of the EEAS in “most …areas” of 
cooperation with China. They infer that the EEAS having any input in the planning of 
Commission-led dialogues is not a given and dependent on the permission of the DGs (i.e. 
“if we can be involved in the agenda setting” [emphasis added]). This is underscored by 
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the suggestion that the EEAS being able to “at least comment on” the agenda reflects a 
positive outcome. Lastly, their comment “and that’s it” suggests finality to this power 
balance and highlights the degree to which the diplomat feels that they cannot change 
this relational dynamic and more substantially influence EU-China dialogues that are 
Commission-led.  
It is important however, to qualify these quotes, in the sense that the diplomat in 
question works with particularly powerful DGs involved in EU-China economic relations. 
Nonetheless, the language points to a situation where interinstitutional tensions greatly 
inhibit the capacity of the EEAS to affect dialogues, supporting the argument that this 
aspect is informing the EEAS’s toleration of partial mainstreaming and the weakness of its 
ad-hoc mainstreaming efforts. 
Overall, in a similar fashion to conclusions regarding the logistical limitations faced by the 
EEAS, interinstitutional tensions would arguably be greatly reduced in impact if formal 
mechanisms were introduced. In this sense, if both EEAS and Commission officials were 
bound by institutional mechanisms to systematically mainstream values in EU-China 
dialogues, then such activities would no longer be so dependent on the initiative of the 




This chapter revealed the value mainstreaming activities which are taking place in EU-
China dialogues, irrespective of the challenges posed by the discourses and lack of 
understanding of China described throughout chapters 6-8. These practices importantly 
highlighted that the EU’s values underpin EU-China dialogues and thus the existence of 
the EU’s normative power with China. However, they were revealed to be limited in scope 
and unable to meet the systematic value mainstreaming standards promoted by the EU’s 
official discourse on value mainstreaming and the ideal-type of NPE. In this sense, they 
appeared to reaffirm, rather than compensate for the weakness of the EU’s normative 
power in EU-China dialogues. 
The concept of partial mainstreaming captured the sporadic inclusion of value-related 




aspects being pre-designed into each sector of EU-China relations. It emerged that the 
EEAS was tolerating these activities, holding back from promoting more systematic 
practices which could effectively realise the official discourse found in documents. 
The chapter also highlighted the EEAS’s own efforts to coordinate value mainstreaming in 
Commission-led dialogues through ad-hoc communications. Again, these activities 
appeared to be unable to meet the systematic standards of the official discourse and fully 
realise the ideal of NPE with China. In this fashion, Commission and EEAS officials 
suggested that such communications were rarely resulting in values being raised in 
dialogues, in practice.  
This inefficacy appeared to be somewhat self-inflicted by EEAS diplomats, who appeared 
to restrain themselves from more assertive and explicit promotion of systematic value 
mainstreaming. In this context, it emerged that such restraint hampering ad-hoc 
coordination and a tolerance of partial mainstreaming could be connected to the 
discourses described in chapters 6-7. There appeared to be a fear of raising awareness 
about the value dimensions of dialogues, triggering the discourses and resulting in even 
less instances where these aspects are raised by Commission officials. This supports the 
conclusions in Chapters 6-7 suggesting that the EEAS is de-facto enabling the discourses 
challenging value mainstreaming through inaction. 
However, the chapter also importantly illuminated how the weakness of these existing 
value mainstreaming activities was informed by logistical limitations and interinstitutional 
tensions. The limited human resources of the EEAS unit primarily coordinating EU-China 
dialogues and the tense relations with their Commission colleagues appeared to 
inherently reduce the capacity of the EEAS to coordinate systematic value mainstreaming. 
This caveat presented an additional explanation for the EEAS’s apparent enabling or 
active reproduction of the discourses legitimising a lack of systematic value 
mainstreaming, described in Chapters 6-7.  
Nevertheless, it appeared these elements could be significantly countered if more formal 
mechanisms were introduced. In this sense, limited human resources could be assuaged 
by the coordination of systematic value mainstreaming through new or current meeting 
mechanisms which regularly bring together EEAS and Commission officials. Similarly, 




carry out formal actions to ensure systematic value mainstreaming in dialogues. These 




Chapter 10 – Conclusions  
 
The final chapter of this thesis summarises the research conclusions, particularly 
reflecting upon the findings outlined in Chapters 6-9. As described in Chapters 2 and 3, 
this thesis has sought to make an original contribution to existing normative power 
Europe (NPE) and EU-China literature through assessing the practical implementation of 
the EU’s normative power with China, arguably the hardest test-case. This approach 
reflected a notable departure from existing scholarship, which typically adopts a macro-
level appraisal of the outcomes of the EU’s external action and assesses whether EU 
values or interests are being prioritised. Due to the nuanced and often overlapping 
relationship between values and interests, such appraisals are analytically problematic 
and arguably unable to discern the extent to which EU values are informing the EU's 
activities.  
Instead, this thesis sought to illuminate the complex processes and dynamics informing 
the practical coordination and implementation - or mainstreaming - of the EU’s values 
with China in EU-China dialogues, at the micro-level. These dimensions, neglected by 
scholars, include the role of individual EU officials mainstreaming EU values, the 
institutional mechanisms governing their practices and the impact of their Chinese 
interlocutors. To tackle this gap in existing literature, this thesis was guided by the 
following overarching research question:  
How is the EU practically operationalising its normative power in EU-China 
relations? 
The empirical chapters dealt with this question through highlighting the extent to which 
values were being incorporated into dialogues and the obstacles facing these value 
mainstreaming activities. They also sought to ascertain the extent to which EEAS and 
Commission officials were meeting their expected institutional roles in facilitating and 
implementing value mainstreaming with China. 
The research question was operationalised through a rigorous research design, described 
in Chapter 4. This involved the application of discourse analysis to EU and Chinese policy 
documents and transcripts from 49 elite interviews with individuals involved with EU-
China relations. The sample principally encompassed 41 EU officials from the European 




dialogues, based in Brussels and at the EU delegation to China, in Beijing. The remaining 8 
interviews included individuals from EU member states, NGOs and the Chinese side, all of 
which provided important context and additional perspectives to shape and ensure the 
accuracy of the findings. 
This research design made it possible to assess EU value mainstreaming in EU-China 
dialogues in practice, both more broadly and specifically in the context of human rights 
(including rule of law) and the environmental facet of sustainable development. Through 
this process, this thesis uncovered shared discourses informing value mainstreaming 
practices by EU officials and the on-the-ground reality of the EU’s normative power with 
China. 
 
10.1 Main Findings – Discourses impeding value mainstreaming 
 
The analysis found that when assessed according to the EU’s official discourse on value 
mainstreaming found in documents, which aligns with the ideal-type standards of NPE, 
the practical implementation of the EU’s normative power with China appeared to be 
weak. Systematic value mainstreaming was not taking place in EU-China dialogues either 
in a broad sense nor specifically in the cases of human rights and sustainable 
development.  
In this fashion, officials from the Commission and the EEAS seemed to be falling short of 
the behaviour/practices expected of them by the official discourse. According to these 
standards, officials from both institutions should be systematically mainstreaming values 
into all dialogues they undertake, while the EEAS should also be actively promoting such 
activities through ad-hoc contacts and formal meetings, reflecting its coordinating role in 
the EU’s external relations.  
While this broad finding superficially supports the conclusions found in (often 
overlapping) NPE and EU-China literature - that the EU is prioritising its material interests 
with China, at the expense of value promotion372 - discourse analysis captured more 
nuanced factors underpinning these dynamics, neglected by scholars to date. In this 
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context, five key discourses were revealed to be shared amongst EU officials, that 
justified a lack of systematic value mainstreaming. These discourses were similarly 
identified across the accounts of officials based in both Brussels and Beijing. They fell into 
two distinct categories: the organisational discourses and those surrounding China’s role 
(Summarised in Table 10.1 below). 
 






1. Values are implicit to EU-China dialogues and no 
further action is required to realise them. 
 
X  
2. Value mainstreaming is not relevant to all EU-China 
dialogues and instead the exclusive responsibility of 
specific individuals and dialogues (particularly the 
human rights dialogue). 
 
X  
3. Raising the most EU controversial values with China is 
expected to trigger an obstructive response by the 
Chinese side which will critically undermine dialogues. 
 
 X 
4. Value mainstreaming is pointless as well as risky, as 
Chinese interlocutors are perceived to belikely be 
unable to meaningfully impact Chinese policy 
connected to EU controversial values. 
 
 X 
5. A perception amongst EU officials that China is not 









Concerning the organisational discourses, Chapter 6 described how institutional dynamics 
and understanding of roles and responsibilities were being used as rationales for 
behaviour relating to value mainstreaming. In this fashion, discourse 1 highlighted how a 
lack of value mainstreaming was justified on the basis that EU officials perceived values to 
be implicit to their dialogues with China and no further action was required to realise 
them. Conversely, discourse 2 captured officials legitimising the avoidance of such 
activities on the basis that they were inapplicable to their dialogue and instead exclusively 
the responsibility of specific individuals and dialogues, particularly the human rights 
dialogue. Chapter 6 also highlighted how EEAS officials appeared to often share these 
organisational discourses, enabling or actively reproducing them amongst their 
Commission colleagues, under the auspices of their coordinating role.  
These dynamics extended to the EEAS-led internal coordination/meetings mechanisms, 
where the organisational discourses appeared to underpin the absence of a coordination 
of value mainstreaming (systematic or otherwise) through these forums. The pragmatic 
language found in the EU’s 2016 China strategy, was also highlighted to be potentially 
playing a role in enabling and reproducing the organisational discourses, particularly with 
its apparent allusion to material interest-based engagement with China and selective use 
of dialogues to meet EU objectives. 
Building on this, Chapter 7 detailed the three remaining discourses surrounding China’s 
perceived role as the principal impediment to EU value mainstreaming. Discourse 3 
captured how concern over triggering obstructive behaviour by China, through raising the 
most controversial EU values in EU-China dialogues – e.g. human rights (including rule of 
law), but not sustainable development - was justifying an eschewing of value 
mainstreaming by officials. These fears appeared to be particularly prevalent in 
interviewees’ accounts. As a result, discourse 3 seemed to reflect the dominant discourse 
challenging systematic value mainstreaming.   
A similar deterrence effect appeared to derive from discourse 4, which related to how 
officials perceived their counterparts as unable to impact Chinese policy connecting to 
these controversial EU values, making value mainstreaming pointless, as well as perilous. 
Discourses 3 and 4 appeared to link to genuinely obstructive actions by the Chinese side.  
Lastly, discourse 5, applicable to the promotion of both sustainable development and 




The discourse revolved around a shared perception that China is not listening to the EU 
and it should be and seemed to be principally informed by actions on the EU side, as 
opposed to China’s behaviour.  
In the rare instances when EU values were being raised in dialogues (particularly via the 
human rights dialogue), the discourse appeared to underpin repeated attempts to 
promote EU values, while dismissing China’s alternative interpretations in parallel. This 
conduct appeared to be informed by a lack of reflexivity on the EU side about how their 
approaches, which tended to assertively express a belief in the superiority and 
universality of the EU’s values, were being interpreted by their counterparts. Repeated 
non-compliance by China seemingly fostered frustrations amongst EU officials, often 
engendering increasingly didactic approaches to value mainstreaming.  
These approaches seemed to be not only unsuccessful, but counterproductive, fuelling 
China’s obstructive behaviour, associated with discourses 3 and 4. Nonetheless, a 
perception that China should be complying led to their perpetuation, despite a 
recognition amongst officials about the inefficacy of these approaches. As a result, the 
prevalence of discourse 5 appeared to limit the pursuit of less didactic and potentially 
more successful strategies for value mainstreaming. These effects were reaffirmed by a 
pessimism amongst officials that China would ever accept EU values in the future.  
Notably, like discourses 3 and 4, discourse 5 also appeared to impede value 
mainstreaming in all other EU-China dialogues, beyond those isolated instances where 
such activities were taking place. This alludes to a crucial analytical dimension highlighted 
in Chapter 7: first-hand experience of mainstreaming values with China did not appear to 
be a prerequisite for officials sharing the discourses surrounding China’s role. In this 
fashion, discourse 5 seemed to inform a perception among officials lacking such 
experience, that value mainstreaming could only be a conflictual exercise and is thus to 
be avoided. This view appeared to be intensified by the pessimism associated with the 
discourse.  
Similarly, in the case of discourses 3 and 4, it appeared that the negative experiences of 
those individuals who had mainstreamed values with China, particularly via the human 
rights dialogue, seemed to strengthen these discourses amongst officials lacking such 
first-hand experience. This again informed an avoidance of value mainstreaming. The 




existence and power of these discourses surrounding China’s role and itself reflects an 
interesting finding.  
Supporting the conclusions from Chapter 6, Chapter 7 further suggested that EEAS 
diplomats shared and thus enabled or actively reproduced discourses 3-5. Relatedly, as 
noted above, the negative experiences of the EEAS-led human rights dialogue appeared 
to fuel these discourses. In this sense, the experiences of the EU’s only dialogue dedicated 
to promoting an EU value, ironically seemed to contribute to a lack of value promotion in 
all other dialogues. This emphasised how China has been the chief beneficiary of the 
human rights dialogue framework. It has been able to compartmentalise discussion of the 
value to an opaque dialogue, which it has not only been able to make unproductive but 
engender a deterrence to the discussion of controversial EU values in all other EU-China 
dialogues. 
In this vein, Chapters 6 and 7 suggested that all of the discourses challenging value 
mainstreaming seemed to align with Chinese, as opposed to EU interests, as they 
informed EU values not being tabled in EU-China dialogues. While China seemed to be 
passively benefitting from most of the discourses described above, it was potentially 
contributing to the perceptions associated with discourses 3 and 4. In this fashion, it 
appeared that China may be instrumentally exaggerating perceptions on the EU side that 
discussion of values would trigger obstructive responses, or that Chinese interlocutors 
would be unable to engage with value-related issues or impact China’s policy in these 
areas. Relatedly, it was highlighted that discourses 3 and 4 could notably be seen to 
represent a de-facto compliance with China’s party-state discourse on values, which was 
informing resistance on the Chinese side to engaging with these areas. This dynamic 
highlighted the importance of recognising the two-way flow of values in EU-China 
dialogues, as the EU was effectively engaging with and acquiescing to China’s values. 
More significantly, it was argued that this de-facto compliance had significant 
implications, seemingly neglected by a complacent EU side, being potentially perceived by 
observers and the Chinese side as an indirect endorsement of China’s official position on 
controversial values like human rights and more severely, a self-inflicted erosion of the 
EU’s values and their continued relevance. As the EU’s values are informed and 
empowered by a fear of the cruelty engendered by totalitarian governments, EU officials 




Chinese side. They are giving into the very fear that the EU’s values are established in 
opposition to and designed to confront.  
The analysis also suggested that the discourses described above were severely limiting 
the potential of the EU-China Legal Affairs Dialogue (LAD) to act as an effective strategic 
channel for the indirect promotion of human rights, as envisioned by its architects. 
Chapter 3 highlighted how the dialogue represented an interesting, yet under-researched 
channel, which embodied the EU’s conceptual linkage between rule of law and human 
rights. This was reflected not only by its design, but an ongoing institutional overlap 
between the personnel responsible for this dialogue and the human rights dialogue.  
Value mainstreaming seemed to be eschewed in the LAD based on perceptions amongst 
officials that the dialogue was inherently normative by-design, due to its passive 
connections to realising human rights (discourse 1) and a view that including human 
rights would be needlessly duplicating the role of the human rights dialogue (discourse 2). 
Similarly, it appeared that the controversial value dimensions of the LAD (namely human 
rights and rule of law) were being side-lined because of concern that such components 
would antagonise China in line with discourse 3 and relatedly, a perception that these 
topics could only manifest in a conflictual discussion with the Chinese side (discourse 5).  
Additionally, it emerged that despite the dialogue’s interlocutor being one of the few 
Chinese institutions that could impact Chinese human rights policy, this notwithstanding, 
EU officials perceived that their counterparts were unable to discuss these issues, 
reflecting discourse 4. Consequently, the LAD represented a key example supporting the 
notion that the Chinese side was instrumentally exacerbating perceptions on the EU side 
and the discourses they inform. The State Council interlocutors seemed to be 
communicating to EU officials that they could not engage with sensitive value-related 
issues, despite this not being the case in practice.  
As a result of the perceptions encapsulated by these discourses, no systematic efforts 
were taking place to ensure that human rights or even rule of law related issues featured 
in these dialogues, enfeebling this potentially high-impact channel for value 
mainstreaming and thus realisation of the EU’s normative power. This finding was 
interesting considering Commission officials’ apparent view that the LAD represented an 
isolated channel for promoting EU values, akin to the human rights dialogue (displaying 




Similarly, supporting the argued collusion of the EEAS in a lack of systematic value 
mainstreaming, it emerged that EEAS diplomats co-managing the LAD appeared to be 
sharing and thus enabling these discourses amongst their Commission colleagues 
operationalising the dialogue. This was particularly interesting, as these EEAS diplomats 
typically had portfolios including human rights promotion and the human rights dialogue 
itself, yet they nonetheless appeared to be complicit in the LAD not systematically 
incorporating human rights. 
 
10.1.1 Additional findings (i) – Lack of understanding of China and value mainstreaming 
 
Beyond the discourses legitimising an avoidance of value mainstreaming, which reflect 
the main findings of this thesis, the analysis also suggested a lack of understanding of 
China amongst EU officials was contributing to the weakness of the EU’s normative power 
in practice. This lack of understanding appeared to be underpinned by a deficit in cultural 
and linguistic capacity on the EU side, with few officials displaying these interrelated skills, 
even at the EU delegation to China.  
Analysis revealed that this deficit was rooted in drastically limited training provision by 
the EU vis-à-vis other international actors of comparable scale. The importance of these 
skills to EU-China relations, as inferred by Burnay et al. (2014) and Fulda’s (2015; 2018) 
work described in Chapter 3, was particularly displayed in the accounts of those few 
officials who had developed these skills through their own initiative. These individuals 
displayed greater reflexivity and emphasized their value-added in fostering more positive 
and productive EU-China dialogues as well as the negative impact of this skill deficit on 
the EU side. 
Chapter 8 suggested that although this lack of understanding seemed to impact all 
aspects of EU-China relations, it was particularly high-impact in the context of value 
mainstreaming due to the sensitivity of the subject matter. This could be seen in the 
posited links between a lack of understanding and the discourses impeding value 
mainstreaming.  
In this respect, the analysis suggested that the concerns surrounding discourse 3 may be 
being intensified by this deficit on the EU side, with China’s obstructive behaviour being 




vein, it appeared that a knowledge-gap about China’s institutional structures intensified 
the perception amongst EU officials that Chinese interlocutors are unable to impact 
Chinese policy relating to EU values (discourse 4). In both cases described above, a lack of 
understanding seemed to reflect yet another input into the discourses, building upon EU 
officials’ fears and aiding the Chinese efforts to exaggerate them.  
Moreover, in the case of discourse 5 - China is not listening to the EU and it should be - 
encompassing EU officials’ frustrations that China is not complying with EU values, the 
discourse may be being impacted by a lack of knowledge about China’s alternative 
understandings of EU values and their basis. In effect, EU officials may be unable to pitch 
these issues in a reflexive fashion which resonates with China’s system of governance and 
its cultural/historical basis.  
Moreover, the connection to discourses 3-5 suggested that a lack of knowledge about 
Chinese culture and language on the EU side was informing officials engaging with China 
on a Eurocentric basis, which was negative to EU-China dialogues, particularly with regard 
to the finding of common ground on controversial EU values. However, this was qualified 
by an emphasis on the mutual nature of the lack of understanding in EU-China relations, 
with comparably problematic Sinocentrism on the Chinese side. It was argued that this 
ethnocentrism reflects the default position for each side in the absence of sufficient 
intercultural knowledge and understanding. 
Although explicit examples of connections between this lack of understanding and the 
organisational discourses were not identified in interviewees’ accounts, a linkage was 
nevertheless suggested. In this respect, low confidence about raising values with the 
Chinese side due to limited cultural-linguistic knowledge, was posited as a contributor to 
officials viewing EU values as implicit (discourse 1) or inapplicable (discourse 2) to their 
dialogues. 
However, while the chapter identified an apparent link between a lack of understanding 
of China amongst EU officials, weak value mainstreaming and the discourses informing 
this, it also highlighted several caveats which would limit the impact of any EU steps to 
resolve this. Firstly, the mutual nature of the lack of understanding means that remedial 
action is also necessitated by the Chinese side. China appears to have comparable 
cultural-linguistic knowledge deficiencies, while its opaque institutional system and 




highlighted how mutual understanding was also dependent on the personalities and 
relationships between officials on each side. Reflecting these dimensions, it is important 
to acknowledge that EU improvements in cultural and linguistic capacity, while positive, 
would not represent a panacea to resolving bilateral misunderstanding and its impact on 
EU-China relations.  
 
10.1.2 Additional findings (ii) - Existing mainstreaming practices and their implications 
 
The final chapter of this thesis importantly identified and assessed the value 
mainstreaming activities which are taking place, in the absence of the systematic 
practices stipulated by the EU’s official discourse found in documents and the ideal-type 
of NPE. This significantly highlighted that EU-China dialogues are underpinned by EU 
values and thus the existence of the EU’s normative power with China in practice. This 
reflects a key nuance of the topic which is neglected by scholars.  
However, these existing mainstreaming practices were shown to be significantly limited in 
their scope to realise the ideal-type of the EU’s normative power with China versus 
systematic actions. This supported this thesis’s main finding that the practical 
implementation of the EU’s normative power remains weak in EU-China dialogues.  
Firstly, the concept of partial mainstreaming captured how issues connected to EU values 
were being tabled sporadically in EU-China dialogues, often without officials necessarily 
being aware, due to them being pre-built into all sectors of EU-China cooperation 
(reflected in the guiding documents for each sector). This irregular and passive role of EU 
values in dialogues emphasised how partial mainstreaming was limited in its capacity, in 
comparison to the systematic practices stipulated by the EU’s official discourse on value 
mainstreaming. Realisation of these practices would necessitate officials methodically 
identifying the value dimensions of their dialogues and incorporating them into all 
exchanges. Supporting past conclusions that the EEAS enabled a lack of systematic 
mainstreaming, the analysis also suggested that EEAS diplomats were not intervening to 
promote more systematic practices in the Commission-led dialogues. 
Beyond this, the chapter also illuminated the existing efforts by the EEAS to promote 
value mainstreaming via ad-hoc interinstitutional contacts with their Commission 




expected behaviour in line with the official discourse - coordinating systematic value 
mainstreaming - deeper analysis revealed that these activities did not fulfil these 
standards. In this vein, values were not necessarily discussed in these contacts (i.e. it was 
not systematic) and even then, not necessarily broached explicitly.  
Most importantly, these activities did not appear to engender value mainstreaming, 
systematic or otherwise, in EU-China dialogues, having very low impact in practice. This 
was broadly reflected in this thesis’s main finding that the practical implementation of the 
EU’s normative power was weak with China. However, it was also displayed by 
Commission officials appearing to deny that their EEAS colleagues were conducting such 
coordination of EU values. In this sense, like partial mainstreaming, the EEAS’s ad-hoc 
mainstreaming efforts seemed unable to compensate for a lack of systematic practices by 
all EU officials. Moreover, the analysis again suggested that the low-impact of the EEAS’s 
activities was partly informed by a self-restraint to promote EU values more assertively 
and explicitly with Commission officials. 
Building on this, the chapter highlighted how although these existing mainstreaming 
practices were taking place despite the discourses challenging value mainstreaming, their 
weakness seemed to derive from them. In this regard, the EEAS’s i) restraint from more 
assertive or explicit promotion of EU values and ii) toleration of partial mainstreaming, 
appeared to be part-informed by a fear of triggering the discourses held by officials. If 
they were more explicit about the value dimensions of dialogues, there was a risk that 
their Commission colleagues would be less likely to conduct mainstreaming e.g. out of 
fear of antagonising their counterparts (discourse 3) or a perception that such activities 
were inapplicable to their sector (discourse 2).  This analysis provides an additional 
explanation for why EEAS diplomats appeared to enable the discourses legitimising a lack 
of value mainstreaming in Chapter 6-7, beyond them merely sharing these discourses 
themselves.   
The chapter also provided additional insight into the root causes of the EEAS’s apparent 
restraint in more assertively promoting systematic value mainstreaming, highlighting the 
role of logistical limitations and interinstitutional tensions. It was argued that the small 
size of the EEAS unit responsible for coordinating EU-China dialogues inherently limited 
its capacity to effectively coordinate value mainstreaming. More significantly, 




Commission and the EEAS were tense, reducing the capacity of the EEAS to influence EU-
China dialogues in line with its constitutional role as a co-equal institution with the 
Commission. However, it was concluded that these limitations faced by the EEAS would 
be countered through the introduction of more formal mechanisms to deliver systematic 
value mainstreaming in EU-China dialogues (discussed below).  
 
10.2 Improving value mainstreaming in EU-China dialogues: Finding common 
ground 
 
To enhance the practical implementation of the EU’s normative power, several key steps 
need to be taken by the EU to ensure that the systematic value mainstreaming prescribed 
by the EU’s official discourse found in documents and aligning with the ideal-type of NPE, 
is practically realised. These steps would counter the discourses challenging value 
mainstreaming and shape the behaviour/practices of officials from the Commission and 
the EEAS in line with the requisite standards. They would also foster common ground 
both between EU officials, in terms of value mainstreaming standards/responsibilities, 
and between the EU and Chinese sides in terms of increasing mutual understanding on 
values.  
First and foremost, formal mechanisms need to be introduced to ensure that EU officials 
systematically identify the value dimensions of their dialogues and how they can be 
directly or indirectly incorporated into EU-China dialogues. In this sense, common ground 
needs to be established between EU officials about who has responsibility for value 
mainstreaming with China and how it can be operationalised.  
As both sides agree on the themes of dialogues in advance (See Chapter 5.6), the EU has 
an opportunity - which appears to be being often wasted in practice - to ensure that EU 
values reach the agenda. A formal mechanism to aid this, could take the form of a 
compulsory (physical) checklist, where officials justify the inclusion, exclusion, or simply 
lack of applicability of individual EU values as defined in the Lisbon Treaty, to their 
upcoming dialogue. This checklist could be then co-reviewed and approved by both the 
EEAS China Division and Senior officials from DGs in advance of dialogues, to avoid 
interinstitutional tensions undermining the process. If EEAS and Commission officials are 




applicable bureaucratic layer, the EEAS would no longer have sole initiative for ensuring 
value mainstreaming. This would again counter the present role of institutional tensions 
in impeding value mainstreaming.  
Supporting this mechanism, an additional complimentary step could involve the EEAS 
ensuring that the discussion of value mainstreaming features regularly in existing internal 
meeting mechanisms, reminding officials of their obligations and proposing more 
effective strategies for value mainstreaming. Concerning the latter, this could include 
raising awareness that value mainstreaming does not have be direct/explicit in dialogues. 
In this vein, indirect mainstreaming strategies should be promoted where issues of 
mutual interest with China, that also address EU values, are sought by officials. For 
example, women’s rights as a human rights issue or environmental governance as a rule 
of law issue. These coordination activities should incorporate meaningful discussion and 
raise awareness about the implications of avoiding value mainstreaming in EU-China 
dialogues. These include a realisation that this neglect is aligning with Chinese as opposed 
to EU interests and could be perceived by observers and the Chinese side as i) a de-facto 
compliance with and endorsement of China’s official interpretation of fundamental values 
like human rights, which is antinomic to that promoted by the EU and ii) represents an act 
of self-harm which actively erodes the EU’s values and their continued relevance. 
In the case of Brussels, where meeting mechanisms are less frequent and less 
manageable due to higher attendance, coordination of systematic value mainstreaming 
would be more effective if new and more regular mechanisms were devised. These could 
feature smaller groups of China desks from thematically similar DGs e.g. a meeting could 
bring together officials from DGs Climate Action, Energy and Environment. The above 
steps would particularly counter the organisational discourses, changing perceptions 
amongst officials that value mainstreaming is implicit to their dialogue or restricted to 
certain sectors/individuals. 
Beyond this, the practical implementation of the EU’s normative power would also be 
aided by improving Chinese cultural and linguistic training amongst EU officials. This 
knowledge would enhance officials’ reflexivity in engaging with China, countering a 
natural Eurocentrism and potentially aiding the establishment of common ground 
between the EU and China on values. In this sense, it could potentially illuminate new 




confidence to pursue more informed and creative strategies to tackle ongoing areas of 
contention, in a manner which China is likely to be most receptive. Moreover, it could 
avoid unnecessary misunderstandings and tensions, which appear to undermine not only 
EU value mainstreaming with China, but EU-China relations more broadly. 
The EU and its member states should seriously consider greater investment in this area, 
particularly for officials in Beijing. Even a very limited training programme would have a 
positive impact on the practical implementation of the EU’s normative power. For 
example, as one interviewee suggested, a two-week intensive course on China’s 
institutional system, cultural features and history, for all Commission and EEAS officials 
engaging with China.373  
 
10.3 Research limitations and future research 
 
EU-China relations as a single case study 
It is important to recognise some of the limitations of this thesis and possible directions 
for future research. Firstly, this thesis focused exclusively on EU-China relations. This was 
justified on the basis that the bilateral relationship displayed the greatest contrast 
between EU economic interests and mutual understanding on values in the EU’s external 
relations. As a result, it reflected a single crucial case for assessing the EU’s normative 
power in practice.  
While a single case study is inherently limited in its inferential power in comparison to 
multi-case analysis, the selection of China on this basis maximised the generalisability of 
this thesis’s findings. In this fashion, it would be expected that the EU’s values would be 
least likely to be prioritised in EU-China relations. However, this thesis revealed that while 
the EU’s normative power remains weak with China, it is informed by highly nuanced 
factors neglected by existing literature at the micro-level. Similarly, partial mainstreaming 
captured how EU values are underpinning EU-China dialogues in practice. This confirmed 
that the EU’s normative power does exist in EU-China relations, though in a fashion which 
falls short of the ideal-type of NPE.  
                                                          




Reflecting these findings, it would be expected in the EU relationships with other third 
countries, that its normative power would also not be meeting the ideal-type of NPE, 
though to varying degrees. This thesis found that EU officials appeared to be severely 
deterred from value mainstreaming in EU-China relations due to the strength of economic 
interests and risk of compromising dialogues with high-stake objectives. In partnerships 
with weaker third countries, this barrier to realising the EU’s normative power would be 
greatly reduced if not absent.  
However, this thesis also highlighted how inter-institutional mechanisms, practices, 
perceived responsibilities and the division of labour between the EEAS and the 
Commission, also strongly underpinned a lack of systematic value mainstreaming. 
Consequently, even in bilateral relationships where the EU’s economic interests are 
lower, the findings suggest that systematic value mainstreaming in all dialogues, as per 
the official discourse, is unlikely to be taking place. Nevertheless, in all cases, the findings 
suggest that despite a lack of systematic actions to promote EU values, they would still 
underpin dialogues and sporadically feature in them, in line with the concept of partial 
mainstreaming. The generalisability of these findings could be improved by replicating 
this project in other cases, particularly strategic partnerships such as EU-Russia, EU-US 
and EU-Brazil relations.  
 
A focus on EU-level dialogues 
Secondly, this thesis focused exclusively on the EU-level dialogues with China and the role 
of the EU side therein, specifically that of the Commission and the EEAS officials 
operationalising these exchanges. Due to the scale of EU-China relations, identifying and 
focusing on the area of greatest pertinence to the implementation of the EU’s normative 
power with China, reflected a practical necessity.  
A focus on the dialogues making up the EU-China Strategic Partnership was principally 
justified on the following basis. Firstly, this thesis’s conceptual foundation of NPE 
considers the EU a supranational international actor distinct from its member states and 
these exchanges reflect the central arena of the EU-level bilateral relationship with China. 
Secondly, a concentration on EU-China dialogues was based on the assumption that the 




China relations, namely the member states and the European Parliament. These actors 
provide EU-China dialogues and the institutions implementing them with their mandates.  
This project was thus strategically narrowed down to sidestep the internal bargaining of 
the EU’s foreign policy and to specifically address the micro-level dynamics of these 
bilateral exchanges between individual EU and Chinese officials. The emphasis on EU-level 
dialogues was also informed by additional practical considerations, with the officials 
involved with EU-level dialogues – based in both Brussels and Beijing – being readily 
accessible to researchers. 
However, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of this thesis’s exclusive focus on 
EU-China dialogues. There are potentially insightful dimensions of the topic not directly 
encompassed by the project. Firstly, EU member states each have bilateral relationships 
with China that impact the EU-level and which could be focused upon in a future research 
project. This was hinted at in Chapter 7.2.1, where it emerged that EU-level unity on 
human rights amongst the member states appeared to be fragile in the face of bilateral 
economic relationships with China.  
Relatedly, future research could address the role of the Council of the European Union or 
the European Parliament in designing EU values into EU-China dialogues and promoting 
mainstreaming practices. It could emerge for example, that the common positions by 
these institutions informing dialogues emphasise EU material interests, acting as a further 
factor influencing a lack of systematic value mainstreaming in EU-China dialogues. 
However, it is important to emphasise that both research avenues described above, while 
worthwhile and capable of improving the inferential power of the findings, were beyond 
the scope of this thesis, in terms of time and resources.  
Beyond this, it is important to acknowledge that this thesis’s focus on EU-China dialogues 
also comes at the expense of greater exploration into the role of EU values in EU-China 
cooperation programmes and projects, which reflect an outcome of many dialogues. It is 
possible that officials carrying out these activities, such as those surrounding 
environmental governance and water management are more systematically incorporating 
values into their activities than their colleagues operationalising the dialogues (CEWP, 
2018; EU Commission, 2018x). This is a particularly interesting dimension, as project staff 




and thus may have different outlooks/approaches as a result.374 That being said, such 
backgrounds and technical expertise may make them less likely to promote EU values in 
practice. 
Again, however, despite the implications for strengthening this thesis’s findings, it was 
not feasible to incorporate this dimension into the project. As EU-China cooperation 
programmes and projects take place across China’s diverse provinces, even focusing on a 
limited number of them in specific policy sectors, would require much more extensive 
time in the country.   
Another significant aspect worth highlighting, is that this thesis’s in-depth focus on how 
the EU practically promotes values in EU-China dialogues comes at the expense of greater 
insights into the role of the Chinese side. This thesis has sought to counter this inherent 
limitation through conducting interviews with Chinese officials, incorporating Chinese 
policy documents/speeches and taking great efforts throughout this thesis to be reflexive 
about China’s role and the EU’s conduct.  
While greater emphasis on the Chinese side and its interaction with the EU’s values in 
dialogues would be fascinating and would have enhanced this thesis’s findings, its 
realisation was impeded by some key barriers. Many of these informed this project’s 
research approach. Firstly, China’s opaque institutional systems mean that officials are 
incredibly difficult to access without the aid of personal networks and even then, there 
would be limits not faced by researchers engaging with the EU. For this very reason, the 
author was only able to conduct three interviews with officials from the Chinese side, all 
of which were secured through personal connections established on the ground. 
Relatedly, China’s opaque authoritarian governance means that interviews are 
substantially different from those with EU officials. Chinese officials are not used to being 
transparent and open about government policies and strategies, particularly with a 
foreigner, while critical thinking in a one-party system is anathema. Similarly, fluency in 
Mandarin language, which the author lacks, would be required to conduct any quantity of 
meaningful interviews with Chinese officials. These aspects again informed this project 
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focusing principally on the EU side and de-emphasising the data focus on the Chinese 
side.  
Moreover, it is important to be lucid about the research environment in China and the 
associated risks for Western researchers, particularly for the sort of topic tackled in this 
thesis which encompasses issues considered highly sensitive in China. These risks have 
been increasing in recent years with China’s pursuit of a more authoritarian and 
nationalistic governance which has informed greater suspicion of Westerners. Any 
misunderstandings could have serious consequences for a researcher. This aspect 
reflected a practical concern for this thesis’s data collection, but it would be much more 
pressing if the project was focusing exclusively on China and more prolonged fieldwork 
was pursued in the country.  
 
10.4 Implications of findings 
 
Finally, it is important to contextualise this thesis’s broad finding that the EU’s normative 
power remains weak in EU-China dialogues. The gap between the EU and China on the 
most controversial values in the relationship appears to be expanding. This is most 
explicitly reflected in China’s currently trialled - and soon to be rolled out nationwide - 
social credit system, institutionalisation of re-education camps in Xinjiang and intensifying 
crackdown on dissent (ABC, 2018; The Guardian, 2018). As one EEAS diplomat noted, 
“what we’re seeing is 21st century communism on steroids”.375 This intensifying value-
gap has significant implications for the perpetuation of the universal values underpinning 
the EU’s normative power and the Western world order.  
The scale of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which would see China becoming the key 
bilateral partner for 60+ countries, risks a re-writing of global norms. This includes a 
possible mainstreaming of authoritarian governance and more broadly, the Chinese 
interpretation of the UN’s universal values. China’s transition from denial to 
acknowledgement and defence of the Xinjiang camps, highlights a growing international 
confidence in its stance on values like human rights (The Guardian, 2018). This global 
push by China comes at a time when the West is divided, with the US’s Trump 
                                                          





Administration having largely adopted an isolationist stance which emphasises US self-
interest and restraint in asserting Western values abroad (Amnesty, 2018; The Atlantic, 
2017). The Administration’s withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and 
refusal to engage with or grant access to UN human rights monitors in relation to 
potential violations within the US, is particularly symbolic of this dramatic change in tact 
by the key architect and historical custodian of the UN human rights regime (The 
Guardian, 2019).  
As a result, the stakes could not be higher for the EU to stand up for its values and aspire 
to the normative power identity promoted by the Lisbon Treaty and conceptualised by 
NPE. However, this thesis’s findings do not bode well for the EU filling this void at this 
potentially critical juncture. The EU’s values are not being systematically promoted with 
China at the EU-level not only due to a failure in institutional mechanisms, but 
predominantly due to a fear of upsetting the Chinese side and triggering political or 
economic consequences. As highlighted throughout this thesis, an aversion to asserting 
EU values with China on this basis, not only reflects a breach of the EU’s own 
constitutional obligations but could be perceived as a de-facto legitimisation of the official 
Chinese interpretation of them. More dramatically, it represents a self-inflicted erosion of 
the EU’s values and their pertinence, wilfully conducted by complacent EU officials.  
While the introduction of new institutional mechanisms could improve value 
mainstreaming in EU-China dialogues, the pervasive fear of antagonising China is deep-
rooted and will likely continue to impede discussion of controversial values without more 
holistic change in EU-China relations. Much of this change needs to stem from the power-
centre of the EU side: the member states. Unity on values with China amongst the EU 27, 
which informs the substance of EU policy and the mandate of dialogues is arguably 
unprecedented in its present weakness.  
As highlighted in this thesis, EU officials suggest a constant battle to attain common 
positions on human rights, particularly with member states reliant on Chinese 
investments. Greece unilaterally blocking the EU’s UNHRC statement criticising China’s 
human rights record in 2017 and more recently, Italy’s unilateral endorsement of the Belt 
and Road Initiative (the first G7 country and largest EU member state to do so) and its 
abstention in a European Council vote creating an EU-level mechanism strengthening the 




in the future amongst the EU 27 (Brookings, 2019; Reuters, 2017; The Economist, 2019). 
However, the Juncker Commission’s proposal for specific EU-level foreign policy issues to 
be decided on the basis of majority voting, including human rights, may reflect a source of 
hope, which could catalyse a strengthening of the EU’s normative power with China (EU 
Commission 2018xi). Similarly, the US-China trade war offers an opportunity for the EU to 
reassert itself as an equal partner along with its values (Bruegel, 2018; EU Council, 2018).  
Nevertheless, as things stand, the weakness of the EU’s normative power and the 
divisions which underpin it, risk the EU sleepwalking into a new world order where 
China’s normative power supplants its own. As one scholar from the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences (CASS) noted, in the context of denying Chinese attempts to divide the EU:  
We don’t have the capacity to divide the EU. The EU is divided already.376  
 
While the interviewee describes the division between EU member states, this thesis has 
displayed that this division extends to value mainstreaming in EU-China dialogues. There 
is division over who has responsibility for promoting values with China. There is division 
over how this should be pursued and the standards which should be followed. Most 
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Appendix i – Interview list: Dates/locations 
 
1) Bath, March 2018 













Interview with a diplomat from the 
EEAS on 23.03.2018 at 2.15pm, in 
Bath. 
 









DG Climate Action 
(CLIMA)  
 





08.03.2017 at 11.00am, in Brussels. 
4. European 
Commission 
DG Energy (ENER)  15.02.2017 at 10.00pm, in Brussels. 
5. European 
Commission 
DG Justice and 
Consumers (JUST)  
 
09.02.2017 at 10.30am, in Brussels 
6. European 
Commission 
DG Justice and 
Consumers (JUST) 
 
01.03.2017 at 10.00am, in Brussels. 
7. European 
Commission 
DG Trade (TRADE)  15.02.2017 at 4.00pm, in Brussels. 
8. European 
Commission 
DG Trade (TRADE) 10.03.2017 at 3.00pm, in Brussels 
9. European 
Commission 




02.03.2017 at 3.00pm, in Brussels. 
10. European 
Commission 











DG Research and 
Innovation (RTD)  
 
08.03.2017 at 5.30pm, in Brussels. 
12. European 
Commission 
DG Education and 
Culture (EAC)  
 
10.02.2017 at 10.00am, in Brussels. 
13. European 
Commission 
DG Education and 
Culture (EAC)  
 





ASIAPAC: Asia and 
Pacific Directorate  
 




ASIAPAC: Asia and 
Pacific Directorate 
 














GLOBAL Directorate 09.03.2017 at 10.00am, in Brussels. 
18. Council of the 
European Union 
 
DG Foreign Affairs  03.03.2017 at 11.00am, in Brussels. 




Foreign Affairs and 
Trade 
13.03.2017 at 11.00am, in Brussels. 
 
 










20. Client Earth N/A  17.05.2017 at 9.00am, in Beijing. 
21. World Resources 
Institute 
 




Trade Section, EU 
Delegation to China 
 
09.06.2017 at 3.00pm, in Beijing. 
23. European 
Commission 










N/A 07.06.2017 at 8.00am, in Beijing. 
25. European 
Commission 
Economic and Finance 
Section, EU 
Delegation to China 
 





EU Delegation to 
China 
 




Media Section, EU 
Delegation to China,  
[BEI] 
 
18.05.2017 at 4.00pm, in Beijing. 
28. European 
Commission 
Political, Press and 
Information Section, 
EU delegation to 
China [BEI] 
22.05.2017 at 12.30pm, in Beijing. 
29. European 
Commission 
Local Staffer, EU 
Delegation to China 
[BEI] 




Political, Press and 
Information Section, 








Political, Press and 
Information Section, 








Political, Press and 
Information Section, 
EU delegation to 
China [BEI] 
 
08.06.2017 4.00pm, in Beijing. 
33. State Council 
[PRC] 
Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences 
 
02.06.2017 10.00am, in Beijing. 
34. State Council 
[PRC] 
Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences 









N/A 17.05.2017 at 3.30pm, in Beijing. 
 





14.06.2017 at 10.00am, in Beijing. 
 
 
4) Brussels (block 2) September 30th - October 16th, 2017 







Social Affairs and 
Inclusion (EMPL) 
 




Social Affairs and 
Inclusion (EMPL) 
 






11.10.2017 at 2.30pm, in Brussels. 
40. European 
Commission 
DG Justice and 
Consumers (JUST) 
 















ASIAPAC: Asia and 
Pacific Directorate 
 













5) Project Pilot Study, Brussels (April/June), 2015 
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Pacific Directorate 
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DG Education and 
Culture (EAC) 





DG Education and 
Culture (EAC) 







Phone interview, 23.06.2015 at 














Appendix ii - EU-China dialogues 
 
This information is adapted from the European Strategic Partnerships Observatory project by the 
think tank FRIDE, which is no longer active (See: ESPO, 2013). The project mapped out EU-China 
dialogues in 2013, including details of their level, information unavailable elsewhere. Before the 
website was removed, the author copied the data in preparation of for fieldwork in Beijing, which 
is displayed below. While some of the information is out of date (e.g. dialogues have been added 
and some DGs have changed in nomenclature), it still provides an incredibly valuable resource 





MINISTERIAL DIALOGUES 8 
SECTORAL DIALOGUES 51 






1. Summit and Ministerial Dialogues 
Type 
 
Name (Frequency) Interlocutors More info 
Summit EU-China Summit 
(Annual) 
EU: Presidents of the 
European Council and 
European 
Commission 
China: Prime Minister 
 
The first Summit 
took place in 1998. 















members of the State 
Council 
 





China: Chinese State 
Councillor responsible 
for foreign affairs 
 
 
High Level Economic 














members from the 
European 
Commission 
China: Vice-Premier in 
charge of Economic, 





The HED is an on-




and it provides a 
forum for resolving  
 








China: Minister of 
Commerce 
 
Established in 1985. It 
covers various issues 
related to trade and 
economy, at the 

















Established in 1992, 
but upgraded to 
ministerial level in 
2003 (4th ministerial 
meeting in 2012). 
 
High Level Dialogue 
on an Integrated 


















































2. Sectoral dialogues and other platforms 
Type 
 








China: Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
 
The EEAS is 
represented at the 
level of Deputy 
Secretary General. 
 
Political Dialogue I 









Political Dialogue II 








Dialogue on Security 




China: Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
 
This dialogue has 









China: Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
 
The dialogue was on 
hold, but it is to be 
reactivated in 2013 



























Political Dialogue on 
Non-Proliferation and 
Disarmament 
(Twice a year) 
EU: EEAS 





EU-China Task Force 
on Cyber Issues 
(n/a) 
EU: EEAS 
China: Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
 





Meetings of EUSRs 
and Special Envoys 
(Ad hoc) 
EU: EEAS 















China: Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
 
Established in 1995. 
Since 2010, both 
sides met only once 
a year, despite the 
EU’s desire to 
maintain a biannual 
dialogue  
 
High Level Dialogue 




EU: DG HOME 
(European 
Commission) 
China:  Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs; 
Ministry of Public 
Security 
 
The dialogue was on 
hold, but it is to be 
reactivated in 2013. 
 






EU: DG TRADE 
(European 
Commission) 
China: Ministry of 
Commerce 
 
Senior officials meet 
to prepare ahead of 
ministerial meetings. 
 
Trade and Investment 
Policy Dialogue (TIPD) 
(Annual) 
 
EU: DG TRADE 
(European 
Commission) 
China: Ministry of 
Commerce 
 
The dialogue meets 
at DG’s level. 
 





EU: DG TRADE 
(European 
Commission) 
China: Ministry of 
Commerce 
 
The dialogue meets 





EU: DG TRADE 
(European 
Commission) 
China: Ministry of 
Commerce 
 
Established in 2003. 
It reports to the 
Economic and Trade 
Working Group 
(ETWG). It includes 







EU: DG TRADE 
(European 
Commission) 








Status Working Group 
(n/a) 
 
EU: DG TRADE 
(European 
Commission) 








EU: DG TRADE 
(European 
Commission) 









EU: DG TRADE 
China: Ministry of 
Commerce 
 
There has been no 












China: Ministry of 
Finance; People’s 

































(Annual (at least)) 
 
EU: DG COMP 
(European 
Commission) 




objective is to 
establish a 
permanent forum for 
consultation and 
transparency 


















Established in 2006. 
Meetings take place 






EU: DG EMPL 
(European 
Commission) 
China: Ministry of 
Labour and Social 
Security 
 















Established in 2003 
with NDRC and in 
2009 with MIIT. It 
intends to contribute 
to the improvement 
















provisions, aims to 
improve mutual 
understanding of 
both parties’ product 
safety rules.  
 
Dialogue on Food 
Safety/SPS 
(Annual) 

















Established in 2006. 



















Established in 2006. 
One tangible 
measure under the 
MoU is that RAPEX 
(the Rapid Alert 
System for non-food 






















EU: DG TAXUD 
(European 
Commission) 
China: Ministry of 
Customs 
Established in 2004. 
The annual meeting 
is opened by the 
European 
Commissioner and 
the Chinese Minister. 
European and 





EU: DG MOVE 
China: Bureau of 
Water Transport; 
Ministry of Transport 
(MOT) 
 
Established in 2002. 
Dialogue in view of 
possible future civil 
aviation agreement 
(n/a) 








Dialogue on Energy 
(n/a) 





Established in 2006. 
Six priority areas 
have been identified 
for cooperation 











(Every 2 years) 
EU: DG ENER 
(European 
Commission) 




Established in 1994. 
Urbanisation Forum 
(Annual) 
EU: DG ENER 
(European 
Commission) 












Dialogue on Energy 
Performance in the 
Construction Sector 
(n/a) 
EU: DG ENER 
(European 
Commission) 






Dialogue on Forest 
Law Enforcement and 
Governance 
(n/a) 
EU: DG ENV 
(European 
Commission) 






(Annual (at least)) 








Established in 2005. 
It is implemented 




as well as through 
direct cooperation 
between each side at 





EU: DG AGRI 
(European 
Commission) 
China: Ministry of 
Agriculture 
 






EU: DG RTD 
(European 
Commission) 






















China: Ministry of 
Science and 
Technology (MOST); 





Established in 2011. 






Dialogue on Space 
Technology 
(n/a) 



















EU: DG CONNECT 
(European 
Commission) 




Established in 1997. 
The dialogue is being 










EU: DG CONNECT 
(European 
Commission) 





Established in 2009. 
 






EU: DG EAC 
(European 
Commission) 
China: Ministry of 
Education 
Established in 2007. 









EU: DG EAC 
(European 
Commission) 










Policy Dialogue on 
Youth Affairs 
(Annual (flexible)) 






Established in 2011. 
 









China: Ministry of 
Culture; Chinese 
Academy of Social 
Sciences (CASS) 
 
Established in 2009. 
The EU-China High 
Level Cultural Forum 












Established in 2004 
by the EU-China 
Tourism Agreement. 
The EU delegation 
negotiates on behalf 
of the EU. 
 
Other platforms Inter-Parliamentary 
Meetings 






Established in 1980. 
 
High Level Political 









the National People's 
Congress and from 
the Communist Party 
 
Established in 2010. 
 
Roundtable Meetings 
(Twice a year) 
 
EU: European 
Economic and Social 
Committee (EESC) 
China: China 
Economic and Social 
Council (CESC) 
 
Established in 2006. 
Two main types of 
topic have appeared 
on the agenda of this 





 Appendix iii – Extended examples of the organisational discourses 
 








Quoted example Analysis 
Political, Press and 
Information Section, 
EU delegation to 
China [BEI] 
1. “The promotion of our values, apart from what the Lisbon 
Treaty says, of course, it’s also part of our global strategy, 
our EU-China strategy, whatever you take, it is there. But at 
least … [from] what I have seen in here [at the EU delegation 
to China], and I am not now talking for [name of human 
rights desk] and you know, and [his/her] human rights 
background or for our core [the political section] specifically, 
you know there to discuss those issues you know, 
straightforward. It’s mostly in the background. I mean on my 
side.   
 
I will give you a very good example …from Home Affairs 
…This thing …between Europol and MPS [Ministry of Public 
Security] …which was signed here last month.  I mean, it is 
clear to everyone that it [values] does transpire in the 
discussions, that for example, we cannot do certain things 
with China, because well either we think that they may 
apply the death penalty or we think that their data 
• Interviewee explicitly suggests that they are not conducting 
systematic value mainstreaming in their dialogues. 
• Displaying discourse 1, they justify this on the basis that such 
activities are unnecessary, as EU values implicitly feature in their 
exchanges with China. They cast as being pre-built into the EU 
documents that guide them (i.e. “apart from what the Lisbon Treaty 
says, of course, it’s also part of our global strategy …whatever you 
take, it is there …It’s mostly in the background. I mean on my side”). 
 
• The interviewee reaffirms this justification for not systematically 
mainstreaming EU values, through the example of the Europol-MPS 
international law enforcement cooperation dialogues.  
• They suggest that EU values are sufficiently featuring in these 
dialogues and no formal actions are required, as them and their 
colleagues will naturally promote/enforce EU’s values (i.e. “it is 




protection is not up to our standards.  So I mean, it is not 
something you know, that is you know is point black and 
white on the Agenda of the meeting, so now we will tell you 
that your standards are not up to our standards but the 
moment you start talking in practice about certain, about 
certain, instruments, or cooperation or whatever I see those 
limits are …the red lines are rather [than being] correctly 
stated somewhere, they are more in the background than 
that, but they are [there]”.377  
  
the red-lines are rather [than being] correctly stated somewhere, 
they are more in the background”). 
• It could also be argued that the quote displays partial 
mainstreaming (See Chapter 9.2), as they infer that human rights 
related-issues are being raised in the Europol-MPS dialogues (e.g. 
the death penalty), though the officials involved are not explicitly 
designing the value into the dialogue.  
 
• The interviewee’s language also alludes to the prevalence of a lack 
of value mainstreaming at the delegation more broadly (i.e. “[from] 
what I have seen in here …it’s mostly in the background”). 
• Notably, their language ascribes this deficit to not only discourse 1, 
but discourse 2, as they suggest that value mainstreaming is only 
relevant to the work of the EEAS (who are “there to discuss those 





delegation to China 
[BEI] 
2. Interviewer: Are you thinking about these things [values], 
how you can integrate [for example] the rule of law 
element? Are these conversations taking place? 
 
Interviewee: They [the values] are there already, based on 





• Displays discourse 1 in the suggestion that value mainstreaming 
activities (systematic or otherwise) are not necessary, since EU 
values are already passively promoted through their dialogues. 
 
 
                                                          
377 Interview with an official from the European Commission on 22.05.2017 at 12.30pm, in Beijing. 




DG Education and 
Culture (EAC) [BRU] 
3. “It’s by actually facilitating the meeting and the joint 
working and creation of Europeans and Chinese people 
…[that] we can best in way advocate our values and defend 
them. Because obviously, I mean, any cultural cooperation 
needs …freedom of expression …So we really in a way, best 
communicate our values and show them how they enfold in 
the joint work and hopefully it will have a positive spill-
over”. 379  
• Interviewee suggests that the implicit demonstration of EU values 
through “joint work” (i.e. via cooperation projects) reflects the 
“best” means to promote EU values.  
• Importantly, they suggest that through “facilitating” these non-
official contacts, where EU values will be implicitly shared, they are 
sufficiently realising EU values in cultural dialogues and no further 
action is required. 
• This reflects an invocation of discourse 1 as justification for not 







                                                          

















1. The official described how EU values were 
“much more discussed” in the dialogues 
managed by their colleagues in the EEAS 
and DG Justice and Consumers (JUST), 
before adding that “obviously we are not 
doing that”.380   
• Displaying discourse 2, the interviewee overtly suggests that EU values are the isolated 
responsibility of their colleagues in the EEAS and DG JUST and not relevant to their 
dialogue. 
• The strength of the discourse is reflected in the suggestion that such a division of labour is 
natural and implicit (“obviously we are not doing that”).  
• Interestingly, the EU-China Legal Affairs Dialogue is cast as an inherently normative 
dialogue, wherein value mainstreaming is outsourced in EU-China relations, despite DG 
JUST accounts also displaying the discourse and themselves outsourcing value 








                                                          







2. I think the dialogue on human rights is fully 
justified and it has its own impact, as 
limited as it is… but it’s important I think to 
have a standalone dialogue on human 
rights. Of course we could consider that 
culture, cultural cooperation and people-
to-people contacts are a way to share our 
values but we should be very careful there, 
because if we use culture for human rights 
purposes I think it can be counter-
productive, I mean it will actually in a way 
weaken our cultural cooperation and 
weaken our effect on human rights”.381 
• Infers that human rights promotion should be restricted to an isolated (i.e. “standalone”) 
channel where responsibility is delegated for promoting the value. 
• Invoking discourse 2, they suggest that they are not mainstreaming human rights into 
cultural dialogues with China on the basis that it is inapplicable,  
• The strength of discourse 2 is displayed in them casting the compartmentalisation of 
human rights to the dedicated dialogue as “important”.  
 
• They also justify their avoidance of human rights mainstreaming on the basis that it will 
undermine cultural dialogues. This displays discourse 3 (“I think it can be counter-
productive …in a way weaken our cultural cooperation”). 
• The example also captures how the human rights dialogue is invoked as a cautionary tale 
for human rights promotion with China, deterring such activities as conflictual and low 




Local staff, EU 
Delegation to 
China [BEI]  
 
3. The interviewee described how human 
rights and rule of law were “more political 
and dealt with by the political section”.382 
• Suggests that controversial EU values in the bilateral relationship are exclusively “dealt 
with” by the EEAS (which populates “the political section” at the delegation) and by-proxy, 
not the responsibility of officials operationalising EU-China People-to-People dialogues. 
• The language can also be seen to reflect discourse 3, as value mainstreaming is cast as an 
activity likely to antagonise the Chinese side and threaten the outcomes of dialogues (i.e. 




                                                          
381 Interview with an official from DG EAC on 17.06.2015 at 5.00pm, in Brussels. 
 






of the European 
Union] 
4. “You find, at least with the people, that 
come to the Council, a certain reluctance 
to engage with the Chinese, uhm, raising 
issues, there are not necessarily part of 
their portfolio and they consider this to be 
something for the EEAS”.383 
 
• Example displays a Council official reaffirming the prevalence of discourse 2 amongst their 
Commission colleagues. 
• Their language implies that Commission officials are communicating to the Council formations 
relevant to EU-China relations - e.g. the Asia-Oceania Working Party (COASI) - that EU values 
mainstreaming is not relevant to their dialogues with China (“not necessarily part of their 
portfolio). 














                                                          











Quoted example Analysis 
ASIAPAC: Asia and 
Pacific Directorate 
[BRU] 
1. “We’ve got a competition dialogue being 
set up …it’s about again, level playing field 
in… market economy principles, so…  
again, we’re not going to have a specific 
human rights article in there but there’s 
other values, that are included in there, 
are embedded somehow”.384 
 
• Displays both organisational discourses. 
• Interviewee invokes discourse 2 through suggesting that human rights will not be 
systematically mainstreamed into the agenda of the new EU-China competition dialogue 
on the basis that it is not applicable to it (“we’re not going to have a specific human 
rights article in there”). 
• Interviewee displays discourse 1 in suggesting that “other (undefined) values” will be 
implicit to the dialogue (“embedded somehow”), so no further actions are necessary to 
realise them. 
• Example supports the argument that EEAS diplomats are sharing these discourses and 











                                                          




Political, Press and 
Information 
Section, EU 
delegation to China 
[BEI] 
2. “I think if you are in trade, you are in trade, 
you are not necessarily thinking about 
human rights, that’s the political section. 
[Spoken from the perspective of trade 
officials:] I don’t deal with that, that’s for 
them to do”. 
 
3. Building on the quote above, when asked 
about whether the value mainstreaming 
prescribed by the Lisbon Treaty’s article 21 
translated to practice in EU-China trade 
dialogues, the interviewee stated:  
 
“I’d say not, because think about the 
human [rights] factor, if you are a busy 
trade official in the EU delegation, you 
have got to understand very fully the EU 
side and what’s all its positions and what 
they mean, its aims and aspirations etc, 
you have to understand the Chinese side 
which is very archaic at times …do you 
really feel confident enough that you know 
enough about the EU’s position on human 






• Interviewee invokes discourse 2 in suggesting that human rights has little relevance for 
officials involved with EU-China trade dialogues, instead being the exclusive 
responsibility of the EEAS, via the delegation’s political section (“I think if you are in 
trade, you are in trade …human rights, that’s the political section”). 
• They allude to the prevalence of discourse 2 amongst their Commission colleagues, 
through paraphrasing them invoking it (“I don’t deal with that, that’s for them to do”). 
• Suggests that human rights mainstreaming is rarely taking place in EU-China trade 
dialogues. 
 
• The second adjacent quote displays the interviewee suggesting that DG Trade officials a) 
do not have the knowledge/expertise and b) are too “busy” to promote human rights. 
• In this sense, they are again invoking discourse 2 to legitimise their DG Trade colleagues 
not mainstreaming human rights. 
 
• Both quotes support the argument that EEAS diplomats are sharing discourse 2 and 












                                                          







and SMEs (DG 
GROW) [BRU] 
4. “I think they try to understand what is 
important to each of us and try to develop, 
you know, our priorities ...and then for 
things like human rights etc, it’s not 
something they are going to consult too 
much on with us they are going to just 
develop it on their own because they, they 
are the most suitable”.386  
 
• Infers that EEAS diplomats are not promoting value mainstreaming amongst their 
Commission colleagues, instead letting the DGs determine their own sector-specific 
“priorities”. 
• Suggests that the EEAS is communicating to the DGs that human rights is not applicable 
to their dialogues nor their responsibility (“it’s not something they are going to consult 
too much on …because they, they are the most suitable”).  
• Example thus again alludes to the EEAS enabling or actively reproducing these 












                                                          





  Appendix iv – Extended examples of the discourses surrounding China’s role  
 















Quoted example Analysis 
EEAS  Political, Press and 
Information 
Section, EU 
delegation to China 
[BEI] 
1. The interviewee described how 
they were seeking a “meeting 
point” between the EU and China 
in the context of judicial 
cooperation and that China “will 









• Suggests that the interviewee is avoiding mainstreaming values through the EU-
China Legal Affairs Dialogue due a perception that such activities are pointless, 
with China expected to refuse to engage with them. 
• This reflects an invocation of discourse 3. 
 
• Interviewee also Infers that these concerns over triggering obstructive behaviour 
by China are informing them restricting the agenda of the LAD to more technical 
issues, which reflect a “meeting point” between the EU and China. 
• Example highlights how discourse 3 supports Chinese as opposed to EU interests 
in ensuring that controversial values are not being tabled in dialogues.   
• Example displays how EEAS diplomats are sharing and potentially enabling or 
actively reproducing the discourse among their Commission colleagues. 
 
 
                                                          







Social Affairs and 
Inclusion (EMPL) 
[BRU] 
2. The official described their 
dialogues as having a “positive 
agenda with China”, particularly 
with regard to labour market 
reform, which the Chinese 
leadership has put “high on its 
agenda”.  
 
Conversely, they noted that “there 
is this idealistic” (value) dimension 
which contrasts with the 
“realistic” substance they 
outlined, which reflects the “the 
negative agenda” with China. They 
added that “If I was to 
mainstream human rights, it 




• Invoking discourse 3, the interviewee suggests that they are not mainstreaming 
controversial EU values into their dialogues out of fear that it will create tensions 
with their counterparts. 
• This is explicitly reflected in their characterisation of value-related substance as 
the “negative agenda”, versus the more productive and successful pursuit of 
comparably non-controversial, sector-specific substance like “labour market 
reform”. They cast this as the “positive agenda with China”.  
• Reaffirming this analysis, they explicitly describe how “If I was to mainstream 
human rights, it would spoil the positive agenda”. 
 
• Example also reinforces how discourse 3 is supporting China’s interest in avoiding 
discussion of values in EU-China dialogues. 
▪ They suggest that the bilaterally agreed dialogue theme of “labour market 
reforms”, a relatively technical area, is a Chinese priority (“high on its 
agenda”).  
▪ This infers that the EU is happy to acquiesce to the Chinese side’s choice of 
theme, which steers clear of the more controversial human rights dimensions 
of the sector.  
 
• While labour market reforms have connections to human rights, the interviewee 
explicitly makes the distinction between human rights and this theme.  
• This not only reaffirms that systematic human rights mainstreaming is not taking 
place but alludes to potential partial mainstreaming (See chapter 9.2) in these 
dialogues: human rights dimensions may be being raised through this theme 
without officials instrumentally designing it into the agenda nor necessarily being 




                                                          


















1. You cannot go to China and try 
China… to try to make China 
adopt or act on something they 
have not signed up to, that’s an 
illusion right. So we’re not… that’s 
not our agenda.389  
• In line with discourse 3, the language here strongly emphasises how obstructive China is in the EU-
China human rights dialogue.  
• Interviewee suggests that promoting any aspects of human rights which do not correspond with 
international documents that China has signed up to is a wasted pursuit and those that think 
otherwise are not engaging with reality (i.e. “an illusion”). 
 
• Quote can also be seen to hint at didactic approaches by EEAS diplomats to promote human rights, 
based on a perception that China should be complying with the EU interpretation.  
• This is reflected in the notion of the EU trying to “make China adopt or act” on the EU 
interpretation of international documents 







                                                          








2. “In 2013, the Chinese started 
asking questions about the human 
rights situation within the 
European Union …they were 
focusing mostly also on cases 
involving Chinese nationals, so it 
would be, I don’t  know if you 
remember, there was a case of 
Chinese students who were 
attacked in the South of France, 
so they raised that …as an 
illustration of xenophobia …There 
was [also] a case of an old Chinese 
couple who couldn’t obtain, gain a 
German citizenship because their 
command of the German 





• Displays how China seeks to obstruct EU human rights promotion by highlighting human rights 
infringements within the EU, seeking to illuminate the EU’s hypocrisies. 
• The obstructive nature of this conduct and lack of genuine concern for human rights infringements 
(according to the Western interpretation of the values) is also reflected in the suggestion that China 
is failing to distinguish between actions by citizens and those by the state.  
 
• The interviewee’s language confirms that the EU views this behaviour by the Chinese side as purely 
obstructive as opposed to benevolent attempt for the Chinese side express their human rights 
concerns in the EU and uphold international standards. 
• Such behaviour by the Chinese side is cast as a primary impediment to EU human rights promotion 








3. “It’s supposed to be bi-annual, but 
for the past four years, basically 
we haven’t been able to have two 
rounds, because de-facto the 
Chinese have decided that one a 
year is enough”.391 
 
• Displays how China reduced the quantity of EU-China human rights dialogues on a unilateral basis, to 
reduce its efficacy (“de-facto the Chinese have decided that one a year is enough”). 
• This reflects an invocation of discourse 3 in its attribution of blame to the Chinese side for impeding 




                                                          









4. “There used to be a human rights 
seminar, that lasted for about 
three years, but that was not even 
very satisfactory, the idea was to 
bring civil society and academics 
together, but it was clear that… I 
mean, I have only attended one 
and that was in 2012. In 2013 we 
just could not get it organized, so 
basically the money was lost as 
well… but it was very tense, it was 
extremely tense.”392 
• Interviewee describes how China instrumentally ensured that accompanying human rights seminars 
unproductive and this underpinned them being ceased altogether. 
• Their language provides greater insight into these dynamics with: 
▪ The suggestion of open conflict during seminars (“it was very tense, it was extremely tense”) 
▪ The seminar system ending after China simply refused to take part (“In 2013 we just could not 
get it organized, so basically the money was lost”). 
 
• The language also alludes to broader poor state of the human rights dialogue itself, which is 
attributed to China’s conduct (“there used to be a human rights seminar, that lasted for about three 
years, but that was not even very satisfactory [emphasis added]”.  







5. “Although the dialogue is still 
taking place, its less frequent it’s 
very difficult to get dates and 
agree on the agenda, well in 
advance of the dialogue because 
we keep saying this a way for us 
to ensure good preparation, the 
presence of experts but normally 
you are told like maybe six weeks 
before those are the dates and 
then we agree on the agenda.”393 
 
• Suggests that the EU is having profound difficulties in organising dialogues due to the conduct of the 
Chinese side. 
• This includes the refusal of their counterparts to provide dates and approve the agenda (“it’s very 
difficult to get dates and agree on the agenda, well in advance of the dialogue”) 
 
• Similarly, the interviewee suggests that the EU side has been repeatedly contacting their 
counterparts to prepare the dialogue, but this has been unsuccessful with the Chinese side 
intentionally providing dates and agreeing on the agenda at very short notice to undermine the 
exchange (“we keep saying this a way for us to ensure good preparation, the presence of experts but 
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6. It’s not a secret at all …with 
Greece, but in terms of the 
others, it can be Hungary, it can 
[be]… there is now a bad 
tendency to come back to 
national interest, in the bilateral 
investment from China to the 
country, an element that is 
[having] increasingly [more] 
weight [than] the human rights 
considerations.394 
 
• Displays how EU unity on human rights is being threatened by Chinese investment to individual 
member states. 
• Suggestion that this pursuit of national interest at the expense of EU unity reflects a common or 
even regular occurrence (“there is now a bad tendency to come back to national interest … 
bilateral investment from China is [having] increasingly [more] weight [than] the human right 
considerations”). 
                                                          




Appendix v – Partial mainstreaming in EU-China employment and 
social affairs dialogues: Participant observation 
 
It is worth briefly summarising some of the partial mainstreaming dynamics that the 
author observed in practice, during their presence at an EU-China dialogue connected to 
social policy in 2017. The dialogue included themes such as adaption to macro-economic 
developments, the so-called new economy (e.g. platforms like Uber and Deliveroo) and 
the promotion of entrepreneurship. On numerous occasions the EU side indirectly raised 
issues connected to human rights.  
An interview with one of the Commission diplomats responsible for planning and 
designing the dialogue, revealed that human rights was not explicitly, nor systematically 
mainstreamed into the dialogue.395 In this sense, on numerous occasions references were 
made by the speakers on the EU side to the importance of policy making which promoted 
the inclusion of underrepresented minorities, particularly women, migrants and lower 
income families.396 These references were typically connected to explanations of the EU’s 
policies in this sector, which are based upon EU values.397 As a result, officials were partial 
mainstreaming these dimensions, having not explicitly designed them into the exchange.  
Perhaps the most interesting example saw the European Pillar of Social Rights being 
briefly explained, but it appeared to only have been raised because it reflected part of a 
guiding sectoral policy document connected to the themes and not because the speaker 







                                                          
395 Interview with an official from DG EMPL on 03.10.2017 at 10.00am, in Brussels. 
396 European Commission officials speaking at an EU-China dialogue connected to social policy and 
employment on 09.10.2017, in Brussels. 
397 ibid. 
398 ibid. 
